DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

American Indians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans

Bernard E. Anderson
Carlos H. Arce
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Haywood Burns
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

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American Indians, Blacks,
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Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

American Indians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans

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SPRING 1981: AMERICAN INDIANS, BLACKS, CHICANOS, AND PUERTO RICANS

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

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Preface to the Issue, "American Indians, Blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans"

SIXTEEN YEARS AGO, in the fall of 1965, *Daedalus* published the first of two issues entitled "The Negro American." The title itself seems redolent of another era; the contents, surprisingly, do not appear similarly dated. Many of the articles could be published today and would seem wholly descriptive of conditions that now obtain. They speak of a society massively divided, fumbling toward somewhat greater political equality, but utterly baffled by complex economic and social issues that serve principally to perpetuate and magnify existing inequities. In 1965 the country, while preoccupied with many other issues—not least, the war in Vietnam—knew that questions of race could not be set aside for another time. Today there is less willingness to insist on this.

Lyndon B. Johnson, writing the Foreword to the first of the *Daedalus* issues, gave poignant expression to the prevailing sense of urgency. The president wrote: "Nothing is of greater significance to the welfare and vitality of this nation than the movement to secure equal rights for Negro Americans." He went on to say:

> No one who understands the complexity of this task is likely to promote simple means by which it may be accomplished. The papers that follow testify to the interlocking effects of deprivation—in education, in housing, in employment, in citizenship, in the entire range of human endeavor by which personality is formed.
>
> It will not be enough to provide better schools for Negro children, to inspire them to excel in their studies if there are no decent jobs waiting for them after graduation. It will not be enough to open up job opportunities if the Negro must remain trapped in a jungle of tenements and shanties. If we are to have peace at home, if we are to speak with one honest voice in the world—indeed, if our country is to live with its conscience—we must affect every dimension of the Negro's life for the better.
>
> We have begun to do that—sometimes haltingly and in great trepidation, sometimes boldly and with a high heart. The will of government and of the people has been committed to resolving the long, bitter trial of the Negro American in the only way that was ever really possible: by including him in our society.

When the Editor first became aware that the president of the United States might be willing to contribute a Foreword to the *Daedalus* volumes, some advised him against seeking such a contribution. The president's reputation in academic and other circles was already beginning its precipitous decline because of America's growing involvement in Vietnam. While no one doubted the depth of the president's commitment to civil rights, or the importance of the words he had uttered at Howard University the preceding June, his foreign policy actions had made him suspect. The decision to invite his participation reflected the

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belief that no other statement would carry equal weight, that no other would more perfectly express the national resolve with respect to social justice.

It seemed so natural at the time for the president of the United States to write as he did, that no one thought to comment on his words or to single them out for commendation. It is a measure of the distance we have traveled in sixteen years that it is almost unthinkable to imagine any prominent white American politician today making such a statement, giving such primacy to the issue of racial equality. How is one to explain this shift? Is it that the public (and private) policies of recent decades have indeed gone far to obliterate the injustices of an earlier age? No one who reads this issue—or who chooses to walk through great parts of the cities of this country—can possibly believe that. Is the majority so overwhelmed with its own economic difficulties that it is simply no longer interested in the plight of the poor? Or, are we to conclude that racial feeling, though sometimes masked, remains vital today, only barely concealing deep-seated prejudices and feelings? Is it even possible that an earlier fear, which once recommended that attention be given such issues, has receded before new fears that make all questions of racial justice and equality seem secondary? Does this explain why the klieg lights no longer focus on the teeming ghettos of America? Is the United States experiencing (and accepting) a condition at home that is not too different from the one that exists abroad? Not knowing how to effect change, and no longer believing that it has the economic power to impose its will, is the country simply learning to live with things as they are?

There may be some truth in all such explanations, but they perhaps skirt another central issue, one that Ralph Ellison insisted on in his several interventions at the *Daedalus* conference that led to the publication of the earlier volumes. Asked how the American Negro felt about Africa, Ellison replied: "Everybody seems to feel that he has to have a 'homeland.' In this country, no one is free not to have a homeland. . . . One has to have some place to feel proud of. Well, I am proud of Abbeville, South Carolina, and Oklahoma City. That is enough for me." At another point in the discussion, Ellison said: "Despite the Black Muslims, the stimulus is not to get away and not to find or construct an African life-style, but to become more a part of the American society." He went on to say: "The feeling that I have about my own group is that it represents certain human values which are unique not in a Negritude sort of way but in an American way. Because the group has survived, because it has maintained its sense of itself through all these years, it can be of benefit to the total society, the total culture."

Am I suggesting by these quotations that Ellison spoke for all the blacks in the room, or that he had a special purchase on certain profound truths about the relations between the races? My concern is to prove neither proposition. I quote from Ellison because the issues he raised in 1965 may have even greater import today, though they are all too rarely confronted. Ellison is saying, in effect, that how a people sees itself, how it defines its past and perceives its future, will fundamentally affect the ways in which it acts, and not only in the political arena. Ellison, when he spoke as he did, spoke as an American black. He took for granted that other blacks in the country would view matters differently. Implicit in his argument, certainly, was the idea that he was not simply expressing a personal preference; Ellison believed that the black reality in the

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United States more closely approximated what he was describing than what others were saying.

In the years since 1965 these issues of identity have become increasingly insistent, and not only in the black community. This issue of *Daedalus* is in some part a testimony to that phenomenon. Whatever other changes have occurred in the United States since Lyndon Johnson sat in the White House, the revision of the sense of the American past needs to be cited as a major intellectual development. C. Vann Woodward recently referred to this as a transition among historians from an insistence on American innocence to an acceptance of American guilt. My own preference is for a less striking formulation: many in this country have been rethinking the character of American society, insisting that the earlier histories were too Euro-centered, male-centered, elite-centered. By one device or another, American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans—among many others—have drawn attention to themselves, seeking to revise "traditional" histories, and offering also new strategies for political and social action. What the impact of such writing has been within these communities is difficult enough to establish; what influence it has had on the country is even more obscure.

Yet, it is obvious that these four peoples—the "victims" of conquest—men and women who did not choose America, who have long suffered exclusion and discrimination because of their origins, live overwhelmingly in conditions substantially different from those common to other groups in the United States. This is not to say that they all crave to be admitted to what passes for the American "mainstream," or that their individual and collective lives are dominated by any such ambition. To read this issue of *Daedalus* is to become aware that the historical experiences—not to speak of the historical memories—of American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans remain fundamentally different. Although it may be convenient for the mass media to ignore such differences, and although there may be compelling political (or bureaucratic) reasons for doing so, they exist. In the last decades these differences have been much emphasized by those who believe that whole communities have been ignored for too long. The concern has been to foster group consciousness, to instill a new kind of collective understanding and pride. Whether or not these sentiments were then communicated successfully to others outside has often seemed quite secondary. The "price" that has been paid for this strategy has never been calculated; nor are its profits easily reckoned. We know very little about how the consciousness of the American people has been altered by these new historical preoccupations.

John Hope Franklin sets the tone for this volume when he reminds us, in effect, that none of the four minorities emigrated from Europe, but that each has had a significant impact on American society. Franklin asks us to look at their individual contributions, to consider how each has helped shape the country. To pretend that these groups habitually cooperate—that they are indeed profoundly interested in one another—is to fantasize. Their common economic plight in fact induces a certain rivalry, and this can only be exacerbated by the kinds of cultural and political differences suggested in other parts of this issue.

Almost a century and a half ago Tocqueville dwelt on the differences between the American Negro and the American Indian. Although certain of these differences have become less significant with time, there is little to suggest

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that the two races have come to share a common view of the world. Nor, if the truth be told, is there evidence that either is closely linked, intellectually or politically, with the two Hispanic peoples, Chicano and Puerto Rican. Does this imply that this volume dwells principally on such mutual disinterest? Not at all. Still, Franklin's penultimate paragraph is almost meaningless if one does not recognize what is implied when he says: "One of the tragedies of the present situation is that the sense of sharing common problems and seeking common goals is minimal. . . . This is not to suggest that their ultimate goals are, or should be, identical."

Franklin accepts the reality of difference. His historical training tells him that this difference cannot (and should not) be eradicated; it also tells him that the American black is an American; so is the American Indian; he forbears to say the same for the Chicano and the Puerto Rican, knowing full well that it is so. Franklin, while studiously avoiding any suggestion that he "speaks" for America's blacks, or that anyone else does so, enunciates policies calculated to discredit any idea that there is some advantage in ethnic or racial isolation. The title of Franklin's essay, "The Land of Room Enough," reveals the substance of his argument.

Vine Deloria shows a similar concern with the past, though his interpretation of recent events is substantially different. Finding, as others do, particular significance in the events of the last decades of the nineteenth century, Deloria shows how new kinds of subordination were legally mandated and economically imposed. Only in the 1950s did conditions begin to change. While many in the country remember the Eisenhower years as a time of tranquillity, it was a turbulent period for the four minorities. Their continued massive migration into the cities of America, which started during the war years, made for great instability. Many who wished them well assumed that they would quickly make their way up the economic ladder, as European "immigrant" groups had done before them. The differences between them and those who had arrived from Europe in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century were little reflected on. Self-help, the old nineteenth century panacea, was thought to be more than sufficient. In any case, Deloria argues, these minorities were largely "invisible" in the 1950s; their indigenous and unique qualities were scarcely known. Most Americans would have been surprised to learn they were different.

With the coming of the 1960s, federal intervention to end discrimination became a major element of public policy. Legal access was relatively easily secured. The "backlash" began, Deloria says, when the full implications of equality began to be understood. Blacks, he suggested, bore the brunt of this public outrage; the other minorities were conspicuous for their passivity, insisting that they "truly believed in law and order." Deloria writes: "The majority had cleverly played them [the other minorities] against the blacks, and since most liberals saw the race problem primarily in terms of black/white relations, they saw no reason to forfeit this minor leverage for intangible and tenuous benefits." Of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Deloria writes: "Each was passed as a memorial to the death of a prominent person after all peaceful efforts to effect change had failed." He goes on to say: "Although a century of oppression was

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cited as justification for many programs, the thrust of the new social welfare concerns was rooted in the outmoded liberalism of the past that saw education as the key to full citizenship." He is not arguing that too heavy a burden was put on the educational system; only that the minorities were obliged to accept the values of the majority. All were made to seem victims, participants in a common culture of poverty.

Deloria sees these minorities moving "from a caste system, where they were subjects of the government, to a social welfare system, where they were its clients, with barely a nod toward citizenship." Soon, in his view, "minority culture assumed an antiwhite, anti-industrialism posture." Deloria sees only one possibility for these minorities: "to broaden American perceptions of cultural diversity," thereby rescuing themselves from a condition that is today intolerable.

Robert Coles in "Minority Dreams, American Dreams" seeks to interpret the dreams of children in three of the minority groups. The cultural specificity in each of these dreams needs to be remarked on: Martin Luther King figures prominently in the black child's dream; suffering at the hands of the "Anglo" is a principal element in the Chicano's dream; the Indian youth, a Pueblo, in his dream, according to Coles, "shows no great interest in joining up with 'us'; there he was, at night, venturing into a distant rendezvous with an elderly ancestor, and having a good time of it, with no evident 'generation gap'—until something happened: a derisive, noisy arrival."

Coles knows there is no such thing as a black child's dream wholly distinct from an Indian child's dream; circumstances will of course be determining in what the child dreams. But he knows also that the culture is a common one in that it makes children of all these groups sensitive to differences in value, skin color, language, surnames, appearance, and historical experience. All these children are immensely susceptible to certain preoccupations, and nothing that has happened in recent decades makes this less so. Still, a great deal has happened since 1960. While wary about claiming more for these two decades than is warranted, Coles asks whether many of the old "stigmas" and "marks of oppression" have not lost their power. The problem is to know how significant such diminished intensity is, for whom, and what consequences it carries.

In planning this issue of *Daedalus* it was agreed that representatives of each of the four minorities should be asked to write about how the events of recent decades have changed the lives of those who belong to these minorities. We urged each to meet and consult, to write individually or collaboratively, as seemed most reasonable and convenient, but to answer a specific set of questions. In my original letter of invitation I said:

> Our charge is a difficult one. We ask you to consider what [American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans, depending on the recipient] have achieved in these last twenty years, why they have not been able to achieve more, what strategies they have used (and why) to achieve certain specific purposes, and what we ought to anticipate in the near future. What choices have seemed to exist during recent years? What choices were made? By whom? Any such analysis presumes that you consider also the larger American society in which the [American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans] have been moving, the

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resistances that have been encountered, the obstacles that they have had to contend with. The article ought to deal with political, social, and economic data in as imaginative a way as possible. The papers ought to aim for "a critical tone," one that will do justice to the complexity of the subject.

Michael Dorris, in his essay on Native Americans, and Faustine Jones, in her essay on blacks, have chosen to write as individuals, though each gratefully acknowledges the help and advice they received from others whom they consulted. The essays on Chicanos and Puerto Ricans are more obviously collaborative; their principal authors are Leobardo F. Estrada, F. Chris García, Reynaldo Flores Macías, and Lionel Maldonado for the Chicanos; Frank Bonilla and Richard Campos for the Puerto Ricans. To say that the historical experiences of these four peoples have been fundamentally different is to belabor the obvious. More significant, certainly, is the fact that the recent experiences of these four groups have not brought them together. Their historical memories are distinctive; so, also, are their interpretations of recent events. Indeed, there are no universal events for them; each chooses to dwell on different conditions and relations, making patently clear that what matters supremely to one has scarcely the same importance for the other. It is not simply that they have different perspectives on time, but that their senses of place, grievance, pride, and strategy are different. No one of these authors would claim to speak for his "people," recognizing the vanity of any such claim. Had other authors been selected to write these "core" essays, other results would almost certainly have been secured. Still, it is striking to note how various the experiences have been, how dissimilar they are even today. If these accounts are accepted in their principal elements, they suggest different kinds of intergroup relations and quite distinct preference for one set of values over another.

Does this imply, then, that the problems of these four groups derive principally from a lack of unity? Not at all. To emphasize their individuality—both in their self-perceptions and in their strategies—is to acknowledge that they have not to date seen either the necessity or the advantage of reaching out to the others. The occasional pleas for greater cooperation notwithstanding, these essays suggest that each is much preoccupied with itself and not conspicuously concerned with the others. Some will find this not at all surprising, given the conditions described; it does, however, suggest again the utility of seeing all such differences within a national (or regional) context.

Today, when so much is made of the growing importance of the Hispanic in the United States and what this development may portend for the future, there is a certain utility in asking how the Chicano defines identity—what the role of the Spanish language may be—and how the Puerto Rican expresses his interest in these matters. Carlos Arce, for the Mexican Americans, and Juan Flores, John Attinasi, and Pedro Pedraza, for the Puerto Ricans, explore dimensions of the assimilation process in the United States, hinted at also in other of the essays in the volume. If Arce acknowledges that we know all too little about such matters, and that these ought to be prime subjects of serious scholarly investigation, the Puerto Rican authors are not too distant from him. The old kinds of "assimilationist" theory, created to help explain and account for the

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consequences of European immigration, are clearly insufficient. To ask whether Puerto Ricans are becoming Americanized is to ask what may seem to be a relatively simple question; the answer is not at all obvious. While many Puerto Ricans are acquiring some command of English, few choose to abandon their native Spanish. Is this significant? Why? What does language use tell us about a people, about its values and beliefs? Does it indicate, as the Puerto Rican writers suggest, a wish to identify with Latin Americans, to act with them to support the cause of justice in their behalf? If so, why should this feeling be so intense among Puerto Ricans and so much less important for Chicanos? According to Arce, "Chicano identity continues to be predominantly Mexican, in spite of national government, media, and academic infatuations with labels such as 'Chicano,' 'Hispanic,' and 'Spanish-speaker.' "

Haywood Burns and Thomas Pettigrew, each in his own way, remind us how much American thinking about the redress of political, social, and economic grievances—about class and race itself—has depended on the black experience. Burns knows that the judicial race relations record of recent decades is largely a record of cases involving blacks, first as petitioning plaintiffs, and more recently as defenders of gains achieved through judicial and administrative decisions. So, also, much of the legislation passed in the 1960s came out of a concern to remedy abuses that weighed most heavily on blacks. Others profited from this legislation, and in time made their own contributions to its implementation. The black role, however, in drawing attention to a whole range of such issues, and, more recently, in resisting what many believe to be a calculated effort to set back the clock of social justice, is incontrovertible.

The situation is not very different for Thomas Pettigrew. Conceptualizations of race relations in the United States were generally almost exclusively based on data and theories that related to black/white conditions in the United States. Even today, the most controversial book on the subject, William Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race*, has as its subtitle *Blacks and Changing Institutions*. When Americans write about race they generally write about blacks. Pettigrew, in offering his own "interactive model," suggests that it is intended only to cover "current black/white realities." We are not told what use such a model would have for analyzing the kinds of discrimination common today, where such practices touch American Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, or others. The knowledge we have of contemporary discrimination is greater for blacks than for all other minorities.

Bernard Anderson and Phoebe Cottingham, writing about the elusive quest for economic equality, acknowledge an analogous situation: until very recently, the available data for black employment (and unemployment) were considerably more ample than any available for Native Americans, Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans. Only in very recent years have we begun to collect data that permit more accurate and precise comparisons. However, there is still much that we do not know, and it is no longer the paucity of data that limits our knowledge. Thus, for example, we still do not understand at all well the relation between equal employment policies and minority group employment. We are unsure of how to measure "equal opportunity" and whether affirmative action is synonymous with that purpose. The whole issue of whether "affirmative action" presumes also the imposition of quotas remains open.

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Joan Moore, approaching the problem from a very different vantage point, suggests that American academic social scientists have been extraordinarily blind to Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and other nonblacks. When scholars did choose to pay attention, they generally used paradigms derived from experience with European immigrants, or otherwise grossly misconceived where and how certain minorities were living. Only after World War II, Moore writes, did "the fates of the four minorities begin to converge," and this sounded the death knell for what she calls the earlier "naive romanticism." By the 1970s all four minorities were predominantly urban, they faced the same kinds of problems, and most were locked in poverty. Depending very substantially on employment in the service industries and in government—both growth industries—they did not fare at all well in their quest for jobs in these sectors. They generally lost out to white men and women with better academic credentials. Although many black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Native American males improved their condition—some substantially—they continued to lag behind white men both in the occupations they could aspire to and in the income they could hope to earn. Women from all four minorities did even less well. A few men and women "made it," if not to the very top, then at least to very high positions; but their condition, Moore believes, is today very precarious. In any case, they never carried others with them. Racism in the schools and housing segregation have kept most minority group members from making any significant ascent, or even from finding remunerative and meaningful work in the urban, industrial world that is at present their only secure home. To change this, Moore argues, a massive restructuring of industrial and institutional bases must be undertaken.

Can any such ambitious agenda today be realized? If, as many believe, we have indeed come to the end of a period in the nation's history, there is an obligation to consider where this country may in fact be tending. To listen to the television news broadcasts, faithfully reporting events out of Washington, one would think that only budget-cutting, tax relief, and El Salvador matter. Those who live in the United States—who experience its unique pleasures and pains—know that this is at best only a very partial rendering of the preoccupations of the American people. The television cameras may not be focusing on other situations; they exist, however, and no turning off of the lights will cause them to disappear.

Who, then, is still concerned about these other matters? Who worries about poverty, illiteracy, bad housing, and the like? Those who suffer these conditions, certainly. Who else can be expected to be concerned? Those who can be made to see that they themselves are affected. Can their consciences be appealed to? In some instances, certainly, but one ought not make too much of the power of such an appeal. Interests are also involved; they ought not to be shunned. The four minorities treated in this volume share many conditions; it would be wrong not to acknowledge this, asking whether certain alliances cannot be formed to achieve purposes on which they agree. It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that coalitions of this kind can be useful for more than very limited purposes. There is a great deal that such minority coalitions cannot achieve, whatever the goodwill and political sagacity of those who create and foster them.

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If the conditions described in this volume are to be substantially alleviated—conditions that any rational person in this country must find scandalous—this can be done only through new forces exerting themselves. There are no simple remedies, no "quick fixes." The solutions of yesterday—the metaphors themselves, "War on Poverty," "Head Start," and the rest—deserve an honorable retirement. They no longer speak to a society as anxious (and divided) as our own.

This issue of *Daedalus* celebrates diversity; it deplores poverty and injustice. If diversity is to be used to help eradicate inequity, it is imperative that we be immensely more imaginative in acting together to achieve certain objectives on which we can agree. The South Bronx today is an abomination; New York City is not. To make the second survive, even as the first is transformed, presumes a social inventiveness that we have not so far been required to demonstrate. There is nothing wrong in Chicanos believing that Mexico will one day be able to influence favorably their own destiny in this country; the Puerto Rican belief that Latin America may perform an analogous service for them is conceivable. My own thought is that such help from the outside world will always weigh very little. A much harder and more treacherous road will need to be taken. American Indians, blacks, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans will be able to transform their lives to the extent that they are able to join with others—many others—to achieve specific purposes that are consonant with disparate American social and political objectives.

Collective action presumes a collective interest, which is not the same thing as an identical interest. It also presumes forms of civility and restraint on every side that have become all too uncommon in our raucous age. Until common interests are formulated, until genuine efforts are made to use institutions that now exist and to invent others, we will go on living the cycle of neglect, distrust, grievance, and blame that is our present unhappy condition. We are today at a low point in our national fortunes, both materially and intellectually. How to escape this condition is a proper subject of intellectual inquiry. Adam Smith claimed that the wealth of a nation depends on the skill, dexterity, and knowledge of its people. Who can say that we have given sufficient attention to any of these?

The Ford Foundation is to be thanked for its help in making this issue possible. At a time when the country's attention appears to be diverted from many of the pressing matters raised by the essays in this volume, it is important to insist that certain grave national problems do not disappear simply because they are left unattended. To the extent that this issue contributes to restoring certain problems to the public agenda, contributing to a debate that cannot be permanently adjourned, to that extent does it serve a public purpose. To the extent that we recognize how immensely complex certain of these questions are, and how much they call for wholly new investments of intellectual capital, to that extent do we suggest what a substantial intellectual effort needs to be made if new insights and understanding are to be looked for. This issue of *Daedalus* has raised profoundly disturbing questions that many may wish to ignore. That option carries very real hazards; they ought certainly to be avoided.

S.R.G.

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JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN

The Land of Room Enough

I

ONE OF THE TRULY GREAT MOMENTS in modern history was the peopling of the New World by inhabitants of the Old, and one of its more magnificent themes was the promise that in the United States there was room enough for all who sought to escape the burden of class, religious, racial, and other discriminations. At first they came in small numbers, as if to test the viability of a New World civilization. Then they came in larger numbers, then in droves as they gained faith in the possibility of building a social order to fit their fondest dreams.

It did not matter to the Europeans that this New World was already inhabited and that the inhabitants were faring quite well without any assistance or intervention on the part of the white man. The Powhatans in Virginia, the Pequots in Massachusetts, and the Tuscaroras in the Carolinas were "civilized"—some by a future "official" designation, others by virtue of the state of their development. They had their own way of life, a religion, family life, an economy, and varying stages of political organization. They were more than prepared to pursue their own destiny and to view with some disdain the various Europeans who began to come to the New World in the seventeenth century.

There is no need to quibble over who came first. It could have been an intrepid Genoese sailor, a stouthearted Scandinavian, or a bold and daring African. They were as one in their search for a better life and in their courage to pursue it relentlessly. What is important is the success of Europeans in building a New World civilization that they perceived to be a distinct improvement over what they had left behind, and their growing sense of confidence that this civilization was superior to anything they found here or anything that was likely to make it to these shores. Consequently, they simply appropriated the land with impunity, even if the Pequots or the Tuscaroras or whoever were peacefully settled and cultivating it. Worse still, they sought strenuously to enslave those people, as if it were their sacred duty to bring them under their control to use for their own purposes. It was best not only for themselves, they reasoned, but for the Indians as well.

What they found here, the Europeans claimed, was a state of heathenism that could not possibly claim respect or even tolerance. The condition of those native to the New World was so abjectly uncivilized as to invite the scorn of its observers, the spread of Christianity, the accumulation of public and private wealth through trade and exploitation, and the "enhancement of national and personal prestige and glory through colonization."[1] Consequently, no serious thought was given to the possibility that Native Americans might share equally

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or even substantially in the social order that grew out of the dreams of Europeans. They would have to wait for centuries before they could even get a hearing before those who presided over the courts that dispensed human justice and equality in the New World.

Europeans were persuaded not only that they were capable of building a civilization that was superior in every respect, but also that they themselves were superior to any of their contemporaries. New England settlers dismissed the hospitality and friendliness of the Native Americans as the "Lord's mercy to His Chosen People" rather than native good nature. In general, the New Englanders thought their genial hosts were trapped in the snare of the Devil, which would explain their unregenerate state.[2] In turn, it would explain the European sense of superiority over the indigenous peoples of the New World and the justification for their taking whatever lands they desired in the name of Christian civilization.

II

The protracted contact of Europeans with Africans, beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century, led to generally unfavorable impressions that were to affect black/white relations profoundly from that day to the present. The firmest fact about an African was that he was black. Soon black became "an emotionally partisan color, the handmaid and symbol of baseness and evil, a sign of danger and repulsion."[3] It was not long before a whole group of unattractive and undesirable qualities were ascribed to Africans, qualities that seemed for the most part to be permanent. They were ugly by reason of color, physiognomy, and hair texture. They were heathens, almost hopelessly so, since their heathenism was tied to their other base qualities. They were savages, and regardless of how different certain groups of them might be from each other, all of them seemed light years behind the English in their stage of civilization. They were lustful and lecherous, and their sexuality was virtually beyond control. Finally, they represented the evil, a spectacle of disobedience for all the world to see, that resulted from the disobedience of Ham, the son of Noah, in begetting a child while in the Ark. This earned his son Canaan and all his descendants the eternal curse of God.[4]

Such were the attitudes of Europeans, especially Englishmen, toward Africans when they came to mainland English America early in the seventeenth century. These attitudes help to explain how Africans slipped almost unnoticed from a status of indentured servitude to one of permanent slavery before the middle of the century. A Virginia magistrate took the fateful step in 1642 when he sentenced two white indentured servants to an additional year of service for running away, and a black indentured servant to labor for the remainder of his life for precisely the same offense. In that single decision the judge not only consigned a black man to perpetual slavery, but in the process began the tradition of the crudest form of racial discrimination that would form so large a part of race relations over the ensuing three centuries. In short order slavery would be legalized, and slavery would be the lot for most blacks. In due course the body of law imposing distinctions based on African slavery and inevitably on race would grow to the point that it commanded the attention of a large and important section of American jurisprudence.

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It is not surprising that the slave code rested securely on the presumption that slavery was the best, if not the only, condition for Africans. It placed them under the constant supervision of their white masters, and if there was any conceivable good in them, this was easily the very best way of bringing it out. Their every waking hour was spent under the surveillance of the owner or his agent, while their hours of repose were carefully regulated by legislation as well as by plantation rules. Meanwhile, the most learned and influential men of the South built up, through their writings and speeches, a most elaborate justification and defense of Negro slavery. There were, of course, the scriptural defenses based on the curse of Canaan as well as the apparent acceptance of the institution during the pre-Christian *and* Christian eras. These were sufficient to win the support, at least, of the average God-fearing Southerner with or without slaves.[5]

If any doubters remained, they could consult the scientists who argued in lengthy treatises that certain anatomical attributes of Africans made them suitable for slavery in the South. Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright of New Orleans claimed that blacks could withstand the heat of the sun better than whites because of a peculiarity in the structure of the eye.[6] Dr. Samuel G. Morton of Philadelphia, a noted craniologist, asserted that slavery was an acceptable status for the "pliant Negro, [who] yielding to his fate, and accommodating himself to his condition, bore his heavy burthen with comparative ease,"[7] because the mean internal capacity of the Negro cranium was less by twelve cubic inches than that of the Anglo-Saxon. Louis Agassiz, Harvard's eminent naturalist, confirmed Morton's general claim by declaring that development of the brain of an adult Negro "never gets beyond that observable in the Caucasian in boyhood."[8]

Negro slavery, many claimed, was good for all concerned. It provided the slave with the only possible opportunity to become civilized and Christianized, thus bringing under control his lower, savage instincts. Meanwhile, since any society needed workers to provide the leisure necessary for the more gifted to elevate the social order, African workers were ideally suited for such function. The now classic statement made in 1854 by James H. Hammond of South Carolina set forth that position clearly:

> In all social systems, there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but little skill. . . . It constitutes the very mud-sill of society, and of political government, and you might as well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build one or the other, except on this mud-sill. Fortunately for the South, she found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand. . . . We use them for our purpose and call them slaves.[9]

In 1858 few persons in the United States and no one in the South would argue that Africans, as slaves, should not occupy an inferior legal and social position in American society. Even the abolitionists gave their attention not to the task of ameliorating conditions among slaves but to transforming slaves into free people. The ideology of white supremacy had become so deeply ingrained, however, that whites treated blacks as inferiors regardless of their status. It is instructive to recall, particularly when one searches for bases for the racial distinctions and discriminations directed against other nonwhites in the United

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States, that whites made virtually no distinction among those blacks who were free and those who were slaves.

Almost from the beginning, American whites rejected the proposition that free blacks were entitled to the same treatment as other free persons. The sentencing in 1642 of a free black indentured servant to a life of slavery for running away was a precedent that subsequent authorities seemed all too eager to follow. In 1790 Congress enacted a law limiting naturalization to white aliens. Two years later it restricted enlistment in the militia to able-bodied white men, thus declaring to the five thousand Negroes who had fought in the War for Independence that their services were no longer required. And when Congress passed laws for the operation of the government when it moved to the new capitol at Washington in 1801, it excluded free blacks from participating in the affairs of that government. In addition, only free white males could be mayor or sit on the Board of Aldermen or the Board of the Common Council. In the following year, Congress passed a law, signed by President Thomas Jefferson, specifically excluding blacks from carrying the U.S. mail, a gratuitous expression of distrust of free Negroes.[10]

In the early nineteenth century, white Americans faced two issues that were related to the future of Negroes in the United States. The first was whether slaves should be treated as property or men. If they were men, Gouverneur Morris had said to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, then make them citizens and let them vote. But the view of George Mason of Virginia and his supporters prevailed, and the Constitution did nothing to indicate that slaves were equal to others in the enjoyment of their rights. The second issue was whether free blacks should be treated as other free persons. In the first fifty years of the nation's history, the dominant view was that they should not be. Even if men did not violate the Constitution in maintaining slavery, they clearly violated it in denying full citizenship rights to free blacks.

If such rights could be denied to free blacks during slavery, it made it much easier to deny those rights to blacks in general once all of them were free. Indeed, the precedent of racial inequality had been so well established during slavery, that it became the universal model in the years following the Civil War. Instead of emancipated blacks moving into a status of full equality at the close of the Civil War, they were consigned to a status where their color and previous condition of servitude were more important than their freedom in determining what they could and could not do. In other words, they were like free Negroes before the Civil War—pariahs, outcasts, and still unequal, even before the law.

III

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States had established a policy that denied to persons of African descent the opportunity of becoming assimilated. This was contrary to the general spirit and attitude toward others, especially those whose native homes were in Western Europe. It was made clear to those people that the process of complete Americanization was merely a matter of time, and their models were those sturdy colonists who had settled on one frontier or another at any time between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. But here were those other early settlers, Africans, who served as models for none of the peoples who were assimilable, but who pro-

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vided an example when white Americans wanted to qualify the assimilability of other nonwhites who were becoming a problem.

Blacks could hardly have been used as an exact model for the development of a policy toward Native Americans, since the white man's experiences with the two groups were so different. Nevertheless, blacks were seldom regarded as equal citizens, even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one suspects that this general attitude toward blacks helped white Americans view Native Americans as deserving something less than equal treatment. After all, how could one respect a group that had the very first opportunity to develop the continent and had not done so? Furthermore, they proved to be obstructionists—sometimes mild, but sometimes fierce—to the white man's advance across the country. They were "failures" as slaves, and their independence was mistaken for indolence. When they pursued their own type of subsistence farming or hunting in the Gulf plains, they were driven out to make way for the Cotton Kingdom. And when they saw American "civilization" closing in on them and surrounding them, they fought their "last stand" without success but with independence and pride.

These responses proved, if anything, that Native Americans could not become an integral part of the white man's America. But something special had to be done for them, and that was the allotment of reservation lands combined with American citizenship. The effort to provide economic support and political enfranchisement for the freedmen had been a failure (W. E. B. DuBois called it a "splendid failure") because the government never provided an adequate economic base and because white Southerners and their Northern allies willed it to fail. Except in a negative way, the experience with the freedmen was of little help in the development of a government policy for Native Americans.

However strong the beliefs that Native Americans were inferior to whites, few if any whites placed Native Americans on the same degraded level with blacks. There was no elaborate ideology of white supremacy over Native Americans as there was over black Americans. Perhaps the relatively small numbers of Native Americans and their dispersal over a large area did not require whites to devote an excessive amount of time and thought to their inferiority. However bitter the fight over every inch of land that Native Americans were forced to yield, it did not leave any legacy of hate and degradation comparable to that left to blacks after the Civil War and Reconstruction.

Even if white Americans viewed Native Americans as inferior—and they did—and even if white Americans despised Native Americans for resisting their incursions—and they did—that did not preclude an effort toward a generous solution of the "Indian problem" in both the public and private sectors. Churches and philanthropic organizations wanted to do something for the "savage Indian," and they established schools that would have a civilizing effect in the hope of awakening in him "broader desires and ampler wants." Meanwhile, Congress in 1887 passed the General Allotment Act that assigned 160 acres of land to each head of a family, with lesser amounts to bachelors, women, and minors, and conferred citizenship on those Indians who resided separate and apart from their tribe and "adopted the habits of civilized life."[11]

American citizenship and a sedentary existence on a land allotment were insufficient to lure Native Americans into adopting the "habits of civilized life" of white Americans. Since the Allotment Act provided for the purchase by the

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federal government of reservation lands that remained after allotment, with the sale price held in trust for the "education and civilization" of Native Americans, reformers and policymakers alike felt certain that the new dispensation was headed for success. Some observers compared the act in historical importance to the Magna Carta or the Declaration of Independence for whites, or the Emancipation Proclamation for blacks. In actual practice, much of the unallotted land fell into the hands of whites, since the secretary of interior tended to force allotment on the tribes faster than they were ready to accept it. Soon Congress provided that even the allotted lands could be leased to others—namely, whites—for agriculture, grazing, mining, and lumbering. By the end of the century, it was clear that whites were benefiting from the Allotment Act more than Native Americans.

Any observer of the 1890s looking at the policy of the United States toward black Americans and Native Americans must have been puzzled at what had been done in the name of reform. For persons of African descent, emancipation did not relieve them of their degraded position. Meanwhile, the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the centerpiece of the Reconstruction program, benefited railroads and other corporations much more than it benefited the freedmen for whom it was ostensibly intended. After a century of dishonor—the phrase used by Helen Hunt Jackson as the title of her book detailing Indian policy—Americans could not be certain that the new day for Native Americans was better than the old. Indeed, the old assumptions regarding Indian inferiority and unassimilability persisted, and no amount of so-called reform legislation could change the attitudes of white Americans toward those who were already here when they arrived. For black men and red men, the American creed of equality was scarcely more than a mirage in the early years of the twentieth century.

IV

Perhaps it was the new Social Darwinism of the late nineteenth century that counseled a rejection of the Negro's claim for equality, for he had been tested and found wanting; and that permitted a kind of condescending benevolence toward the Native American, for even as the white man took his lands, he was still the Noble Savage. But a new vantage point, that of the white man's burden, began to influence America's policies and attitudes toward darker peoples generally. In extending its influence abroad, the most dramatic example of which resulted from its acquisitions in the Spanish-American War, the United States confronted the problem of dealing with Cubans, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and other similar groups outside continental United States. Up to this time, U.S. experience in such matters had been limited to the Eskimos of Alaska, acquired in 1867, and the Polynesian peoples of Hawaii, annexed in 1898 after several earlier efforts.

It was not possible to anticipate either the pleasures or the pain that Puerto Rico would bring to the United States when it was acquired in 1898. What could have been anticipated, it seems, was that in dealing with a territory not contiguous to the United States, the inevitable question of its future status

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would arise. But since there were as yet no clear precedents, the United States was not ready to answer the question. And in dealing with a territory, many of whose people were of African descent or had some admixture of African, Indian, and Spanish ancestry, it was dealing with a race problem not unlike the one in the United States. This one would be almost hopelessly complicated, however, by the difference in perceptions between the people of the United States and those of Puerto Rico of the importance of race. Although white Americans, by tradition and legislation, regarded all such persons as Negroes, and thus subject to the degraded opinion held of them, Puerto Ricans, with all the rich and subtle color distinctions they made among themselves, could not possibly have understood clearly the implications of the white Americans' classification of them.

Once Puerto Ricans began to migrate to the United States, especially after this country conferred citizenship on them in 1917, they discovered what it meant to be a pariah in the country that had adopted them. They were trying to get away from the sugar plantations that had come to be known as "Uncle Sam's sweatshops," but on the mainland they could not be certain that they would obtain *any* kind of work. Their initial optimism was not realized, and soon some began to return to the island. It was obvious, however, that to return was not a solution, and more and more Puerto Ricans became permanent residents of the mainland. By 1930 there were forty-five thousand Puerto Ricans in New York City alone; their numbers increased steadily and reached about one million by 1970. By that time they were in other American cities, most notably Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, and Chicago.

In one sense, Puerto Ricans presented a picture of the classic immigrant leaving home to better his condition, bringing with him such ethnic identifications as history, culture, religion, and language. In due course they could be assimilated and completely Americanized. In another sense, however, they were atypical, because a substantial number of them possessed sufficient African features to be noticeable. The result was as confusing to them as it was to whites, who were quick to reject the darker ones as unassimilable and to consign them to a permanent low status in the social and economic order. The tragedy of the resulting segregation and discrimination was even greater when it cut across family lines, where a portion of a family was regarded as black and treated as such, while another portion was accepted as white and accorded privileges denied their darker sons and daughters or brothers and sisters.

The implications of this for Negro/Puerto Rican relations were as unfortunate as they were inevitable. Both groups were on the lower rungs of the economic ladder, and they competed, sometimes quite bitterly, for the community's most unattractive, lowest-paying jobs. And in the early years of Puerto Rican migration, greater experience and better language facility frequently gave blacks the edge, thus deepening the antagonisms between the two groups. At the same time, many Puerto Ricans were mistaken for Negro Americans and treated as such, causing them to go to great lengths to renounce any affiliation or identification with their African cousins. On occasion they expressed a preference for the terms "Latino" or "Hispanic" if that would assist them in escaping from the term "Puerto Rican," which became, at times, almost

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pejorative. The white community was not above pitting the two wretched minorities against one another where competition for jobs or housing was concerned and where it was to the whites' advantage to do so.

After thirty years of large-scale migration, the 1.7 million Puerto Ricans on the mainland in 1977 were no better off, and possibly even worse, than those who came a generation earlier.[12] They remained at the bottom of the economic ladder, lower than other Hispanics as well as black Americans. Their situation remained desperate: they still lived in squalor in some of the nation's worst slums, were victims to some of the nation's worst racism, and had failed, except in a very few cases, to rise significantly on the political or economic ladder. The time came when their lowly status on the mainland prompted them to join those forces back home who contended that complete independence from American domination, rather than commonwealth status or statehood, was the only solution worth seeking. Neither Native Americans nor Negro Americans provided any meaningful experience that seemed applicable in dealing with the problem of Puerto Ricans in the United States.

V

Like the Puerto Ricans and Native Americans, Mexican Americans in the United States were essentially people of the New World, some of them an admixture of Indian, Spanish, and African. When they began to migrate to the United States after 1900, they had behind them a long history of conflict with the people of America. Mexicans had been opposed to the incursions of people from the United States during the early days of Mexico's independence, in the 1820s and 1830s, especially those who insisted on bringing their slaves. Shortly after independence, Mexico had outlawed slavery, as had all other Latin American countries, except Cuba and Brazil. Their resistance to America's encroachments brought about a full-scale independence movement when American settlers in Texas refused to accept Mexican law. Annexation of Texas in 1845 and the enormous cession of lands to the United States after the Mexican War in 1848 left Mexico bereft of its richest and most desirable lands. With Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and California in the hands of the United States, the fledgling, beaten republic to the south had few resources with which to repair her losses.

Mexico's disadvantages were numerous. Her people were dark-skinned, and Americans were developing increasing variations on the theme of white supremacy. They were Roman Catholic at a time when the Protestant crusade was reaching its peak in the United States. Mexican culture was regarded by Americans as decadent and inferior, whereas their own was reaching perfection, if one listened to Southerners, or was in a progressive, experimental stage, according to liberal Northerners. Consequently, it was assumed that Mexicans living in their own ceded territories were unable to contribute much, if anything, to the march of civilization. And contact with them merely confirmed the lowest opinions that white Americans had of them. White squatters regularly appropriated land held by Mexicans in California and other areas in the Southwest, calling their victims lazy, indolent, unambitious, and undeserving of the lands they occupied.

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Under the circumstances, it would not be surprising if the Mexicans had preferred to maintain some distance between themselves and the white Americans. But with hard times and few opportunities at home, the United States was one of the few promising places within their reach, if only they could overcome the obvious prejudices against them. They began to migrate to the United States in substantial numbers in the early years of the century. Unlike the Puerto Ricans who flocked to the city, the Mexicans initially went into the rural areas to become farm laborers. Indeed, they were often recruited and brought into the country to take up the slack during periods of labor shortages. Some came on their own, with neither visas nor passports, thus becoming particularly vulnerable as "undocumented aliens." As fruit and vegetable pickers in California, Arizona, Idaho, Washington, and Colorado, they were exploited mercilessly by the large farmers, and when their own leaders began to organize them into unions, the stage was set for reprisals, deportations, and other actions to blunt the effects of unionization.

Those who went to the cities faced discrimination in housing and jobs, and competition with blacks and Puerto Ricans. Everywhere, even in the Southwest, where many had always lived and to which large numbers came annually from across the border, Mexican Americans received the distinct impression that, aside from their seasonal or periodic labor, they were not to enjoy the advantages and blessings of American civilization. In due course, however, leaders would rise among them who could speak out in their behalf and demand equality of treatment as workers and as human beings. If their demands were not always heeded, no one could any longer ignore them. They added significantly to the racial and ethnic quandary all Americans faced in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

Although many Mexican Americans were citizens of the United States, there were many others, resident in the United States, who were citizens of Mexico. Their treatment, therefore, was of interest not only to their union leaders or American public officials at different levels of jurisdiction, but to the government of Mexico as well. And their flagrant mistreatment—as workers, in seeking housing, or as victims of brutality at the hands of the local police—merely added to the litany of grievances that the Mexican government had accumulated through the years. More than once, particularly in recent years, their treatment was the subject of delicate discussions between the heads of state or other high officials on both sides of the border. Even if such discussions did not result in a dramatic improvement of their lot, Mexican Americans could get some satisfaction from the knowledge that a sovereign state, with increasing leverage, could espouse their cause if it were inclined to do so. Neither Native Americans, black Americans, nor Puerto Ricans were in such an enviable position.

VI

One cannot help but be impressed by the bonds of disadvantage and even degradation that tie these four groups of Americans together. In varying degrees they were victims of American racism, developed initially out of the American experience with persons of African descent, but extended to others of darker

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hue—Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican Americans—as they sought equal treatment at the hands of white Americans. Their struggle for full equality has been an ongoing one, and they would have much to tell one another both about their limited successes and numerous failures. They are, in general, clustered at the lower end of the occupational and economic scale, victims of discrimination in employment and in compensation for work done. They are for the most part confined to certain sections of the city where housing, although expensive, is limited and frequently substandard. All too often the several groups are in fierce competition with one another for jobs, housing, and other favors of society. Such competition leads to invidious comparisons, jealousy, and envy, and they become easy pawns in the game played by the white majority of pitting one wretched group against the others.

Despite the fact that black Americans were clearly the greatest victims of a well-defined racism that dated at least from the seventeenth century, the other groups tended to feel that blacks had been the most successful in combating racism. The examples of their civil rights organizations, their activities in the field of litigation, and their political influence are a source of envy as well as admiration, but what is more important and to the point is that they have provided inspiration for the others. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and a host of presidential orders, commissions, and agencies are seen as coming primarily from the efforts of Negro Americans. Blacks are seen, moreover, as making rapid strides up the economic ladder. No other group can boast of the kinds of gains made by blacks that are heralded in each issue of *Black Enterprise* and *Ebony*. In reading the glowing accounts of their successes and achievements, we have to remind ourselves that these are exceptions, that the percentage of unemployed blacks in the work force is twice that of whites, and that in many cities across the country as many as 40 percent of black teenagers are unemployed. In such dismal matters they are closer to the other groups than one might think.

There is little doubt that the vigorous drive by blacks for equality during the past two decades has encouraged other groups to make similar moves. This is not to suggest that the movement in other groups was wholly derivative, but that the climate of the sixties, in which blacks had an important role, stimulated a widespread movement for equality among numerous groups. Thus, *La Causa* of the mid-sixties became a crusade to assert the dignity of Mexican Americans, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund undertook to protect the rights of its people, as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund had been doing for blacks since the 1930s. Likewise, the American Indian Movement (AIM), which began in the 1960s, was notably successful in publicizing the plight of Native Americans and winning support from a wide variety of sources. Puerto Ricans did not need the climate of the 1960s to spawn movements for dignity, self-respect, and even independence. Almost from the time they began to come to the mainland in significant numbers, they founded organizations to improve their condition. Today they range from the quite proper Puerto Rican Association for Community Affairs in New York City to the radical, terrorist FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation).

Despite the common bond of discrimination that all four groups share, there are significant differences. One of these has to do with language and culture.

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Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans are proud of their distinct cultures and especially of their language. One Puerto Rican recently said that the Spanish language was for his people a unifying factor and a guardian of their identity.[13] Both groups tend to hold fast to it, the Puerto Ricans apparently with greater tenacity than the Mexican Americans. Blacks and Native Americans, on the other hand, have only English as a common language and cultures that have been almost completely diluted and eclipsed by the culture of the dominant racial and ethnic groups.

Another difference is that Puerto Ricans on the mainland have a homeland to which they are deeply and permanently attached. Frequent visits, where possible, reinforce the attachment and cause many to regard themselves as Puerto Ricans first and Americans second. Mexican Americans do not seem to be nearly as deeply attached to Mexico. Many of them are not immigrants but have always lived on the lands ceded by Mexico to the United States. Others were recruited from Mexico as laborers, and under the circumstances, would just as soon forget the wretched conditions from which they came. Still others came without permission and return the same way if and when they care to. On the other hand, the connections of Afro-Americans with their ancestral lands lie deep in the past. They came to the New World involuntarily and for centuries had no opportunity to return. In recent years, with the independence of African states and with the example of blacks serving as political and economic leaders in numerous countries, Afro-Americans have experienced a renewed interest in the land of their fathers.

Native Americans had no such experiences. Their attachment to their own land was attested to by their resentment of the way in which Europeans dispossessed them. But nothing could dispossess them of the notion that America was *their* homeland. As the first settlers they never conceded that others, in the name of a superior civilization, had a right to push them aside. Without the power or the weapons to turn back the Europeans, they finally made their peace with them on the theory that the New World was indeed the land of room enough. Only through the kind of litigation that black Americans had pushed were Native Americans able to hold on to the theory and then recover and save some of the land as well as some of the rights for themselves.

If being an American is to share in the history and culture of the country, to contribute to its well-being, and to be a part of its future, the Americanism of these four groups cannot be successfully challenged by anyone. The Indians were here before any other known group, and their imprint has had a profound impact on virtually every aspect of American life and history. For three centuries Afro-Americans have been a central feature of America's history, and no amount of gainsaying can eradicate their importance. Mexican Americans are native to much of this country's Southwest, and there as well as elsewhere their culture is as American as that claimed by any former European. Likewise, Puerto Ricans, both in their island homeland and in mainland America, have added both substance and flavor to American culture. These groups need not yield to any group in their claim to be integral parts of American life, even as they remain conscious of their own distinctiveness.

One of the tragedies of the present situation is that the sense of sharing common problems and seeking common goals is minimal. It is true that under

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the circumstances the four groups are almost natural competitors, since they must scratch around at the bottom of the economic ladder for whatever falls from above. But it is also true that with increased education and greater technical skills, and with a better understanding of the benefits of cooperation, they could effect the kind of intergroup arrangements that would transcend and neutralize many of the divisive forces that exist. In an age of shrinking economic opportunities, it is "more tempting for one group to see the other as a potential rival than as an ally," as Joel Dreyfuss has observed.[14] Even so, the alternative to cooperation is a continuation of the crudest forms of bitter group rivalries, energetically promoted by the groups that have always benefited from such rivalries. The most compelling argument clearly favors an elimination of suspicions, jealousies, and rivalries, and the adoption of all feasible methods of peaceful cooperation. This is not to suggest that their ultimate goals are, or should be, identical.

It has become fashionable in the past three or four decades for various hyphenated Americans to emphasize the distinctive aspects of their respective cultures—as though these groups have been so successfully and securely assimilated that they can afford to look back to their origins and pay homage to their languages, histories, and the special features of their culture. This new way of looking at themselves and their past has become a luxury no less important than their expensive homes and automobiles. These same decades witnessed an important rise in the decibels of protest and in the crusade for equality on the part of Native Americans, black Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican Americans. It was as though this was *not* the land of room enough and that the assimilation of the others had been accomplished at their expense. These cries of anguish and these demands for attention to their problems serve as a reminder that the very term *assimilability* is one that suggests there are problems that lie outside its scope. These are the problems of those who have not been assimilated. And as a Puerto Rican woman recently said, "There is never a lack of problems. The poor live off hope."[15]

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[11]Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian*, p. 175.

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[13]*The New York Times*, May 13, 1980.

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VINE DELORIA, JR.

Identity and Culture

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY IS OFTEN CHARACTERIZED by astute observers as ahistorical and therefore lacking a discernible orientation and direction; it represents, Arthur Miller argued, "generalized, moralistic mush."[1] The roots of this condition can be found in postwar technological and political developments: industrialism on a massive scale; electronic communications; improved transportation facilities; universal, although sometimes superficial, education; and the emergence of America as a world superpower. No single factor is more important than any other; they are all interdependent and play a critical role in how we perceive ourselves and our problems.

Historical dislocation is important to recognize because it speaks directly to the conceptions of progress held by the majority and confuses the standards minorities are measured against. Traditional perceptions of social conditions depend ultimately on sets of data gathered in customary categories and on the ensuing arguments that revolve around the optimistic or pessimistic interpretation of information based, almost always, on an assumed incremental pattern of growth. The first step in any accurate appraisal of arguments on either side is to formulate a context within which the extent of historical dislocation can be determined. Although the Second World War must form the baseline from which we can examine the progress of racial minorities in recent times, the conditions out of which minorities emerged in the postwar decades originated shortly before the beginning of this century.

The 1890s are a critical decade in American history; both the white majority and the racial minorities experienced substantial changes during these years that exert continuing influence today. American society saw the final consolidation of large industries into trust and national corporations, a process that began in the Civil War and was completed with a reduction of the western lands to their final political, social, and economic institutional expressions. Although many Americans think individual initiative epitomized the 1890s, and some writers see the robber baron as the personification of the age, Christopher Lasch argued, with justification, that "the nineteenth-century cult of success placed surprisingly little emphasis on competition. It measured achievement not against the achievements of others but against an abstract ideal of discipline and self-denial."[2] John D. Rockefeller distributing dimes and moral admonitions is a more accurate picture of those years than Jay Gould frantically fleeing New York City, his bags bulging with railroad bonds. At any rate, white Americans

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often like to think of the age as one of individual initiative triumphant over competition, and they continue to gauge minority efforts to succeed by this mystical standard.

While white urban Americans were moving rapidly, if unknowingly, into an industrial age that cherished managerial skills over hard work, blacks, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Puerto Ricans were being subjected to a form of legal exclusion unique in human history. Although given the franchise in 1870 by the Fifteenth Amendment, by the last decade of the nineteenth century blacks saw their political rights destroyed. This was accomplished by a line of reasoning that distinguished state from national citizenship, beginning with the Slaughterhouse Cases,[3] expanded by the Civil Rights Cases,[4] and finally articulated in *Plessy v. Ferguson*[5] in 1896 as "separate but equal" citizenship. In a debate in 1901, Congressman Marlin E. Olmstead of Pennsylvania indicated the magnitude of subsequent black disfranchisement when he introduced a resolution to get Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment:

> In the seven districts of Mississippi the total vote cast for all Congressional candidates in 1890 was 62,652; in 1898, 27,045. In the seven districts of South Carolina the total vote in 1890 was 73,522 and 28,831 in 1898. In the six districts of Louisiana 74,542 in 1890 and 33,161 in 1898.

He further noted that one member of the House representing six counties in South Carolina, with a population in 1890 of 158,851, received only 1,765 votes.[6] The *Plessy* decision only gave legal formality to a social and economic movement that transformed blacks from citizens to subjects.

According to Frederick Jackson Turner, the frontier closed with the 1890 census reports. This announcement, combined with a wave of nostalgia generated by touring Wild West shows that attempted to relive the frontier adventure, permanently accorded Indians a mythical existence. The General Allotment Act of 1887[7] was the progenitor of nearly a hundred agreements between the U.S. government and the Indian tribes to subdivide tribal land estates into small farming tracts. The act fragmented tribal customs, and enabled Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp to remark a decade later that Indian affairs were now merely a matter of administration.[8] The Indian, now a ward of the massive federal bureaucracy, fell permanently into a subservient status, receiving as income only the pittance that the Bureau of Indian Affairs asked as a price for the lease of his lands.

Mexican Americans were reduced to political impotence following the Mexican War, although some of the well-to-do continued to exercise local influence in parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Mexican land grants expressed the property rights and political identities of the Mexican settlements, but the Court of Private Claims, established in 1891,[9] by a variety of legal technicalities dispossessed almost all the landowning Mexicans and eliminated the common lands of villages that had been their heritage for centuries. The reduction of the large numbers of incoming Oriental agricultural workers through restrictive legislation boosted the economic value of Mexican American families. Working in the fields of California and Texas, these families became seasonal serfs to the large ranchers and farmers. Use of Mexican

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laborers on railroad construction completed the task of dispersing the indigenous Mexican community throughout the southwestern United States.

Puerto Rico fell as a prize to the United States in the Spanish-American War in 1898. The island was perceived, as were the Philippine and Hawaiian islands, as destined for perpetual colonial status both because of noncontiguity to the mainland and the large native population that precluded significant white settlement and domination. When the Supreme Court excluded the island from the application of the constitutional Bill of Rights in the Insular Cases,[10] it was evident that Puerto Rico, although culturally distinct from the United States, would remain a colonial possession until it served no useful purpose in American hemispheric plans.

Public attitudes and perceptions do follow statutory enactments, and the legal-political subversion that made these racial minorities less than full citizens served to reinforce racial stereotypes that had formerly suggested their subhuman qualities. Pseudoscientific pronouncements regarding the lesser technical and cultural accomplishments of these groups bolstered the legal prohibitions against them; the discriminatory status seemed a benign step of wardship on a progressive march upward toward eventual civilized status. Separate and unequal educational facilities were justified by majority beliefs in the inherent inferiority of the colored races, and the low level of achievement of pupils produced by substandard schools was cited as further scientific evidence of the reality of the cultural evolutionary incline these groups were attempting to ascend. The educational system, which was then being expanded in order to socialize European peasant immigrants arriving in the United States, became the major public institution for suppressing these groups.

The Depression and the Second World War each brought a measure of equality for racial minorities. National social welfare programs sponsored by the New Deal were generally applied with a minimal amount of discrimination. American Indians and Mexican Americans served in the armed forces with only sporadic incidents of discrimination, Puerto Ricans were generally used in installations on their island, and blacks served in all branches, although they played a strange, subservient role in the navy as ships stewards. The irony of German and Italian prisoners of war having more social status and privileges than American racial minorities was not missed by sensitive observers, and caused acute embarrassment. If one chose to debate theories of racial superiority, similarities between Nazi treatment of the Jews and the status of blacks in the South made justifying the war against Germany difficult.

For the majority, the 1950s were calm, peaceful years, but for the racial minorities, they were a turbulent time when fundamental changes occurred. Two major activities dominated these years: migration and the stabilization of institutions representing these minority communities in the larger society. The industrial needs of the Second World War, even more than the First—which saw immense black migration from the South—required relocating tremendous numbers of workers into the war industries, primarily in the Midwest and the Pacific Coast. Black migration to Northern cities increased dramatically, and American Indians and Mexican Americans moved in large numbers to the West Coast. This pattern continued once the war was over. Puerto Ricans migrated in large numbers to New York and other Eastern cities in the early 1950s. After

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1954, under the federal policy of relocation, significant numbers of American Indians were relocated to Midwestern cities to learn new industrial skills. The bracero program, begun in 1942 in partial answer to wartime labor needs in agriculture, became a permanent answer to low-cost labor requirements in the Southwest.

Although life in the urban ghetto exposed racial minorities to new ideas and values, the sense of deprivation, isolation, and vulnerability increased, as obvious economic disparities reminded people of their subservient status. Access to national communications media compensated to some degree for the social liabilities of urban life, because such access enabled members of the different minority groups to establish new working relationships with others similarly situated. The larger national organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the League of United Latin American Citizens, the G.I. Forum, and the National Congress of American Indians experienced tremendous growth during the fifties, and began to exert a new kind of political leadership previously absent in race relations.

During the postwar years, self-help doctrines permeated American society, and although these doctrines provided no real avenue for expression by any of the communities, they nevertheless formed the standards by which the larger society judged minorities. In the misguided hope that withdrawal of support services to the reservations would create a new wave of individualism among Indians, Congress terminated federal responsibility for them. "Operation Bootstrap," Luis Muñoz Marin's island version of self-help for Puerto Rico, was seen by acute observers of that island as a modern version of old imperialist and mercantilist practices. Bootstrapping did little to resolve the island's economic problems, and served primarily to link the masses of poor with the consumer society and to show people what they could *not* have rather than provide them with the conveniences and products of modern industrialism.

Education was the primary field in which self-help reigned as the guiding ideology. The John Hay Whitney Foundation Opportunity Fellowships provided financial assistance to minority students for graduate education, while the G.I. Bill, available during most of the fifties, provided subsistence benefits to veterans for undergraduate training. American belief in education as the basis of full citizenship and economic prosperity was underlined in the conflicts over school desegregation. These conflicts reached a crescendo following the *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*,[11] decision in 1954, which abolished the legal basis for separate educational facilities for minorities. Successful individuals who escaped the poverty and discrimination that were the lot of their group were touted as proof that self-help worked; it was believed that every member of the racial minorities, given the time and opportunity, could become successful. The absence of motivation rather than discrimination was cited as the reason the majority of each group did not progress. That a handful of people escaped the severe handicaps of segregation was advanced as evidence of the ultimate capability of the groups, provided they accepted the tediously slow and incremental changes offered them.

The chief characteristic of minorities during the fifties was their invisibility to the majority. Lulled into believing that America was a land of limitless opportunities, most whites assumed that minorities were either prospering or wanted to remain in poverty and helplessness. Discrimination was explained as

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the desire of minorities to remain "with their own kind," and only the Montgomery bus boycott and subsequent nonviolent demonstrations by the emerging civil rights movement proved otherwise. With each demonstration, more of the majority began to understand the desperate straits of the minorities in education, housing, employment, and access to public facilities.

Desegregation of educational facilities challenged traditional beliefs about education and raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of American institutions. Desegregation entailed more than equal opportunity; it confronted separatism in every form, and perpetuated the belief that access to Anglo-Saxon beliefs, values, and domestic behavior patterns constituted equality in the larger sense. The problems of inherited advantage—class and not race—lay beneath the surface struggles over desegregation. The Selective Service Act of 1951 was typical of the confused perception of race and class. The act imposed universal military obligation on the young, but nevertheless exempted the offspring of the affluent, who were able to get deferments to attend college, and then to serve as officers—if they were drafted into the armed forces at all. It basically created a military composed of minorities and lower-class whites rather than a democratic citizen army. Equal opportunity, which the minorities eagerly sought, actually meant having access to the informal networks and relationships of the affluent majority rather than the chance to compete in the marketplace.

Until the sixties, identity and culture were inseparable concepts that encompassed the same phenomena and were indistinguishable in their objective reality. Segregation forced minorities to create institutions, similar to those enjoyed by the majority, that could provide a measure of activity to reassure them of their status as Americans. The realization that such measures were necessary because of the exclusionary practices of the majority was a long time in coming. Thus the beauty pageants "Miss Black U.S.A." and "Miss Indian America" were created because of the discriminatory practices of the majority, not because they expressed values transcending all groups in society. Minorities were *identified* by skin color, but the confirmation of this identification depended on the recognition of parallel institutions and community participation. Truly indigenous activities and institutions qualitatively distinct from majority values went unnoticed and unappreciated. The outward expression of minority community life, however, was that of American culture, not one of distinctive variance from majority behavior.

The election of John F. Kennedy as president in 1960 began a period of radical change in American society. "America's leading man,"[12] as Norman Mailer aptly described him, recruited "the best and the brightest,"[13] as one commentator cynically described the New Frontiersmen who came to Washington with the Democratic victors. Kennedy was the first truly media-oriented president; he was obsessively concerned with his image. In courting the racial minorities during the campaign, he created a gap between public perceptions and performance that had to be closed to preserve his fragile electoral coalition. His first inclination was to keep the minorities calm, and hope that negotiated settlements behind the scenes could solve the civil rights problem with minimal disruption of the traditional American life-style. In February 1960 the sit-ins began in Greensboro, North Carolina, and in 1961, as Kennedy was getting the New Frontier established, the Freedom Rides began, with a well-integrated group of white and black protestors challenging segregation on public transpor-

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tation in the South. The liberal community, looking to Kennedy for leadership, forced his hand, and federal involvement in the civil rights struggle became a reluctant reality.

Consider, then, the situation that the four racial minorities confronted as the sixties began. The *de jure* impediments to education were being removed in the South, and in their collapse other legal obstacles were falling. *De facto* discrimination, although obvious, was still excused by the misinformed majority as the result of slothful attitudes of the minorities. Phrasing their demands for legal reform as "freedom," "integration now," and "self-determination," the minorities began to agitate for reform more substantial than merely eliminating institutional barriers. Mistaking image for substance, Americans came to believe that Martin Luther King's call for nonviolence would forever dominate protest tactics. Most white Americans, in fact, believed that even King's peaceful protests were too violent; they convinced themselves that a peaceful and clear articulation of goals would produce instant and reasonable change. The burning question of the day, asked of every minority with complaints about discriminatory treatment, was, "What do you want?"—as if identification of the problem in simple terms was akin to its solution.

The first phase of the civil rights movement succeeded, although in tracing its ideological roots, there seems to be no consistent theory to explain its potency. Perhaps a majority of Americans had so confused their political and economic beliefs that they saw in desegregation a solution to pressing social, educational, and economic problems a century in the making. This is entirely possible; as legal barriers started to collapse and the majority began to accept racial minorities as equals in their access to public institutions and services, there was a discernible backlash when the implications of equality were fully understood. Allowing minorities to purchase any seat in the stadium was permissible; assisting them in earning enough to afford to attend sporting events and dramatic productions was an indication that minorities were pushing too hard and too fast.

Blacks bore the brunt of majority rage and reaction because the primary discriminatory laws were aimed at their exclusion. The other minorities suffered proportionately in relation to their proximity to the black movement as far as *de jure* discrimination was concerned. Mexican Americans living, like Southern blacks, in predominantly rural locations confronted long-standing institutional racism that had become a natural part of the Southwestern environment. But insofar as the other minorities were able to distinguish themselves from blacks, they escaped direct and continual confrontation with majority backlash. The other minorities were at first happy to be dissociated from the suffering and abuse connected with nonviolence, and were able to remain somewhat aloof by reassuring local whites that they truly believed in law and order—which in translation meant they would not protest their conditions until they were certain of success. Indians, in fact, went to considerable trouble in their efforts to remain separate and to preserve their newly acclaimed status as America's most abused, but also most patient and peaceful, minority.

Although we can look back with some disappointment at the hesitancy of the other minorities to engage in civil rights demonstrations, there were pressing reasons for their refusal to become involved that went to the heart of minority identity as the different groups perceived it. The other minorities had

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not been as consistently oppressed as blacks. In 1945, in *Méndez v. Westminster*,[14] Mexican Americans had won a major victory in getting their culture and language protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Return migrations to the island relieved the intolerable pressures facing the Puerto Rican community in the United States, and language enabled many Puerto Ricans to distinguish themselves sufficiently from blacks to give them both a measure of status and relief from the oppressive institutions founded in *Plessy*. Indians had long since traded the right of self-government for continuing federal services and supervision. Thus the other groups felt they had as much to lose as gain by becoming identified with a major assault on long-standing institutional racism. The majority had cleverly played them against the blacks, and since most liberals saw the race problem primarily in terms of black/white relations, these groups saw no reason to forfeit this minor leverage for intangible and tenuous benefits.

The March on Washington in 1963 in quest of jobs was applauded for its commitment to nonviolence, but produced no congressional action to help fulfill its avowed goals. Removal of *de jure* prohibitions on full citizenship was not seen as directly related to *de facto* discrimination in the economic arena. But when white civil rights workers were killed in the South, the political leadership began to take civil rights seriously. Following the beating to death of the Reverend James Reeb in Selma, Alabama, President Lyndon Johnson appeared before a joint session of Congress, spurred by thousands of telegrams demanding action. Adopting the civil rights slogan "We Shall Overcome," Johnson appealed for immediate passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Three major pieces of legislation mark the first phase of the civil rights movement: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Each was passed only as a memorial to the death of a prominent person after all peaceful efforts to effect change had failed. The majority accepted these statutes not simply because Kennedy, Reeb, and Martin Luther King had been slain in senseless violence, but because they were presented in terms familiar to the people. "Why shouldn't people have these rights?" was the question that undergirded these laws, and few intelligent people could justify excluding minorities from the exercise of the rights articulated by the statutes. Since minority identity had been a function of prohibitions that people recognized as outmoded, a substantial number of Americans believed that racial problems would vanish with passage of corrective legislation.

Elimination of *de jure* discrimination only served to highlight the existing *de facto* patterns of discrimination erected during the long twilight struggle for legal equality. Real participation in American life involved economic independence, and although civil rights laws prohibited discrimination against minorities in their public lives, the reality was that, apart from the few middle-class people of each group, the masses lacked the means to enjoy their newly defined rights. The legal identity established by exclusionary statutes gave way to a new identity of poverty that generated its own mythological roots and drew upon ancient stereotypes for justification. President Johnson, recognizing early that political rights depend on economic independence, initiated a massive war on poverty in 1964 to help alleviate the pressing problems of minority groups. Although a century of oppression was cited as justification for many programs, the thrust of the new social welfare concerns was rooted in the outmoded

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liberalism of the past that saw education as the key to full citizenship. Thus, most of the Johnson Administration's specific solutions to poverty involved funding early childhood educational services, not a massive transfer of capital to minority communities. A decade and a half later, former liberals such as Nathan Glazer remarked, with some degree of disappointment, "We would have had a right to expect that, with growing desegregation and with greater sums of money being put into education, Black-White achievement gaps would diminish markedly. They haven't changed much."[15] There was, one can conclude, no ready answer available to the majority that had any realistic chance of success absent a recognition that the nation's wealth badly needed redistribution.

Two major ideologies can be identified in the social programs of the sixties that affect us today. Minority participation in the new programs involved an articulation of poverty statistics that presented a negative image of minority groups and phrased their condition as a deprivation of white values and practices. Thus education was seen as an immense problem area and not as a natural part of the community's life. In the rush to give new meaning to equal opportunity, traditional institutions within minority groups suffered from neglect. Many activities were regarded as inadequate and were seen as part of the problem rather than an indigenous expression of concern. The path to educational parity was interpreted as conformity to majority values, which were presumed to be the universal norm. Statistical data assumed Western civilization as the cultural context, and minorities became subgroups that lacked critical attributes. As the ideology of participation evolved, new groups were added to eligibility sections of social welfare programs, so that initial goals became blurred, and a strange kind of pork-barrel agency emerged able to provide funds to almost any group for almost any activity.

The corollary to educational deprivation was the idea that all racial minorities shared a common culture of poverty. Differences among minorities were thought less important than the new description of their status that barred them from full social and economic participation. In some instances, the majority adopted cultural particularities of the different minority groups—black music, Indian attire, Mexican and Puerto Rican food—but these appropriations were quickly regarded as the property of the majority, not the unique heritage of these groups. Manners of dress and dance, ethical values, and introspective concerns now visible in the white majority are traceable to minority influences and the majority's embrace of the external characteristics of a romanticized culture of poverty.

Legal discrimination created in racial minorities a feeling of solidarity and a tendency to rely on community resources. Individuals patronized their own institutions because they were prohibited from using facilities of the majority. *De facto* segregation meant a shift from racial to class discrimination and enabled the middle class of each minority to enter into the majority arena, leaving behind the less fortunate of their community. Group solidarity shattered, and many individuals in the middle class abandoned leadership roles and accepted token status as members of the new affluent society, adopting, in some instances, what Joseph Heller called "America's inhuman callousness."[16] Almost every effort made by minorities to participate naturally in American society seemed thwarted by misplaced concerns of the majority.

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Affirmative action was typical of the dilemmas facing minorities. Federal intervention was unquestionably needed to assure equal treatment in employment practices, because in both private and public sectors, the manipulation of job requirements and qualifications eliminated worthy minorities from consideration. Yet even here the heritage of racism worked to blunt efforts to right past wrongs. Federal and state officials charged with integrating programs often filled quotas with pliable minority group members and then refused to take the next step to make significant economic opportunity a reality. Individuals hired under these circumstances were often fearful of losing their jobs and thus failed to develop their individual good fortune for the benefit of their group. In federal programs especially, the four minorities each developed "tracks" on which a selected group of individuals moved up the bureaucratic hierarchy. Lateral movement through the government into agencies not directly connected with the activities of minority groups occurred rarely. Through an ironic twist of fate, these minorities moved from a caste system, where they were subjects of the government, to a social welfare system, where they were its clients, with barely a nod toward citizenship.

Identification by the discontented in the majority with racial minorities during the later sixties created a new image that further confused the public identity of these groups. Linking discontent with the war in Vietnam and environmental concern with protests against racism and discrimination—and putting them all into the general category "counterculture"—the older members of the white majority shifted their attitudes and began to believe that the racial minorities had achieved enough progress. This mood was heightened and accelerated by the power movements within minority groups, which were grounded in access to the national media and which featured a surplus of inflammatory rhetoric about revolution. Forgetting the General Motors strike during the Depression and the farm rebellions against mortgage foreclosures during the New Deal, the majority convinced themselves that energetic protest was not the American way, and stiffened their resistance to any further social changes. The racial minorities found themselves in a poisoned atmosphere created by other protests; their public identity, perceived as part of a counterculture that sought to tear out all roots of American beliefs, became increasingly negative.

Coincident with the power movements, and in part a manifestation of their cultural dimension, were the demands for ethnic studies in colleges and universities. Although higher education was rapidly opening its doors to a much greater number of minority students, many of these students, taken directly from ghettos, barrios, and reservations, were alienated by the rigid curriculum requirements that to them smacked of cultural imperialism.

Protests against university rules and regulations forced many campus administrators to submit to unreasonable demands that completely transformed the programs in ethnic studies from educational to ideological training grounds. Political rhetoric often polarized the development of new courses that could have informed both minority and majority about the role of minority groups in American history. Beneath the political rhetoric, however, lay a deeper and more fundamental issue that attracted minorities and made the subject more explosive than it seemed to be. Robert Bellah, commenting on the literature of Black Power, for example, noted that "it is not economic or political grievances

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that propel the activists, though they are acute, but rather a profound need for inner worth and authenticity."[17] He observed that the movements were seen as personally redemptive, redemptive for communities, and perhaps universally redemptive, although it is doubtful that even the minorities were asking these programs to perform this function.

Minority history, in most instances, had not been written from a minority viewpoint; thus the only path open to a discussion of minorities in American history was to emphasize mistreatment of minorities by the majority. The anthologies used in ethnic studies courses reflected bizarre beliefs and callous misconduct on the part of the whites toward minorities, so much so that ethnic studies programs rapidly became centers of discontent, imperiling their acceptance by the academic community they wished to join. Although the majority was prepared to admit minorities into the historical mainstream, it was not prepared for the materials gathered by minority scholars to prove their case. The submergence of racial minorities had produced such a homogenized and sanitized version of American history that the documents cited seemed impossible to believe.

Ethnic studies programs were never able to distinguish between the culture in local communities and the political identity the groups necessarily had to assert in order to qualify for government assistance and protection. Out of this dilemma emerged the recognition that identity and culture were very much different from what had been supposed. Minorities, like other Americans, adopted a materialistic interpretation of culture and concentrated on external and objective features that clearly distinguished them from the majority. Language became as much a political tool as a cultural treasure. "Afros" and long hair marked the black and Indian response to the homogenization the educational institutions demanded, and the variance was defended in the case of Indian religious groups, although growing hair long was in fact a political act. In attempting to resolve the dispute between identity and culture, minority groups became consumers of their own culture, which they objectified, and this consumption was understood as a political act that affirmed a nationalistic identity. The acid test for ethnic studies was, unfortunately, economic. Although the students of the sixties and early seventies flocked to such courses, the downturn in the economy by the mid-seventies made such courses anachronisms: minority students, like others seeking a piece of the American corporate pie, switched to management and business administration courses.[18]

The retrospective view of cultural progress and achievement that confronted the minorities as they tried to distinguish themselves from mainstream Americans called for a reexamination of their historical experiences. Historical review would recapture first the essence of life prior to the encounter with white America, and then the conditions of oppression thereafter that generated the poetry, song, folklore, community institutions, and sardonic commentary that heartened the people in times of severe stress. Much of the postwar literature revolved around the latter period as compounded by this generation's involvement in the events of the age, and as interpreted by them. The few efforts to return to precontact days involved more romanticism than reality, but these efforts provided the significant religious context that made sense of a people buffeted by rapid and often incomprehensible change. Ultimately, most

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contemporary expressions of minority culture assumed an antiwhite, anti-industrialism posture.

In spite of the promises of equality, the larger society seemed to impinge on minority communities in two basic areas: the displacement of groups by industrial and redevelopment schemes, and intrusions by well-meaning whites seeking to create better conditions for minorities. Disruption of neighborhoods by projects shattered the ability of communities to impose informal local controls on individuals, and meant that each community's service infrastructure was increasingly controlled by outsiders. Working within local communities, well-wishers who had influence with outside forces often sought to become spokespeople for the community, thereby disrupting traditional problem-solving techniques and alienating people. The result was a reduction in local leadership and its replacement by external supervisors beholden to larger agencies and institutions that controlled the resources required to change conditions. That more sporadic violence did not occur is testimony to the patience of the mass of minority group members.

During the 1950s, minority groups were always referred to as problems—the black problem, the Puerto Rican problem—as if their emergence in the social fabric had been accidental, punitive to the majority, but capable of resolution by clever and determined techniques. The disappearance of this term, which relegated minority existence to adjectival status within the homogeneity of American life, marks a major shift in perception by the majority. Although conditions of Indians and Puerto Ricans are sometimes described by the majority as a "plight," which connotes perpetual status, by and large the majority has incorporated the presence of racial minorities in its wider vision of American life.

During the postwar era, the majority of members of the different minorities, like other Americans, generally followed the trends and fashions in life-style brought about by industrialization. The universal hedonistic culture fostered by the entertainment media encompassed the racial minorities, sometimes making their cause fashionable, but more often portraying them as darker imitations of the typical white American. This homogenization of cultural values and world view, while creating a more favorable feeling toward minorities, tended to submerge the root cause of their dilemma—white racism—in a cuddly, if somewhat nebulous, American mythology that ultimately affixes the blame for the minorities' condition on themselves. In this benign milieu, group identity and the particularity of culture become given quantities that are incapable of serving as vehicles to distinguish the unique quality of groups.

The velocity of change during the postwar decades in America might very well have radically altered the status of these groups had there not been a particular objective hurdle—segregation laws—for them to overcome. The postwar baby boom, coincident with the development of nationwide television programming, produced a generation that was capable of intense feelings but that lacked the traditional literary background that had previously characterized white Americans. President John F. Kennedy transformed the intellectual from theoretical maverick to stylish government consultant precisely at the time when hard thinking might have resolved domestic differences. The impact on minority groups was considerable. Apart from Martin Luther King, minority

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leadership in the postwar decades, and particularly in the 1970s, was largely a matter of personification and symbolic presence rather than realistic representation of groups. As a result, many Americans assumed that the presence of minority leaders in positions of prominence testified to their acceptance of American values on behalf of their constituents.

There is no question that blacks and American Indians have made an impact on the domestic scene, but for entirely different reasons. The introduction of considerable black talent into declining areas of American life sparked a significant renaissance. Sports such as basketball, for example, changed radically with the admission of amazingly agile black athletes. And popular music moved from swing bands and traditional romantic ballads toward the blues-jazz-gospel rhythms of Southern folkways, producing the modern variations of the rock style.

American Indians, traditionally aloof from whites except for ceremonial purposes—such as adopting politicians into their tribes—influenced American society by invoking the romance of their ancestral traditions. The simple technology of pre-Columbian days was heralded as sophisticated ecological knowledge, and their esoteric religious ceremonials became rites of passage for many young white Americans. If there was one overwhelming symbol of the fascination that Indians held for other Americans in the sixties, it was the movie *Billy Jack*. In this film, a half-breed Indian pacifist demonstrates his beliefs by breaking as many red-neck bones as possible, and submits to a sequence of rattlesnake bites to prove his religious sincerity. The message of this dreadful film was traditional American Western lore dressed in buckskins, authenticated by an intense Lutheran belief that justification by faith alone is sufficient. But its immense popularity indicates that it struck a responsive chord in majority hearts and minds.

Puerto Ricans and Mexicans did not seem to make an impact on the popular values of American society. Overshadowed by the "pop" Indian image and the black presence, these groups found neither intense national oppression nor encouragement. The isolated locales in which they were concentrated contained the same kinds of institutional brutality and discrimination, yet the international flavor of the so-called Hispanic communities gave them a blurred, if slightly favorable, image in the eyes of the public. Both Puerto Ricans and Mexicans seem more inclined to make culture-bearing a masculine phenomenon, as distinguished from white Americans, where culture is strictly female, and the black and Indian communities, where culture is a shared responsibility. The protection that Puerto Rican and Mexican folkways offered to their cultural heritage thus may have proved decisive in preserving it from expropriation by the larger society.

The Puerto Rican independence movement, still a minor item in most American newspapers, has enabled Puerto Ricans to project their concerns to an international arena. The continuing presence of Castroism in the Caribbean makes it imperative that a new relationship be developed that is more congenial to the mass of Puerto Ricans. Although rarely articulated, this seems to place Puerto Rican concerns in a category different from those of the other three groups. The Mexicans also have an ultradomestic dimension to be exploited. Although the government of Mexico shows little concern for its nationals who

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cross the border to do stoop labor, incisive observers of the domestic scene suggest that any severe oppression of Mexicans may have serious repercussions in the international community. Consequently, the American posture toward "illegals" is confused and nebulous, and depends primarily on political expedients of the moment rather than on an understanding of the nature of the problem. The continuing migration between Manhattan and Puerto Rico and the annual influx of illegals across the U.S.-Mexican border enable these groups to replenish their cultural strength, a condition that blacks and American Indians no longer have.

The international dimension is critically important because both blacks and American Indians have attempted to move into that arena to express their concerns. Stokely Carmichael, the most prominent black spokesman to try to link American domestic problems with the emergence of the African bloc of Third World countries, was considerably disappointed when African leaders failed to respond. In 1977 a delegation of American Indians went to Geneva to present their concerns to a subcommittee of the United Nations. The Indians were popular primarily because of the romantic image they projected with their costumes. Their accusations against the colonial policies of the United States failed to move the European delegates, whose countries shared responsibility for the Indians' traumatic history.

Contemporary conditions suggest that these four minority groups, like the rest of American society, need to grasp a new sense of historical continuity if they wish to make the future intelligible. Although the white majority has lost faith in itself as the bearer of the highest values of Western civilization—and in that sense becomes ahistorical—the racial minorities find it difficult to distinguish the inner essence of their historical experience from their continuing oppressive relationships with the white majority. An insightful commentator of the domestic scene, Tom Wolfe, points out, however, that racial and ethnic minorities continue to have heroes, while the majority finds its national heroes only when there is an external threat to the country, indicating, perhaps, that minorities retain sufficient identity to overcome the ahistorical handicap.[19]

Racial minorities appear in the larger hemispheric history as groups without origins, by-products of a larger process, and therefore peoples without futures, apart from their client status as one of the unsolved problems of industrial America. The fundamental change of the last few decades is a shift from race to class, although some observers such as William Styron argue that the concern with race relations merely spreads to new groups rather than being transformed. Racial discrimination still exists on a group basis, but white society, recognizing the changes of the immediate past, allows a small number from each minority to participate in the benefits of the ruling class. Thus an indelible cultural and emotional servitude has been impressed upon minorities that will not be easy to erase.

The increasing complexity of American society seems to thwart this generation's discernment of a clearly understood national identity. Proliferating institutions and agencies, public and private, discourage meaningful comprehension by ordinary citizens, and vest decision-making in a smaller, select group of experts, whose authority, in most instances, is unquestioned. Bureaucrats have replaced priests as interpreters of social reality, and the racial

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minorities, linked to government and corporate activities as recipients of economic largess, are placed in a permanent reactive role in society. Since the continuation of economic assistance generally involves behaving in certain socially acceptable ways, cultural conflict can be expected to increase as minorities weigh the price to be paid for the privilege of full participation in social activities. American society is increasingly dominated by a managerial elite, which includes selected members of racial minorities, but which views the mass of citizens with aloof disdain, manipulating images and symbols as a means of continuing its control. It remains to be seen whether the minority members of the new elite can leaven the new social mixture with cultural values distinct from the majority.

Racial minorities will always have a social/political identity because of their obvious presence within a large white majority. It is unlikely that blatant *de jure* discrimination comparable to that of the past can be restored absent a terrible catastrophe and subsequent loss of rationality by a high percentage of Americans. *De facto* discrimination and segregation, however, remain as critical problems because they basically reflect the cumulative product of millions of individual decisions regarding social and economic values, decisions that originate in the unarticulated and sometimes subconscious views of the white majority. Insofar as problems will continue to exist for racial minorities, America is no nearer resolving its most pressing dilemma. Brutal measures have declined with the increase of majority sophistication, but basic attitudes create new forms of oppression, unique to the age but ancient in impact. As the cultural traditions of racial minorities erode and become homogenized by modern communications, the fearful possibility exists that these groups will be sapped of their natural resources for survival and become perpetual wards of the welfare state. Thus, although legal political identity remains a strong interest of the racial minorities, the real task for them is to broaden American perceptions of cultural diversity, both as a measure of protection and as an avenue for eventual realization of the American promise of equality and justice.

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ROBERT COLES

Minority Dreams, American Dreams

DURING TWO DECADES OF WORK among blacks and Spanish-speaking Americans of the Southwest (in the Rio Grande Valley they often prefer to be called Chicanos, but up in the hills of New Mexico some shun that word in favor of Hispanic-Americans), and among Pueblo and Hopi Indians, as well as some Athabaskan Indians in Alaska, I have tried to gain some sense of how words such as "race," "ethnic heritage," and "class," not to mention "history" itself, become for particular children moments—and longer—of self-observation, reflection, hopeful anticipation, or sheer dread. With enough time, children talk about their lives, and sometimes draw or paint in such a way that they tell more than their words are able to convey. With enough time, children and their parents, and even, upon occasion, a teacher or two, will remember a certain dream—as so many of us do, on one or another day, when the intensity and power of a given nighttime experience is simply too much for the normal forgetfulness we all can take for granted much of the time.

When I first began visiting families or schools, I tended to downplay the significance of the dreams I would be told about—not for the individuals concerned, but as clues to the more sociological interests I had in the early stages of my work, an effort to find out how a given society, a cultural tradition, a moment of political change came to bear upon children and the adults around them. But gradually, as I asked more and more about, say, the experience of working on a plantation in the Mississippi Delta or of trying to make a go of it in a Northern ghetto, I began to realize that a few of those dreams were terribly important for me to remember and consider. There are moments for any number of us when we dip into ourselves as deeply as we know how, so determined are we to make clear what it is that we want, above all, to have put on the record.

When I worked in Roxbury, a black neighborhood of Boston, in the late 1960s, I became involved with a group of young blacks, a street gang of sorts I suppose they might have been called—though they had no name for themselves, no emblem, no one place to hang out, and, certainly, no motorcycles. They were unemployed black youths, who had, mostly, grown up in families on welfare. Of the five I came to know reasonably well, three had been born in the South, part of a notable immigration of blacks and, later, Puerto Ricans, who found the Boston of the 1950s and 1960s appealing. One of those young blacks, whom I shall call Charles Robinson, had been caught up in the *Northern* school desegregation struggle, which, once and for all, reminded everyone concerned

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with race in America that the racial problem is by no means a regional, or Southern, one. When Charles was thirteen he told me this—and I don't think I have to spell out any further than he did at least some of the precipitating circumstances that were involved in his mind's life:

"My mother still can't stop crying about Dr. King. She comes from near Selma, and that's where he went and stood up to the sheriffs and they couldn't get him then, so now they've got him. He was always telling us that he had a dream. I had one the other night, and it won't go away. I try to forget, but I don't seem to be able. I woke up and it was there, the dream, and I couldn't go back to sleep. I ended up bothering my brothers. They said I was trying to ruin their night, but I wasn't. I was just trying to forget that dream and go back to sleep.

"In the dream I was in a helicopter, like you see in the news. It wasn't Vietnam, though. Maybe it was a police helicopter, like on television. I was alone at first. I didn't know how to operate the thing. But it was going, and I could look down, and I saw trees and some farmland, so I figured I was back in Alabama. Then I saw a church. But there wasn't anyone near it. I had the feeling it was empty. The helicopter kept going, and next thing I saw a crowd of people, and someone was talking to them, upon a platform, and it was him, Dr. Martin Luther King! The helicopter got closer and closer to him, but he didn't look up to notice. I got worried that I'd be drowning out his words—or rather, that the helicopter I was in would. I tried to get it to lift up higher, but I didn't know how to do it. Then I was so low, I could hear him, and he was saying that the black man has to stand up and not let the white man get away with hurting us anymore, and the black man has to find his own place, and not let the white man tell him where to go. And suddenly he did look up, and he looked right at me, and he smiled, and he pointed to the helicopter, and to me inside, and he told all the people to look, and they did, and they were staring, and he said, Dr. King, that I wasn't always good, the way my mother and father want, but I'll be good, if I just stay where I am, in the helicopter, and keep going, but if I don't watch out, I'll crash, and that'll be the end of me. I got scared. He was trying to praise me, I think. He was trying to tell the others that I was doing the right thing, going in the right direction! I saw their faces, a lot of men and women. My uncle was there, my mother's brother! He stayed in Alabama. And his wife and my cousins, they stayed. Our minister was there, the one we have here in Roxbury. My mother wants us to go to church, but we don't want to go. We stay home.

"I could see that Dr. King was sweating. It was hot down there. I wanted to throw my handkerchief to him. I had it in my hand. I couldn't find a window in the helicopter. I pulled a switch, and it didn't do anything, but a red light came on. I got scared. I pulled another switch, and the helicopter started shaking. I looked down, and Dr. King was sweating worse. Then he looked bad, and I realized he was crying. The sweat was tears. Then he was gone! He was on the ground, and he seemed dead. The people were crying. I was afraid the helicopter was going to crash! I was afraid they'd all get hurt, and I'd get hurt.

"The next thing I knew, Dr. King was in the helicopter, and he was trying to show me how to use it, but he wasn't sure how himself! He said we'd better go to a garage, quick. He looked worried, and I got real scared. Then I woke up. I

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was shaking! I couldn't get the dream out of my head. I still can't. First one part of the dream comes to me, then another part. When I go to bed, I think of the dream, and when I wake up, I think of the dream. I'll get over it, I tell myself. I hope I will."

He did, in about a week's time; he forgot that vivid, dramatic, puzzling moment in his mind's emotional and intellectual life. Just another young urban black struggling with "cultural disadvantage" and "cultural deprivation" and the grim statistics that have become yet one more economic commonplace—the ghetto and its unemployment difficulties. He had nevertheless managed to be, literally and figuratively, a visionary. Only for a moment, to be sure; he would, soon enough, slide back, shake his head, and say, "Man, I don't know what I'll do." He would also, soon enough, say, "Man, there's nothing anyone can do, so it's best to have the most fun you can, this day, because tomorrow—that's another time!"

But he had, in fact, looked long and hard and far ahead. He had done a social and political and economic analysis of his situation, his people's condition; he had figured out what the black man's past has cost, and what his future must be if there is to be a real and continuing change in America's racial affairs. He had allowed his mind to make a survey—to connect Northern hardship and disillusionment with Southern frustrations and injustices. He had cast his eye on the Southern land, the Southern church; he had commented, at night and to himself, about the need for leadership and direction among blacks as well, not to mention others. But he had also shown himself a shrewd, knowing, even prophetic person. In 1968 he connected the helicopter to Vietnam, to the police—two aspects of the "reality" countless black men had to face then: to grow up and go fight for a living if one can't get a decent job, or to agree to disregard various laws and succumb to the considerable temptations that present themselves to some fairly desperate people.

He had, too, spotted not only his own dilemma, but that of so many other blacks as well: how to get out of their present position, how to rise up, how to find a satisfying, rewarding direction for themselves, *and* hold on to it, stay the course. The heroically protesting Dr. Martin Luther King becomes, in Charles's dream, the hurt and suffering Dr. King, the Dr. King eventually assassinated, but also the Dr. King who wanted more for his black listeners than the excitement of powerful oratory. He was trying to uplift his people, as Charles makes quite clear in the imagery he uses, but he shared Charles's concern: Where are the tools, the means, the circumstances through which a people caught up in the political protests of the 1950s and 1960s can move further—consolidate themselves with know-how and opportunity as white people have? Charles Robinson, never to finish high school, now an exceedingly hardworking garage mechanic, had understood in his early adolescence that in an advanced technological society such as ours, the campaign Dr. King waged in Alabama (for the vote, against school or restaurant or moviehouse segregation) was only a beginning; that blacks now had other, maybe even more arduous struggles to face—if they are to work their way up with self-respect, in an honorable and ethical way.

I will not labor that dream, weigh it down with overwrought interpretations. This one black youth, selected not by any survey research for suit-

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ability but in an utterly and unashamedly subjective manner, had managed to indicate what many other blacks, children and adults, have been thinking and saying and, one guesses, dreaming—even as Dr. King had "a dream." How do black people get (Charles Robinson asked in his sleep) themselves moving along (up) when Southern sheriffs and Northern courts have no longer proved obstacles—when serious economic problems confront the entire nation, not just the so-called minorities? When I eventually asked Charles what *he* thought of his dream, he answered me tersely, poignantly: "Dr. King is dead. I guess it was registering in my head." Then he added, "We all pray for him in church. Every time, we pray for him. I wish I'd been praying for him in the dream. It's not good to interrupt a man's meeting with a helicopter. But he seemed to want to get into that helicopter. I wouldn't mind getting into one myself!"

He has followed the dictates of his dream, actually. He hasn't got into a helicopter, but he has learned how cars work, and at least won't be caught helpless in the face of automotive technology. And now that he is married and has a son and a daughter, he talks about their future as if he is still having that dream of his: they must learn "skills"; they must go further than he, rise up, finish high school, go to college, even. This is a different time, he keeps on stressing; not the time of Southern civil rights battles, and not the time of Northern riots as momentary expressions of rage—that so much talk of "equality" and "justice" can come out of American politicians and journalists and activists of various kinds, yet men such as Dr. King get cut down, and the day-to-day life of the ghettos remains unaffected. Perhaps it can be said that this young black man had tried to envisage the basis for a steady ascent, had tried to obtain, quite specifically, an overview of what needs to be done by, and for, his own kind. The result was a dream, followed by a life that in its own quiet, modest, undramatic fashion has provided a continuing witness to what was averred so strikingly, so intelligently in a moment of sleep.

In the Rio Grande Valley of Texas I heard a different kind of dream from a then twelve-year-old youth, Carlos Gomez, the son of agricultural workers who live near McAllen but leave it for several months each summer to go "on the road" as migrants—up through Missouri and into Indiana and Michigan. This young man was spotted by a teacher as "smart"; he was a beneficiary of a bilingual program, federally financed, aimed at encouraging an interest in education among people who have in the past often found the Anglo-run schools forbidding and antagonistic—hence to be left early. This boy not only stayed in school, but was encouraged by a teacher to think of going to college one day. Carlos's mind was "quick," the teacher told the child's parents when the boy was ten, a realization enabled by the willingness of all the school's educators to ask questions in Spanish, rather than berate those whose faulty English was, understandably, quite common.

One day Carlos complained of a headache, and told me what he'd told his mother earlier, that he'd had a "bad dream," and that it was surely the cause of the pain he felt over his forehead. Maybe so, I thought and said. He needed no prodding to tell me what had crossed his mind the evening before:

"We're leaving soon for the summer, and I guess I was jumping ahead of my family! I was walking on a road, and I think it was to the north, maybe in

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Oklahoma. We go through Oklahoma on our way to find work. I think I was feeling okay. I was thirsty, maybe. I wanted a coke. I looked for a store, and the next thing, there it was! I had a quarter in my pocket. I went to get my coke. The lady there said No—to go away. She was a big Anglo. She had long blond hair, and a hat on. It belonged to the police, the Texas Rangers! I didn't move fast enough, so she said she had a gun, and I'd better go. Then another lady drove up, and she was my schoolteacher! She said she'd buy me a coke! The blond lady said No. My teacher said she's Anglo, too, and she wants the drink for herself. So she got it. Then she gave it to me. I started drinking it, but I saw a police car coming, and I decided I'd better leave right away. The teacher said she'd talk to the police, so I stayed with her. But when the police came, they told her to get away, and she left and I went with her.

"The two Rangers followed us, and suddenly a priest met us, on the highway. He said we could go to his church, and he'd give us a coke. We kept walking, but the teacher argued with the priest. I wasn't sure why. In the church there weren't any cokes. I was thirsty. The teacher said we should push on and try to reach a city, where they'd serve us. I told her if I could speak really good English, maybe I could get a coke at the next place on the road. The priest offered us water, but it was warm. I wondered if it was holy water! I didn't drink much. We started out, the teacher and me. Then I woke up, and I was thirsty, and I went to the kitchen, and got a coke! As I drank it, I noticed I had a bad headache, and it still hasn't gone away."

This is a youth who has had other "dreams," more conscious—hopes of leading his people in their continuing and strenuous struggle against certain agribusinesses, politicians, policemen, and not least, schoolteachers. When I asked him, around that time of his life, what he wanted to be come adulthood, he said that he would like to own a store, and serve "anyone" who entered, and make money, which he'd give to others like him, hard-pressed Chicanos. Once he told me he wouldn't mind joining the service; that way, he could get away from Texas and see if there wasn't somewhere a "better place"—meaning a town or county or state or nation where one's name and religion and accent and "look" (Carlos's word) wouldn't, collectively, matter so much. That way of putting things, the use of the word "look," furnished distinct evidence of a particular child's "bilingual" competence—an ability to say an awful lot rather precisely. The young Carlos had heard Chicanos talk about the prejudicial treatment they had received at various times, and had learned that the way they "looked" meant a lot: the clothes worn; the manner of walking, or talking; the complexion of the person. As with blacks, the issue is how different one appears, behaves, is seen to be—by "them," whose standards are not only their own, of course, but part of everyone's mental life, including those who fight longest and hardest at "liberation."

Here was a young man who knew such matters of psychology and sociology in his bones. His dream had ended up hurting him upon awakening, because the subject was suffering—a people's aching walk toward self-respect, and the vicissitudes to be met along the way. Carlos knew well what they were—the antagonism that even can affect the behavior of storekeepers, who are supposed to be blind to everything but coins and green paper. Carlos was able in that dream to express the confusions, the divided sentiments, of the Anglo world as

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well as his own. He is not the only Chicano child who perceives splits among the "boss people," a phrase I've heard in Texas, among other places, from Chicanos. The teacher is one kind of Anglo—a friend, but not with the power others have; the police are quite another kind. And the church, so important to many Chicanos, so much a part of their history, culture, and daily experience—what is the boy to do in that regard? Accept an ancient source of reassurance and sanctuary—or take one's chances on the federally subsidized road system and what it has to offer: a job, maybe, and a more hospitable restaurant, maybe, and a less antagonistic system of "justice," maybe—all over some Midwestern rainbow? (Carlos has never seen *The Wizard of Oz;* nor is *Oklahoma!* a musical landmark in his young life.)

Carlos stayed in school, all right; but when he was sixteen, his father died of a stroke. He found a job in the Rio Grande Valley, working as a janitor in a medical clinic and in a shopping center, both owned by a doctor. When the doctor, a self-styled "liberal on race," is feeling especially expansive, he talks with Carlos about medical matters, and when the young man is quick to pick up the point of things, he gets to hear that he is "smart" and that he "would have made a good doctor." At that point he knows to smile with gratitude. If he is even luckier, he'll be offered a coke! Now, such small ironies are not only the property of scriptwriters for television soap operas. Spend enough time with a Carlos, and the mental soreness of a dream will be seen and heard as yet another incident in a certain person's life.

Carlos would be the first to point out that there are many Chicanos, all too many, in the Valley who would find his job enviable and his moments of seemingly relaxed conversation over a soft drink with an Anglo doctor plain inconceivable. Thousands of the Valley's Chicanos have never seen a doctor under any circumstances. Chicanas bearing children are lucky if a nurse delivers them; and certainly many of the children I got to know near towns such as Edinburg, Texas, had never once in their lives seen a pediatrician.

As for those who work in the church, there are, as he would later put it, "all kinds." There are activist priests who have affiliated themselves unmistakably, and sometimes at substantial risk, with the rural and urban Chicanos of Texas and other Southwestern states. There are other priests who pray hard for their Chicano parishioners, and remind them that this world is not the end of everything—that Christ favored the humble, indeed spent all His brief time on earth with them. And there are priests, alas, whom Carlos would describe with bitterness and scorn—"No friends of anyone who has little money," he once put it, in an elegantly restrained recourse to a double negative. So much for the benefit of bilingual education for a "smart Chicano," as this youth, Carlos, was repeatedly described by the teacher who once entered his dream.

Farther west, in the neighboring state of New Mexico, one meets a different landscape and people, the Pueblos, who have had their own experience with Anglos, some of them, needless to say, Spanish-speaking—talk about ironies, in this case a rather large, or historical, one. Put differently, for some young Indians, Carlos's people are associated with the experience of defeat and plunder—at the hands of the conquistadores who roamed New Mexico and

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Arizona in search of gold and anything else "precious" they might get their hands on. Eventually the language and culture of Spain would become part of the life Pueblo Indians learned to deal with—as well as, later, in the nineteenth century, the language and culture of Britain, brought insistently west. On a Pueblo reservation north of Albuquerque those facts of American history can be seen as still of significance—Spanish names and Anglo-Saxon names belonging to Pueblo Indians. The Pueblos long ago learned to make such accommodations; they were, it seems, the first to do so in what is now the land of the United States.

A boy of thirteen with the name Johnnie Jones knows that—and not because he learned it in a Bureau of Indian Affairs school. There is a tradition of talk in his family, among his people, of a serious kind. Stories are handed down over time—dramatic or simply narrative accounts of what took place. A people who have bent over (and over and over) in order to live amicably with their often enough truculent, if not extortionate, relatively new-found neighbors have nevertheless tried hard to keep in touch with their own values and ideals. And in that regard, besides the stories handed down by day, there is the work of the evening. A youth such as Johnnie Jones can take an Anglo visitor, no stranger to accounts of dreams, quite by surprise when describing what happened during a period of supposed sleep:

"I got restless last night, and went out and climbed the hill. I watched the stars signaling each other, and then a cloud came and stopped me. Then more clouds. I thought it was going to rain. When we do get rain, we drown! But a wind came and blew the clouds away. The stars hadn't paid any attention! They were still talking. My grandfather suddenly showed up. He told me I looked as if I wanted company! I said Yes, and I was sure glad to see him. He told me his story of the horses, how he had them, and rode them, and then they came, the Anglos, and ruined our pastureland. They did something to the river. He told me that sometimes he'd like to be back with us, but he's not unhappy where he is. He hasn't met an Anglo yet where he is! He told me that! I laughed and so did he!

"Then I heard a noise, and I looked up, and it was one of their planes, and the boom meant it was going real fast, and it crossed the sky, and the stars stopped shining. They got real distant, and I couldn't see them clearly, and then I couldn't see them at all, and then my grandfather was gone, and all of a sudden I was in the BIA school, and that new teacher was pulling his eraser across the blackboard, but I hadn't copied what I was supposed to copy. He gives us lists, then new lists. He moved fast. Then I was up and looking out the window, and our dog was running on a scent, and so was another dog, and I could hear a car, not near, though."

It is not easy, with such an account, to know precisely when the "dream" ended—or began. One uses quotation marks for the very word, because the young Pueblo is not at all anxious to think of the experience he has described as a "dream." Nor does he indicate in the telling precisely when, as we would have it, the subjective work of his mind stops, and as we also would have it, the objective moment of awakened perception begins to take place. But the boy is

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quite willing to tell a reasonably familiar visitor that he was "up," in two senses, at the end of his account—*awake* as well as standing and regarding the activities of two reservation dogs. And as he has talked, he has emerged, uncannily, and with no help from anyone interested in either the psychology or neurophysiology of sleep, with an account of how he felt just before he started dreaming (restless), what he saw and heard while dreaming, and what he did upon awakening. Moreover, he has connected with extraordinary subtlety the inner workings of a particular mind, the collective visions of a people, with the day-to-day life of a certain person, living in a certain place, and at a certain time in history—the Pueblo reservation life of twentieth century America.

This Indian youth, Johnnie, has done all that in a manner that indicates quite clearly a certain heritage—Indians of the parched Southwest, still fighting to hold on to their land, still in jeopardy, because if the white man is not conquering one way (the Spanish adventurers, on the hunt for metal), he is intruding another way—by air, by water, by land. Johnnie's grandfather, while alive, would remind younger Pueblos that there was a time when the space left to Indians in New Mexico, restricted as it had come to be, nevertheless was at least secure with respect to the air—no jets streaking across the sky, and no noise of automobiles, a constant Anglo din that indicates for some "natives" of the Southwest a restlessness that goes with another kind of dreaming than that of a Pueblo Johnnie Jones. We call it "the American Dream," and we say it is meant to be for everyone. Yet a young Pueblo shows no great interest in joining up with "us"; there he was, at night, venturing into a distant rendezvous with an elderly ancestor, and having a good time of it, with no evident "generation gap"—until something happened: a derisive, noisy arrival.

While thousands upon thousands of American Johnnies look to the skies with excitement and pleasure and anticipation and desire—a ride, a swift ride, a supersonic ride, and the sooner the better—this Johnnie spends a precious moment of sleep telling himself that it's no fun, and, really, rather upsetting, to be near those Anglo airplane fields and what they harbor, not to mention the Anglo hydraulic engineers or Anglo educators. One has to add as a footnote that Johnnie knows what other Pueblo children of his reservation know—that in those mountains, not far from the reservation, there are other proofs of an Anglo presence: bombs hidden, bombs that once prompted Johnnie's father to tell him that "they are going to wipe us all out, every one of us, that's what the Anglos will do, and only our ancestors will be safe." Johnnie told his father not to be so sure of that last assertion—and so there may well be a generation gap, if one only waits long enough for the "evidence" to come in!

Dreams such as these three have been central, edifying landmarks for my wife and me in our work. "You cannot fool children," Erik H. Erikson once observed, echoing a sentiment, surely, that many parents and teachers have felt over the years as they have heard children take the world's measure exactly, if by the indirection of a symbol, a story or fantasy, a joke, and, yes, a dream. When one tries to summarize the contemporary attitudes of American children who belong to minority groups, one must always remember to qualify, to be wary of indiscriminate generalizations. One must constantly ask *which* children, living where, under what circumstances? Blacks in rural Alabama working as

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tenant farmers, or blacks in Atlanta living well, indeed, up on Collier Heights; blacks in the grim, sad tenements of Harlem, or blacks in the posh apartments of Harlem? Chicanos in the "factory-farms" of the Rio Grande Valley or in the barrios of San Antonio, or Chicanos who own land and businesses in that city or who are quite prosperous in Albuquerque? Indians living under the most abject conditions on reservations with unemployment rates at a staggering 90 percent or more, or Indians who own reasonably successful farms or businesses in New Mexico or live in Albuquerque and work in its stores or offices? What these three youths have in common with millions of others is their recognition of certain differences—a recognition wrought gradually in the inner precincts of their souls: differences of values, of skin color, of language, of surnames, of appearance, of historical experience. Nothing that happened in the past two decades—and a lot did indeed happen—has changed that process of recognition, at least in the children I have worked with, or in those known to the parents and teachers and social workers I have talked with.

No doubt, on the other hand, these recent years have had their effect on the minds of black children, Chicano children, Indian children. (I have only come to know two Puerto Rican families, both Bostonian, and these only recently, so I feel unable to speak about them with any confidence.) Rather obviously, these three dreams are late twentieth century dreams; they are the dreams of children who knew Dr. King, who knew about our atomic bomb program, who were aware that Chicanos in Texas do have a few allies among the Anglos, though of questionable power and authority. They are the dreams of children who have been told that through "education" (and what a multitude of virtues and sins that noun can encompass!) there is hope for a significant change in their lives. The black youth uses one kind of technology (the helicopter) as a metaphor; the Chicano summons the automobile as a means of possible movement out of his inherited situation; the Indian youth fears that what little solitude his people have left is in jeopardy—a dilemma many Indians feel as they hear yet another round of promises from the BIA or other federal agencies. No one who understands the complex nature of social change, not to mention the personal kind, would expect a Supreme Court decision (1954) or a series of federal laws (1964 and thereafter) to banish a given minority's chronic social and economic problems or the psychological difficulties any number of children who are black (or brown or red) keep having. And new problems arrive with "progress"—the problems of children making their way "across town" to integrated schools, of children learning the new stresses that a more demanding education can impose, of children learning to negotiate their way into a more promising environment.

Needless to say, each minority has its own sources of strengths, its own potential pitfalls to avoid. Blacks have been singled out negatively in American history in a special way from the very start—written into our Constitution, alas, and the occasion of our one and only civil war. Yet, that awful heritage, in a strange way, has put them nearer the front of the white world's mind, so to speak. Blacks have often, therefore, carried the initial burden of political protest—the minority group for a long while most visible in centers of opinion and power such as Boston, New York, and Washington. Indians have been "out there," and Chicanos "down there," though the arrival of large numbers (in the minds of many, at least) of Puerto Ricans in recent years to the Atlantic states

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and elsewhere, along with a larger urban (Northern) mobility on the part of Chicanos, has changed all that. Chicanos, in contrast, have their own distinct language and a powerful church that both sets them apart from many (Protestant) Anglos and connects them to millions of others. (The black churches, arguably, do the same, though often they are fundamentalist, revivalist, hence each on its own; and of course there was for a long time a separatism within the more traditional, established black churches, such as the African Methodist Episcopal church, and so on.)

Chicanos look to a specific nation, Mexico, right across our border. Indians look to the land—the source of their historic confrontation with the white man: we were here first, and now we have been *put* here, *left* here, in ways at the mercy of our historical conquerors; and so this land reminds us of what we are, but also what we were, what we have lost. By the same token, many Indians both hate the white man's government (whose soldiers once subdued them) yet want more and more from that same government—an immensely deserved recompense, they believe. I know from my work with Indian families the mixed feelings generated, especially in youths—the desire to leave the reservation and live in an urban world, on one's own, and the desire to stay where one feels "safe," where things are familiar, however lacking in one or another respect life may be.

As for reservation life, some of the economic and medical facts are appalling—the extremely high unemployment, the precariousness of health, the inadequacy of medical care. But then, it is no picnic in the migrant camps of southern Texas, inhabited by Chicanos, nor in the ghetto life of certain American cities. The substantially higher infant mortality rates that are characteristic of minority groups, as compared to our white population, have their own sad message. And such hard data are more than matched by more subjective phenomena—the disillusionment, melancholy, apprehensiveness, social anxiety, frustration, and moody wariness in relation to the quite dominant majority world that all come across in the three dreams recounted here, and, one hastens to add, in many others, told to my wife and me these past years.

Once, in a brutally candid conversation that perhaps was only possible for two mothers who, despite the barriers between them, had come to know each other fairly well, my wife, the mother of three sons, was told by a black woman, also the mother of three sons: "My boys come and tell me what's on their minds, and I want to cry. I'll be shaking the rest of the day. My oldest son, he's fourteen; he came to breakfast the other day, and he said he had a 'bad night.' I asked him why. He said he was tossing and he was turning. It's hot, I thought. No, he was dreaming! He told me the dream. I wish he hadn't! I'll have a bad dream myself tonight."

She went no further for a few minutes. But with some shared coffee, and discussion of a television program seen by both women (on the violence in Ulster), there was enough conversation about the difficulties of people far away for the black woman to feel able to tell the white woman this: "I don't know what to say to my son when he wakes up and he tells me he's been in a gunfight, and he's killed some white people, some cops, because they went after him and his friends. Then, he says, he got caught, and he was in death row, and he woke up on his way to the electric chair! And the man at the switch was a cop, a white

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man! I told my boy to forget the dream. He said he would, as fast as he could. But I can't."

Her son is no incipient or hardened delinquent. He is a good, solid, studious youth—from a poor family, but headed, we believe, for E. Franklin Frazier's "black bourgeoisie," considerably larger than, and more different from, the kind he documented years ago. Yet, the fear and trembling—and truculence. A youth works intense racial conflict into an ordinary summer night, and then tries to resume his life of going to a summer session of the Boston public schools. One has to emphasize, however, that white upper-class youths also know guilt and self-accusation and rage—the "crime and punishment" that Dostoevsky did a rather able job of analyzing before my kind appeared on the scene with our authoritative psychological notions. On the other hand, there is indeed a racial side to this black youth's emotional struggles that draws its energy not only from one person's private discontents, but also from the quite real and visible and audible world of a neighborhood, a social and political scene, a racial scene: black life in a Boston ghetto, among families trying to move out and along and ahead and up, and experiencing no easy time doing it. (This family had tried to move into a mostly white working-class neighborhood adjacent to Roxbury, and caught hell from a white street gang for doing so—while the city's police seemed strangely inadequate, passive, immobilized. The black family pulled back after a month.)

There is no reason to emphasize only the harsh and mean aspect of life as it continues to be lived by America's minority children. These are *American* children's dreams, the three related above (as well as, unfortunately, the fourth). These are dreams of children who have an interest in the white world, a curiosity about it, a guarded wish to share in its various benefits. Nor, again, are white children without worries and despairs connected to their particular social situation. White children want to soar, so to speak, to transcend their daily personal difficulties; want to figure out where they are welcome and where they are not; want to find a place where they can feel safe, and if need be, solitary. One has to keep moving back and forth, keep remembering that these are American children, but also that in each case a particular minority group is pressing its claims upon a particular child's life: the black world of the South and the North, of Dr. King and the challenges and frustrations of "educational opportunity"; the Chicano world of Texas Rangers, not rarely a brutal lot, and schools only recently bilingual (some not at all), and a church both powerful but not always unequivocally on the side of the world's poor and humble; the Indian world of a lyrically pastoral tradition, with its wry, skeptical distance from the hustle and bustle of the big-talking, big-doing Anglos, who are not afraid to sing their own praises, and who are hardly able, often enough, to comprehend the modesty, the gentle and quiet humor, the spiritual calm and ease of "those reservation people," as we sometimes heard the Indians of New Mexico called.

And speaking of minorities, these have been the dreams of boys, of young men! There are just so many "variables" one wants to juggle in an essay! We would recite different dreams here were we reporting what we have heard from black girls, black youths who are women; and, similarly, were we intent on conveying how one or another Chicana thinks about the world in her sleep. Maybe the differences would be more subtle among Indians—for whom the

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land of the reservation, the natural world, can be a continuing repository of imagery, no matter one's sex. On the whole, though, a nation that has connected, in its culture, men with technology, is a nation whose minority members who are men will follow suit in such an association. Again and again black girls and Chicano girls have told my wife and me about their dreams; in them have figured household incidents, and as with the dreams above, searches—but commonly, for men, rather than for positions to hold, tools to wield, and failing those, vengeance to be exacted. It is one of those ironies that novelists such as George Eliot told us ever to keep in mind when reflecting, never mind commenting, upon the human condition—that one can take the accurate measure of a majority, its obsessions and demands, by virtue of one's membership in a double minority.

Only a fool would try to say that 1980 is 1960; we spent years seeing at least some changes in the political and social conditions that various minorities in the United States must contend with. It would be condescending in the extreme, and erroneous, to deny minority children the perceptions that social and psychological observers claim for themselves. The children who initiated school desegregation in the South two decades ago are now grown up, and themselves parents—and observers: "It's different for us now. My girl has hopes I never had. She wants to go to college. She wants to be a doctor. I thought I'd be lucky if I finished high school, and even luckier if I got a scholarship to a nursing school. I look at my kids—I look at myself—and I hear myself using the word 'uppity!' We're still in Alabama, and the old words don't die!"

Those "hopes" are a kind of continuing dream—the everyday striving of minds toward purposes previously believed out of the question. I really do believe that the old "stigmas," the "mark of oppression," and so on, now have a significantly reduced intensity in the lives of many, many minority children. Where there used to be acquiescence, resignation, intimidation, apprehension—there often still is. But there is also likely to be a higher level of expectation, an assertiveness about one's aspirations, a vigorous and well-expressed cynicism about certain elements in the "majority group," and so on: a change in the ratio of passivity to activity, in the ratio of retiring inertia to outspoken self-affirmation. Laws have their effect. Affluence has done its work. Protests have moved not only sheriffs, but have become a part of a community's life, a family's, a child's. Television cannot be discounted—the sight of all those protests in the 1960s amounted to a continual, significant, hard-to-forget presence in homes all over the land. School desegregation, as my wife and I have followed its course in the South, then the North, has given countless black children a sense of entry into an outside world, even as bilingual education and associated efforts to recognize the distinctive cultural life of Chicanos has given many of their children a new sense of their own rights and requirements. And Indian youths, too, at least a good number of them, have witnessed new and strong efforts on their own behalf by their own people.

One makes such an obvious recitation not in banal nostalgia, one hopes, or sentimental national self-congratulation. One simply thinks of schoolteachers and doctors and nurses and social workers, black and Chicano and Indian and white, who have highlighted to children new possibilities—the better side of some of the educational and medical advances set in motion during the 1960s.

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True, there was waste, and there were cruelly aborted initiatives and hypocrisy and stupidity and no small amount of arrogance and lots of bureaucratic fumbling, and even crookedness. True, we "lost" the "war" on poverty; we pulled out, and more than occasionally we tried not to pull out, but we were inept, or we overestimated what we knew, what we could do. School desegregation, Head Start—they did not change totally the psychological, the educational, the social and cultural "facts" of America's race relations problem. We still struggle with severe economic disparity related to race—and, with that, inequity of educational opportunity, housing, health, longevity. And always there are the costs of mind and heart and soul—dreams that don't go away in the morning, dreams that erupt and vex and plague and end up being lived out: hurt and hate, from generation to generation, if not (it sometimes seems) world without end.

And yet—one insists on that final and necessary and important qualifying phrase: *and yet*. Let a one-time Southern segregationist, a white racist from Louisiana, have the last word here: "I never would have dreamed back then in 1960 that we'd come to this—the black people holding their heads up as high as ours everywhere you go in this town. It's been a revolution. Now that it's over, I can't figure out when it began and when it ended, how it all came to take place. All I know is that it *did* happen. All I can do sometimes is scratch my head. My wife, too. We couldn't think of going back to the old days. We've forgotten how it was then. I'll not say we're 100 percent for all the minorities. But we're living in a different time, and we have to go along with it, you see."

One does try to see; one sees the shift in his assumptions, too—the things he once "never dreamed" gradually became the things others didn't so much dream as actively demand, assume, take for granted, while pressing on to new dreams, which that man and those like him, right now, might find beyond their affectionate imagining, or again, not to be dreamed as possible or desirable or likely. Or so one dreams—that such is the spiral of American history we are all part of. If not, the issue may not be dreams, but a kind of collective nightmare one very much hopes this nation will be spared.

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MICHAEL A. DORRIS

The Grass Still Grows, the Rivers Still Flow: Contemporary Native Americans

To STUDY THE LEGAL STATUS of American Indians in the United States is to wade into an extraordinarily complicated arena of legislative and judicial definition. Federal Indian policy, without precedent or parallel anywhere in the world, is unique and complex for two reasons. First, the United States initially inherited and then developed over the next two hundred years a singular relationship with American Indians—that of a massive immigrant population with an enormously varied set of indigenous societies. Second, the formulation of Indian policy derives from disparate and often conflicting sources: ethnocentric preconceptions and expectations; racism; treaties; congressional acts and statutes; federal, state, and tribal court judgments; programs evolved within such federal bureaucracies as the erstwhile Department of War, and the Departments of the Interior, and of Health, Education and Welfare; the findings of the Indian Claims Commission; and even the laws and understandings inherent in the American and tribal constitutions. In attempting to grasp the practical realities of Indian rights, claims, and title, one continually encounters paradox, confusing historical precedents, and misunderstanding. There are dozens of seemingly self-contradictory non-Indian theories about, and strategies for dealing with, Indians; and there are scores of separate Native American tribes, each defined in its relationship to the federal government by hundreds of distinct treaties, each with wide variation in terms of goals and objectives.

Even the most highly educated among us are befuddled by a lack of factual information about Native American history. When we become aware of the contemporary existence of Indians at all, we expect to know easily "what Indians want," and are inevitably frustrated in the attempt. To those unfamiliar with the ethnohistorical context, modern Indian assertions of sovereignty, land title, and what amounts to privileged status appear presumptuous, capricious, and annoying. The tendency in contemporary American society is to see the world through non-Indian eyes—as it has historically been seen—and that perspective is generally taken for granted. We read a map issued by the American Automobile Association unaware that, whereas state and often even county and city boundaries are delineated, reservation lands—whose status in a legal and constitutional sense is quite distinct from, and superior to, any of these—are omitted altogether. Or we may visit the Custer National Monument

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on the Crow Reservation in Montana, the sight of the most renowned victory in the long history of the resistance of Indian tribes to Euro-American incursions, and not find it amiss that the entire battle is described—unapologetically—from the standpoint of the losers.

I will attempt in this essay to present some of the ambiguities and questions raised by the history of European-Indian contact, paying special attention to those issues of tribal lands and sovereignty most current and pressing. It will be necessary, however, to begin with some basic background material and to develop a sense of the cultural and legal trends that laid the foundation for the ambiguities of modern Indian policy.

Cultural Background

Whatever explanation of origins one accepts—be it the independent and intentional creation of most mythic and religious systems or the more quantifiable archeological record of migrating populations—it is a fact that the ancestors of those people who are today known as American Indians have continuously inhabited North America for upwards of thirty thousand years,[1] and possibly much longer. This aboriginal configuration of peoples was by any criterion—genetic, linguistic, social, or political—mightily heterogeneous. It is currently estimated that in the fifteenth century there were at least four hundred separate and distinct cultures north of the Rio Grande, and that they included a vast array of physical types and language stocks. Among these cultures were theocracies and democracies, hereditary chiefdoms and matrilineages; their peoples lived in large cities supported by agriculture and in small mobile bands of hunters.[2] They thoroughly, if not densely, inhabited this continent, adapting to temperature extremes from subarctic to desert, and exploiting environmental possibilities from deep-sea fishing to intensive cultivation of hybridized crops. Persuasive evidence attests that for tens of centuries prior to Columbus's voyage they were, for all practical purposes, isolated from, and out of touch with, human communities in Europe, Asia, and Africa; and though each Native community maintained a far-flung, dynamic set of trade and cooperative—sometimes hostile—relations with other neighboring societies, no single group dominated more than a small fraction of the continent.

The attitudes Native American peoples brought to their contacts with settlers in the New World in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries were shaped by their prior experience. Indian tribes had long existed in a plural world where foreign cultures differed substantively from one's own. Other groups looked, spoke, dressed, believed, and prayed in ways singularly appropriate to themselves. This is not to imply that all cultures were regarded as equally good or worthwhile; like people the world over, each Native American probably felt confident that his or her people were the *raison d'être* of creation and the most enlightened, interesting, tasteful, and "human" society imaginable. But no sense of superiority, however secure, could contradict the inescapable observation that other groups whose ways and beliefs seemed bizarre and inexplicable similarly felt themselves to be the center of the universe.

Thus it would appear that initial contact with Europeans would be rather unspectacular for members of a Native American society. In many respects, the

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historical record indicates that Europeans were treated as neither more nor less exotic than would be members of another Indian group. Native people seem not to have been especially intimidated by, or impressed with, most of the novelties brought as trade goods, and often appear to have regarded the newcomers with a mixture of curiosity and concern: though Europeans looked like adults, they frequently seemed unable to feed themselves and to be perpetually on the brink of starving to death.[3]

The history of Europe prior to the Age of Exploration contrasted sharply with that of North America. For all of its tradition of interethnic strife and turmoil, Europe was, relative to the rest of the world, fairly homogeneous. With only a handful of exceptions,[4] every language spoken from Ireland to the Dardanelles derived from a single family, the Indo-European. Furthermore, the Europe of 1491 was bonded by a mental culture a millennium and a half old, the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Every man, woman, and child on the Continent knew the basic tenets of this macroreligion. Its Ten Commandments were the foundation of moral and common law; its leadership was international and powerful; and its official language, Latin, formed the lingua franca of learned and legal communication. Europeans believed in the same cosmology and the same divinity, and shared fundamental assumptions concerning the meaning of life itself. For the most part, they were wholly unaware that alternative systems and world views existed.[5]

Finally, some important political and social conventions were widespread throughout Europe, particularly Western Europe. Patrilineality, the system by which men are nominally dominant over women in every arena from marriage to property rights to leadership roles in both secular and spiritual spheres, was the unexcepted custom. Certain assumptions about leadership itself were commonly held—that one person or a small group of persons could govern the actions of many, that rulership was hereditary, that allegiance or loyalty was owed an individual simply because of his rank or station. In addition, the concept of the "nation-state" was beginning to emerge in many areas.[6]

For the greater part of European history, this rather myopic and misleading attitude, bred of cultural isolation, persisted. Beyond familiar borders, the world was regarded as either a place infested with demons, barbarians, and infidels, or as not existing at all; in the popular flatlander vision, the ocean and everything else simply stopped somewhere west of Portugal. True, occasionally invaders demanded attention from the cultures on Europe's peripheries: the Moors in Iberia, the Huns and Turks in the East. But these encounters made little dent in the ethnocentrism of most Europeans.

The lack of any strong traditions of culturally plural coexistence or respect for extracontinental societies left Europeans poorly equipped to deal with the "discovery" of a "new" and inhabited world. Initial reactions to the presence of human beings whose looks, beliefs, or disposition did not fit the familiar molds ranged from awe to outrage. The very humanity of indigenous peoples was seriously questioned by some,[7] and it was universally and instantly assumed that there was a "natural" hierarchy of "civilization," with Europeans at its apex. Notions such as cultural relativity seem to have been almost totally absent, and it was at first expected and eventually mandated that all Native peoples would unremittingly and unhesitatingly forsake their own languages, mores, and beliefs, and embrace European substitutes.

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Ethnohistorical Context

From its earliest beginnings, the politics of social interaction between indigenous and immigrant (non-Indian) peoples in North America evolved out of a growing sense of confusion. Neither group really knew what to make of the other, and each searched their own known and mythic histories for explanations or analogues for dealing with unknown and unfathomable beings. Various Native societies came up with a wide assortment of hypotheses to identify and predict the behavior of Europeans, ranging from the Aztec, "Maybe it's Quetzalcoatl," to the idea of the Southern Cheyenne that mountain men—the early European trappers in the Rockies—represented the return to the world of a class of long-departed excrement-eating clowns.[8]

Europeans apparently had little problem in postulating an equally dazzling set of improbable theories to explain the origin and true nature of those whom they found in possession of America. Puritans blithely concluded that indigenous peoples were but manifestations of the Devil, sent to test their will for The Good.[9] Others felt Indians embodied the familiar Teutonic wildman-of-the-forest bogey—long hair, guttural language, sylvan abode—and treated them accordingly.[10] Scholarly types speculated that Indians exhibited a level of cultural development prior to that of contemporary Europe.[11] Their retardation was laid to any number of possible causes: a separate and more recent creation or evolution, or both, or the limitations imposed either by mental capacity or restrictive environment, to name only two. For Europeans, it was just a matter of time until Indians "caught up"—as far as they were able. Still others imagined that the Natives had come from outer space, Phoenicia, or Atlantis.

Cultural interactions have always taken place on at least two levels, the imaginary and the real. North America, at its most cosmically mythic, was the setting for the dramatic encounter of The Indian with The White Man. In this realm of inflated stereotype, only conglomerate Races, complete with their imagined associated personality characteristics, confront each other—individual people and unique groups are nowhere to be found. One can only speculate on the mass of interpretation made by Indian societies to account for the appearance and behavior of The White Man, but there is certainly no lack of data traditionally used to describe his tawny counterpart.

In popular and persistent folk belief, The Indian is, among other things, male, red-skinned, stoic, taciturn, ecologically aware, and a great user of metaphor. Or, he is cunning, mercurial, wild, lusty, and a collector of blond scalps. At nightfall he silhouettes himself in the sunset, or dances, shrieking, around his campfire. Before vanishing, he was prone to skulking, sneaking, and sundry other double-dealings. Rather than defend himself, he "uprose"; rather than resist the occupation of his land, he "outbroke"; rather than defeat a foe, he "massacred."[12] The one major commonality uniting this schizophrenic persona is a general agreement that, whoever and whatever he was, for better or worse, he is no more. The Indian, by and large, is a motif embedded in Americana, not perceived as a part of the American present.[13] The confusion comes when we realize that Indian people, too often mistaken for The Indian, are still very much around.

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Contact Strategies

If nothing else, American Indians have been consistent in their objectives. For the nearly five hundred years since continuous contact with the Eastern Hemisphere was established, simple survival has been the common denominator of every major tribal, national, or pan-Indian campaign vis-à-vis the first Europeans and their genetic or cultural descendants. During some periods of history that objective has been easy to define and identify. The apparent Native American lack of immunity to many Old World diseases, for example, resulted in a decimated aboriginal population within a generation or two after the first encounter with a germ-carrying European. It is currently estimated that often as many as nineteen out of twenty members of many Indian societies who contracted smallpox, cholera, measles, or any number of other contagious infections succumbed shortly after the initial exposure.[14] Such was the devastation, that their "discoverers" were wont to regard Indians as "vanishing," and to forecast their biological extinction in the immediate future.

One cannot begin to fathom the trauma that must have been experienced by those few Native people who, by genetic chance, survived the onslaught of previously unknown diseases, only to watch most of their families and friends perish. Yet they not only had to attempt to hold the fabric of their kin-based political systems together, but at the same time try to make a proper response to a growing and increasingly aggressive invading force of foreigners. The question of survival was, for them, not a subtle one.

Intentional genocide, though documented in certain instances in North America,[15] was not carried out with any prolonged determination against Indians. This may have been owing in part to the common assumption that natural attrition would solve the "Indian problem." Believers in eighteenth and nineteenth century notions of cultural evolution, complacent in their ethnocentric teleology, regarded the prospect of Indian survival with a nostalgic, if somewhat cold-blooded, attitude. "Irresistibly held in the vise of evolution, [Indians] filled their niche in destiny and departed to their happy hunting ground."[16]

Yet, though their precontact population was reduced from an estimated 12 to 15 million[17] north of the Rio Grande in 1491 to a low of 210,000 in the 1910 census, Indians did not altogether disappear; those who did not die from one or another imported malady passed their predisposition to immunity on to their offspring, and each succeeding generation experienced relatively fewer fatalities as a result of disease.[18] Today, with an estimated population well in excess of one million nationally, Indians constitute one of the fastest growing ethnic populations in the United States. However, their expected mass demise profoundly affected the nature of early European perceptions and consequent official dealings with Indians, and thus had a lasting impact, through the precedents and language of the accords that marked the establishment of relations between Indians and Europeans, on all later legal relationships.

Actual contact, as opposed to the imaginary, takes place between people, and whatever their confusions about each other, all parties must reach agreements that regulate and define the areas of interaction between them.

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There is a period of mutual testing and appraisal before the situation becomes stabilized and understandings are established. The two, or more, parties must exist, or expect to exist, in a relatively equitable power relationship, or a dominant-subordinate context will result.

By the time a substantial number of British colonists arrived to settle in North America, several major points had already been settled. After some years of debate by Spanish intellectuals, the Pope had ruled with finality that Indians did, in fact, have souls and were therefore human beings.[19] It was also evident that there were sufficient Indians to make any precipitous European conquest and defense of a land base untenable. Finally, commonly held concepts of international law (i.e., rules of conduct shared by European nations) now included an understanding known as "Right of Discovery,"[20] that at its minimum interpretation suggested that a superior legal jurisdiction fell to the European nation first landing on, and laying claim to, territory not formerly held by other Europeans. As it came to be understood, Right of Discovery awarded to a European nation the sole and exclusive authority to negotiate for the transfer of absolute ownership and title to property with the Natives (if any) of that property. This type of jurisdiction was an extreme form of "spheres of influence"; it enabled the various "exploring" European nations to divide up neatly the non-European world, at least by their own reckoning, over the next several centuries. If through conquest or negotiation one European nation succeeded the other in the control of a land area, the Right of Discovery was inherited along with other prerogatives.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was no clear idea of the extent of the North American continent, nor were the type and total of the aboriginal population known; but it was clear that they existed in sufficient numbers to defend their land. In response to this reality, the English, in particular, adopted an interesting and innovative policy, the effects of which are profoundly felt today. In word and practice, the British recognized the prior sovereignty of the Indian nations they encountered. They conceded that the indigenous populace had a legal right both to self-governance and to claim title to land on the basis of long ("time immemorial") use and occupancy; they stipulated that such claim, based on aboriginal right, could be extinguished only by negotiations or warfare carried out at the highest level—as between nations.

The mechanism for negotiation was the treaty, a means of international agreement long in use among European states. As the British understood it, an Indian treaty, among other things, formalized the cession of territory claimed by the Native group in exchange for the formal English recognition of clear and abiding title to the nonceded and still-claimed area. The English would then "own" outright the lands from which aboriginal claim was withdrawn. The Indian nation would retain ownership on the remainder, with undisputed tenure.

Legal Precedents

Though most Indian tribes had no prior concept absolutely analogous to the European idea of land title, they were quick to learn, and they entered into

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treaty negotiations relinquishing once-used lands for several reasons. First, the toll taken by European diseases, which often preceded intense European settlement, had so reduced the Native population, that it was unfeasible to expect to defend effectively as wide an expanse of territory as had once been used. Second, the English (and to a lesser degree, the French) offered strong inducements to tribes that agreed to enter into, and be bound by, treaties; in exchange for land claims, tribes were promised annuities in money and trade goods, health and education benefits, and most important, the security of an uncontested land base where they could live in peace and independence "as long as the waters flow and as long as the grasses grow." That latter phrase, commonly known as a perpetuity clause, was routinely inserted in the treaties Europeans made with Indians, though ordinarily it was not a part of the compacts they made with each other. Its inclusion may reflect the European expectation that Indians were indeed "vanishing" and would not survive to reap the long-term benefits of an easily made promise.

In certain respects, it ultimately mattered less what those first treaties actually said—since virtually all were eventually broken by the European signatores—than that they were made at all. The very act of treaty-making imparted a European version of nationhood to the Native party, and as a result, established at least a legal parity, in terms of co-equal sovereignty, between aboriginal and European states.[21] This status, once recognized, did not diminish when the relative power balance between the two sides shifted, nor theoretically, with the passage of time. "Age has not invalidated the treaties any more than it has invalidated the Constitution which recognizes them as 'the supreme law of the land.' Nor does breach of violation of treaties nullify them any more than does the act of committing a crime nullify the law that forbids that crime."[22] Furthermore, it certified beyond question that Indian nations had existed as self-governing nations prior to their contact with Europeans. This key reality has been—and is still—often misunderstood by the general American public.

> In spite of the inherent sovereignty of the Indian nations, and in spite of its repeated affirmation in old and recent United States law, many Americans believe that tribal governments were created by treaties and conferred upon Indians as benevolent dispensations of federal law. The reverse is true: the tribal governments entered into treaties and conferred certain rights to the colonials, and later to the United States.[23]

The recognition of Indian tribes as sovereignties, although somewhat regulated in their external affairs, continued without interruption after the American Revolution. In fact, the U.S. Constitution itself takes particular note of the special relationship that existed between the new nation and the ancient Native American states. Article I, Section 8, stipulates that "the Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with Indian tribes." Indian tribes are the only group specifically identified in the Constitution; "persons unfamiliar with Indian law mistake this distinction as one of a *racial* nature. Such is not the case. Indian tribes are

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distinct political entities—governments with executive, legislative and judicial powers."[24]

In 1790 the Congress further clarified its understanding of its role vis-à-vis Indian tribes. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790[25] stated that only the federal government—as a sovereign—and not states—as lesser political entities—may inherit the "discoverer's" right to treat with Indian nations and thereby extinguish portions of aboriginal land claims. In other words, Indian lands may pass out of Indian hands *only* when the federal government, as an equivalent sovereign, is involved in the transaction.

In the case of *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831),[26] the Supreme Court added a definition of its own. Regarding the status of the Cherokee reservation—that is, the aboriginal core lands remaining to the Cherokee after all external claims had been legally and appropriately extinguished and relinquished—it was the opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall that the reservation existed as a "domestic, dependent nation," having a special relationship to the United States. This was later made even more explicit in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832);[27] in that decision, Marshall termed the Cherokee reservation a "distinct, independent, political community." These definitions were transferable and applicable to all other federally recognized reservations, and are among the fundamental principles of all subsequent Indian law.

During all the years that the U.S. government was testing, refining, and ultimately reaffirming *its* understanding of the maintained sovereignty of Indian nations, the issue was never in question for this country's partners in treaty. From the point of view of the Indian tribes, their own legal and political situation was perfectly clear. "Nationhood" may have initially been a somewhat foreign concept to some or even most of them, but they had understood and adapted to it long ago. They regarded their treaties both with European powers and later with the American government with the utmost seriousness, and had every reason to construe them as binding and in force. After all, they had, without exception, fulfilled to the letter all of their obligations under these agreements—they had dutifully and without violence ceded all stipulated lands according to the terms of their respective treaties.

Those compacts had been minutely discussed and examined within their own governing bodies, and some of the Native leaders at the time of enactment had committed the agreements in their entirety to memory. This oral record was as immutable and stable as its written counterpart in Washington, and in many cases was better understood by the population who most felt its impact. Indian peoples were well aware, in general, of what they had been forced to give up, and were equally well acquainted with promised terms of payment.[28] The latter may never have been equal in value to the former, but Native societies were in no position to strike the most self-advantageous bargain. Recent testimony[29] shows that the tribes have maintained, through meticulous oral history, a complete inventory of these agreements, including the most detailed accounts of all discussion and debates surrounding treaty negotiation. There can be no question of the tribes' intent when entering into and ratifying these accords. From their perspective, they paid dearly in lands and opportunities to reserve for themselves and their descendants the rights of self-government, freedom of choice and expression within their own territories, and the

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additional compensation, in most cases, of an ongoing installment plan payment. They may have, during the difficult days of the past one hundred fifty years, lacked the military or political clout to protect their rights when violated, but recent history shows that they never forgot what those rights were nor conceded their diminution.

Modern Challenges

By 1871, when the treaty-making process formally came to an end,[30] virtually all tribes in the area that was to become the forty-eight contiguous states had reached some *modus vivendi* with the American government, and all were, for better or worse, established on one or another reservation. Their lands were not new, nor were they gifts; rather, they represented the residue of Indian land holdings that once encompassed all of North America. In exchange for ceding most[31] of their territory, tribes were promised that their remaining lands would be held in trust for them and for their progeny in perpetuity.

Few non-Indians in the United States had read those treaties, and as a result, even those who had framed and ratified them, even those who called themselves "friends of the Indian," came to interpret Indian lands in ways quite at odds with their initial and legal status. For some, reservations were viewed as holding grounds where tribes could be controlled by the government and subject to the civilizing and Christianizing effects of education and missionary work.[32] Benevolent societies, such as that which became known as the Lake Mohonk Conference, issued such statements as, "The organization of the Indian tribes is, and has been, one of the most serious hindrances to the advancement of the Indian towards civilization, and . . . every effort should be made to secure the disintegration of all tribal organizations; . . . to accomplish this result the Government should . . . cease to recognize Indians as political bodies or organized tribes."[33]

It did not take long for the federal government to respond. Senator Henry Dawes, a former officer of the Indian Rights Association of Philadelphia, proposed legislation that would allot the reservations "in severalty," assigning to each male head of household, unmarried woman, and orphaned child a discrete plot of land to "prove" for a period of twenty years or more, after which they might petition to become U.S. citizens. Under the provisions of the General Allotment Act (1887),[34] the president was empowered to unilaterally abrogate existing international agreements with Indian tribes. Each Indian allottee was granted a share or a portion of a share, usually not exceeding 160 acres; according to this schedule, there was considerably more remaining Indian land than there were Indians to distribute it to individually (according to the preassigned average schedules). Thus, in one stroke of the pen, almost one half[35] of all the lands controlled by Indians in 1885 were declared "surplus" and passed out of Native control. Over the course of the next forty-five years that the act was in force, substantially more land was lost from this shrinking base because of theft, chicanery, sale, or fraud.

It is undoubtedly true that some people who sponsored and supported the Dawes policy sincerely believed that they were acting in the best interests of Indian people; however, the results were disastrous for the supposed beneficia-

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ries. In 1928 the Institute for Government Research (Brookings Institution) published *The Problem of Indian Administration*—popularly known as the Meriam Report, after the project's director, Lewis Meriam—which detailed the economic and social conditions of the Indians as they were almost fifty years after the passage of Allotment.[36] The report found "deplorable" conditions prevalent in almost every Indian settlement in the country,[37] and concluded that the federal government's "allotment in severalty" and "Americanization" programs were failures. It recommended increased appropriations for Indian health and education, cessation of allotments, and more effective protection for their property, among other things. In sum, it discouraged forced assimilation as a policy, and urged that Indians be fitted to live in contemporary American society without being bludgeoned into it.

President Franklin Roosevelt's appointment of John Collier, a cultural anthropologist, to the position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs furthered this line of reasoning in the next decade. His proposal for a sweeping set of reforms was embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.[38] This legislation recognized afresh the right of Indian tribes to be and to remain distinct, functioning political entities, and reaffirmed the special trust relationship between the American and Native governments. Funds were allocated to repurchase some of the lands lost through Allotment policy, and reservations were strongly urged to design and enact tribal constitutions based on the American model. Though some religious and assimilationist groups opposed this "return to tribalism," the vast majority of Indians hailed aspects of the act as a long overdue reinstitution of the legal relationship that existed between the United States and Indian tribes.[39]

Collier noted that the Wheeler-Howard, or Indian Reorganization, Act

> endeavors to provide the means, statutory and financial, to repair as far as possible, the incalculable damage done by the allotment policy and its corollaries. . . . Congress and the President recognized that the cumulative loss of land brought about by the allotment system, a loss reaching 90,000,000 acres—two-thirds of the land heritage of the Indian race in 1887—had robbed the Indians in large part of the necessary basis for self-support.

He went on to note that

> the first step in this rebuilding process must be the reorganization of the tribes. . . . In the past they managed their own affairs effectively whenever there was no white interference for selfish ends. They can learn to do it again under present conditions with the aid of modern organization methods, once they realize that these organizations will be permanent and will not be subject to the whims of changing administrations.[40]

One may hope that few Indians so "realized," for this "New Deal for Indians" was short-lived indeed. Within two decades, House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1953)[41] proclaimed that it was the policy of the United States to abolish federal supervision over the tribes as soon as possible and to subject the Indians to the same laws, privileges, and responsibilities as all other citizens of the United States. With this resolution, the government began the process of "termination," the unilateral abrogation of treaty responsibility toward the

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tribes. The language of Resolution 108 was as euphemistic as had been that of the Allotment Act some eighty years before. It talked of giving Indians "equal rights" and of "freeing" them from "federal supervision and control and from all the disabilities and limitations specifically applicable to Indians"[42]—as if no one understood that in equalizing rights, Indians were losing those very advantages for which their ancestors had exchanged most of North America. Native Americans would henceforth be "free" to do all that they had fought so hard to be exempted from; hereafter they would be subject to state taxes and to state fishing and hunting laws, and would lose federal protection over their lands and the right to self-governing sovereign status.

Passage of this resolution was quickly followed by the adoption of Public Law 280,[43] which extended state jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians and over specified parts of "Indian Country." Obviously the Congress did not construe reservations to be Justice Marshall's "distinct, independent, political communities." On the contrary, for almost one hundrd years the House had seemed determined, with the notable exception of the hotly debated Indian Reorganization Act,[44] to undermine the legal basis for Indian tribal power. It had overwhelmingly voted in favor of every piece of legislation limiting Indian sovereignty since 1887. In fact, the General Allotment Act (1887), the Indian Citizenship Act (1924), House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1953), and Public Law 280 (1953) all passed without so much as a roll call.

Recent Developments

Perhaps the only good thing that can be said about the termination policy is that it proved to be socially and economically unfeasible faster than it could be implemented on a large scale,[45] and thereby did not directly affect the vast majority of reservation people. Its attack on the precept of tribal sovereignty and integrity, coming so close on the heels of the resumption of that recognition in the Indian Reorganization Act, alerted tribes that they must act conscientiously and cautiously if they were to protect their inherited and constitutional rights.

Felix Cohen articulated the legal and political basis for tribal autonomy when he wrote:

> 1. An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state.
>
> 2. Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States, and in substance, terminated the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe. . . .
>
> 3. These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.[46]

Many important aspects of this definition are generally undisputed. Indian tribes have not carried on "external powers of sovereignty"—that is, conducted

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international relations except with the United States, since the War of 1812.[47] Although Congress asserts plenary (i.e., overriding) authority in dealing with Indian tribes, the tribes retain their authority unless legislation has expressly denied it. These as yet unrestrained powers constitute "residual authority."

Another significant and long-standing concept is the federal trust relationship with Indian tribes—meaning that the United States, by virtue of its dominance over the tribes as dependent nations, is obliged to certain responsibilities toward them. These fall into three broad areas: (1) protection of Indian trust property; (2) protection of the Indian right to self-government; and (3) provision of social, medical, and educational services for survival and advancement of the Indian tribes.[48] The tribes, in other words, are due certain privileges, protections, and benefits as a consequence of yielding some of their sovereignty to the United States.

The Native American Commissioners of the American Indian Policy Review Commission stated unambiguously at the conclusion of their *Final Report* (1977) that "there are two elements essential to the ability of all Indian tribes to progress towards economic development and eventual self-sufficiency: self-government, i.e., sovereignty, and the trust relationship."[49] Both goals would appear to be logically available, yet, historically, Congress has shown an inconsistent comprehension of Indian nationhood. Reflecting the ambiguous and ill-informed attitude of much of its constituency, Congress often seems to regard reservations and treaty rights as transitional stages that will cease as soon as even approximate economic parity of Indians with other groups within the country is achieved.

Certainly, from the very beginning of the formal association between the United States and Indian tribes, there has been much to suggest that at least some of the prerogatives available only to nations exist for Indians. The Cherokee treaty of Hopewell (1785), for instance, was the first to make mention of certain tribal jurisdictional rights: "If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall attempt to settle on any of the land . . . hereby allotted to the Indians . . . such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Indians may punish him or not as they please."[50] However, the treaty limits that very authority to a ceratin degree: "If any Indian . . . or person residing among them, or who shall take refuge in their nation, shall commit a . . . capital crime . . . [the tribe] shall be bound to deliver him . . . up to be punished according to the ordinances of the United States."[51] A variety of Supreme Court decisions, both early[52] and more recently[53] have upheld the concept that tribal authority naturally prevails over that of surrounding or contiguous states.

Though most tribes adopted a written constitutional form of government at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act, other tribes such as the Iroquois and the Pueblo retained their traditional—and ancient—political systems. In either case,

> as governments, Indian tribes have general powers to (1) make laws governing the conduct of persons, including non-Indians, in Indian country; (2) establish bodies such as tribal police and courts to enforce the law and administer justice;

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(3) exclude or remove non-members from the reservation for cause; and (4) regulate hunting and fishing, land use, and environmental protection.[54]

When Congress voted in 1924 to make all Indians citizens of the United States,[55] it specifically noted that "the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property." Yet the status of individual Indians was somewhat unclear; on a day-to-day basis, did they operate under the laws of the United States or of an Indian nation? Which authority, federal or tribal, prevailed?

Specific legal guidelines are sometimes hard to discern, and as always in Indian law, one must search first for historic decisions as precedents. *Talton v. Mayes* (1896)[56] held that federal courts have no authority to review Indian court convictions by the writ of *habeas corpus;* in other words, the tribe's right to punish offenses is not limited by the Fifth Amendment, because the Bill of Rights applies only to federal governmental actions, and Indian tribes are not federal powers. *Native American Church v. Navajo tribe* (1959)[57] simply ruled that the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion was not binding over the Navajo Tribe, nor by analogy could it extend to any other functioning tribal government. The Fourteenth Amendment due process provision is also non-applicable, because "Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that of states."[58] Inherent and residual sovereignty are the foundations of these findings that affirm the judicial and political separateness of Indian governments.

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968[59] imposes on tribal governments specific and slightly modified individual rights derived from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It mentions only one federal remedy available—the writ of *habeas corpus*—in conjunction with this act and from the legislative hearing prior to its passage.[60] From the summary remarks of Senator Ervin,[61] it appears that this was the only recourse intended.[62] Public Law 280 was amended to allow further assumption by states of jurisdiction *only* with the approval of the Indian tribes affected,[63] and to provide automatic retrocession to the federal government if desired by the state.

A recent Supreme Court decision, *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez* (1978),[64] limits the circumstances in which an individual can bring suit against a tribal government, and affirms the sovereignty of those governments. In that ruling, it was stated that "in addition to the [Indian Civil Rights Act's] objective of strengthening the position of the individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal policy of furthering Indian self-government."[65]

The Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975[66] recognizes the right of Indians to "control their relationships both among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations and persons," and goes on to observe that "the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities."[67]

In *Oliphant v. Suquamish* (1978),[68] the Supreme Court found that tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians when they commit crimes on

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reservation lands, yet in a related decision in the same year, it ruled that "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."[69] Russel Barsh and James Henderson point out that

> *Oliphant*'s theory of power reaches much further. According to one federal district court, tribes now lack *civil* jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-Indian firms as well,[70] frustrating zoning, environmental regulation, and the enforcement of public health and safety standards on reservations. Without the power to protect reservation residents, tribes cannot maintain political legitimacy.[71]

Interpreting Recent Laws and Cases

Where, then, do congressional and judicial decisions of the past twenty years, not to mention the previous two hundred, leave Indians? There are any number of ways to interpret the Indian Civil Rights Act as it is reflected in the major Supreme Court decisions of *Santa Clara Pueblo* and *Oliphant*. The assimilationist perspective views the act, together with the Major Crimes Act (1885), as making "drastic inroads on the judicial sovereignty of the tribes."[72] According to this line of thought, tribal courts are too expensive and—despite the historical rationale for special status—inequitable, in that they separate one ethnic population from the general court system of the United States.

Another view regards it as appropriately limiting, rather than obliterating, tribal sovereignty. "The answer lies in tying tribal power to its purpose," this argument goes. "Thus limited, the exercise of tribal power would have no impact on non-members, yet such exercise would be unfettered by congressional supervision within its proper sphere."[73] It is proper, then, that tribes have jurisdiction over members *(Santa Clara Pueblo)* but not over nonmembers *(Oliphant)*.

Yet another interpretation emphasizes the protectorate relationship, "whereby tribes retain their political independence except as limited by express provisions in the federal statutes, treaties or by [inherent] restraints"[74] between the federal government and the tribes. There is some feeling that the rights specified in the Indian Civil Rights Act should be applied and interpreted in the same manner as those outlined in the Bill of Rights.[75] Any disputes between the two should be resolved by Congress or by flexible standards determined by the courts.

The Indian Civil Rights Act places limits on the

> power of tribal governments by guaranteeing certain individual rights to all persons within tribal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has asserted that these limitations were intended to strike a balance with, and not to override, the well-established federal policy of further Indian self-government.[76]

Each case must be resolved on its own merits, and precedents are to be avoided. It is recognized that federal authority should not ordinarily intrude on the sovereignty of a tribe.

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> If the Indian nation is found to possess a degree of sovereignty sufficient to support the conclusion that it expects to conduct its internal affairs free from federal regulation, then no [federal] civil remedy should be implied under the Indian Civil Rights Act.[77]

"Sufficient" sovereignty derives from several sources: the absence of a congressional act denying it, treaties specifically asserting it, or the persuasive power of a strong extant tribal government. "Absent Congressional mandate, the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the evolution of Indian governments that Congress is presently supervising."[78]

This leads to another, more positive interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act: in a perverse way, by limiting tribal sovereignty, Congress reaffirmed its existence.[79] Though nontribal members are excluded from jurisdiction by *Oliphant*, the residual authority of Indian courts to try civil actions exclusively within their domain persists, as upheld in *Santa Clara Pueblo*. It would seem by this standard that a continuing refinement of the meaning of tribal sovereignty, and not a total usurpation of it, is underway. Alvin Ziontz observes:

> The Indian Civil Rights Act remains, of course, an imposition of values of the dominant American culture which sharply conflicts with the tradition of many tribes. But *Martinez [v. Santa Clara Pueblo]* allows the tribes to implement the Indian Civil Rights Act in a manner which preserves their ability to decide difficult questions in accordance with tribal values, and more importantly, in a manner consistent with tribal sovereignty.[80]

There are still other, more novel and intriguing ways to interpret the act. Some, like David Robertson, see it as illustrating the "intention of Congress to bring the tribes within the conceptual scheme of federalism while simultaneously making more secure their right to tribal autonomy. As such it constitutes a new policy, not directly descended from either the separatist or the assimilationist line."[81] This seems to correspond with the import of the *Wheeler* ruling (1978),[82] which determined that successive state-federal and tribal-federal prosecutions do not constitute double jeopardy, since jurisdictional authority derives separately for tribes than for courts using Western modes of justice. Michael Gross argues that Congress should mandate that tribal actions parallel American "notions of fairness, including notice, an opportunity for hearing, and ascertainable standards for decision" to protect individual Indian groups or communities "in their struggle for local control of important government services, especially education."[83] But it seems clear that whenever the United States deals with Indians in their capacity as individual American citizens, their dual, tribal status is at a disadvantage. No other group in this country exists in this dichotomous position, and therefore most non-Indians, including lawmakers, do not understand it; but from a Native American point of view, the advantages of dual citizenship are theirs by legal contract and congressional ratification.[84]

There are some additional significant congressional actions falling somewhat outside the general focus of this paper that should be noted. In 1975 Congress fulfilled part of its obligation to honor promises made forty years earlier, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act, by passing the Submarginal Lands Act

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Amendments (P.L.. 95-114). This act returned 480,000 acres of land, almost all of which existed within the boundaries of the reservations of some eighteen tribes. Further, it passed in 1974 the Indian Finance Act (P.L. 93-262), thus creating the largest source of federal loan capital ever made available to Indian business enterprises. Once again, a pledge made in the 1930s but never adequately carried forth was recalled and acted upon.

In the field of education, Congress passed in 1972 the Indian Education Act (Title IV of the Educational Amendments of 1972, P.L. 93-3181), creating the Office of Indian Education and the National Advisory Council on Indian Education. The goals of this act include bilingual/bicultural enrichment programs, teacher training, and adult and early childhood programs; the act also stipulates a hiring preference for Indians. Three years later, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (P.L. 93-638) further placed in the hands of local communities responsibility for, and control over, the education of Indian children.

In 1976 Congress passed the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (P.L. 94-437), a far-reaching piece of legislation designed to improve the level of health care delivery on reservations and to train Indian professionals in modern medical techniques. The Indian Civil Welfare Act (1978, P.L. 95-608) was aimed at clarifying jurisdiction over dependent Indian children. It acknowledged the authority of tribal courts over child custody and related cases. Finally (also in 1978), Congress at long last passed the Native American Religious Freedom Act (P.L. 95-341), which mandated that federal agencies be restrained in all activities from enacting policies that would interfere with the practice of traditional Indian forms of religious expression.

Two things should especially become clear from even a brief review of these bills. First, all stem directly from treaty agreements reached long ago; the rights to adequate health, education, and protection of lands derive from the trust relationship between Indians and the United States; and it stands to reason that Indian sovereignties have a clear right to worship as they choose and to control the welfare of their own children. In other words, there is nothing *new* in any of this legislation—it simply furthers promises made implicitly or explicitly at a previous time. Second, it is significant to note that all the bills are written in such a way as to suggest that Congress believes and attests that Indian tribes will persist in a special and unique political status over the long-term future. There is no suggestion that any of the provisions exist only for a transitional period, to a time when the trust relationship will cease to apply. They are in this sense the true federal repudiation of the policy of termination, and should act as a cornerstone to future developments.

The Courts, Indians, and Other Americans

A greater degree of judicial activity regarding Indians has taken place within the past twenty years than in any previous equivalent period. A good part of the reason for this explosion in litigation must be that there is a greater awareness within the Indian community, not only of the rights that proceed from treaties and legal precedents, but of the means by which to assert claims and to protect rights in court. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of Native

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American attorneys and in the number of non-Indian lawyers specializing in Indian law. And national Indian legal and advocacy organizations, such as the Native American Rights Fund, the National Indian Youth Council, the Institute for the Development of Indian Law, and the Association of American Indian Affairs have pressed cases and research of all types.[85]

The one million[86] American Indians constitute only one half of one percent of the American population. But when they challenge or are victorious in court over other, more populous and powerful groups, they soon cease to be regarded as emblems of nobility and bygone days. Their non-Indian sympathizers seem positively irate when they realize that Indians still expect treaties made long ago to apply, and are more chagrined still when the courts agree. Barsh and Henderson, as well as Sam Deloria, director of the American Indian Law Center at the University of New Mexico, have noted that "Indian policy runs in cycles. After a generation of relative security comes a period of intolerance, confrontation, and confiscation. In time, the country confesses error and makes some small attempts at tribal reconstruction and preservation. Tribes regain a part of their former intellectual, political, and technological strength. Then the cycle repeats."[87]

During the 1960s, Indians in the abstract were regarded fondly by the general public. A spate of "plight" books, capped by Dee Brown's *Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee*,[88] an appealing but somewhat simplistic and one-sided recounting of Indian history, had the country beating its collective breast for the demise of the noble Red Man. Thomas Berger's *Little Big Man*[89] in both book and film versions dramatically recreated the good old days gone by, and the quasi-mystical writings of Carlos Castaneda convinced sundry hippies, romantics, and Californians-of-all-regions that Indians were somehow genetically endowed with extrasensory powers. Bloomingdale's department store in New York City stocked and sold huge quantities of beads and feathers, and Native American chic was in.[90]

The love-in ended abruptly, however, when it became clear that contemporary Indians were not content to play the role of cultural symbol or caricature. A variety of events and court decisions simultaneously shattered the image of the "groovy Indian." Since World War II, an increasingly sizable Indian population migrated to urban areas in search of employment and other opportunities,[91] encouraged by the somewhat ill-conceived federal Urban Relocation Program initiated in the 1950s. In the past twenty years alone over two hundred thousand Indians have left their reservations and moved to such metropolitan centers as Los Angeles, Minneapolis, the Bay Area, Seattle, Denver, Chicago, Boston, New York, and Buffalo. Today nearly one half of the total Native American population in the United States could be classified as urban, though studies strongly suggest that the majority of these migrants maintain significant ties with their home communities.

The major reason for this demographic shift is a search for improved economic opportunities. Research conducted among Indians in both San Francisco and in Denver[92] indicates that the vast majority would prefer to return to their reservations if work were available there. Indeed, there is much evidence that urban Indians adjust to the city only marginally, regardless of the duration of their stay. If anything, the pressures of city life, coupled with a

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desire to resist "psychological assimilation," may spur and reinforce an increase in Indian self-identity and a rejection of non-Indian values.[93]

Such an attitude is clearly not rewarded by the dominant society. Theodore Graves found that the arrest record for Indians in Denver was some twenty times the Anglo rate and eight times the Spanish-American rate.[94] Many Native people born and educated within their tribal communities never experienced the reality of being a minority before they moved to the city, and it can be a traumatic event. There is a vivid fictional portrayal of this situation in N. Scott Momaday's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel *House Made of Dawn*,[95] and several of the short stories of Simon Ortiz describe it as well. For urban Indians, there are many ambiguities concerning treaty and other legal issues of jurisdiction, accountability, and right. It is not clear what benefits (e.g., health and education) ordinarily available on the reservation they are entitled to, or for how long. Cut off from the larger tribal community, they tend to seek out other Indians, minimizing past cultural differences; but, as J. H. Stauss and Bruce Chadwick point out in their study of Seattle, "the Indian who has lived his entire life in [the city], as well as the migrant, does not surrender his Indianess *(sic)* and blend into white society. . . . Although economic improvement does result, most migrants live a fairly marginal existence in the city while clinging to most of their traditional values."[96] Urban migration alone is not a route to cultural assimilation, but it does have other far-reaching social consequences.

By the late 1960s, a new generation of young people had grown up in cities, at the same time maintaining their ties to reservation communities. As they reached adulthood, they organized to form pan-Indian activist organizations such as the Indians of All Tribes and the American Indian Movement. The former group occupied and demanded title to Alcatraz Island; the latter took possession first of the Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington (which they termed the "Native American Embassy") and then the hamlet of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Both actions, though symbolically meaningful in and of themselves, were grounded in Indian interpretations of the rights and sovereignty granted to tribes under existing treaties, and were carried out to call attention to the fact that the government was not living up to its part of these bargains.

At the same time, those same treaties were being tested and upheld in important court cases and congressional actions. Tracts of lands of various magnitudes, ranging from the relatively small Taos Blue Lake[97] to the massive 40 million acres of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,[98] were returned to Native peoples on the basis of their treaty or aboriginal rights. The Menominee Reservation in Wisconsin, terminated in response to House Concurrent Resolution 108, was restored.[99] Other significant land claims cases were advanced, with varying success, in Maine,[100] Massachusetts, New York,[101] Rhode Island, Connecticut, and South Carolina.

In one of the most famous, controversial, and far-reaching decisions of the 1970s, *U.S. v. Washington* (1974), Judge Boldt of the 9th Circuit Federal Court recognized the inherent superiority of treaty rights over the privileges of ordinary citizens, and maintained that the state could regulate treaty-protected fishing only if it could be shown that it could not obtain the desired ends of conservation by any other means.[102] In this historic case, recently substantially

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upheld by the Supreme Court in *Washington v. Washington State Fishing Vessel Association*,[103] the Court decided that treaties gave the tribes the right to take between 45 and 50 percent of the total amount of harvestable fish in the state.

In the area of water rights,[104] some fifty Indian suits have recently been filed in the West and Southwest. These assert, largely on the basis of the *Winters v. U.S.* (1908)[105] decision, that treaties guarantee the tribes as much water as it takes "to make their reservations flourish," and that they have prior claim on the use of any waters that lay under or flow by or through their territory. The so-called Winters Doctrine gives tribes "command of the lands and waters"—control of all their beneficial use whether kept for hunting, for grazing herds of stock, or turned to agriculture or other forms of development. In the system of Western water law, where first users have prior rights, Indian tribes, by virtue of their ownership of the lands from time immemorial, or because the establishment of a reservation generally predated any contiguous permanent settlement, have a first use that makes their water rights paramount over those of all other users. In areas where tribes, such as the Pueblos, hold unextinguished aboriginal land title on lands where waters were used in precontact times to support agriculture (through irrigation and so on), there are "concomitant appurtenant unextinguished aboriginal" water rights that supercede all others.

Needless to say, this list of asserted claims has won Indians few friends among those most competitive with them on a local or regional level. Backlash movements have sprung up in a number of states, many of them part of an organization euphemistically titled the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities. As in the past, *equalization* of Indian rights translates to mean *reduction* of Indian rights, that is, concession of those elements of special privilege that derive from agreements reached in the eighteenth and nineteenth century treaties between the tribes and the United States. A booklet widely circulated, *Indian Treaties/American Nightmare*, by C. Herb Williams and Walt Neubrech[106] regards residual treaty rights as a threat to civilization-as-we-know-it, and calls for their speedy demise, primarily because they interfere with current majority "rights" in some areas.

A bill introduced in the 95th Congress by Rep. John Cunningham (D-Washington) called for the abrogation by the president of all treaties with Indian tribes entered into by the United States.[107] It was predictably titled the Native American Equal Opportunities Act, and called for the unilateral termination of the trust relationship between the tribes and the federal government, and the liquidation of all tribal lands and assets, which would be distributed to individual tribal members. This act received little support in Congress and was summarily defeated, but to many Indians it seemed ominously to portend a rebirth of a terminationist philosophy. To demonstrate the depth of their opposition, Native people from throughout the United States participated in a 1978 cross-country march on Washington to lobby in favor of the maintenance and further realization of Indian treaty rights.

The insistence on the right to special status distinguishes Indian "activists" from those of virtually every other minority group, and is often a bone of contention between Native Americans and their potential supporters. To some it appears, in the words of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, that

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"the law has . . . conferred upon tribal Indians and their descendents what amounts to titles of nobility, with all that entails."[108] From the Indian (and legal) point of view, however, Indian tribes granted rights *to* the United States, and thereby to a degree remain in control of everything not expressly granted,[109] whereas all other groups seek rights *from* the various branches of the American government. Moreover, Indians do not want blanket "equality"; they feel they have paid well—and in advance—for the few special rights and privileges accorded them, and are reluctant to wipe the slate clean and join a common pool of "citizens." The right to self-determination on the part of an Indian tribe is virtually the opposite of equal access.

In terms of their "demands" and their rationales for these goals, Indians are for the most part in sharp contrast with other groups. For one thing, whereas oppressed groups traditionally seek the overthrow of, radical change in, or major new concessions from, the government that has discriminated against them, Indians are notoriously antirevolutionary. They want actualized what they have been promised on paper for one or two hundred years. Their best hope lies in the honoring of agreements made by the United States when Indian power was relatively stronger. Though there has been some hopeful consideration of the prospects of United Nations intervention in their behalf, or other such developments, pragmatic Indians feel they are unlikely soon to be in a very advantageous bargaining position, given their numbers in the total American population. Native American tribes have often fared best in courts where conservative judges apply the letter of the law.

Indians feel that obligations are owed them not merely because a government should be fair and humane toward all its citizenry, but more important, because *this* government is obliged to keep existing promises and fulfill active contracts. Every major tribal or pan-Indian organization, whatever its self-presentation or tactics, is committed at base to the same thing: exhorting the United States to abide by treaties, statutes, and other formal understandings that have been made. As such, Indians make poor coalition partners with other ethnic minority groups that seek structural or innovative changes in government and law.

Finally, Indian tribes are by no means united in their short-term goals or strategies. Though tribes have cooperated in various constellations on one or another policy (and are united in opposition to others, such as termination), tribes are individually defined in their relationship with the American government by their specific treaties, and as a result, are occasionally competitive with other Indian nations. Many theorists have argued that a unified front must be sought and maintained by all Native groups. Such a plan of action, they say, is the only route to not only success, but survival; but people have been saying the same thing to Indians for two hundred years, to no avail, and Indians are still very much here.

Few non-Indians truly realize what every Native American knows absolutely: that historically, culturally, philosophically, legally, and in many other respects, tribes really *are* distinct, and it is in their unique qualities that their strengths and traditions reside. Indians are *not* a single ethnic group, and show no signs of becoming one. They have been forced to respond to uniform American policies, but the pattern of their reaction has varied greatly from tribe

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to tribe. Although such a reality has its obvious liabilities, it may not be altogether a disadvantage. One million Indians, even *if* united, are not likely to affect profoundly the American nation with its 250 million people. However, when the federal government is mandated, as is now the case, to supervise and live up to two hundred separate, diverse treaties, the number of people involved matters less. It is much more unwieldy to control a heterogeneous Indian population than to deal with one homogeneous group.

If nothing else, it was widely recognized in Indian tribes throughout North America in the precontact period that tribal members had pervasive and inherent rights to make individual choices. "United fronts" are difficult to achieve even within tribes, where competing factions (clan versus clan, "traditionalists" versus "progressives," and so on), each believing that it represents the best interests of the group, vie for ascendancy and influence. On a national scale, this incipient divisiveness is discernible on many levels. Though increased mobility and the existence of national Indian organizations facilitate frequent meetings of leaders and others from various tribes, few strong national or pan-Indian leaders have emerged who have remained in authoritative roles for long. Perhaps it is inevitable that no single individual, the product of a particular tribe and experiential background, can successfully represent such a diversity of interests, but the short life of national Indian leaders has become a standing joke—the Indian crab syndrome[110]—among tribal people. All this is not to say that Indians cannot and have not worked together for common goals in particular cases—only that the Great Indian Alliance, long the bugaboo of paranoid pioneers, is no closer to realization today than it was two hundred years ago.

Future Prospects

At the conclusion of the 1970s, American Indians seemed to be at a crossroads of rather major proportions. Statistically they remain among the poorest economically, the least employed, the unhealthiest,[111] the lowest in education and income level,[112] and the worst-housed[113] ethnic group in America—but there are signs of improvement in each area.

Yet, somewhat to their own and the federal government's surprise, Indians find themselves possessed of undreamed of resources. The Great American Desert, thought to be the ideal out-of-the-way spot to locate Indians in the nineteenth century, turns out to have more in common with Arabia than anyone at the time imagined. Of the 90 million acres owned by Indian tribes on over two hundred reservations in twenty-six states, it is estimated that over 53 million of these acres contain a good deal of the raw materials this nation will need to achieve energy independence.[114] Nearly two thirds of all the low-sulphur coal reserves in the country are contained either on or near Indian land, and almost all of the potential uranium reserves are found in Indian Country.[115] Other tracts of tribal lands contain, or are adjacent to, large copper reserves, have significant geothermal production, or have the potential for lucrative oil and gas production.

More specifically, the Southern Utes in Colorado, the Uinta-Ouray Utes in Utah, and the Blackfeet in Montana all have gas and oil reserves, as do the

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Shoshones and Arapaho in Wyoming. The Bannocks and Shoshones, whose reservations are located in Idaho, own one of the richest phosphate deposits in the West. The Navajo and the Hopi reservations in the Southwest contain vast oil and gas fields, as well as uranium reserves, and so much coal that the Navajo tribal chairman, Peter MacDonald, has estimated the quantity to be half of all strippable coal in the United States.[116]

In 1975 twenty-five Indian tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource Tribes (CERT), whose goals are the promotion of the well-being of member tribes through the protection, conservation, control, and prudent management of natural resources. CERT intends to assist its members in developing the capability to manage their resources for their own benefit and according to their own values.[117]

Perhaps the major legal questions to be addressed by Indians and their representatives in the coming years will be those that determine who will ultimately control these resources—who will decide if and when and where and how much to develop, and who will have the final say if a tribe and the federal, state, or adjacent city government disagree over priorities. Conceivably, Congress could always attempt to assert plenary power, claim eminent domain, and unilaterally breaking its treaty promises, confiscate "in the national interest" the exhaustible mineral resources of Indian tribes. Certainly that would be in one tradition of American Indian policy. Or the courts could further define the reserved rights of tribal sovereignty, protecting the trust relationship and underlining the self-determination ability of Indian nations.

Whichever course is followed—grasping self-interest or respect for the law—Indians will once again play the role of "the miner's canary," testing the integrity of this nation's promises. There is little doubt that many tribes will experience a degree of affluence in the coming few years, unparalleled since the European invasion. There will be changes and developments in tribal communities—but the tribes have always been dynamic, *appearing* to be static only in the nearsighted eye of the culture-bound observer, who believes that the only *real* Indians live in museums. As some tribes begin to at least achieve a degree of economic parity with other segments of the American population, it is likely that some non-Indians will once again assume that sovereignty and the trust status should cease to apply. It is then that the real mettle of the American system will be tested: has the bitter experience of the past two hundred years taught anything, or will the same disfranchisements be attempted once again?

The American Indian Policy Review Commission, founded by Congress in 1975 and instructed to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of federal Indian policy, concluded in its *Final Report:*

> The cornerstone of Federal Indian Policy can be stated simply and clearly. From the very beginning of this country, the law has recognized that the Native people in this country possess a right to exist as separate tribal groups with inherent authority to rule themselves and their territory. Although the United States necessarily exercises predominant power, it has time and again bound itself to respect this basic Indian right and has assumed the responsibility to protect the Indian people in the possession of their lands and in the exercise of their rights. Consequently, self-government (i.e., sovereignty) in conjunction with the trust relationship, is truly the inheritance of Indian people. Although times and

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conditions change, the United States' adherence to a policy of continuing to keep faith with the Indians on this fundamental level will always remain the foundation of Federal Indian Policy.[118]

Never has there been a greater misnomer than to call Indians the "vanishing Americans"; against the greatest of odds over the past five centuries they have proved their staying power. Today, like the colonists who framed the American Constitution, "tribes hope to secure their political rights on legitimate historical and legal grounds, out of continuity rather than novelty. The foundation of this approach is and was an appeal to charters."[119] From their first grant of land to the Virginia Colony to acceptance of the Indian Self-Determination Act, almost every international agreement the tribes have ever entered into with Europeans or their descendants has in whole or in part affirmed the principle of sovereignty. Tribal allegiance and identity have weathered disease and removal, allotment and termination, war and indifference. Of all the myriad rich and diverse customs that are identified with one tribe or another, a single tradition—survival—unites them all.

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[1]Thomas C. Patterson, *America's Past: A New World Archeology* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1973), pp. 22-27.

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[3]See, for instance, Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Indian In America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 67-110.

[4]Finnish, Magyar, Basque, and Estonian are the non-Indo-European languages spoken by contemporary Europeans.

[5]For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Ronald Sanders, *Lost Tribes and Promised Lands: The Origins of American Racism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

[6]Margaret Aston, *The Fifteenth Century: The Prospect of Europe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 9-48.

[7]Wilcomb E. Washburn, *Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 3-23.

[8]I am indebted to Professor Henrietta Whiteman, a Southern Cheyenne and chairperson of the Department of Native American Studies at the University of Montana, for this priceless tale.

[9]Louis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (London: Hollis & Carter, 1959), pp. 1-27.

[10]Dr. David Stinebeck, professor of American Studies at the University of Rhode Island, discussed this topic at a lecture delivered at Dartmouth College in 1975.

[11]This attitude permeates the early anthropological theory of Sir Edmund Tylor in England and of Lewis Henry Morgan in the United States.

[12]Michael Dorris, *Native Americans: Five Hundred Years After* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975), pp. 3-11.

[13]For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

[14]For a full examination of the effects of Old World diseases on American Indians, see Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492*. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972). Indians continue to have higher incidences of certain diseases than the general population. According to *Indian Health Trends and Services* (1974 Edition, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, Health Services Administration, Indian Health Service, Division of Resource Coordination, Office of Program Statistics, DHEW Publication No. (HSA) 74-12,009, pp. 13-48), diseases that are more prevalent for Indians

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include tuberculosis (a rate of 157.4 cases per 1,000 population for Indians compared with a rate of 17 cases per 1,000 population for the U.S. population as a whole), cirrhosis of the liver, otitis media, and influenza. It is also interesting to note the early American theory that God sent smallpox and other diseases to clear out Indians. For a fuller discussion, see Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 1-35.

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[16]Eva A. Speare, *The Indians of New Hampshire* (Littleton, N.H.: Chester Printing Co., 1936).

[17]For a thorough discussion of the methodology of Native American demographic estimation, see Henry Dobyns. "Estimating Aboriginal American Population: An Apraisal of Techniques with a New Hemispheric Estimate," *Current Anthropology*, vol. 7 (1966): 395-416; also, Wilbur R. Jacobs, "The Tip of the Iceberg: Pre-Columbian Indian Demography and Some Implications for Revisionism," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 31 (1974): 123-32.

[18]However, as has been pointed out, Indians still contract these diseases at a disproportionately high rate.

[19]Washburn, *Red Man's Land/White Man's Law*, p. 10.

[20]For a full discussion of all aspects of American Indian law, see Monroe E. Price, *Law and the American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).

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[22]Institute for the Development of Indian Law, *Old Problems—Present Issues: Nine Essays on American Indian Law* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Development of Indian Law, 1979), p. 7.

[23]Ibid., p. 1.

[24]Ibid., p. 1.

[25]Act of July 22, 1790, I Stat. 137, 25 U.S.C.A. 177. The Final Form of the Non-Intercourse Act is found in the Act of June 30, 1834,c/61, #12, 4 Stat. 730. One might speculate that the newly created federal government used this act as a means of asserting its *own* sovereignty, paralleling federal, as opposed to state, authority with the *already established* sovereignty of Indian nations.

[26]Richard Peters (ed.), *The Case of the Cherokee Nation Against the State of Georgia: Argued and Determined at the Supreme Court of the United States* (Philadelphia: 1831) pp. 153-56.

[27]31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

[28]Russel L. Barsh and James Y. Henderson, *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 286.

[29]For a detailed case study of oral historical testimony, see Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz (ed.), *The Great Sioux Nation: Sitting in Judgment on America* (Berkeley: Moon Books, 1977).

[30]Congress, in an obscure rider to the Indian Appropriations Bill (U.S. Statutes at Large, 16:566, March 3, 1871), outlawed further treaty-making with Indian tribes. Thereafter reservations were created by executive order; see "Tribal Property Interests in Executive Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right," *Yale Law Review*, 69 (1960): 627-42.

[31]Approximately 155 million acres remained in tribes located in what are today forty-eight contiguous states at the time treaty-making ceased.

[32]See Robert A. Trennert, Jr., *Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the Reservation System, 1845-51* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975).

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[39]For a discussion of some of the problems of conception and implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Angie Debo, *A History of the Indians of the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 339-42.

[40]*Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior*, 1934, pp. 78-83.

[41]U.S. Statutes at Large, 67:B132, August 1, 1953.

[42]Ibid.

[43]U.S. Statutes at Large, 67:588-90, August 15, 1953.

[44]Barsh and Henderson in *The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty* note that the Indian

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Reorganization Act policy of repurchasing allotted reservation lands was adopted only a year after the twentieth century low point in the price of U.S. farmland (1933) (p. 289).

[45]Of the larger reservations, only the Menominee and the Klamath were actually terminated. For a discussion of the history of the policy in the former case, see Deborah Shames (ed.), *Freedom with Reservation* (Madison, Wisc.: National Committee to Save the Menominee People and Forests, 1972).

[46]Felix Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 123. (First edition, 1940).

[47]Some tribes or confederacies (e.g., Hopi and Iroquois) have on occasion demonstrated their conviction that they retain some of the prerogatives of external sovereignty through acts such as separate declaration of war on the Axis powers in 1941 and the issuance of tribal passports for certain types of international travel. The latter have, in recent years, been accepted by at least the European nations.

[48]Institute for the Development of Indian Law, *Old Problems*, p. 3.

[49]American Indian Policy Review Commission, *Final Report*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 622.

[50]Charles Kappler (ed.), "Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, 1785," in *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, vol. 2, pp. 8-11.

[51]Ibid.

[52]*Cherokee Nation v. Georgia*, *Worcester v. Georgia*, *Holden v. Joy*.

[53]*McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission*, *Fischer v. District Court*.

[54]Institute for the Development of Indian Law, *Old Problems*, p. 5.

[55]U.S. Statutes at Large, 43:253, June 2, 1924.

[56]163 U.S. 376 (1896).

[57]272 F. 2nd. 131 (10th Cir., 1959).

[58]Ibid., p. 134.

[59]U.S. Statutes at Large 82:77-81, 1968.

[60]Hearings on S. 961-968 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st Session.

[61]Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Congress, 1st Session, p. 15.

[62]As always, unless expressly specified, tribal sovereignty prevails.

[63]It remains unclear whether or not this amendment applies retroactively to those states already operating under 280.

[64]98 S. Ct. 1670 (1978).

[65]Ibid., p. 66.

[66]U.S. Statutes at Large, 88:2203, 1975.

[67]Ibid., Title 25, Section 450 (a) 1 and 2.

[68]98 S Ct. 1011 (1978).

[69]U.S. vs. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (1978).

[70]Trans-Canada Enterprises Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, District Court for the Western District of Washington, Civ. no. C77-882M (July 27, 1978), as quoted in Barsh and Henderson.

[71]Barsh and Henderson, p. 291; see also Russel L. Barsh and James Y. Henderson, "The Betrayal: *Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe* and the Hunting of the Snark," *Minnesota Law Review*, 63 (4) (April 1979): 609-37.

[72]Samuel J. Brakel, *American Indian Tribal Courts: The Costs of Separate Justice*, American Bar Foundation, 1978, p. 8.

[73]Frederick J. Martone "Of Power and Purpose," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 54 (5) (June 1979): 831.

[74]Robert G. McCoy, "The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal Interests," *Harvard Civil Rights, Civil Liberties Law Review*, 13 (2) (Spring 1978): 376.

[75]Ivan B. Rubin, "Federal Indian Law: Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country," Annual Survey of American Law, New York University School of Law, Issue 3 (1977): 517-33.

[76]McCoy, "The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty," p. 394.

[77]"Implications of Civil Remedies under the Indian Civil Rights Act," *Michigan Law Review*, 75 (1) (November, 1976): 230.

[78]Ibid., p. 325.

[79]Keith M. Werhan, "The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes: A Reaffirmation and Strengthening in the 1970's," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 54 (1) (October 1978): 5-26.

[80]Alvin J. Ziontz, "After *Martinez*: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government," *University of California at Davis Law Review*, 12 (March 1979): 35.

[81]Dario F. Robertson, "A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty," *American Indian Law Review*, 6 (2): 391.

[82]U.S. v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (1978).

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[83]Michael P. Gross, "Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Indian Policy," *Texas Law Review*, 56 (7) (August 1978): 1225.

[84]Credit for much of the material on the various legal views of the Indian Civil Rights Act goes to the painstaking research of Ann Catherine Boyce, currently a student at Dartmouth College.

[85]It should also be noted that under a 1966 amendment to the Judicial Code, tribes need no longer depend on the federal government to represent them in court, and may file suit themselves when the United States refuses to fulfill its obligations as trustee.

[86]*1970 Census of Population Subject Reports: American Indians* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973). Many have suggested that this figure is an undercount. If so, the 1980 census should record a considerably larger aggregate population.

[87]Barsh and Henderson, *The Road*, p. 289.

[88]Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971).

[89]Thomas Berger, *Little Big Man* (New York: Dial Press, 1964).

[90]One might conclude that the trend continues with the popularity of Ruth Beebe Hill's *Hanta Yo* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979); though generally panned by knowledgeable critics from an anthropological or tribal perspective, or both, the book has attracted a wide readership among the uninformed public.

[91]For an interesting set of articles on this subject, see J. O. Waddell and O. M. Watson, *The American Indian in Urban Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[92]Joan Ablon, "Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area: Social Interaction and Indian Identity," *Human Organization*, 23 (1964): 362-71; and for Denver, Theodore Graves and Martin Van Arsdale, "Values, Expectations and Relocation," *Human Organization*, 25 (1966): 300, 307; also Robert Weppener, "Urban Economic Opportunities: The Example of Denver," in *The American Indian in Urban Society*, Waddell and Watson (eds.).

[93]J. H. Stauss and Bruce A. Chadwick, "Urban Indian Adjustment," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, 2 (3) (1979): 23-38.

[94]Theodore Graves, "The Personal Adjustment of Navajo Indian Migrants to Denver, Colorado," *American Anthropologist*, 72 (1970): 35-54.

[95]N. Scott Momaday, *House Made of Dawn* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

[96]Stauss and Chadwick, "Urban Indian Adjustment," p. 36.

[97]U.S. Statutes at Large, 84:1437-39, 1970.

[98]U.S. Statutes at Large, 85:688-92, 1971. For an excellent critique of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, see Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission for Alaska, *Policy Recommendations* (Anchorage: 1979).

[99]U.S. Statutes at Large, 87:700 ff., December 22, 1973.

[100]See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F. 2d. 370 (1st Cir., 1975).

[101]See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); this case established that federal courts could rule on violations of the 1790 Non-Intercourse Act, and opened the door to subsequent litigation.

[102]See American Friends Service Committee, *Uncommon Controversy: Fishing Rights of the Muckleshoot, Puyallup and Nisqually Indians* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970).

[103]"Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association," *U.S. Law Week*, 47 (50) (July 2, 1979).

[104]For an excellent summary article, see M. C. Nelson, *The Winters Doctrine: 70 Years of Application of "Reserved" Water Rights to Indian Reservation*, Arid Lands Research Paper no. 9, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), NTIS PB U.S. 564 (1908).

[105]Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

[106]C. Herb Williams and Walt Neubrech, *Indian Treaties/American Nightmare* (Seattle: Outdoor Empire Publishing Co., 1976).

[107]Larry Light, "Backlash in Congress Seen as Indians Push Claims," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Dec. 2, 1978, pp. 3385-88; eleven bills were introduced in the 95th Congress to restrict Indian hunting, fishing, and land claims rights, including HR 13329.

[108]See 73 Wash. 2d 677, 687, 440 P.2d. 442, 448 (1968), as quoted in Wilcomb E. Washburn, School of Law, Duke University, 40 (1) (Winter, 1976).

[109]Barsh and Henderson, in *The Road*, make an extremely interesting observation pertinent to this point: "The federal government did not, historically, create the sovereignty of tribes. Acts of Congress limited, modified, and channelled tribal powers, usually without tribal consent. The termination of what Congress created should therefore result in an *increase* in tribal self-governing powers. Instead, Congress has acted as if the termination of tribal dependency results in the dissolution rather than the emancipation of the tribes" (p. 285).

[110]The text goes something like this: Two men were coming down the pier after a day of crab fishing. The White man had a lid on his crab bucket, but the Indian didn't. Said the White man to

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the Indian: "How come all your crabs don't get out?" Replied the Indian, "They're Indian crabs! As soon as one starts to crawl out, the others pull him back down."

[111]Lawrence Rosen, Foreword to *The American Indian and The Law.*, p. 1. Thirty-eight percent of Indians identifying themselves in the 1970 census had incomes below the poverty line; in the poorest areas of Arizona and Utah this figure reaches upwards of 65 percent. Death from tuberculosis, dysentery, and accidents occurs four times more frequently among Indians than among the rest of the population. Employment for reservation men, averaging 18 percent nationally, climbed well above 30 percent in many areas.

[112]Office of Special Concerns, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of Ethnic Minorities Based on the 1970 Census, vol. 3: American Indians*, HEW Pub. No. (OS) 75–122, July 1974. In educational achievement, 34 percent of Indian males were high-school graduates (compared to 54 percent of all U.S. males); percentages were 1 point higher, respectively, for Indian females and all females. In income levels, 64 percent of rural Indian men earned less than $4000 per year; 46 percent of urban Indian men earned less than $4000 per year; only 31 percent of all U.S. men earned less than $4000 per year.

[113]Testimony of Margaret S. Treuer before Subcommittee on Rural Housing and Development, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 1, 1980, p. 3. A 1970 Census Bureau report on housing characteristics indicated that 62.4 percent of the housing units on Indian reservations were substandard, compared to 12.9 percent of the total U.S. population. In March 1978 the General Accounting Office issued a report on Indian housing that estimated that fully 60 percent of all Indian families were living in substandard housing.

[114]*Conference on Energy Resource Development and Indian Lands*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1978, p. 26.

[115]Ibid., p. 25.

[116]Wallace Stegner, "Rocky Mountain Country: Arabs of the Plains," *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1978, p. 56.

[117]American Indian Policy Review Commission, *Final Report*, p. 622.

[118]Barsh and Henderson, *The Road*, p. 284.

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FAUSTINE C. JONES

External Crosscurrents and Internal Diversity: An Assessment of Black Progress, 1960-1980

THIS ESSAY FOCUSES ON THE PAST TWENTY YEARS; it seeks to define and evaluate black progress in the United States during that period. It is assumed that most of those who will read this paper will know something of the vast literature that analyzes white/black-dominant/minority relationships in this country in the years preceding 1960.[1] Present-day black/white inequalities and difficulties are rooted in this earlier period of American history.[2]

Historical Background

Blacks have lived in the United States for 362 years; the first Africans brought to this country in 1619 came as indentured servants, a status that proved to be short-lived. It was supplanted very early by legal slavery, a more onerous status that ended formally only with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution on December 18, 1865. The slave status was unique to blacks in the United States; no other race was comparably treated.

During the more than two hundred years when most blacks lived in enforced bondage, an elaborate system of laws, social codes, customs, traditions, attitudes, and beliefs developed that were used principally to rationalize and justify the institution of slavery. In the *Dred-Scott* decision of 1857, explicit reference was made to the fact that blacks enjoyed no rights that whites were required to respect.[3] It was during this period that human intergroup relationships became rooted in racial differences[4] characterized by the ascribed superiority of whites and assigned inferiority of blacks. Public policy was formulated wholly in terms of group characteristics, without reference to individual attributes, needs, or interests.

From 1865 to 1877 blacks enjoyed a brief release from certain of these more onerous conditions. Citizenship conferred on blacks by the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) was given ever more concrete expression by the Fifteenth (1870), which guaranteed blacks the right to vote. The Freedmen's Bureau, established by the federal government in 1865, made major efforts to help the recently liberated slaves, especially in the area of education. Blacks now enjoyed specific civil rights, including the right to vote and to be elected to public office. The extent of the federal concern is perhaps most eloquently reflected in the passage of a major civil rights bill in 1875.

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Reaction to this kind of progress came swiftly. In 1883 the Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights bill unconstitutional. The majority of blacks, who lived in Southern states, found themselves disempowered through denial of the ballot by "grandfather clauses," and other devices such as the poll tax. The *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision in 1896 institutionalized the separate and unequal conditions legally imposed upon blacks until 1954, when it was overturned by *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.*[5] From 1896 to 1954 Northern and Southern state policies and practices confirmed the prediction made by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in *Plessy* that the decision would place "in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens."[6]

Jim Crow laws were passed, segregating blacks under unequal conditions in schools, courtrooms, and churches; public transportation was segregated, as were most other public accommodations and facilities. Fewer employment opportunities existed for blacks in general; the jobs available to them were paid lower rates than those generally offered whites in comparable positions.[7] Housing and health care conditions were deplorable. Although some black individuals and families were able to prosper despite this system of imposed inequality and racism,[8] most blacks were severely hindered by these institutionalized restrictions.

Blacks chose not to accept their castelike status without resistance. Through their own sustained organizational efforts, often with the help of concerned and sympathetic white citizens, they created such institutions as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909 and the National Urban League in 1910. These organizations, and others, began systematic resistance against racism. Through the NAACP particularly, white attorneys joined blacks in a step-by-step, case-by-case legal challenge against state and local segregation laws, policies, and practices. These efforts culminated in the *Brown* decision of 1954, which overturned *Plessy,* formally ending the legal disempowerment of black citizens.

The organized efforts of blacks and whites were assisted by demographic and political changes that imposed new pressures on national leaders and served to create a societal climate more conducive to change. From 1915 to 1918 half a million blacks moved north, migrating from small rural Southern communities to work in the war-related industries that were established during World War I.[9] This internal migration put blacks in wholly new settings, especially in Northern industrial centers, where they found new opportunities for employment, better housing, and chances for education and participation in politics greater than any common in the Jim Crow South. The New Deal policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt were beneficial to blacks; equal pay clauses, introduced with the Tennessee Valley Authority legislation, soon became common in all federal agencies. Such policies challenged economic aspects of Southern employment practices at a time when other legal efforts were being made to overturn Southern segregation laws. Roosevelt, in response to A. Philip Randolph's planned March on Washington for equal employment opportunity, issued Executive Order 8802, which created the first Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). As a result of this action, federal contract funds would be made available only to companies hiring black and white workers on an equal basis.

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Although enforcement was weak, this signaled the beginning of efforts by blacks to effect change through the use of the power of the Executive Office.[10]

In the Fair Deal era of Harry S. Truman, such policies were maintained and, indeed, strengthened. The President's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947 recommended the "elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life,"[11] and in 1948 Truman issued an executive order desegregating the armed forces. He also recommended that Congress establish a permanent FEPC. The judicial branch of government began to make similar decisions in this period. Segregation in interstate transportation was outlawed in 1944 as was the Democratic white primary in 1947. The federal government increasingly supported the efforts of black individuals and organizations to end institutional discrimination.

Meanwhile, demographic changes continued, with very substantial impacts on the black population. From 1940 to 1960 more than 3 million blacks migrated from the South, moving principally to Northern and Western cities. Remunerative employment in war-related industries was important for some. Many others came to participate in politics in cities, counties, and states; blacks began to have a voice in state legislatures as well as in Congress. More than a million blacks served in the armed forces during World War II, and with their reentry to civilian life, these veterans sought to forge domestic changes that would create greater democracy in the United States.

The international scene was also changing. With the beginning of decolonization in the 1940s and 1950s, Africa became gradually a continent of independent black states. The United Nations, formed to monitor world peace and pledged to stimulate friendly reciprocal relations among nations "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," imposed subtle pressures on the United States. To continue to tolerate second-class citizenship for millions of its own citizens would place the United States in an untenable position and, of course, be inconsistent with its international commitments. The United States had assumed a position of world leadership and could ill afford to continue its historic domestic policy of separatism and discrimination. In the late 1940s and during the 1950s, responsible leaders of American labor organizations, religious groups, and civic associations joined with influential newspaper editors and publishers and with political leaders in insisting that the United States move closer toward realizing the justice and necessity of equal rights for its black citizens. New black organizations emerged to join the struggle for recognition of human rights both at home and abroad; this was a time when the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) all came into being.

After the *Brown* decisions in 1954 and 1955, blacks and whites worked together within the system, moving the fight for racial equality and justice from the courts to the buses to the lunch counters, the streets, and even to the jails. This was the era of the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott (1955-56) and the Central High confrontation in Little Rock, Arkansas (1957). In the 1950s black efforts to effect change were concentrated in the South, where most blacks lived. It was also the region where segregation was most visible and where

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discrimination was most blatant and harsh. The movement for change did not take on a national character until the 1960s.

The 1960s were a time of progress for black Americans. By comparison, the 1970s were a time of retrogression for most black citizens. Gains and losses may be measured in three ways: (1) how much blacks had gained by 1980 as compared with their status in 1960, as measured by certain key social indicators—voting rights, education, employment, income, housing, longevity, and the like; (2) how they have fared in comparison, and how their relative position vis-à-vis whites has changed, since 1960 or 1970; (3) what progress they have made in moving steadily toward their ultimate goals, equality and justice. Have blacks, in short, made continuous gains from 1960 to 1980 as they have sought full citizenship rights and an end to their historic castelike status? While these are not mutually exclusive ways of examining the relevant data, those who are most concerned to dwell on "what has been accomplished" are generally white social scientists who perceive "enormous progress" and "marked improvement" for blacks, particularly in the 1960s.[12] Black social scientists and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, by comparison, are more inclined to reflect on "what remains to be done"; they generally found "steady progress" in the 1960s, retrogression in the 1970s.[13]

General Principles

Present-day inequalities of blacks in the United States are directly traceable to the historic castelike structures that were created in black/white interrelationships from the seventeenth century to 1865. These inequalities were maintained from 1883 to 1954 through the disempowerment of blacks in a society that continued to accept the basic idea that blacks were inferior beings. Long-standing inequalities in education, economic opportunity, housing, social status, and discretionary choices have been the most salient features of black life in the United States. Progress toward eliminating these inequities was made from 1865 to 1877 and from 1961 to 1968, but each of those periods has been followed by retrogression and retrenchment. Blacks at the bottom of the economic and social scale were not largely affected in either of these periods. Personal ability and individual performance, coupled with family background and the region they live in, have enabled some blacks to overcome structural limitations, especially since 1964. For more than 60 percent of the black population, however, structural arrangements based on racial status continue to be limiting factors, despite the individual attempts of many of these persons to succeed by their own efforts.[14]

Five major questions will be addressed in this paper: What have blacks achieved in the last twenty years? What strategies have they used, and why, to achieve specific purposes? What conceptions of social justice have prevailed as blacks have sought to change their historic castelike societal positions? How have particular strategies adopted by the federal government, political parties, or major special interest groups contributed to the formation and realization of black objectives? Do we now live with substantially new criteria for judging equality?

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Crosscurrents and Diversity, 1960–1980

The 1960s were shaped fundamentally by the *Brown* decision, which overturned the concept that separate-but-equal was just and made possible the lifting of the castelike status that had been imposed on black Americans. This was a decade of sustained economic growth, when diverse public efforts were encouraged, especially to aid citizens previously excluded from full political participation. In the early years of the decade, there was a seriousness of purpose coupled with a spirit of optimism and hope on the part of blacks; they sought through various strategies to realize the goal of full integration promised by the *Brown* decision. This was also a time of militancy, marked by "black pride," where "black power" was thought useful in negotiations with the dominant power structure for those policies and programs that were essential to total integration.

The decade began with a continuation of the black self-help efforts that were evident at the end of the fifties. Some of the strategies implemented were based on the principle of direct nonviolent action: sit-ins, wade-ins, and freedom rides in the South; a March on Washington; and an intense drive to register blacks to vote. All this activism was directed toward specific goals: equal access to public accommodations; the right to vote; desegregated elementary and secondary schools; increased access to state-supported institutions of higher learning. Concerned individuals, participating in organized group efforts of SNCC, CORE, and SCLC worked to achieve these goals. At the same time, the NAACP continued its litigation and lobbying strategies designed to eliminate any and all legal barriers to full citizenship.

Not all blacks were satisfied with these strategies, nor was the choice of complete integration as the ultimate goal satisfactory to all. By 1963 and 1964 thousands of discontented blacks, tired of waiting to have their civil rights recognized, showed their disappointment by participating in more than two thousand mass demonstrations and protest movements. From 1964 to 1967 the struggle took on nationwide proportions; major uprisings and revolts occurred in poverty-stricken Northern and Western ghetto areas where fundamental economic needs had long been ignored. The Black Panthers emerged as a new political force, insisting that their fight was against police brutality. Increasingly, individuals and groups argued for various kinds of separatism, claiming that continued white resistance to full civil rights for blacks justified such a course. Still others opted for the philosophy and goals of the Nation of Islam (Black Muslims).

Reactions to the civil rights struggle were not slow in coming; there were evidences of concern and support in prestigious intellectual quarters. *Daedalus*, for example, in 1965-66 devoted two full issues to a detailed exploration of the problems, concerns, and goals of the Negro American.[15] Public sensibilities were stirred by televised newscasts, but also by well-planned film documentaries that depicted the condition of the poor in America, the unemployed, migrant workers, and others who lived in misery. At the other end of the spectrum, individuals and groups, who were now seen to be part of a "backlash," demanded that Chief Justice Earl Warren be impeached. For them, the Supreme Court appeared as the villain, responsible for giving impetus and legiti-

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mation to the black civil rights movement. Also, the cry for "black power" alienated many whites. However, the reactions generally were more positive than negative. White Americans, on the whole, supported the ending of legal barriers that perpetuated discrimination and were indignant about the violence and chicanery perpetrated by extremists against black citizens and their white supporters. Those who sought to restore the *status quo ante* received little encouragement.

In the sixties at least two and sometimes all three branches of the federal government showed a measure of support of black efforts to attain civil rights. The judicial branch, exemplified by the Warren Court, assumed a leadership role. Basing its decisions on a concept of social justice that recognized low-income individuals and minority groups as Americans protected by constitutional guarantees, the federal courts were used to attack social inequities that were being addressed neither in the state courts nor through the political process.[16]

The executive branch, headed by John F. Kennedy early in the decade, was galvanized into action. Kennedy's small margin in electoral votes was provided by the solid support he received from certain minorities, especially the blacks.[17] The civil rights thrust of his administration suggests that he placed no small value on these black votes. He was influenced also by pressures that resulted from the civil disobedience of blacks and the almost continuous media coverage of the black protest movement. As a result of all these and other factors, he was moved in 1963 to ask Congress for legislation to support court decisions mandating an end to segregation as public policy. Although the desired legislation was not forthcoming until the Johnson years, Kennedy used the resources of the Justice Department to stop certain of the more overt resistance efforts of white Southerners.[18]

Lyndon B. Johnson emerged as an equally strong Chief Executive. His views about social justice were made explicit in his Commencement Address at Howard University, Washington, D.C., in June 1965. In that speech Johnson made unprecedented commitments to interracial reform, promising substantive redress for long-imposed inequalities. Arguing that the solution to continuing interracial problems must exceed "the bounds of legalistic and procedural reform,"[19] Johnson used his influence to promote the enactment of over a hundred bills designed to overcome state and local obstruction of civil rights for blacks. The Johnson legislation included the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Higher Education Act of 1965, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing Act, and the Higher Education Amendments of 1968. Also, his Executive Order 11246, issued on September 24, 1965, provided for affirmative action to "ensure that applicants are employed without regard for race, color, religion, or national origin." This was a concrete expression of his "substantive redress" commitment to bring about social justice. Affirmative action became public policy; it was a strategy intended to correct undeserved inequalities that could not be remedied by traditional means. The Vietnam War brought an end to this expanded social concern; many insisted that "guns and butter" could not be secured simultaneously. Domestic programs designed to improve the life

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chances of minorities were given a lower priority as "butter" gave way to "guns" and as domestic issues generally receded. If the Vietnam War deflected the president's attention from civil rights issues, it also eroded his relationship with the electorate. In 1968 Johnson chose not to seek reelection. His immediate successors came to office with quite different beliefs both about social justice and race relations, beliefs that were not calculated to support black objectives in respect to civil rights or justice.

From 1957 to 1965 Congress passed three major civil rights acts, a voting rights act, and significant legislation affecting education and poverty issues. The civil rights legislation was the first of its kind passed since 1875.[20] One immediate result of this legislation was to strengthen and reinforce the judicial decisions and executive actions taken by the other branches of government; another was the opening of new educational and employment opportunities for blacks. When the three branches of government act in concert, they are a powerful force for social change. In the 1960s they contributed greatly to realizing the objectives that blacks had insisted on: to alter their castelike position and to move toward equal civil rights and justice. The effects of federal action were quickly evident in the South, for example, where it became too expensive for public school systems to discriminate against black children. Since federal funds would be withheld from discriminating districts, such a threat was enough to end practices that had become traditional in the region. The Administration was not equally successful in the North; Johnson, for example, backed down before the objections of Mayor Richard Daley, fearing political reprisals if he insisted on withholding school funds because of discriminatory practices.

The legislation of the 1960s was impressive; so, also, was the fact that the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which outlawed the poll tax, was ratified in 1964. This tax had long served to disfranchise black voters. Black gains during the Johnson years resulted from what Gunnar Myrdal has called a cumulation of social forces. Judicial decisions and pressures from the civil rights movement were principal catalysts; so, also, were Johnson's personal commitments to change, the placement of blacks in important decision-making positions, and the black presence in the Civil Service.[21] Enforcement of the newly minted laws and establishment of systematic means of handling violations and grievances were additional factors contributing to the progress of the 1960s.

There were, of course, certain negative crosscurrents. The federal sector did not always support black efforts to secure equal rights. J. Edgar Hoover, the powerful director of the FBI, for example, was openly antagonistic both to the black movement and its leaders.[22] Congress showed a continued reluctance to pass legislation and to fund at appropriate levels specific social programs designed to provide remedies or compensation for inequalities that originated in racism.[23] A number of Cabinet officials, concerned about civil rights strategies, worried also about the philosophical implications of such a vastly expanded role for government. Many lower-level judges were not inclined to share the liberal viewpoint of the Warren Court.

In short, blacks, together with their white supporters in the 1960s, using direct action strategies, both nonviolent and violent, worked within the system through specific group organizational efforts to gain abolition of legal barriers to

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full citizenship rights; voting rights, which are basic to participation in the political system; and access to education at all levels, since learning is the primary means for entry into the job market and for all subsequent upward mobility. Gains were achieved in all these areas, though certain unintended negative consequences also resulted. In removing legal barriers to full citizenship rights and guaranteeing voting rights, specific goals were achieved across the whole nation; obstructions could be declared unconstitutional and eliminated. But the educational goal proved more difficult to achieve, not least because educational authority is vested in the fifty states and their political subdivisions; it is a costly, time-consuming process to challenge effectively the discriminatory practices of local school boards or officials at the state level.

The black civil rights movement served to give form, shape, and substance to domestic politics during the 1960s. The enormous efforts of blacks and their allies to achieve equal citizenship rights succeeded in awakening the conscience of the nation. As a result, the promise of *Brown* was brought closer to reality; court decisions, executive orders, legislative acts, and public sentiment worked for the same general purposes. The similarities to what had happened in the country a hundred years earlier were striking.

In the 1860s blacks were freed from the bondage of slavery. In the 1960s blacks were freed from the bondage imposed by the "separate-but-equal" doctrine; civil rights acts gave federal enforcement muscle to the judicial decisions of the 1950s. In the 1860s blacks received the right to vote. The right was reconferred in the 1960s on blacks in the South, where the majority of blacks lived. Black officials were elected to local and state offices in the South from the 1860s to the 1890s; their successors began to reappear almost a hundred years later. From 1868 to 1895 twenty-three blacks served in Congress;[24] similar numbers did not sit there again until a century had passed. Educational opportunity for blacks was a major concern of the federal government in the 1860s and 1870s; a major function of the Freedmen's Bureau was to build schools, train teachers, and educate disadvantaged children. Educational opportunity became a major federal concern again in the 1960s.

At the end of the decade, blacks had benefited from many of these societal changes. Major economic and educational gains were made, particularly by a growing middle-income group that enjoyed greater access to jobs and higher earnings. They came closer to some sort of parity with their white counterparts. In 1964 the median income of black families was $3,724, 54 percent of that of white families; in 1969 it stood at $5,999, 61 percent of the white median. Economic expansion, significant civil rights legislation, social consciousness, and increased educational attainment made it possible for a certain number of talented, ambitious, trained blacks to advance. Housing options were greater, particularly for middle-income families; so, also, was the availability of good health care.

There was, however, a negative side to the picture. The majority of black Americans remained victimized by unsolved systemic problems—unemployment, a more subtle kind of prejudice, segregation (especially in housing), inferior education, lack of opportunity, and increasing isolation from the rising black middle-income group, as well as from whites. For these blacks, problems of income, employment, education, housing, and health care remained acute. In 1969 the unemployment rate for blacks and other races was twice that of whites,

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6.4 and 3.1 percent, respectively.[25] These official figures do not adequately reflect the condition of discouraged workers who no longer sought work, or the plight of involuntary part-time workers who failed to find full-time jobs. Thirty-eight percent of blacks were homeowners in 1960 as compared with 65 percent of whites; those proportions changed only slightly in the period 1960-70, when 42 percent of blacks were listed as owners compared with 65 percent of whites.[26] Again, the statistics tell only part of the tale; housing units occupied by blacks, whether as owners or renters, are generally more overcrowded than those occupied by whites, this being especially true in the South.[27] Also, more housing units occupied by blacks lack some or all plumbing facilities; this was as true in 1970 as in 1960, particularly in the South.[28] In 1968, 21.6 percent of the black population age fourteen to twenty-four years old were school dropouts; this compared with 11.9 percent of whites of comparable ages.[29]

To make matters worse, there were evidences of a growing conservative mood in the nation. The rapidity of social change, as well as its breadth and depth, frightened many Americans. The sheer complexity of events confused many others. The recession of 1969-70 created new economic insecurity, contributing to fresh concern about employment. In the sixties a whole series of national and international crises did a great deal to disturb the equilibrium of the country.[30] In these circumstances, the public's concern about the plight of black Americans was considerably reduced.

For the black population, it was also a time of growing uncertainty. Where so many had been genuinely optimistic at the decade's beginning, at its end there were expressions of disappointment both with the pace of change and with its pervasiveness. Bitterness was felt also because of the violent deaths of those black and white leaders who had been major initiators of, and spokesmen for, change. Also, an awareness that the gains had occurred largely in the public sector gave many a new sense of the limits of the purported black progress. The decade ended on a note of ideological debate, at least among black intellectuals, who asked whether integration ought to remain the ultimate goal for American blacks.[31]

By 1970 the civil rights movement clearly had changed, as had its leadership. Organizations such as the Black Panthers that had come into existence in the sixties were obviously in decline; older organizations like the NAACP and the National Urban League seemed to enjoy a new opportunity. It was increasingly evident that black progress had been very uneven. Talented, educated individuals had made gains; the hardcore impoverished had scarcely been touched by the strategies of the 1960s. Techniques that worked well for the smaller sector of the black population did not appear to operate at all successfully for the larger sector. The abolition of legal barriers and the elimination of overtly racist discriminatory policies had not been sufficient to help those blacks at the lower end of the income spectrum. New emphases would need to be considered in the 1970s if life conditions were to improve for the majority. The black goal remained full inclusion in the society; that term, however, came to mean "cultural pluralism" for many rather than simply "assimilation."

Strategies employed by black organizations and individuals tended to turn away from public confrontations, massive rallies, demonstrations, and boycotts

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toward the more effective use of the vote. Other strategies were also advocated, the most important of which were greater participation in education at every level—designed to secure enlarged employment opportunities—and the pressuring of labor unions, corporations, and the federal government to expand training and employment opportunities. In the 1970s protest took a back seat to the newer strategies of utilizing electoral politics to influence public policy, participation in education, lobbying for black interests, and renewed efforts at enlarging and equalizing employment opportunities.

A major thrust of black efforts in the seventies was the use of the vote gained in 1965. Many blacks felt that political power was their greatest lever to change the system in their interest; by electing blacks and favorably inclined whites to decision-making positions, they hoped to achieve their ends. By July 1979 those efforts had placed 4,607 blacks in elective offices nationwide, about 66 percent of those being in the South.[32] The greatest gains were at local and state levels; in 1979 there were 191 black mayors, 313 state legislators and executives, 17 Congressmen.[33] This was a marked increase from the 103 elected officials in these categories in 1964,[34] immediately prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Few blacks, in fact, had been elected or appointed to public office between Reconstruction and 1965. Still, elected black officials today constitute less than 1 percent of all elected officials nationally; the Joint Center for Political Studies in Washington estimates that if blacks continue to be elected at the present rate, they would hold only 3 percent of all elective offices by the year 2000. This is far below the almost 12 percent of blacks in the national population. If the goal is to achieve a representative proportion of black people in political decision-making positions, including appointive office, that end remains very distant.

Registration and voting behavior of blacks have been generally disappointing since 1972; blacks have failed to register and vote in the proportions they did in the years 1966-72.[35] Some argue that this is because the tradition for voting in the black community is weak; others suggest that blacks understand instinctively that nothing will be changed by their votes. Whatever the explanation, it is obvious that the full potential power of the black electorate has not been realized.

Traditional belief in the worth of education and its possibilities remained characteristic of the black population throughout the 1970s. It was especially discernible at the higher education levels, where there was continued black progress in gaining access to college. Although blacks were only about 6 percent of the undergraduate population in the mid-sixties, they were slightly over 10 percent in 1976-77, approximating more closely the proportion of blacks in the general American population. Also, black students were more widely distributed among the major institutions, both public and private. Special admissions procedures, increased financial assistance, and supportive tutorial programs made it possible for a greater number of blacks to enter and remain in college.

This is not to say, however, that racial parity has been achieved. A greater number of blacks than whites are in two-year institutions; many of their diplomas or certificates will not allow them to go on to four-year degree-granting colleges.[36] Blacks received only 6.4 percent of bachelor's degrees awarded in 1975-76; 37 percent of the recipients were from the historically black colleges.[37]

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Clearly, then, far fewer blacks graduate from college than enter; larger proportions of those who enter predominantly black colleges graduate than those who enter other institutions. The situation is graphically rendered in the fact that "in 1978, about 1 out of 10 black men and women 25 to 34 years old had completed 4 or more years of college as compared with 1 out of 4 white men and women in this age group."[38] While there have been substantial gains at the higher-education level, the lag between blacks and whites remains conspicuous.

Equality eludes blacks,[39] and this is particularly apparent at the graduate and the professional levels. Of all the doctorates awarded in 1975-76, blacks received only 3.6 percent. They numbered only 6 percent of the graduate school enrollment in the fall of 1976, and were a mere 4.5 percent of the professional school enrollment. There has been a consistent decline since 1971 in both law school and medical school admissions.[40] There is also a downward trend in Ph.D. recipients, from 1,180 in 1976-77 to 1,100 in 1977-78.[41]

The explanations for these phenomena are not entirely clear, but it appears that several factors are at work, including, very importantly, a more limited use of affirmative action criteria for admissions; increased tuitions, which restrict the number of blacks who can afford to seek such education; and the cost of food, housing, transportation, and the like, which is often quite beyond the means of many potential black students, especially at the graduate and professional levels. Also, job opportunities are fewer, and this affects the decisions of blacks who seek further education.

At the elementary and secondary levels, *de facto* has replaced *de jure* segregation. Although mandatory segregation by law is a thing of the past, segregation itself has not ended. Indeed, segregation has become harder to combat as "segregative intent" needs now to be demonstrated. "White flight" to the suburbs had made school integration wholly impossible in certain communities by the 1970s. At the beginning of the decade, the population of the District of Columbia was 91 percent black, whereas the black public school enrollment stood at 93 percent; in Newark, New Jersey, the black population was 54 percent, whereas 72 percent of that city's public school children were black. Atlanta showed the same configurations in this period: 51 percent of the population were black; 65 percent of the public school children were black.[42] Thousands of poor black children continued to experience substandard education in central city elementary and secondary schools that were for all practical purposes segregated.

The expectation that desegregation would create equal educational opportunity has faded; the foes of integration have found new ways to subvert both the spirit and the letter of the law.[43] Ironically, while desegregated schools became more common in the South in the 1970s, racial isolation became the norm in many Northern public schools. Private schools flourished both in the North and the South; white children abandoned public school systems, and in many central cities, black parents, particularly in the middle class, pulled their children out of public schools, especially at the secondary level, believing them to be inferior and declining institutions. Busing plans came under severe attack in Northern cities as different as Detroit and Boston. Academic achievement records of black children across the nation showed that they were generally below those of whites.[44]

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A primary reason for black support of education has been the belief that this would increase employment opportunities. Blacks for a hundred years have been very sensitive to the issues of employment, underemployment, and unemployment. Blacks have little control over the economy, yet the state of the economy—whether it is healthy and growing, or turbulent and faltering—is critical for black employment.[45] Blacks, like whites, benefited from economic growth in the 1960s; the recession of 1969-70 caused a slowdown in these economic gains, and the high rate of inflation, beginning in 1973, worsened their economic plight. More severe recessions in 1974-75 and 1979-80, accompanied by double-digit inflation and large-scale unemployment, have been a catastrophe for blacks. The state of the economy spelled turbulence for blacks throughout the 1970s.[46] As their economic problems became more acute, with the majority of blacks experiencing severe distress, individuals and groups focused on questions of economic opportunity; black organizational efforts shifted their goals—equity in employment opportunity as well as in income potential became prime purposes.

Rampant inflation and recession have been devastating for blacks; reduced opportunities for employment, more limited purchasing power, and underemployment and unemployment have been the common conditions. Two thirds of blacks earn less than $15,000 annually for a family of four. In 1978 black teenage unemployment rates stood at 52.5 percent; in some central city areas, the unemployment of the young approached 90 percent. Almost half of those who were officially unemployed were age sixteen to twenty-four,[47] who needed not only the income from employment, but an opportunity to begin assuming adult responsibilities. Single-parent families headed by black women were hit especially hard by the high unemployment rates; the small earnings of many of these heads-of-households exacerbated the problem.[48] In the rural South, "where many blacks remain on the fringes of the economy, AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) is often the only means of survival."[49]

AFDC is synonymous with welfare to many in the larger society, and hostility to blacks "on welfare" is manifest. Although the data show that in absolute numbers most AFDC recipients are white—to be expected, given the size of the white population—many Americans continue to believe that most beneficiaries are black and that they ought to "go to work." That there would not be any economic benefit in their doing so, and that such a nonremunerative choice thus militates against poorly paid work as a solution to the welfare problem, are rarely acknowledged. Isabel Sawhill's research on potential annual earnings for mothers on welfare indicates that "half the welfare mothers could not earn as much in the labor market as they were receiving on AFDC, and only a fourth . . . could increase their income by as much as $1,000 by going to work full time."[50] Their economic problems are systemic, quite beyond their individual capacity to resolve. In a time of skyrocketing living costs, when industry is free to export its jobs to other countries where greater profits are anticipated, and where government policies to control and correct economic forces, including wages and prices, are limited, the individual's control of his own economic destiny is minimal.

Charles Benson noted in 1979 that "many central city areas serve as storage bins for people who have no productive role to play in the market economy."[51] Black unemployment rates are consistently double those of whites, and have

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been so since 1948 at least.[52] They have not fallen significantly even in the best economic times, as for example during the 1960s. The earnings gap widened in the 1970s not only between blacks and whites, but between the middle-income black minority and the much larger black underclass as well. But large segments of the black middle class feel extremely vulnerable to economic shifts; industrial cutbacks, nonenforcement of the law, and a declining commitment to affirmative action efforts—both public and private—cause great anxiety among them.[53]

The black elderly feel themselves especially vulnerable. Their plight is described in a recent publication of the National Center for Black Aged:

> There exists in America today a generation of Black people who are too old to work, too undereducated to qualify for work and who, during their productive years, were relegated to menial and low-paying work. This gives them, in their twilight years, the lowest of the low-income-related retirement incomes and benefits.
>
> Their incomes are substandard. Their housing is substandard. Health services available to them are far less adequate than those available to whites. Worse yet, the burdens they have carried throughout their lifetime have reduced their potential lifespan to an average of 6 to 7 years less than that of their white counterparts.
>
> The problem will not die with that generation. Even today, 7 out of every 8 Black males between the ages of 55 and 64 have less than a high school education. One out of every three Black families has an income below the federally set poverty level. The median income of Black families headed by persons between 45 and 64, with both parents working, is less than two-thirds that of white families in the same age group.
>
> The translation is simple: less savings, less home ownership, less wage-related retirement income in years to come.
>
> And so the problems of the Black aged grow as their numbers grow. As inflation and unemployment grow, the resources potentially available to meet their problems shrink.[54]

At the end of the 1970s, economic concerns were foremost in the minds of blacks. Social justice now means greater equity in employment, income potential, housing, education, and health care. These economic and social goals are far more difficult to attain than were the legal and political goals of the 1960s. They require far more cooperation from the private sector and a continued willingness by government to implement and enforce existing legislation. They depend on something more than legislation, however; they presume a greater equality of income than now exists. Further, they are all the more difficult to achieve in a time of relative "scarcity," when government protests that it lacks the means to finance social expenditures. Also, achievement of such social goals is complicated by current public policy that permits the entry of waves of immigrants, legal and illegal, who, of necessity, compete with low-skilled and unskilled blacks for jobs that require a minimum of education and experience.

The social climate of the 1970s, so substantially different from that of the 1960s, was accompanied by a no less remarkable change in the political climate. The country moved in a conservative direction after 1969;[55] even the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 did not alter that situation. Fear intensified and good will declined as Americans found no solutions to certain of the more pressing problems: the international arms race; the energy crisis; escalating housing, food,

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and transportation costs; the unfinished business of racial justice. New social movements—for women's rights, the rights of ethnic groups, gay rights, and the like—demanded time and attention as these groups also insisted on a greater sensitivity to their demands for social justice. Watergate, which resulted in the first resignation of an American president, was a great shock to the country. Trust in government declined as the American people grew increasingly disillusioned with their leaders. Angry voters showed their displeasure by passing bills such as Proposition 13 that called for substantial relief from the high levels of taxation that had resulted from high levels of government spending. Yet the voters seemed also to want the government to continue to provide them with adequate schools, libraries, parks, and recreational facilities, not to speak of garbage collection and other such services. Voting patterns and demands seemed strangely contradictory and obscure in the 1970s.

Still, the evidences of conservatism and retrenchment were everywhere; they were accompanied by an inward-turning on the part of many in the society. Confronted with so many pressing problems beyond their own control, many accepted the idea that the only reasonable course was to look out for themselves. A philosophy of "me first," "do your own thing," or "looking out for number one" does not lend itself readily to a concern for social justice for the less advantaged. This inward-turning reduced the commitment of many to continue their work for social justice for blacks. When inward-turning was joined to a new ethos of permissiveness, as seemed to be the case in the 1970s, there was little time for involvement in social causes, especially those that seemed to defy equitable solution—as is the case with black/white-dominant/minority relationships. Most of the decade was dominated by the leadership of Presidents Nixon and Ford, whose political behavior was scarcely supportive of black objectives to attain equal civil rights and social justice. As for President Carter, although he made many conspicuous black appointments to high office, he never formulated policies or programs calculated to help the black majority. None of these presidents assumed positive leadership roles in inspiring the American people to live up to their highest societal ideals, or even to the best in themselves, with respect to social justice for blacks. Indeed, Nixon and Ford, in their pronouncements against "forced busing," assumed a public posture of playing to the fears and negative mind-sets of the majority. Such presidential behavior helped to legitimize the conservative mood that was enveloping the nation; it served to arrest the forward progress of blacks who depend on the executive branch of government to enforce the law and on the Chief Executive to serve as a role model for the white majority. The image projected by Nixon is exemplified by his statement on open housing: "I can assure you that it is not the policy of this government to use the power of the Federal Government . . . for forced integration of the suburbs."[56] Such sentiments were not expressed so overtly by either of Nixon's successors—Carter, indeed, made positive efforts to avoid them—but none kept the idea of racial justice and racial equality to the fore.

Nixon's most devastating actions affecting blacks probably occurred with respect to his Supreme Court appointments. His campaign pledge to replace the societal commitment to "justice in our time" with a commitment to "law and

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order" was realized when he appointed men of conservative views to the Supreme Court. The Burger Court, in reaffirming traditional values and principles in the law, in declining to expand the area of civil and individual rights, and in its decisions on criminal procedure and education, has reinforced state autonomy and judicial restraint. Yet, although it is a far more traditional court than the Warren Court, the Burger Court has not been as conservative in its opinions as Nixon probably expected it to be.

Two of the more controversial cases decided by the Court in the 1970s tested the constitutionality of affirmative action, which was intended to equalize opportunity for blacks and other minorities (including women) in gaining access both to higher education and employment. The first of the cases, *University of California v. Allan Bakke* (1978), was of such moment to its protagonists that sixty-nine *amicus curiae* briefs were filed, a record number for the Supreme Court. When the sharply divided decision was rendered, there was considerable confusion: both sides appeared to have won; both sides appeared to have lost. Although the University of California was ordered to admit Allan Bakke, the Court held that race could be a determining factor in the selective admissions process. How race was to be counted as a "determining factor" was left unclear; Harvard's admissions plan was cited as an acceptable model. The Court's ruling, while cloudy in terms of implementation, left considerable room for interpretation with each admissions committee. Although some blacks and others were disappointed, some looked at the decision positively. Daniel C. Maguire wrote, "While Bakke the man won, Bakke the symbol of invidious individualism lost."[57] The Court had not ruled that affirmative action was unconstitutional, a decision it might have rendered had the evidence warranted such a conclusion.

The second case, *United Steelworkers of America v. Weber* (1979), tested the legality of a Louisiana employment training program with a 50:50 ratio of blacks to whites. Some believed this case to be even more vital to black progress than *Bakke*, since its concern was directly with employment. The legality of the program was upheld, making it a landmark decision in the black struggle for equal employment opportunity.

The Court's clearest decision with respect to affirmative action was rendered on July 2, 1980, in *Fullilove v. Klutznick*. In a 6 to 3 opinion, the Court ruled that Congress may impose a proportional share by race in its allocations of federal funds. More specifically, the ruling upheld a 1977 law that set aside 10 percent of federal public works contracts for minority contractors. In voting with the majority, Chief Justice Burger said:

> Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered to result not from any lack of capable and qualified minority businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. . . . When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing of the burden" by innocent parties is not impermissible.

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This latest decision is important not only for its clarity, but also because it recognizes that historic barriers based on racial discrimination continue to condition the position and opportunities of today's minorities. Further, even though mandatory legal discrimination has ended officially *(de jure)*, its effects continue to be felt *(de facto)* by minorities because of ongoing discriminatory practices. Because the effect on minorities is the same from *de facto* as from *de jure* discrimination, remedies are permissible for those "who still suffer from the effects of identifiable discrimination," and, if necessary, nondiscriminating parties must share the burden of justice.

Black leaders, elated by this decision, felt at once its far-reaching implications. They believe it may be applied to housing, employment, education, and other areas where Congress has evidence of past discrimination for which individuals currently seek a remedy. Collectively, these decisions offer substantial promise to those concerned with racial justice. Thus blacks are greatly concerned about the composition of the Supreme Court, for its structure will affect the course of all future decisions.

Although it is always rash to generalize about Congress, or to predict its future behavior, it is obvious that Congress in recent years has reflected the growing tide of conservatism in the society. There is a clear erosion of social commitment, observable in what must be described as antibusing, anti-affirmative action, and antipoverty legislation. Certain legislators, once liberal, find it necessary now to move toward the political center. Their seats are in jeopardy, and they feel that to save them they must busy themselves with the narrow interests of their own constituencies. But the extension of the Voting Rights Act and very significant legislation in education are evidence that the Congress is not wholly conservative.

In the last twenty years, federal intervention has been recognized as an important follow-up strategy to give substance to the more formal equality obtained by blacks in the 1950s through court decisions and overt protest behavior. When that federal intervention has faltered, black gains have slowed. Blacks believe it is the proper role of government to enact programs that will enhance the economic, educational, social, and political welfare of the underprivileged. This is done to provide opportunities for many to develop their potential so that they can become equal to those citizens who start from a more privileged social position. It is done also to promote the general welfare; there is a compelling national interest in improving the lot of the whole of its citizenry.

The aim of the civil rights movement was never merely to achieve a superficial integration of the classes, as exemplified by the right to dine in the same restaurants, travel on the same planes, or even occupy the same prestigious corporate boardroom positions. The purpose was always to include the black masses—to open new opportunities for them; to obtain jobs that pay living wages, with security in their tenure; to buy houses; to meet the costs of living, even when they escalate rapidly; to educate the children; to enjoy recreation and pleasure; and to prepare for old age and retirement. Those results have not been achieved. Two thirds of the black population are as far from those goals as they were in 1960.[58] Continuous progress for blacks toward the ultimate goals of equality and justice was not a characteristic of the 1970s.

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Gains and Losses from 1960 to 1980

The clearest gains remaining from the civil rights activities of the 1960s include the abolition of mandatory legal segregation, access to public accommodations, voting rights, increased educational opportunity, and a reduction in overt hostility from whites. The historic castelike status of blacks has been altered, though it is by no means eliminated. Conversely, the economic gap between blacks and whites is widening,[59] and there is a widespread opinion that blacks have had as much societal help as they need or deserve. That opinion is fed by an illusory view of black progress,[60] by the highly visible presence of a small number of blacks in prestigious positions not previously held by blacks, and by the presence of some blacks who live in integrated urban and suburban areas.

There are several prominent black social scientists who hold with William Wilson that the gains made by blacks in the 1960s are reflected in greater opportunities available to blacks in 1980, and that the growing number of successful blacks is evidence that race is a factor of declining significance in American society. Since class differences are widening in the black population, they say that class is becoming a more critical factor than race in determining the fate of black Americans.[61] This is a controversial and much-disputed thesis within the black community.[62]

POLITICAL SYSTEM

Blacks continue to feel that participation in electoral politics is essential to the realization of their goals to share more fully in decisions that affect life chances of people in the United States. The Joint Center for Political Studies, believing that election to public office is a major device for achieving certain purposes in the political arena, sees the existence of such institutions as the Congressional Black Caucus as absolutely essential to effective black political action. Voter registration, membership in political parties and other political organizations, service in appointive office, and active support of, or opposition to, issues and candidates, as well as running for public office are all seen as vitally important.[63]

The research the Center has done confirms that although formal barriers to black political participation have been largely removed, many informal obstacles remain. These include racial gerrymandering, which dilutes the black vote; social and economic forces in most disadvantaged communities that necessarily limit and undercut effective political participation; and the reluctance of white voters to support black candidates. The Center estimates that a significant increase in black elected officeholders will occur only when a great variety of social, economic, political, and attitudinal problems have been resolved.[64] Charles Hamilton, believing that voting occurs only when the process is related to a specific end, suggests that participation will increase when blacks believe that voting will accomplish particular goals.[65]

Until 1918 the greatest part of the black electorate voted Republican because they believed that the "party of Lincoln" was more likely to be sympathetic to

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their needs and interests than any other. Black loyalty shifted to the Democratic party in 1936 when the policies and programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt were thought to be more conducive to the specific goals that blacks deemed important. Despite these major voting trends, the black vote never has been monolithic. In 1956 it divided 60/40 between Stevenson and Eisenhower. In 1960 the black vote went 70/30 for Kennedy/Nixon, a proportion of some consequence to both. By 1980 black leaders believed disproportionate commitment to the Democratic party to be unwise because it limits effectiveness in political negotiations.

Surveying the current political situation, the Joint Center for Political Studies sees at least two potential threats to black political gains. First, there is great concern over the results of the 1980 census, which will require the redrawing of many congressional districts and the reapportionment of congressional seats among the states. The congressional districts of all fifteen black members of the House of Representatives are likely to be affected, as will certain of the other sixty-six congressional districts in which blacks are 20 percent or more of the total population.[66] If many of these districts are merged into adjoining districts, black representation and influence could be reduced appreciably. This is only one reason for the great concern about the potential black undercount in the 1980 census. Blacks were undercounted by 7.7 percent in the 1970 census; a black undercount in 1980 threatens to compound this error. State officials, required to make congressional districts relatively equal under the Supreme Court's "one-man one-vote" ruling, understand the import of the 1980 census. Black congressional representation, no less than black influence on other legislators, will be influenced by this count.[67]

The Center is concerned also that the ruling of the Supreme Court in April 1980 on at-large elections may be a setback for black political aspirations.[68] In *City of Mobile et al. v. Bolden et al.*, the Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, dramatically limited the scope of the Voting Rights Act. Though the constitutionality of the act itself was upheld the same day by a 6 to 3 vote,[69] the majority opinion in the Mobile, Alabama, case held that proof of exclusion of blacks and other minorities from electoral schemes at the state and local levels is not enough to warrant federal court action on their behalf. Proof must be established that such exclusion was intentional. This decision follows the pattern set by the Burger Court in school desegregation and employment cases, where the victim is required to prove segregative intent on the part of the other party. Proof of intent is always difficult to establish; it presumes knowledge of the state of mind operative at the time of the action. Since there are no criteria for judging the state of mind, except in the results of specific actions, the Court appears to be building a structure of "intent" that will be hard to crack as blacks and other minorities continue to seek equal justice under law.

Many blacks perceive the decision as part of an effort to effect a "Second Post-Reconstruction Period." So do many whites, who look upon it as the beginning of a "Second Redemption," analogous to the return to power of whites during Reconstruction after the Civil War. While whites seek to retain power and control, blacks seek a larger share of power and control, and their interests necessarily collide. An equitable, just resolution of these competing claims can

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only be based on a respect for individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution. As the Center makes explicit, "Local governments can hardly be expected to articulate unambiguously any intent they may have to dilute black votes."[70] Moreover, the Voting Rights Act comes up for renewal in 1982; that renewal could be imperiled by the *Mobile* decision.

Voting rights are fundamental to achieving equal rights for blacks. Strong resistance to black voting rights calls for more assertive efforts from blacks, including increased voter participation and developing coalitions with other groups. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that states that restrict voting can have their representation in Congress reduced, a penalty never invoked. However, if political strategies fail to safeguard black voting rights, pressure must be exerted to enforce this constitutional guarantee.

LEGAL SYSTEM

Mandatory segregation by law has ended; this is an important achievement. However, it has been replaced by *de facto* segregation in most metropolitan areas. The effect is much the same; segregation has clearly not ended for most of the black population. Those who wish to discriminate find subtle ways to do so, either by manipulating the law or evading its intent. Such subtle forms of discrimination are less easily dealt with than the overt, blatant "massive resistance" schemes of white Southerners in the 1950s and 1960s; they are harder to prove, more difficult to resist.

As the Joint Center for Political Studies has demonstrated, Supreme Court decisions give a "signal" to the country; a decision such as *City of Mobile et al. v. Bolden et al.* transmits the message that black rights can be eroded. Although the adverse effects may be somewhat reduced because the judgment was made by a divided court, such decisions probably do slow the drive to correct inequities.

Also, blacks continue to face serious problems in their encounters with police departments. The summer 1980 uprisings of blacks in Miami, Orlando, and Chattanooga were in part protests against police brutality. Blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested or jailed; they tend to get longer sentences when convicted. Because blacks are less affluent than whites, they are less likely to be able to employ the services of the best lawyers when legal problems arise. Also, it is common for higher bail to be set for blacks than for whites. All-white juries are again common in the South. They are not at all representative of Southern populations, and they frequently return verdicts unfavorable to blacks.

On the other side of the coin, President Carter appointed more blacks, women, and Hispanics to federal judgeships than all other previous presidents combined. Thurgood Marshall is the first black justice to serve on the Supreme Court. No less important gains have been made in the lower courts.

Still, the continuing assaults on affirmative action and on voting rights, coupled with renewed attacks on proposed housing and education legislation, make it evident that black gains are not secure. Blacks have not attained equal justice under the law, though some progress has been made in their legal status.[71]

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EDUCATION

Meanwhile, education at all levels remains "a matter of grave concern."[72] What black parents and the NAACP fought for in 1954 was equality: equal per pupil expenditures; equal length of school terms; equal buildings, equipment, facilities, and books; equal curriculum; equally prepared teachers—in short, an equal chance to learn, an equal opportunity for their children to be known as persons of worth and to know other such people. There has been some progress in certain areas where measurement is possible and quantifiable; per pupil expenditures, length of school terms, equipment, books, curriculum, and facilities do appear to be more equal now than they were a quarter of a century ago. Pressures from black organizations and parents, coupled with court decisions, have produced this progress, especially in the South. However, there has been less progress in qualitative improvements, in the quality of schooling provided, and in the opportunity to know individuals of diverse backgrounds. These insufficiencies are evident North and South; there is a continued white flight from public schools, while at the same time many black middle-income students have abandoned the public school systems to attend private schools.

All this is true, yet it is also a fact that at the elementary and secondary level there has been a steady improvement in rates of black participation and in the median years of schooling that blacks complete. This improvement is now very visible in the educational attainments of younger black adults. In 1978, 73 percent of blacks twenty to twenty-four years of age had completed high school; this compared with 85 percent of whites in the same age group. In 1960 only 33 percent of blacks and 61 percent of whites of similar ages had a comparable educational achievement. At the higher education level, participation has increased no less dramatically over the last twenty years. In 1960 only 4 percent of blacks and 12 percent of whites twenty-five to thirty-four years old had completed four years of college or more. By 1978, 11 percent of blacks and 25 percent of whites of the same ages had attained this level.[73] The gains are obvious, but parity remains the goal. One of the results of increased levels of schooling is that larger proportions of blacks are now employed in occupations requiring higher levels of education.

Dropout rates also have declined. The rate for black dropouts fourteen to twenty-four years old was 21.6 percent in 1968, compared with 11.9 percent for whites. By 1978 the rates were 16.5 percent for blacks, compared with 11.3 percent for whites. Improvement is considerable, though black dropout rates remain high. One fifth of black young adults have not completed high school.[74] In a society as credential-oriented as ours, this leads to an enormous reduction in life chances.

The problems that persist affect adversely the possibilities for black children to learn, grow, and develop in ways that are desirable. Attitudinal support for public education is declining; because most black children continue to depend on public education, the health of that system is of the greatest importance to them.[75] Absenteeism and tardiness within schools, coupled with vandalism, crime, and drugs outside, make for a poor learning environment.[76] Cities continue to spend smaller proportions of their total budgets on schools than do suburban communities.[77] It remains common for some prestigious intellectuals to ask whether black children have the native ability to learn as well as do white

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children.[78] Such ideas can have considerable influence with local school boards, taxpayers, and federal officials, who perhaps may ask whether it is not futile to expend large sums of money to educate disadvantaged blacks, given their supposed inferior mental abilities.

Within far too many urban schools, tests suggest a decline in educational achievement. Many black students do not appear to be mastering reading, writing, and mathematical skills in a way that suggests they will be able to perform competently at work or in college.[79] They are not expected to be effective competitors with higher-achieving students, and their own self-confidence cannot grow until they improve the overall quality of their academic performance.

Competency-testing, approved by some thirty-six states as a measure to guarantee minimum performance levels of high-school graduates, is accompanied today by a back-to-basics trend that has the same purpose in mind. There is considerable controversy about these programs and about the ways they are implemented and the publicity they draw to themselves. Black parents, who have asked for years that schools be held accountable for the competence of their children, sought "community control" in Ocean Hill-Brownsville in New York City, in Washington, D.C., and in other cities in the late 1960s precisely with such interests in mind. Their efforts, however, were fought by teachers' unions, particularly in New York City, where they were perceived as a threat to the unions, which emerged victorious in the battles that ensued.

At the higher education level, the "open door" of predominantly white colleges tends to be a "revolving door" for a disproportionate number of black students; they end up feeling defeated, and resent the stigma that attaches to them because of their failure. More of the black students who do remain in college and graduate need to be counseled and encouraged to major in fields where blacks are now underrepresented, such as the sciences, mathematics, engineering, architecture, and business, because the traditional fields (the social sciences and the humanities), which offered high employment opportunities in the past, now offer fewer opportunities. Also, disproportionately fewer talented blacks, as compared with talented whites, are able at this time to pursue and complete graduate and professional training.

The existence of a group of historically black colleges, both public and private, since Reconstruction has given young blacks a supportive intellectual environment conducive to learning and to maturity. Most blacks earned undergraduate degrees in these colleges until the 1970s; they were the principal training grounds for black leaders in all fields and remain today a major resource for the black community. The private black colleges, however, are now threatened by fiscal disaster. Many are experiencing severe shortages of students as a growing number of blacks seek higher educational opportunities in integrated colleges. The public black colleges are also threatened; the *Adams* decision, which ruled that dual educational systems violated the law, has been interpreted by some states as an excuse for diminishing their support of black colleges. President Carter, however, in August 1980 signed an executive order to "expand the capacity of black colleges to provide quality education and overcome any discrimination that might keep black educational institutions from taking full part in federal programs."[80] This order reinforces an earlier one in which the president asked heads of federal agencies to facilitate black college and university

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participation in federally sponsored programs. Black educators have been enthusiastic in their response to such support for black colleges.

Educational institutions have been a primary employer of professional blacks in the past. However, school integration, as it has been implemented, has made the black principal a "vanishing American"; it has also had certain negative effects on black teachers, who suffer from continuing discriminatory practices at state and local levels in employment, promotion, and retention.[81] A number of school boards and local authorities resist the idea of having white teachers work under black principals. It is not uncommon for white parents to object to having their children taught by black teachers. Such resistance is encouraged by socialization patterns that govern authority/power relationships of whites and blacks in the United States today; they are encouraged also by false beliefs about the mental abilities of blacks, even those who have acquired the requisite degrees and teacher/principal certification.

Education is an obviously necessary, though not sufficient, means for blacks to attain the economic, political, and racial goals they seek. They must continue to use education as "an active catalyst for the attainment of equality."[82] Efforts to reverse recent educational gains by limiting legislation at the national level, defeating school bond issues at the local level, and initiating tuition tax-credit schemes, education vouchers, and the like must be counteracted by individuals and organizations through lobbying efforts, voting patterns, and caucuses and coalitions with other individuals and groups equally committed to public schools. The maintenance of a public system of quality education to enhance the general welfare of all by providing equal opportunity remains a prime objective.[83]

ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The economic system is complex and intricate; its inequities are harder to combat than those in the political or legal system precisely because only a small part of it is directly controlled by government. Other forces intrude to make themselves felt; a market economy is not always an economy free of prejudice and special interests, even of the rankest variety. Such an economy is heavily influenced by public mores, which may at times be retrograde and racist. Its values and goals have centered around profits, not improving the quality of human life. Concepts of social justice that operate in the public sector are not automatically accepted in the private sector. Three centuries of discrimination effectively conditioned attitudes, policies, and practices of both public and private employers. Such discrimination has not declined significantly except where federal regulations and enforcement efforts have made it impractical or unprofitable.[84]

To complicate matters, blacks are today seeking economic advancement in a declining economy. While most job-seeking blacks live in central cities, many factories and businesses have moved from the cities to the suburbs and, increasingly, from the industrial Northeast to the Sunbelt areas of the country. Those who most need jobs do not often live in the areas where employment opportunities are the greatest. While the service sector is growing, highly educated professional help is the type that is most sought. At the same time, American

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corporations have exported a great many jobs to foreign countries where costs are lower; foreign workers, including political refugees, are entering the country in very substantial numbers. All these conditions contribute to a tight employment situation in the United States.

There are other complexities. Lester Thurow has written:

> Historically, one of the interesting things about our economy and political structure is that we find it much easier to set up welfare programs to give people money than we do to set up work programs to give people jobs. Transfer payments stood at $224 billion in 1978 while only $10 billion was spent in subsidized jobs. Yet public rhetoric would lead one to believe the opposite. If an equitable distribution of economic resources is ever to be achieved, it will require the provision of jobs for everyone who wants to work.[85]

The public welfare system ought to be seen as a substitute for full employment, which is no longer even aimed for. In 1977, 53.6 percent of recipient families in AFDC programs were white; 43.0 percent were black.[86] This evidence notwithstanding, the prevailing public myth is that the welfare system exists primarily to support lazy blacks who refuse to work. Although public subsidies to agribusiness, aircraft and automobile manufacturers, and others encounter little resistance from the public, federal and state subsidies to individuals and families, through the welfare system, are thought by many to be intolerable. Unfortunately, it is true that these subsidy systems have the unhealthy effect of creating a dependence on government on the part of the recipients, corporate and individual. Because the business cycle "has a profound impact on the status of black workers,"[87] any discrimination in either the private or the public sector has an immediate impact, and this is particularly evident in times of recession.

Most of the literature extolling the economic progress made by blacks describes conditions in the 1960s, not the 1970s.[88] The economic gains of the late sixties eroded under the pressure of recession, inflation, and large-scale unemployment. Analyzing black human resources, Barbara Jones wrote:

> The underutilization of blacks as workers has reached crisis levels. Unemployment is twice as high among blacks as whites and three times as high among black teenagers. The high unemployment must be considered in tandem with declining labor force participation rates. Thus, joblessness among black males approaches 40 percent. Occupational shifts are moving many black workers into jobs with higher wages and less unemployment, but these shifts in labor demand are also leaving another group of workers jobless.[89]

The situation is particularly critical in respect to young workers age sixteen to twenty-four. Norman Bowers, examining historical trends and racial differentials between blacks and whites, shows that unemployment has increased continuously for black males both absolutely and relatively since 1954.[90] For black women, the unemployment rate has rarely been less than twice that of white women; also, black women are concentrated in low-paying jobs that offer small opportunity for upward mobility. Bowers concludes:

> Racial unemployment differences have widened; . . . racial disparities in male labor force participation rates and employment-population ratios are increasing; . . . the female-male unemployment differential has increased moderately;

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> and . . . after lagging behind black female participation for many years, the participation rates of young white women are now generally significantly higher than those of blacks.[91]

When these economic facts are linked to demographic data, the picture becomes truly frightening. The Census Bureau has projected a 1980 return that will show 59 percent of the black population to be twenty-nine years of age or younger.[92] These young people, requiring educational and employment opportunity, find limited opportunities for work. Even their improved educational attainments are no longer sufficient. All this creates the possibility of serious disorder. To make matters worse, although census data show also that in 1980 33.2 percent of blacks will be between thirty and sixty-four, in what ought to be their most productive years, many will find little opportunity to realize their employment ambitions.[93] Many in this age group are highly educated; many are still searching for their first rewarding employment. The age group includes also a large body of mature adults who were barred from equal employment opportunity and adequate income possibilities as young adults when their careers were beginning. Most of them will need to remain in the labor force until they reach the mandatory retirement age; few have alternative sources of income. Using official figures, known for their undercount, it is obvious that in 1980 and for the rest of this century more than half the black population will be seeking educational opportunity; at the same time, from 33 to 43 percent will be seeking economic opportunity through employment so that they are able to provide for themselves and their families, and to contribute to the society.

To meet the human needs of blacks, other minorities, and the poor, the United States urgently needs a change in social values. We have not even begun to analyze why the failures in the 1970s have been so glaring, why so many Americans remain locked in poverty.

The income that results from employment is a primary factor in all individual decision-making. It determines to a very great extent whether one will marry and have children, where one will live, what one will be able to save or invest, what health care will be available, what educational options will exist, and how one will prepare for retirement. Blacks are today far below whites in both income and income expectations. Thurow's study of poverty and discrimination reveals that the average black family income has consistently remained near 55 percent of white income.[94] The median income ratio was up to 0.61 in 1969, compared with 0.55 in 1960, but dropped to 0.58 in 1974, was at 0.59 in 1976, and was 0.57 in 1977.[95] Managing with such incomes is proving exceedingly difficult for most black families. Energy costs and food expenses consume a higher proportion of black family income than of white family income. The inflated costs of housing, utilities, transportation, health care, and education cannot be met by many so long as these differential income ratios prevail. Since these differences cannot be explained simply by educational inadequacies, skill mismatches, or job-search difficulties, attention must be given to the continuing racial discrimination that afflicts so many blacks.

In his study of poverty and discrimination, Thurow said that "Negro losses and white gains from discrimination amount to approximately $15 billion per year." He states further that "discrimination causes a large reduction in the

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potential level of output of the American economy. Negro economic resources are not fully utilized and white resources are inefficiently utilized as a result of discrimination. Efficiency losses amount to approximately $19 billion per year."[96] Bowers's analysis of youth employment in 1980 reveals continuing "evidence of a persistent and chronic racial differential for virtually all labor market indicators."[97]

Thurow offers an explanation for the cause of the problem and its solutions.

> Much discrimination is based on the monopoly powers of whites. Without such powers racial prejudices would have less impact on Negro incomes. With monopoly powers, however, whites may gain financially and enforce discriminatory practices that substantially lower Negro incomes. Functionally, monopoly can be reduced without changing the attitudes of the whites who discriminate. Equality need not wait until man has goodwill toward all races or until the government is willing to bribe him to be nice to his neighbor. . . . The institutions of government are an important link in implementing discrimination. Either directly through legal restrictions or indirectly through harassment and expenditure decisions, the coercive powers of the white community flow through local, state, and federal government institutions. Eliminating discrimination in all levels of government may be one of the most effective means of eliminating the effects of discrimination through the economy.[98]

Elimination of discrimination in government must be a principal aim of the Chief Executive. However, it demands also greater involvement by blacks in the political process, in the making of public policy, and in the planning of the budget.

Continuing discrimination and economic adversity spell disaster for blacks as they seek housing in today's market. The Fair Housing legislation of 1968 has been weakly and unevenly enforced in the country; it provides few remedies for those who have experienced discrimination.[99] Realtors have maintained their traditional steering practices; lending institutions and insurance agencies have continued their "red-lining" policies. These practices and others determine to a very large extent where blacks live and why the Fair Housing Act has not provided the relief anticipated. Housing choices continue to be closely related to skin color. For blacks who have below-average incomes, purchase of a home has become almost an impossibility in 1980. Meanwhile, rental options decline in major cities like Washington, D.C., where apartments, rapidly converted to condominiums, sell at prices far beyond the means of any but the most affluent.

Congress needs to provide through new legislation an effective enforcement mechanism for the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Without such protection, housing discrimination will continue; blacks will continue to suffer major disadvantages in their access to rental housing or to home ownership.

* * *

To analyze the black condition in terms of progress or regression calls for an analysis of the larger American society, since the gains and losses of blacks are inextricably bound in with the way society functions. Those forces that seek to retain the *status quo* for blacks continue to encounter those that are working for

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modification and change; blacks have an interest in seeking greater control of this process through the use of power, exercised selectively.

To analyze the black condition today is to become acutely aware of the growing diversity within this population over the last twenty years. For the first time in American history, about one third of all blacks live at what may be described as a moderate level of comfort or above. Black progress toward equal opportunity, however tenuous, is a clear gain; it draws on efforts that go back to the 1930s. The most tangible effects are perhaps most evident for blacks who are well-educated intact married couples where the head of the household is thirty-five or younger.

The remaining two thirds of the black population still suffer acutely from past and present discrimination. Although there is heated debate on whether the primary cause of this condition is ongoing racism or social-class constraints, those who are forced to live in this condition have no interest in such discussions. For them, the effects are the same; what they most seek are policies and programs that will improve their living conditions and enhance the life chances of their children.

Blacks are divided also about the utility of affirmative action as a policy calculated to give substantial benefits. Although most black intellectuals support the policy, a minority express very serious misgivings. Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, for example, hold that the stigma that results from the application of affirmative action principles reinforces the notion of black inferiority; in the long run, in their view, the potential harm outweighs the possible good. Charles Hamilton gives somewhat qualified support to affirmative action, believing it to be a corrective policy justified by the substantial national interest involved. He looks for a policy that would combine protecting the public interest with providing equality of opportunity, and recommends that attention be focused primarily on those constituencies that could be served by individuals trained for specific needs under affirmative action programs. For example, he sees good reason to train individuals to provide health-care services to poor people. Whatever the disagreement among blacks about affirmative action, there is none about the public obligation to affect the conditions under which blacks live, so that they can in fact achieve equality and justice.

The achieving of equal opportunity remains a prime concern. There is an enormous gap between publicly mandated goals of equal access to employment, housing, health care, education, income, and justice, and their actual attainment. Many forms of inequality exist, with complex and varied patterns.[100] While opportunities shift, with industry moving increasingly to the Sunbelt, blacks today, as before, seek to accommodate themselves to these changes. In the 1970s, for example, black "reverse migration" to the South came close to the numbers moving from the South.[101] This demographic change could have important political and economic consequences in the future; it remains to be seen, however, what the results of this new pattern may be.

Bold, decisive action is mandatory if this nation is to continue to progress toward its ideals and goals of liberty, equality, and justice for all. The pervasive philosophy of gradualism that has been operative recently must change; the number of blacks now included as full participants in American society is grossly inadequate. Greater efforts must be made by the executive branch of the

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federal government to assume a new and determined leadership role to shape positively the pattern and pace of change. Legislatures on every level—federal, state, and city councils—share equally in this responsibility, as do local school boards. And it is the responsibility of blacks and their allies to increase both their political consciousness and their efforts to shape the membership and affect the decisions of these legislative bodies. Most of all, policies and programs are needed to move the economy toward full employment. The "cycle of progress," once so useful to blacks, must be reinstituted; the "vicious circle," created in the 1970s by the erosion of forces working for modification and change, must be arrested. Tocqueville saw the situation correctly when he wrote:

> A natural prejudice leads a man to scorn anybody who has been his inferior, long after he has become his equal; the real inequality, due to fortune or the law, is always followed by an imagined inequality rooted in mores; but with the ancients this secondary effect of slavery had a time limit, for the freedman was so completely like the man born free that it was soon impossible to distinguish between them.
>
> In antiquity the most difficult thing was to change the law; in the modern world the hard thing is to alter mores, and our difficulty begins where theirs ended. This is because in the modern world the insubstantial and ephemeral fact of servitude is most fatally combined with the physical and permanent fact of difference in race. Memories of slavery disgrace the race, and race perpetuates memories of slavery.

And,

> The nations of our day cannot prevent conditions of equality from spreading in their midst. But it depends on themselves whether equality is to lead to servitude or freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness.[102]

It is our national obligation to make those choices that will lead us as a citizenry to freedom, knowledge, and prosperity.

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This paper has benefited from the insight and advice of Dr. Benjamin Bowser, Dr. Edmonia W. Davidson, Dr. John E. Fleming, Dr. Robert B. Hill, Dr. Willie T. Howard, Dr. Barbara A. P. Jones, Dr. Charles Long, Dr. Lorenzo Morris, Dr. Louise Taylor, Dr. Kenneth S. Tollett, Dr. Darwin Turner, Dr. Ronald Walters, Dr. Bernard C. Watson, Dr. Emory West, and Dr. Michael Winston. I am grateful for their willingness to share their special knowledge with me. Any shortcomings or errors are my own.

[1]Selected references from this prolific literature are: John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978); Carter G. Woodson and Charles H. Wesley, *The Negro in Our History*, 11th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, Inc., 1966); Saunders Redding, *They Came in Chains* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1950); C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, 3d rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice* (New York: Knopf, 1976).

[2]For a succinct, yet complete, explanation of this situation, see John Hope Franklin, "The Two Worlds of Race: A Historical View," *Daedalus*, Fall 1965, pp. 899-920.

[3]Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393.

[4]Other human intergroup relationships based on *religious* differences, for example, are of longer-standing duration and just as troubling and difficult to resolve justly and humanely. Think of the Catholic/Protestant intergroup conflicts in Ireland, for example.

[5]Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas et al. 349 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954). This decision was followed in 1955 by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 349 U.S. 294.

[6]Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 U.S. 537, at 563.

[7]Public school teachers' salaries are a case in point. Black teachers at Dunbar High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, early in the 1940s won a court action to equalize the salaries of black and

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white teachers in that city. There were several such suits for equal salaries in Virginia in the late 1930s and early 1940s, beginning in Norfolk and spreading to other cities such as Newport News, Danville, and Richmond. For a more detailed explanation, see Doxey A. Wilkerson, "The Negro School Movement in Virginia: From 'Equalization' to 'Integration,' " in *The Making of Black America*, August Meier and Elliott Rudwick (eds.) (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 261-63.

[8]Such people are W. E. B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington, Carter G. Woodson, Mary McLeod Bethune, Mary Church Terrell, and such families as that of Horace Mann Bond. Successful individuals and families were to be found primarily in cities, North and South.

[9]Faustine C. Jones, "Black Americans and the City: A Historical Survey," *Journal of Negro Education* 42 (3) (Summer, 1973): 261-82.

[10]Dorothy K. Newman et al., *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940-75* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 11-13.

[11]*To Secure These Rights, The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights* (New York: 1947), p. 166.

[12]Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, "Black Progress and Liberal Rhetoric," *Commentary*, April 1973, pp. 35-44; Herman P. Miller, *Rich Man, Poor Man* (New York: Crowell, 1971), p. 53; Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 127-28. Penn Kemble supported this viewpoint in a presentation on Panorama, Metromedia, October 14, 1977.

[13]Outstanding examples are Robert B. Hill, *The Illusion of Black Progress* (Washington, D.C.: National Urban League Research Department, 1978); Robert B. Hill, *The Widening Economic Gap* (Washington, D.C.: National Urban League Research Department, 1979); and U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

[14]Useful theoretical explanations for inequality of blacks can be found in Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1944, 1962), sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. A follow-up to that study, also sponsored by Carnegie, is Newman et al., *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*. See also Robert A. Rothman, *Inequality and Stratification in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978).

[15]"The Negro American," *Daedalus*, Fall 1965 and Winter 1966.

[16]Kluger, *Simple Justice*.

[17]Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1960* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 323.

[18]Under orders by the attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, federal troops were sent to guard James Meredith, the first known black entrant to the University of Mississippi; several hundred troops had to remain until Meredith graduated. Kennedy also ordered the desegregation of bus depots and airports in the South after the freedom rides had ended. He saw that voting rights were secured in many Southern counties. He met with black spokesmen to learn more about black concerns that needed to be acted upon, and participated in public school desegregation efforts in Memphis, Atlanta, Dallas, and New Orleans.

[19]Albert P. Blaustein and Robert L. Zangrando, *Civil Rights and the American Negro: A Documentary History* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968), pp. 558-66.

[20]Woodson and Wesley, *The Negro in Our History*, pp. 786-87.

[21]Newman et al., *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, pp. 118-19.

[22]Jack Anderson reported in *The Washington Post* that the FBI kept secret files on the leaders of the black movement. The material in the files was obtained through FBI spying and was alleged to be derogatory. J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FBI, had hoped to use the materials to discredit the leaders, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and the movement—which he tried to label "communist." Anderson has published the file numbers of these secret files. Also, the FBI tapped King's phone, with the approval of Robert F. Kennedy, then attorney general.

[23]Congressional committees at this time were dominated by the traditional seniority system. Crucial committees were chaired by long-term white Southerners who had spent their entire careers blocking legislation designed to assist blacks by any means at their disposal, primarily through the filibuster. But Lyndon B. Johnson had been their colleague and peer for many years; he was respected by these powerful congressmen, and they responded to his urgings to pass civil rights legislation. This, together with the passage of the Voting Rights Bill in 1965 and with the seniority system under attack from younger forward-looking congressmen, made the powerful Southern congressmen more willing to pass liberal legislation and to fund it.

[24]Woodson and Wesley, *The Negro in Our History*, p. 403.

[25]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, no. 80, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.: An Historical View, 1790-1978* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Table 47, p. 69.

[26]Ibid., Table 96, p. 137.

[27]Ibid., Table 102, p. 141.

[28]Ibid., Table 99, p. 139.

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[29]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 100th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Table 238, p. 148.

[30]Among these were the space and arms races with the Russians; the Cuban missile crisis; the civil rights struggles, deterioration of the cities and white flight to the suburbs, urban riots, hardcore poverty, the war in Vietnam, youth rebellion, marches on Washington, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Robert F. Kennedy, and the women's movement.

[31]See *Black World (Negro Digest)* from 1963 to 1966 for commitment to the civil rights movement; 1966 to 1969 for commitment to black power and nationalism; 1969 to 1973 for interest in Pan-Africanism; and 1973 to 1976 for movement to the left, when *Black World* ceased publication. *Freedomways* began in 1961 as a direct result of the intensification of the civil rights struggle, but always had a Third World focus. *The Black Scholar* began publication in 1969 with a militant focus that has continued.

[32]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Tables 131 and 132, pp. 179-180.

[33]All of the data come from the Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington, D.C. See their *National Roster of Black Elected Officials*, vol. 9, July 1979.

[34]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 109, p. 156.

[35]Ibid., Table 130, p. 179; see also Table 103, p. 150.

[36]See Michael A. Olivas, *The Dilemma of Access: Minorities in Two Year Colleges* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1979).

[37]*Higher Education Equity: The Crisis of Appearance Versus Reality*, National Advisory Committee on Black Higher Education and Black Colleges and Universities, U.S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 22.

[38]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, p. 168.

[39]Lorenzo Morris, *Elusive Equality: The Status of Black Americans in Higher Education* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1979).

[40]Ibid., chapter 7. See also *Access of Black Americans to Higher Education: How Open Is the Door?* National Advisory Committee on Black Higher Education and Black Colleges and Universities (Washington, D.C.: 1979), pp. 24-33.

[41]*Civil Rights Update*, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October, 1979).

[42]Edmonia W. Davidson, "Education and Black Cities: Demographic Background," *Journal of Negro Education* 42 (3) (Summer 1973): 233-60.

[43]Nancy L. Arnez, "Implementation of Desegregation as a Discriminatory Process," *Journal of Negro Education* 47 (1) (Winter 1978): 28-45.

[44]These achievement levels most commonly are ascertained by use of standardized tests. This testing process is very controversial. See Sylvia T. Johnson, *The Measurement Mystique* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Educational Policy, 1979). Ralph Nader and Allan Nairn severely criticize the use of standardized achievement tests in *The Reign of ETS: The Corporation that Makes Up Minds* (Washington, D.C.: 1980).

[45]Newman et al., *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, pp. 5-7. See also Barbara Becnel, "Black Workers: Progress Derailed," *AFL-CIO American Federationist*, January 1978.

[46]Robert B. Hill, *Black Families in the 1974-75 Depression* (Washington, D.C.: National Urban League Research Department, July 1975). See also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 133, p. 189; Table 134, p. 190; Table A-25, p. 250.

[47]Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 63. Thurow used official U.S. Labor Department statistics, correcting for the number of black teenagers who have dropped out of the system, not at school, at work, or looking for work.

[48]Robert B. Hill, "Black Families in the 1970s," *The State of Black America 1980* (New York: National Urban League, 1980), pp. 29-58.

[49]Marc Levinson, "Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Georgia," *The Crisis*, January 1980, pp. 31-33.

[50]Isabel Sawhill, "Discrimination and Poverty among Women Who Head Families," in *Crisis in American Institutions*, 4th ed., Jerome H. Skolnick and Elliott Currie (eds.) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 187-97.

[51]Charles S. Benson, "Investment and Disinvestment in Public Education," *Cross Reference* 2 (4) (July/August 1979).

[52]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 47, p. 69. See also *Social Indicators 1976: Selected Data on Social Conditions and Trends in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), Chart 8/12a, p. 339; Table 8/12, p. 379.

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[53]Barbara A. P. Jones, "Utilization of Black Human Resources in the U.S.," *Review of Black Political Economy* 10 (Fall 1979): 79-96.

[54]Cited in Louis Stokes, "Keynote Address," *Winning the Rights and Entitlements of the Black Elderly*, Sixth Annual Conference of the National Caucus/Center on Black Aged, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 263.

[55]Faustine C. Jones, *The Changing Mood in America: Eroding Commitment?* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1977).

[56]*Nixon: The Second Year of His Presidency*, Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 164A.

[57]Daniel C. Maguire, *A New American Justice: Ending the White Male Monopolies* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 39.

[58]Employment, income, and unemployment figures, coupled with inflation rates, support this point. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population; Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 100th ed.; also, *The State of Black America 1980*.

[59]Hill, *The Widening Economic Gap*.

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[61]William J. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

[62]See the two papers on class and race in this issue: Joan W. Moore, "Minorities in the American Class System," and Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Race and Class in the 1980s: An Interactive View." Gerald R. Gill also addresses the race versus class controversy in *Meanness Mania: The Changed Mood* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1980), pp. 31-35.

[63]Joint Center for Political Studies, *National Roster of Black Elected Officials*, vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: 1979).

[64]Ibid.

[65]Charles V. Hamilton, "On Politics," in *The State of Black America 1980*, p. 211. See also Eddie N. Williams, "Black Political Participation in 1978," in *The State of Black America 1979* (New York: National Urban League, 1979), p. 41-77.

[66]Eddie N. Williams, "Perspective," *Focus* 8 (2) (February 1980): 2.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Joint Center for Political Studies news release, April 25, 1980.

[69]Fred Barbash, "Justices Limit Scope of Voting Rights Act," *The Washington Post*, April 23, 1980, A-14; and Fred Barbash, "High Court May Have Derailed Voting Drive by Blacks in South," *The Washington Post*, April 24, 1980, A-1.

[70]Joint Center for Political Studies news release.

[71]Harry A. Ploski and Warren Marr, III, *The Negro Almanac: A Reference Work on the Afro-American* (New York: The Bellwether Co., 1976), pp. 257-92.

[72]Bernard C. Watson, "Education: A Matter of Grave Concern," in *The State of Black America 1980*, pp. 59-93.

[73]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 124, p. 174; Figure 8, p. 85; Table 71, pp. 94-95.

[74]*Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 100th ed., Table 238, p. 148. See also National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education*, 1979 ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), Table 5.5, Chart 5.5, pp. 184-5.

[75]Gill, "Attacks on American Public Education," pp. 36-40.

[76]This is a general phenomenon, not peculiar to blacks. However, there seems to be more of it in low-income black neighborhoods where the children already have more than their share of obstacles to surmount in environmental conditions.

[77]See Table 4.13, Chart 4.13, Table 4.14, Chart 4.14 in *The Condition of Education*, pp. 166-69.

[78]The work of Arthur Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, H. J. Eysenck, and William Shockley on this point is well known. Jensen's most recent book on the subject is *Bias in Mental Testing* (New York: The Free Press, 1979).

[79]Because of public concern about minimum competencies of high-school graduates, thirty-six states have developed and are using minimum competency tests in some way. See *The Condition of Education*, pp. 47, 69.

[80]*The Washington Post*, August 9, 1980, A-9. Jeremiah O'Leary provides a more complete account in "Carter Orders Help for Black Colleges," *The Washington Star*, August 9, 1980, A-3.

[81]*NEA News: Press, Radio, and Television Relations*, a National Education Association press release (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 1972). See also J. C. James, "The Black Principal: Another Vanishing American," in *The New Republic*, September 26, 1970, pp. 17-20; and Arnez, "Implementation of Desegregation as a Discriminatory Process," pp. 28-45.

[82]Watson, "Education: A Matter of Grave Concern," p. 61.

[83]Supportive evidence for this statement is provided in John E. Fleming, Gerald R. Gill, David H. Swinton, *The Case for Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1978).

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[84]Lester C. Thurow, *Poverty and Discrimination* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 153. See also Special Labor Force Report 233, "Young Workers and Families: A Special Section," U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 5.

[85]Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society*, p. 206.

[86]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 100th ed., Table 574, p. 357.

[87]Jones, "Utilization of Black Human Resources in the U.S.," pp. 93-94.

[88]Hill, *The Widening Economic Gap*, p. 10.

[89]Jones, "Utilization of Black Human Resources in the U.S.," pp. 94-95.

[90]Norman Bowers, "Young and Marginal: An Overview of Youth Employment," *Young Workers and Families: A Special Section*, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Special Labor Force Report 233, 1980, pp. 5-6.

[91]Ibid., p. 16.

[92]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social Indicators 1976: Selected Data on Social Conditions and Trends in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), Table 1/3, p. 23.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Thurow, *Poverty and Discrimination*, chapter 2, pp. 9-25.

[95]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 14, p. 31; Table 135, p. 191; p. 186.

[96]Thurow, *Poverty and Discrimination*, pp. 158-59.

[97]Bowers, "Young and Marginal," p. 5.

[98]Thurow, *Poverty and Discrimination*, pp. 158-59. His complete analysis is in chapter 7, pp. 111-38.

[99]There are two options for persons who experience discrimination in housing. The first is appeal under state fair-housing laws. Only New York, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Connecticut, Colorado, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky have good records for penalizing violators, according to Martin Sloane of the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing, and William Taylor, director of the Center for National Policy Review. The second is to file a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Washington, D.C. HUD invites conflicting parties to resolve their differences, but if the discriminating party does not appear for conciliation, HUD lacks power to do more. The victim then has no option but to file a private lawsuit, if he can afford it; that lawsuit might not be settled for years.

[100]U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). See also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The State of Civil Rights: 1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

[101]U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the U.S.*, Table 9, p. 16.

[102]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, J. P. Mayer, (ed.) (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1969), pp. 341, 705.

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Chicanos in the United States: A History of Exploitation and Resistance

THIS ESSAY SEEKS TO PROVIDE material that will contribute to an understanding of Chicanos[1] in the United States today. The task calls for a historical perspective on the Mexican people within the context of the U.S. political economy.

It is essential to examine first the early and continued influence of Mexicans in the development of what is today the southwestern United States. Unlike those who believe that social, political, and economic influences in the region were largely the result of Anglo penetration, we argue that practices and institutions indigenous to Mexicans were largely taken over by colonizing Anglos.[2] The military conquest of the Southwest by the United States was a watershed that brought about the large-scale dispossession of the real holdings of Mexicans and their displacement and relegation to the lower reaches of the class structure. Anglo control of social institutions and of major economic sectors made possible the subsequent exploitation of Mexican labor to satisfy the needs of various developing economic interests.

Mexicans were not passive actors, simply accepting Anglo domination. Mexican resistance to exploitation has taken a great variety of forms since the conquest, contributing to the maintenance and perpetuation of cultural patterns among Mexicans living in the United States. These cultural patterns include: a national identity built around an "Indian" past; an Indianized Catholicism *(La Virgen de Guadalupe);* racial miscegenation (*mestizaje*—Indian and Spaniard—although almost as many Africans as Spaniards were brought to Middle America during the colonial period); and a regional, single language, Spanish. These patterns and practices, which distinguish the Mexican population from other groups, have persisted even among those who left the Southwest for other regions of the United States.

The Military Conquest

Mexicans were incorporated into the United States largely through military conquest. The period that brought the northern reaches of Mexico under the U.S. flag begins approximately in 1836 with the Battle of San Jacinto, and ends in 1853 with the Gadsden Purchase. The military conquest was preceded by a period of Anglo immigration.

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In 1810 Mexico began its struggle to gain independence from Spain, an objective finally achieved in 1821. Mexicans, recognizing the advantage of increasing the size of the population loyal to its cause, granted permission to foreigners in 1819 to settle in its northern area, what is now Texas. Two years later Stephen Austin founded San Felipe de Austin; by 1830, one year after Mexico had abolished slavery, it is estimated that Texas had about twenty thousand Anglo settlers, primarily Southerners, with approximately two thousand "freed" slaves who had been forced to sign lifelong contracts with former owners.[3] This trickle of immigrants soon became an invading horde.

Immigrants into the territories of Mexico were required to meet certain conditions: pledge their allegiance to the Mexican government and adopt Catholicism. The settlers' initial acceptance of these conditions, however, soon turned to circumvention. The distance of the settlements from Mexico's capital city, together with the internal strife common in the period, made enforcement of these settlement agreements difficult, almost impossible. The foreigners' attitudes toward their hosts only aggravated the situation. Eugene C. Barker, a historian, wrote that by 1835 "the Texans saw themselves in danger of becoming the alien subjects of a people to whom they deliberately believed themselves morally, intellectually, and politically superior. Such racial feelings underlay Texan-American relations from the establishment of the very first Anglo-American colony in 1821."[4]

A constellation of factors—attitudes of racial superiority, anger over Mexico's abolition of slavery, defiance of initially agreed-upon conditions for settlement, and an increasing number of immigrants who pressed for independence from Mexico—strained an already difficult political situation. Direct and indirect diplomatic efforts at negotiation failed. The result was the Texas Revolt of 1835-36, which created for Anglo-Texans and dissident Mexicans the so-called independent Texas Republic, which was to exist until 1845. This republic, while never recognized by the Mexican government, provided the pretext for further U.S. territorial expansion and set the stage for the war between Mexico and the United States (1846-48).

Despite significant and conflicting regional interests in the war, imperialist interests allied with proponents for the expansion of slavery carried the day. When the United States granted statehood to Texas in 1845, almost a decade after recognizing it as a republic, war was inevitable; it was officially declared on May 13, 1846. It has been argued that U.S. politicians and business interests actively sought this war, believing Mexico to be weak, a nation torn by divisive internal disputes that had not been resolved since independence.[5]

When hostilities ended in 1848, Mexico lost over half its national territory. The United States, by adding over a million square miles, increased its territory by a third. Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Nevada, and Utah, as well as portions of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming, were carved out of the territory acquired.

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed on February 2, 1848, officially concluded hostilities and settled the question of sovereignty over the territories ceded. A new border was established, and the status of Mexicans in the newly acquired U.S. territory was fixed. Mexicans were given one year to decide whether to relocate south of the new border, maintaining their Mexican

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citizenship, or remain on their native lands, accepting U.S. sovereignty. The treaty explicitly guaranteed that Mexicans who elected to stay in the United States would enjoy "all the rights of citizens of the [United States] according to the principles of the Constitution; and in the meantime shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their religion without restriction."

Mexican property rights were further defined once the treaty had been approved by both governments. A Statement of Protocol, drafted by U.S. emissaries when the Mexican government reacted strongly to changes unilaterally made by the U.S. Senate, said:

> The American government by suppressing the Xth. article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not in any way intend to annul grants of lands made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These grants preserve the legal value which they may possess, and the grantees may cause their legitimate [titles] to be acknowledged before the American tribunals.
>
> Conformable to the law of the United States, legitimate titles to every description of property, personal and real, existing in the ceded territories, are those which were legitimate titles under the Mexican law of California and New Mexico up to the 13th of May, 1846, and in Texas up to the 2nd of March, 1836.

Subsequent events soon indicated that these "guarantees" were specious.

A final portion of Mexican land was acquired by the United States through purchase. James Gadsden was sent to Mexico City in 1853 to negotiate a territorial dispute arising from the use of faulty maps in assigning borders under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico's dire need for funds to rebuild its war-ravaged economy influenced its agreement to sell more land. Gadsden purchased over 45,000 square miles in what is now Arizona and New Mexico, land the United States wanted for a rail line to California. The Gadsden Purchase territories were in time seen to contain some of the world's richest copper mines.

The importance for the United States of this imperialist war and the later Gadsden Purchase cannot be overstated. Vast tracts of land, rich in natural resources, together with their Mexican and Indian inhabitants, provided conditions very favorable to U.S. development and expansion. The United States had done very well in its "little war" with Mexico.

Dispossession and Displacement

To make matters worse, the social and economic displacement of Mexicans and their reduction to the status of a colonized group proceeded rapidly, in clear violation of the civil and property rights guaranteed both by treaty and protocol. In Texas, a wholesale transfer of land from Mexican to Anglo ownership took place. That process had started at the time of the Texas Revolt and gained momentum after the U.S.-Mexico War. Mexican landowners, often robbed by force, intimidation, or fraud, could defend their holdings through litigation, but this generally led to heavy indebtedness, with many forced to sell their holdings to meet necessary legal expenses. With depressing regularity, Anglos generally ended up with Mexican holdings, acquired at prices far below their real value.[6]

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The military conquest, the presence of U.S. troops, racial violence, governmental and judicial chicanery—all served to establish Anglos in positions of power in economic structures originally developed by Mexicans. Anglos adopted wholesale techniques developed by Mexicans in mining, ranching, and agriculture.[7] Because this major transfer of economic power from Mexicans to Anglos varied by region, it is important to say something about each.

Texas, responding to a significant expansion in the earlier Mexican-based cattle and sheep industries, was quick to cater to increased world demands.. Acreage given over to cotton also expanded, helped greatly by improvements in transport facilities. These industries helped create and develop the mercantile towns that soon became conspicuous features on the Texas landscape.[8] Mexicans, instead of reaping the economic rewards of ownership, found themselves only contributing their labor. Mexicans were increasingly relegated to the lower ranks of society. By the end of the century, ethnicity, merged with social class, made Mexicans a mobile, colonized labor force.

The social structure of *New Mexico* in the beginning was quite different from that of Texas. The state, sparsely populated, was more densely settled in the north, in and about Santa Fé, than in the south; communal villages with lands granted to each community were common in the north. Communal water and grazing rights were assigned by community councils; only homestead and farming land were privately owned. Southern New Mexico, by contrast, boasted *haciendas* that had been established by grantees. This system consisted of *patrónes*, with settlers recruited to perform the necessary chores. It was a social structure organized on a debt-peonage system.

Anglo penetration into New Mexico after the war was more limited and did not occur on a large scale until the mid-1870s. Indian and Mexican defense of the territory served to keep out many settlers. Only an established U.S. military presence in the area made it at all accessible to Anglo cattlemen and farmers. Encountering a diversified class structure among the resident Mexicans, the Anglos generally chose to associate with the U.S. armed forces, creating a quasi-military society in the process. By the early 1880s, however, the railroads had helped to stimulate a new economic expansion. There was a further swelling of the Anglo population, and as pressure for land increased, the process of Mexican dispossession also dramatically accelerated.

The dispossession process in New Mexico was achieved in part through taxation. The Spanish-Mexican traditional practice had been to tax the products of the land. Under the new Anglo regime, land itself was taxed. With agricultural income fluctuating greatly with climatic conditions, fixed land taxes placed severe burdens on both farmers and ranchers. Small-scale subsistence farmers were unprepared and generally unable to raise the capital to meet the newly imposed tax liabilities. The practice of transferring the title on land on which delinquent taxes were owed to the person making such payment caused many Mexicans to lose their land. Fraud, deceit, and manipulation were common. An associate justice of the Court of Private Land Claims wrote:

> A number of grants have had their boundaries stretched and areas marvelously expanded. But this has been done mostly by Yankee and English purchasers and not by the original Mexican owners. Where boundaries were made by natural landmarks, such as a "white rock," and "red hill," or a "lone tree," another rock,

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> hill or tree of like description could always be found a league or two farther off, and claimed to be the original landmark described in the grant documents.[9]

Toward the end of the century, federal policies also operated to dispossess Mexicans of their land. The National Forest Service, for example, began taking over millions of acres from northern villages, which were rarely compensated for their losses. Inhabitants were now compelled to pay grazing fees on land that had originally belonged to the villages. The granting of large tracts of land to the railroads served further to confine Mexicans to increasingly smaller land bases.

The Court of Private Land Claims, established in 1891 to resolve conflicts over land claims in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona, existed for thirteen years; its Anglo judges had a very limited knowledge and understanding of Mexican and Spanish landowning laws, traditions, and customs. Their judgments, based on Anglo legal practices, greatly contributed to the dispossessions. In time, Anglos came to own four fifths of the New Mexican grant areas,[10] and this loss of land relegated the vast majority of Mexicans to a bleak economic and social existence.

Twenty or so prominent Mexican families in New Mexico joined with the Anglo interests in banking, ranching, and the railroads, expecting to maintain their own political, economic, and social advantages.[11] The alliance, however, was controlled by the Anglo faction, and was therefore always unequal.[12] In any case, efforts by this small proportion of the original Mexican families to hold on to their advantaged status had no positive effect for the vast majority of Mexicans. As in Texas, ethnicity and class merged, and Mexicans, dispossessed of their holdings, saw them taken by the Anglo elites that dominated the political and economic activities of the society.

Arizona offers the example of the development of a colonial labor force in yet another mode. Arizona, not a separate entity at the time of conquest, was originally part of New Mexico, administered from Santa Fé. The small Mexican population was concentrated in the south, largely in Tucson and Tubac. One of the reasons for the sparseness of the settlements was the failure of the Spanish missionaries to impose Christianity on the nomadic Indian inhabitants; another was the aridity of the soil, which made agricultural pursuits difficult. The presence of the U.S. Army in the 1880s began to have its effects on the region. The Army fought the Indians, allowing the mining of copper and silver to resume; it was soon to become a large-scale economic enterprise. As with other industries, Anglo ownership was the norm; Mexicans contributed their labor, employing the familiar techniques they had developed long before.[13] Railroads accelerated the migration of Anglos and the establishment of new towns. The growth of all these major industries called for a cheap wage labor pool. Mexicans who migrated north, mostly to work in these industries, discovered that the wages they received for tasks identical to their Anglo counterparts were considerably lower. Restricted to menial and dangerous work, and forced to live in segregated areas in the mining and railroad communities that had created their jobs, they felt the indignity of their situation.[14]

California differed from the other regions: New England clipper ships had established very early ties with California; Franciscans, founding missions in the area in the 1830s, forced Christianized Indians into agriculture and

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manufacturing, to work alongside mulatto and *mestizo* Mexicans. This labor force helped to make California—economically, politically, and socially distant—independent of Mexico City. Excellent climate and abundant natural resources contributed to make this the most prosperous province in Mexico. Strong ties bound the missions to the *ranchos*. Missions, given large parcels of land to carry out their Christianizing enterprise, were neighbors of private individuals who owned vast tracts of land. Eventually, however, the privately owned *ranchos* established their supremacy throughout the province.

Urban settlements also developed: Monterey was the center of northern California; *el Pueblo de Nuestra Señora, la Reina de los Angeles de Porciúncula*, the economic and social center of southern California. Other towns sprung up around the major forts and missions. The rigid feudal system of *patrón* and *peón*, typical of southern New Mexico, did not develop in California. The class system that emerged was three-tiered: wealthy landowners enjoyed political, economic, and social power, and constituted about 10 percent of the population; artisans, small-scale landowners, vaqueros, herders, and soldiers constituted the bulk of Californian society; Indians and lower class *mestizos* stood at the bottom of the class hierarchy.

A few Anglos had come to Alta California before the U.S.-Mexico War; some were recipients of land grants, and many of them apparently assimilated into Mexican society. After the Texas revolt, however, Anglo foreigners coming to California were more reluctant to mingle or assimilate, and openly showed their antagonism towards Mexicans. The U.S. government was at the same time stepping up its efforts to secure California. In 1842, in fact, the U.S. flag was prematurely raised in Monterey, when Commodore Thomas Jones imagined that the war with Mexico had already begun.

The transfer of land titles from Mexicans to Anglos in California differed significantly from the transfer of title in other areas conquered by the U.S. forces. To begin with, the vast majority of Mexicans did not own land in California. The original *Californios* began to lose title to their lands to better-financed Anglo newcomers very early; there was no possibility of competing with wealth established through banking, shipping, railroads, and other such enterprises. The holdings of these new elites ran into the hundreds of thousands of acres early in the nineteenth century.[15]

Congress established the Land Commission in 1851 to judge the validity of grant claims made by *Californios* whose titles came down through the Spanish and Mexican periods. The commission served mainly to hasten the process of dispossession. Litigation costs often involved a contingent lawyer's fee of one quarter of the land in question. Some Mexican landowners borrowed money at high interest rates to carry on their legal fights, and frequently found themselves in the end selling their lands to meet their debts. Anglo squatters only added to the burden; they formed associations to apply political pressure favorable to their own interests, and were generally successful in retaining land forcefully taken from Mexicans.[16] Violence and murder in California, as in other parts of the conquered territories, was the order of the day.

Gold discoveries in 1849 in northern California brought a massive influx of Anglo gold-seekers. Although Mexicans had been working claims in the area for some time, those who now arrived entered as laborers. The Anglo-American foreigners, inexperienced and ignorant of mining techniques, depended on the

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Mexican/Spanish/Indian mining experience in Arizona, northern Mexico, and California for the technical knowledge required to develop mining in California. Large-scale borrowing of mining techniques, tools, and language, not to speak of geological knowledge, took place between 1840 and 1860. The highly prejudiced Anglo miners treated Mexican miners as they did Chinese laborers; illegal taxation, lynchings, robbings, beatings, and expulsion became daily occurrences. Gold-mining lasted only a short time. When it was over, Anglos in great numbers turned to agricultural pursuits. The Mexican and Chinese populations migrated to California's towns to become landless laborers.

Southern California showed a very different face. *Rancheros* managed to hold onto their land for at least a generation after the Gold Rush. But climate, in the end, defeated many of them. Floods, followed by severe droughts, undercut the economy of the region in the 1860s and again in the 1880s. These were not "good times" for California agriculture.

By the turn of the century, Mexicans had been largely dispossessed of their property. Relegated to a lower-class status, they were overwhelmingly dispossessed landless laborers, politically and economically impotent. Lynchings and murder of both Mexicans and Indians were so common that they often went unreported. Long-term residents of the region were reduced to being aliens in their native lands. The common theme that united all Mexicans was their conflict with Anglo society. The dominant society, profoundly racist, found it entirely reasonable to relegate Mexicans to a colonial status within the United States.

Political, Military, and Cultural Resistance

Mexican resistance to Anglo hegemony took many forms. A great deal has been made of what individuals like Tiburcio Vásquez and Joaquín Murrieta were able to do; they, and others like them, became legendary for their resistance to Anglo domination. While many others resorted to the courts, a militarily conquered people, dispossessed and relegated to a subservient economic and political status largely justified by notions of racial inferiority, have seldom been successful in pressing their grievances to any equitable solution through a legal system controlled by the conquerors.

The political resistance that occurred varied from region to region, but almost always involved an accommodating elite who wanted to force the conqueror to stick to the "rules"—to abide by the Constitution, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the like. In some areas, Mexicans went as delegates to constitutional conventions, winning at least *some* of the battles that the treaty negotiators had not been able to guarantee. In California, for example, it was significant that the franchise was *not* limited to white males. Legal recognition of the Spanish language was achieved for various periods in certain areas. Such political victories were won through struggle and resistance, yet they were rarely long-lived. Once there was Anglo control over a region—through military or police action, by economic advantage, or population size—there was no possibility of such "victories" being sustained.

The military resistance of Mexicans was never "official." Such actions were most often responses to individual or collective Anglo acts of violence against a Mexican, whether through lynching, rape, murder, or arson. The first person

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hanged in occupied California was a Mexican woman, three months pregnant, who had been raped by a drunken Anglo assailant. Her Mexican lover/husband who killed the Anglo was exiled; she was lynched.

The atrocities of the U.S.-Mexico war, especially along the Texas-Mexican border, continued; the Texas Rangers in time assumed the role once taken by the U.S. Army in Texas. Jacinto Treviño, Joaquín Murrieta, Chino Cortina, and Las Gorras Blancas are all examples of the "people's revolt" continuing well into the early twentieth century. Although Anglos called such men bandits, outlaws ("Mexican outlaws"), and desperados (from *desesperados*—those without hope, those who are desperate), Mexicans considered them heroes, often aiding and abetting their activities, if for no other reason than because they saw them as the only friendly force between themselves and the Anglo gun.

Many Anglos saw the Mexicans as a natural resource of the region that was to be domesticated and exploited. The Mexicans refused such a characterization; their resistance was a struggle to maintain their identity—control over their language, family, art, and religion—that involved them in a continuing relation with Mexico.

Mexico and Its Relative Standing

Mexico, a nation with a long history of striving for social, political, and economic stability, seemed farther from its goal after its war with the United States than ever. The French invasion of Mexico in 1860 and the ensuing political instability only served to exacerbate many of Mexico's problems. When Porfirio Díaz became president of Mexico in 1876, he inaugurated policies that were intended to lead to rapid economic development. Federal government policies encouraged European and U.S. investments in railroads, mining, oil, and agriculture, especially cotton, sugar, coffee, and rubber. The attraction of foreign capital and investment was, however, too successful. By the time of the 1910 Revolution, foreigners owned three quarters of Mexico's mines, more than half of its oil fields, and massive tracts of land. Huge cattle ranches, particularly in northern Mexico, were owned by foreigners. Five major rail lines in northern Mexico, built and owned by U.S. interests, were characteristic foreign investments. Foreigners, in sum, owned more capital in Mexico than its citizens.

It was one thing to be successful in attracting foreign capital; it was another to reap significant benefits from such a policy. The effects of large-scale foreign investment were neither anticipated nor always beneficial to Mexico. The five rail lines, for example, did little to integrate Mexico's national economy. All five ran unerringly north, connecting Mexico's markets and labor supply with ranching and commercial centers in the U.S. Southwest. Mexico's products made their way into the world market economy; they were not intended for internal markets and thus brought no great advantage to Mexicans, whose industrial economy remained massively underdeveloped.

Meanwhile, mechanization in agriculture displaced many Mexican workers; few could be absorbed into the modest industrial sector. Prices for food and related commodities doubled, and in some cases tripled, in the decades just before the 1910 Revolution. Real wages declined; inflation was consistently high. At the same time, Mexico's population was growing rapidly; it increased

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by 50 percent between 1875 and 1910. Not surprisingly, such pressures led to great discontent and ultimately to the Revolution of 1910. That event, in turn, created a large-scale movement of Mexicans unable to fit into the restricted Mexican economy. Galarza, in his moving autobiography, *Barrio Boy*,[17] tells how Mexicans in the interior were forced from the land, sought work wherever they might find it—generally on the railroads—and gradually made their way northward, along with products extracted from Mexico, with scant compensation.

The U.S. Southwest and Beyond, 1900-1930

Foreign capital investments in Mexico retarded its economic independence. Far more was extracted than was left for internal development. The situation was made even more serious by events within the United States, particularly in the Southwest, where the local economy was developing and expanding. Initial U.S. demands for labor were large, particularly for agriculture, but also for sheep and cattle ranching. Between 1870 and 1900 the land given over to farming increased from 60,000 to nearly a million and a half acres.[18] Protective tariffs for agricultural products helped to expand the acreage under cultivation. The more powerful influence, however, was the effort by the federal government to bring water to arid regions. The Reclamation Act of 1902 significantly bolstered the struggling agricultural economy of the Southwest; the building of dams and reservoirs in the desertlike area created new prospects for a highly labor-intensive agricultural enterprise. Large areas in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico were turned over to the cultivation of cotton, a commodity of increasing demand for the new industrial sectors of the world. When war came in 1914, Allied needs gave additional incentives for such agricultural expansion. Southwestern agriculture diversified; sugar-beet cultivation was another labor-intensive enterprise bolstered by a protective tariff and improved irrigation; California, Colorado, and Utah all profited. Fruits and vegetables—citrus, lettuce, spinach, beans, carrots, dates, cantaloupes, and nuts—became important commodities, particularly in California.

Agriculture played its own procreative role. It helped create industries for the processing, canning, packing, and crating of agricultural products. These tied in nicely with an expanding rail system that first linked east with west, and later, and more pragmatically, crisscrossed the Southwest to transport its products to new markets. Sheep and cattle ranching continued, creating yet new industries in meat processing and shipping.

Mining gained new momentum and new dimensions during this period. The manufacturing of machinery for ore extraction and processing became vitally important, first, with copper in Arizona and New Mexico, then, with quartz in Nevada, Colorado, and Arizona, and later, with petroleum in Texas and California. The petroleum industry had a multiplier effect; it rapidly became a major component in the nation's burgeoning chemical industry.

The lumber industry also grew. Texas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico identified timber-cutting very early as a profitable economic activity that called for new modes of processing and distribution. These in turn developed still other industries.

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The common denominator for all this rapid growth in the Southwest was the availability of cheap labor. The majority of European immigrants flowing into the United States through New York were absorbed in the industrial economies of the Northeast and Midwest. The Southwest had its own source of readily available and exploitable labor in the colonized Mexicans who filled the lower ranks of the economic order. They were still developing communities throughout the Southwest and would in time become increasingly visible also in the Midwest.

The conditions that greeted new immigrants from Mexico were essentially like those that Mexicans already in the United States knew only too well. There was powerful racial hostility; Mexicans were thought to be inferior beings and inherently unassimilable and foreign. Their economic niche was insecure; their work was often seasonal in nature. In agricultural and related pursuits they were forced into a dual-wage system where they received low wages, frequently below those received by Anglos for the same type and amount of work. Many found themselves barred from supervisory positions. The situation in mining and related industries was not much different.

The railroad companies offered only slightly better conditions. By 1908 the Southern Pacific and the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe were each recruiting more than a thousand Mexicans every month. The vast majority worked as section crews, laying track and ensuring its maintenance. The major difference between this industry and others in which Mexicans found work was that it seemed somewhat more stable and less seasonal; wages, however, were uniformly low.[19]

The Southwest was growing; its urban centers—in most instances, expanded versions of earlier Mexican towns—were often inhabited by Mexicans overwhelmingly concentrated in the lower range of the urban occupational structure. The wage differentials common to the rural sector were not as obvious in the urban areas. Access to particular occupations and industries, however, was limited and channeled. There was no mobility out of the unskilled and semiskilled positions in which Mexicans found themselves. They formed a reserve labor pool that could be called up as the situation dictated. When the economy expanded and jobs were created, these might be filled by Mexicans in specific sectors. Contractions of the economy relegated Mexicans quickly to the ranks of the unemployed; it was then they were reminded that they could be technically subject to another "sovereign," Mexico.

Mexicans served the industrial economy in other ways also. As a reserve labor pool, employers used them as a sort of "strike insurance," much as female and child labor were used to undercut unionizing efforts in other parts of the country. Such policies tended to generate ethnic antagonism between working-class Mexicans and working-class Anglos. Trade union practices, which excluded Mexicans and contributed to their exploitation, also helped to maintain them as a reserve labor pool, forcing them in the end to organize their own unions and associations.

While the beginnings of a middle class among Mexicans is discernible at this time, it is important to emphasize that most of those who made up this incipient class were self-employed in small-scale service businesses (newspapers, retail stores, and the like) while a few were "professionals," mostly elementary and

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secondary school teachers (in segregated schools). This class was never absorbed into the general economy. Rather, these business ventures tended to be restricted overwhelmingly to the Mexican community. On a social level, members of this emerging middle class encountered substantial barriers to their acceptance in the larger society, further perpetuating the prevailing patterns of residential and social segregation.

The Mexican government regularly lodged formal complaints with the State Department, protesting the abusive treatment its citizens received from industrial, mining, and agricultural enterprises. Those protests went largely unheeded; the U.S. government generally chose not even to verify the assertions, let alone make efforts to correct abuses.

By the early 1920s Mexicans began to settle outside of the Southwest. Many were recruited by northern manufacturing interests: meat-packing plants and steel mills in the Chicago area; automobile assembly lines in Detroit; the steel industry in Ohio and Pennsylvania; and Kansas City's meat-packing plants. By 1930 about 15 percent of the nation's Mexicans were living outside the Southwest. In addition to the recruitment of Mexicans from northern Mexico and the American Southwest by the industrial sector, many others chose to settle out of the principal migrant agricultural stream. Regular routes had become established that connected South Texas with the Great Lakes and Plains states. Many Mexicans continued their odyssey, following the crops west through the northern tier of states, finally arriving in the Northwest, and then turning south again. Others journeyed from Texas to the South, then north along the Eastern seaboard. Still others went west for agricultural work. Mexicans in California worked the crops north through that state, into the Northwest, and then east through the Mountain states. Many settled out of the migrant stream in areas where they found work.[20]

Migration 1900-1930

No precise figures are available on the number of Mexicans who migrated north (or south) across the paper-made border between Mexico and the United States before 1900. The fact is that the border was open to unrestricted immigration until the creation and organization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and the Border Patrol) in 1924. Even then, however, large parts of the 2,000-mile border were unguarded, making the accuracy of all immigration figures somewhat questionable. One estimate is that from 1901 to 1910 approximately 9,300 Mexicans, principally from central and eastern Mexico, came to the United States each year.[21] In the second decade of the century, Mexicans came principally from northeastern and west-central Mexico; it is thought that 1,900 or so came annually between 1911 and 1914. About 2,750 migrated annually from 1915 to 1919. Economic factors and the Revolution of 1910 spurred migration during this period. The third decade witnessed a very heavy Mexican migration to the United States. Between 1920 and 1924, more than 135,000 Mexicans (about 27,000 on an annual basis) left for the United States. Migration then tapered off to just under 109,000 between 1925 and 1930, about 18,000 per year. In all, about a quarter of a million

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Mexicans arrived in the United States during the first three decades of the twentieth century. No comparable figures are available on return migration.[22]

Included in the large wave of Mexican immigrants were a number of merchants, landowners, and intellectuals, many of whom had been displaced by the Revolution of 1910. Many settled in Texas; others established themselves in the Midwest, in cities like Kansas City; some went as far north as Milwaukee. Many, continuing with activities they had pursued in Mexico, became entrepreneurs in the United States. A greater number of Spanish-language newspapers, pamphlets, books, and articles appeared; analysis of the political effects of the Mexican Revolution became a staple item of such publications. Many Mexicans who crossed the border at this time, including this group of entrepreneurs, saw themselves as temporary expatriates who would one day return to Mexico when conditions there were more settled.

The population flow from Mexico during these decades represents one of the largest movements of people in the history of the world. The reasons are easily discoverable: there was an active labor recruitment by mining, railroad, and agricultural interests in the American Southwest, who justified their policies by arguing that Mexicans were uniquely suited for work that Anglo workers refused to do. The labor shortage resulting from U.S. involvement in World War I was another reason for the large upturn in demand. Mexico's Revolution of 1910 also induced many to leave. The net result, however, was that economic interests in the Southwest found an abundant source of cheap and exploitable labor.

The United States has been quite deliberate in permitting access to all immigrants except Asians. This policy of unrestricted immigration had significantly furthered national development. Immigrants took jobs in the industrial Northeast and Midwest that natives would not take, frequently at wages that tended to undermine unionizing activities. Immigrants served other purposes as well; for example, they traditionally constituted a disproportionate number of the enlisted men in the U.S. military forces.

Between 1917 and 1924, however, a combination of events caused the open-door policy to be changed, and free access to the United States was thereby ended. The sixty-year struggle of nativists and xenophobes to control the foreign population stimulated restrictionist legislation and promoted Americanization programs. The uneasy peace after World War I nurtured fear and distrust of all that was foreign, ranging from the League of Nations to immigrants. Old Yankee families in New England viewed with some misgivings the rising percentage of foreign-born around them. Organized skilled labor felt that its interests could be protected only by sharply curtailing cheap foreign labor. There were blocs of Southerners, Populists, and Progressives, each with its own reasons, wanting immigration to end.[23]

These groups were successful. Legislation passed in 1924 set national quotas on European immigrants to the United States. The year used as a base for calculating national quotas was 1890, a date chosen with care and deliberation, for in that year many more of the "older" immigrants from Northern and Western Europe had arrived in the United States. The law thus discriminated openly against the "new" immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. Justification for restrictive immigration was provided by the detailed study of the Immigration Commission. Appointed in 1907 by President Theodore

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Roosevelt, and chaired by Senator Dillingham, the commission issued its conclusions in 1911 in an impressive forty-two volume report, which was soon widely quoted. Its principal message was that the new immigration was essentially different from the old and that new immigrants were less capable of being Americanized. Oscar Handlin, critically reviewing the commission and its work, cites the overt bias of the commission's report, beginning with the acceptance of the very assumptions it was ostensibly charged with investigating:

> The old and the new immigration differ in many essentials. The former was . . . largely a movement of settlers . . . from the most progressive sections of Europe. . . . They entered practically every line of activity. . . . Many of them . . . became landowners. . . . They mingled freely with the native Americans and were quickly assimilated. On the other hand, the new immigration has been largely a movement of unskilled laboring men who have come from the less progressive countries of Europe. . . . They have . . . congregated together in sections apart from native Americans and the older immigrants to such an extent that assimilation has been slow.
>
> Consequently the Commission paid but little attention to the foreign-born element of the old immigrant class and directed its efforts almost entirely to . . . the newer immigrants.[24]

The commission's report reflected the racial bias and attitudes of the time. Handlin cites from *The Passing of the Great Race*, the immensely popular book by the distinguished anthropologist Madison Grant on these newer immigrants:

> The new immigration contained a large and increasing number of the weak, the broken, and the mentally crippled of all races drawn from the lowest stratum of the Mediterranean basin and the Balkans, together with hordes of the wretched, submerged populations of the Polish ghettoes. Our jails, insane asylums, and almshouses are filled with human flotsam and the whole tone of American life, social, moral, and political, has been lowered and vulgarized by them.[25]

These beliefs, although vigorously debated in scientific circles, were given validation by their wholesale incorporation in the Dillingham Commission's report. They gave intellectual support for restrictive immigration legislation.[26] If the Rogers Act, passed in 1924, was silent on the matter of Mexican immigrants who continued to arrive in great numbers, there was no comparable reticence by the Dillingham Commission, which had said of Mexicans:

> Because of their strong attachment to their native land, low intelligence, illiteracy, migratory life, and the possibility of their residence here being discontinued, few become citizens of the United States. . . . In so far as Mexican laborers come into contact with native or with European immigrants they are looked upon as inferiors. . . . Thus, it is evident that in the case of the Mexican he is less desirable as a citizen than as a laborer.[27]

The Dillingham Commission, in common with later immigration legislation, officially sanctioned the social and economic niche of Mexicans: they were not good enough for citizenship but certainly acceptable as manual laborers. Why such "tolerance"? To begin with, there was a great social distance between the Mexican of the Southwest and the nativists of the Midwest and Northwest. Also, the continued expansion of the region's economy, particularly in railroads

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and agriculture, made the availability of a large labor force imperative. Social distance and the emerging economic needs of the Southwest resulted in a lax policy toward Mexican immigration when the country was otherwise obsessed by its restrictionist mood.[28]

The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act made Mexicans conspicuous by their continued free access to the United States. Debate on the issue continued to agitate Congress. A report prepared for the 1928 congressional hearings on Western Hemisphere immigration, which argued against Mexican immigration, suggests how some, at least, saw the Mexican:

> Their minds run to nothing higher than animal functions—eat, sleep, and sexual debauchery. In every huddle of Mexican shacks one meets the same idleness, hordes of hungry dogs, and filthy children with faces plastered with flies, disease, lice, human filth, stench, promiscuous fornication, bastardy, lounging, apathetic peons and lazy squaws, beans and dried chili, liquor, general squalor, and envy and hatred of the gringo. These people sleep by day and prowl by night like coyotes, stealing anything they can get their hands on, no matter how useless to them it may be. Nothing left outside is safe unless padlocked or chained down. Yet there are Americans clamoring for more of these human swine to be brought over from Mexico.[29]

The Indian racial mixture was clearly a part of the cultural perception, little distinction being made between the two. The nativist drive for racial purity, emphasizing the superiority of the "white" race, denigrated the racial mixture characteristic of Latin America generally and of Indian nations like Mexico in particular. Yet no action was taken to curb the flow of Mexican immigrants. The powerful economic arguments for the continued importation of Mexican laborers had been articulated two years earlier before a congressional committee by John Nance Garner, who was to become Franklin Roosevelt's vice president: "In order to allow land owners now to make a profit of their farms, they want to get the cheapest labor they can find, and if they can get the Mexican labor it enables them to make a profit."[30]

At the same time, control of the "immigrant" population came to include measures that could be applied to the domestic Mexican population. The Americanization activities of the early twentieth century spread throughout the country and were used to bleach all ethnic vestiges in the national flock. These activities included intensive English instruction—with retribution for those who chose to speak other tongues—and success defined as a capacity to speak as did the English-speaking middle class; and intensive "civics" classes to socialize the "foreign" population. The norm for success became the Anglo middle class, and standardized IQ and achievement tests measured this success. The widespread institution of high schools that tracked the population into occupational or college preparatory curricula, with immigrants and racial minorities tracked into the former—when they entered high schools at all—became common. English oral proficiency became a requirement for immigration, as did English literacy for voting. The latter was also aimed at blacks in the South, and spread throughout the United States as a mechanism of social control. Legislation mandating English instruction in the schools and English proficiency as a prerequisite to employment was targeted for various groups in different parts of the country. Segregated Mexican schools were maintained. In the early 1930s,

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through federal court litigation, segregation based on race was challenged, and segregation based on grouping for language instruction was initiated and legitimated.[31] Statehood for Arizona and New Mexico (which together had been one territory) was denied several times at the beginning of the century, in part because there were too many Mexicans in the territory. References were made to their "mongrel racial character," their inability to speak English, and therefore, presumably, their dubious allegiance to the United States. Despite racial conflict, physical abuse, cultural genocide, and economic exploitation, the Mexican population grew; however, where restrictionists had failed to limit Mexican immigration, the Great Depression succeeded.

The Great Depression and Repatriation

The decade of the Great Depression was another watershed for Mexicans. Social forces during this period significantly shaped the lives of Mexicans and are in many ways still responsible for their status half a century later. The decade began with a massive economic collapse that started late in the 1920s and continued until World War II. There was a major decline in economic activities, with wage rates in both industry and agriculture suffering, and rampant unemployment. With this came a major acceleration of government intervention in social welfare, with bureaucracies developing and expanding to meet the urgent needs of a dislocated populace. There was also a large-scale westward migration out of the Dust Bowl. In the Southwest, this was a time of accelerated rates of concentration into larger and larger units in both agriculture and mining, where increased mechanization led to a further displacement of labor. The industrial sector in the Southwest lagged behind the rest of the nation and could contribute little to absorb either the locally displaced labor or the dust-bowl migrants. These major economic dislocations fell on Mexicans with even greater force than on other groups. Already relegated to a marginal status, Mexicans were particularly vulnerable. The situation worked to eliminate for all practical purposes further northward migration from Mexico.

The Great Depression had another sobering effect: it engendered a collective social atmosphere of insecurity and fear that set the tone in allocating blame for the major social and economic traumas. Mexicans were singled out as scapegoats and made to bear the guilt for some of the ills of the period. It was not long before great numbers of unemployed Mexicans, like other citizens in the country, found themselves on the rolls of the welfare agencies.

One response to the strain placed on limited economic resources throughout the country was the demand for large-scale repatriations. To reduce the public relief rolls and agitation to organize labor, the Mexican became both the scapegoat and the safety valve in the Southwest. It is estimated that in the early years of the Depression (1929-34) more than 400,000 Mexicans were forced to leave the country under "voluntary repatriation." Those who applied for relief were referred to "Mexican Bureaus," whose sole purpose was to reduce the welfare rolls by deporting the applicants.[32] Indigence, not citizenship, was the criterion used in identifying Mexicans for repatriation.

A 1933 eyewitness account of a Los Angeles repatriation scene suggests the mental frame of those responsible for the program:

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> It was discovered that, in wholesale lots, they could be shipped to Mexico City for $14.70 per capita. The sum represented less than the cost of a week's board and lodging. And so, about February 1931, the first trainload was dispatched, and shipments at the rate of about one a month have continued ever since. A shipment consisting of three special trains left Los Angeles on December 8. The loading commenced at about six o'clock in the morning and continued for hours. More than twenty-five such special trains had left the Southern Pacific Station before last April.
>
> The repatriation programme is regarded locally as a piece of consummate statecraft. The average per family cost of executing it is $71.14, including food and transportation. It cost one Los Angeles County $77,249.29 to repatriate one shipment of 6,024. It would have cost $424,933.70 to provide this number with such charitable assistance as they would have been entitled to had they remained—a savings of $347,468.40.[33]

Repatriations took place both in the Southwest and Midwest, where Mexicans, recruited to the area by employers with promises of work, had lived since the early twenties. Approximately half of the "returnees" actually were born in the United States.[34] Shipment to Mexico was a clear violation of both their civil and human rights. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, in concert with the Anglo press, identified the Mexican labor migrant as the source of (Anglo) citizen unemployment, for the increase of public welfare costs (and taxes), and as having entered the country "illegally"and in large numbers. The scapegoating tactics of an earlier nativist generation, with its xenophobic memories and myths, were used against the Mexicans. There was a good deal of sentiment also against Mexico's expropriation and nationalization of its oil industry, which U.S. oil companies had once controlled. Repatriation caused widespread dissolution of family and community, and contributed to an even more acute distrust among Mexicans of all government—local, state, or federal.

Some small efforts at organized resistance were made. Strikes and organizational campaigns were started in the agricultural and industrial sector. *La Unión de Trabajadores del Valle Imperial* and *La Confederación de Uniones Obreras Mexicanas* began late in the 1920s to try to ease the blow of the unfolding Depression through labor organizing and self-defense. There were similar, but less successful, efforts made in the mining industry. *La Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana*, a Mexican industrial union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, sought to encourage the formation of unions in California.

Mexican consuls, meanwhile, continued to lodge complaints with the federal government, protesting the treatment of Mexican citizens recruited to work in the United States. Official protests by Mexico generally were ignored, and the abuses went unchecked.

Despite all such efforts, the social and economic standing of Mexicans was seriously eroded by the Great Depression. Families were forcibly broken up by the repatriation efforts, as were communities. The overall economic impact of trade union activities was limited, and failed to modify the underlying problem of relegating Mexicans to the lowest levels of the economic system.

World War II to 1960

World War II brought many changes. In the economic upturn that followed, there was a new demand for both industrial and agricultural labor.

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The movement to the cities accelerated. Regional economic needs and interests reasserted themselves; they were again instrumental in shaping national legislation in the agricultural arena. The bracero program, reestablished in 1942 and patterned after a similar program in effect from 1917 to 1920, was based on a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States, and was intended to supply labor for agriculture. The United States underwrote Mexicans' travel costs, insured a minimum wage, and guaranteed their just and equitable treatment. Agricultural interests were required to post a bond for every bracero and to abide by the agreements negotiated by the two governments. The program, in effect, was a federal subsidy of agriculture's labor needs.

Although intended only as a limited-term war measure to meet specific labor shortages in the agricultural sector, the advantages of the bracero program to both countries suggested its continuance. For Mexico, it was a temporary solution for high levels of unemployment, and made for a significant flow of capital to Mexico in wages earned and sent home. For U.S. agriculture, it gave promise of a steady supply of labor that was readily controlled and minimally paid, and for whom no long-term responsibilities were assumed.

The program, extended annually after the war, was formalized in 1951 as Public Law 78. The reasons given for the extension were labor shortages stemming from U.S. involvement in the Korean War; it is better understood as a continuation of the traditional U.S. manipulation and control of the flow of Mexican labor. The program was terminated in 1964, when annual immigration quotas of 120,000 were established for all the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

Large-scale abuses were common in the program.[35] Mexico protested these abuses, and each time the agreement was renegotiated, sought to protect its citizens from inequitable wages and overt discrimination in working conditions, housing, and general treatment. The U.S. government relinquished the determination of wage rates to the agricultural employers, but continued to take responsibility for contracting and transporting Mexican laborers across the border. Nearly 5 million Mexicans came to the United States as a result of the program. The peak years were from 1954 to 1962, when 70 percent of all Mexicans involved in the program were working in the United States. We have no figures to tell us how many of these laborers returned to Mexico.

A steady flow of undocumented workers paralleled this importation of braceros. The undocumented proved to be a mixed blessing for agricultural interests. On the one hand, they were generally hired for wages substantially below the modest levels that agribusiness established for braceros, and bonds were not required to be posted for them. They were widely used as strikebreakers to thwart unionizing activities in agriculture. But there were obvious drawbacks. A labor pool made up of largely undocumented workers was very unstable. Since such workers were under no binding agreement to any employer, they were free to seek the highest wage, within the restrictions imposed by specific jobs and particular industries, and under the continuous threat that the employer would terminate the job by calling the Immigration and Naturalization Service just before he was to meet the payroll. To the extent that agribusiness failed to establish a uniform wage, there was a constant temptation for undocumented workers to move on in search of better employment. Moreover, since the undocumented worker was not covered by an

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agreement restricting him to agricultural tasks, he would always be attracted by industrial jobs in cities, where wages and working conditions were generally better. During World War II, the informal agreements between industry and agribusiness that prohibited the hiring of Mexican labor for factory work were in abeyance.

We understand today how an initial bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States to supply braceros became in time a unilateral program dictated by U.S. agricultural interests, supported by the federal government.[36] Once agricultural employers took control of the bracero program, they sought to expand their control also over the undocumented worker. Agricultural entrepreneurs ended up by transporting undocumented workers to the border, where they were immediately rehired as braceros, thereby transforming what was once an unregulated labor supply into a legal and semicontrolled work force bound to the agricultural sector.

After a regulated labor pool was firmly reestablished for agribusiness, in 1954 the Immigration and Naturalization Service vigorously launched "Operation Wetback." Undocumented workers, unstable and intractable as a labor source, were now to be removed. An astonishing 3.8 million Mexican aliens (and citizens) were apprehended and expelled in the next five years. Of the total number deported during that time, fewer than 2 percent left as a result of formal proceedings. The vast majority were removed simply by the *threat* of deportation. "Looking Mexican" was often sufficient reason for official scrutiny. The search focused initially on California and then Texas; it soon extended as far as Spokane, Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City.[37]

For urban Chicanos and Mexicans, World War II had effects similar to those for their rural cousins. On the positive side, war industries provided the semblance of occupational opportunity for many, though often in unskilled, semiskilled, and low-level service capacities. Still, the rigid tie between class and ethnicity seemed somewhat weakened.

World War II posed a major dilemma for the United States. In its official pronouncements and acts, the country strongly condemned the racism explicit in Nazism. Yet at the same time, the United States had a segregated military force. This was also a time when President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the internment of Japanese who were U.S. citizens and whose sole "crime" was living and working on the West Coast.

This contradiction also manifested itself in ugly confrontations between Mexicans and Anglos. The press, for its part, helped to raise feelings against Mexicans. The violent confrontations between servicemen and local police against Mexican residents began late in 1942 and continued until mid-1943. The overt racial bias of the press with regard to Mexicans has been thoroughly documented. It suggests the power of the press in shaping public opinion and in justifying major abuses by law enforcement and military personnel. The so-called zoot suit riots illustrate the power of the press in mobilizing prejudice:

> The zoot-suiters of Los Angeles . . . were predominantly Mexican youth with some Negro disciples, between the ages of sixteen and twenty. They wore absurdly long coats with padded shoulders, porkpie hats completed by a feather in the back, watch chains so long they almost touched the ground, and peg-top trousers tapering to narrow cuffs. . . . at best, as one pundit observed, they were "not characterized primarily by intellect." They formed themselves into bands

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with flamboyant names: the "Mateo Bombers," "Main Street Zooters," "The Califa," "Sleepy Lagooners," "The Black Legion," and many more. Their targets for physical harm were members of the armed forces, with a special predilection for sailors. The latter fought back with devastating effect. The situation quickly deteriorated to the point that the Navy declared Los Angeles out of bounds. The city council outlawed wearing of zoot suits for the duration and the city simmered down.[38]

Some investigators, more objective than the press, have reversed the roles, with the navy on the offensive and the Mexican young obliged to defend themselves. The firsthand accounts show that the police actually encouraged and supported the servicemen's aggression. And not only did the police refuse to halt the violence, they often contributed to it.[39]

Another celebrated incident was the so-called Sleepy Lagoon case in 1942. A Mexican youth was killed as the result of gang conflict. A sensationalist press soon gave the incident a wholly false character; it was thought to be the beginnings of an incipient crime wave led by insurgent Mexicans. Public pressure led the police to massive roundups. Twenty-four Mexican youths were arrested; seventeen were indicted and tried for murder. The defendants, beaten by the police and forced to appear in court in their unkempt and disheveled states, received scant sympathy. Despite the lack of tangible evidence, nine were convicted of murder, eight, of lesser crimes. These decisions, reversed two years later by the California District Court of Appeals as a direct result of efforts by outraged civil rights lawyers and activists, tell much of the temper of the times. They also suggest why Chicanos and Mexicans are so suspicious of the U.S. law enforcement and legal systems. Mexicans believe that they consistently receive harsher sentences than Anglos for the same crime. They also believe that this explains their disproportionate representation in U.S. penal institutions.[40]

The Mexican community, in responding to the situation of World War II, acted as it had done in previous times of hostility and exploitation—with organizational efforts and litigation, and occasionally with armed resistance. Unity Leagues, created in the early 1940s, had as their principal purpose the election of Mexicans to city councils in Southern California communities; they also conducted voter registration drives, attempted fund-raising, and worked to get voters to the polls. The basic theme uniting these leagues was the fight against racial discrimination, particularly in the schools. The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), founded in South Texas in 1928, expanded into a national organization in the post-World War II period, and was soon heavily involved in antidiscrimination activity, again particularly in the educational arena.

A landmark court decision in 1945 *(Méndez v. Westminster School District)* barred *de jure* segregation of Chicano students. A similar legal action in Texas in 1948 was also successfully pressed. The results of both court actions, as well as others during the 1950s, helped set the stage for the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954, and clearly established the illegality of the deliberate segregation of Chicano and Mexican schoolchildren on the basis of race, and of bilingual education as a partial remedy for segregation. The success of these efforts served to encourage civil rights suits in other areas, notably against job discrimination in New Mexico.[41]

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The refusal of local officials in Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1948, to allow the burial of a Chicano war hero in the local "for whites only" cemetery was the specific catalyst for the creation of the G.I. Forum. The Mexican community proudly emphasized two facts: Chicanos received the largest number of Congressional Medals of Honor during World War II, and despite forbidding interrogations by the North Koreans and Chinese during the Korean War, no Chicano soldier ever "broke down." The collective memory of such Chicano military contributions fed the Mexican distaste of continued political gerrymandering, economic exploitation, physical abuse, and cultural repression at home.

The Mexican American Political Association, formed in 1959, had as its goal "the social, economic, cultural and civic betterment of Mexican Americans and all other Spanish-speaking Americans through political action." The association established chapters in voting districts with large concentrations of Mexican residents, and endorsed candidates for public office who could be counted on to work actively for social improvement.

Large numbers of Mexicans migrated to urban centers in the decades after World War II. There was a general optimism that life in the cities would be better than in the rural setting. The cities seemed to hold out the promise of better jobs, more adequate housing, and new educational possibilities. These early migrants to the cities came with visions of expanded opportunities, and believed that if they themselves did not achieve their aspirations, their children surely would. This optimism made tolerable the thwarted aspirations so many of these urban migrants soon came to feel. Since they outnumbered Mexicans already living in the cities, their optimism spread to the larger group.

Many of the postwar organizations were primarily self-protective, mutual-aid associations. They were formed principally to protect their numbers by offering services consistent with Mexican cultural traditions, in effect compensating for services withheld by the larger society. Organizations such as the G.I. Forum and LULAC entered the activist period of the 1950s and 1960s with an organizational base redirected toward activism. Their resources were considerable—a growing constituency, established legitimacy, and a solid leadership core. Their past history of noninvolvement in political affairs, their emphasis on assimilation, or working within the system, and their passive, nonactivist stance, drew criticism in the 1970s. Such groups, however, provided the foundation for attempts to improve the condition of the Mexican people.

The Chicano Movement 1965-1975

In the 1960s and early 1970s, activist, sometimes radical, organizations appeared. These organizations came to be known collectively as the Chicano movement. Often very critical of certain of the basic assumptions of U.S. society, they sought fundamental transformations in the distribution of power in the United States. Many promoted radical alternatives, preferring socialism, for example, to the prevailing economic and political system. Others hoped to create various kinds of alternative or separatist institutions, with alternative schools, community control of law enforcement, health, educational, and political institutions, and the like. They were looking, in short, for a radical and equitable transformation of a racist society. Almost all such groups emphasized

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the distinctiveness of Mexican culture. They actively promoted Chicano cultural norms and values. Chicano culture represented the common ground that bound together all the members of the group. Political terms such as "Chicano" and *La Raza Nueva* were used to symbolize unity, and were intended to increase the cohesiveness of otherwise diverse elements.

Charismatic leaders appeared. Reies López Tijerina hoped to restore lost Spanish and Mexican land grants in New Mexico through the widely publicized and often dramatic activities of the *Alianza Federal de Pueblos Libres*. Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzáles, former prizefighter and disaffected Democratic party official, organized the Crusade for Justice and established several alternative community institutions in the Denver area. The miserable working conditions of Mexican agricultural laborers became the special concern of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, led by César Chávez.

Throughout the Southwest and Midwest, political and educational issues sparked new organizing activity. In Texas, José Angel Gutiérrez and others overthrew the minority Anglo-dominated governments of several South Texas cities and counties, primarily through a third party, *El Partido de La Raza Unida*. To secure educational change, students in secondary schools and colleges formed Chicano organizations to stage massive school walkouts. These organizations served as foci for various kinds of diffused activities; they brought a variety of grievances under a single banner, and made a collective approach to these grievances possible.

Anglo decision-makers, reacting to the politics of direct action and confrontation, were sometimes repressive, sometimes progressive; many of the gains made could be attributed to the "threatening" activities of such militant organizations. The protest groups, however, were often short-lived. They called for a great expenditure of time and effort and involved considerable risk.

The student groups were ideologically very diverse: some were moderate-liberal; others were radical. The Mexican American Youth Organization, a precursor in Texas to the *Raza Unida* party, gave José Angel Gutiérrez, Mario Compeán, and others apprenticeship training in community-based and campus-based politics. *El Movimiento Estudiantíl Chicano de Aztlán*, a campus-based organization, was fairly radical and had many chapters throughout the Southwest; it was very active in support of the farm workers' movement and many other nonschool issues. The United Mexican American Students and the Chicano Youth Organization were other prominent student organizations during the period. Although such organizations often worked off-campus, they pushed also for increased recruitment of Chicano students and faculty, for opening new educational opportunities to Chicanos, and for curricula more relevant to Chicano concerns. Many of these demands were embodied in the new Chicano Studies programs developed in many colleges and universities.

The importance of these campus-based organizations cannot be overemphasized. They provided invaluable resources for both on-campus and off-campus activities. Many interacted with both staff and faculty. Student groups were effective agents of political mobilization; they had the idealism, ideological commitment, and the relatively supportive environment necessary for sustained organizational activities. Many of these campus organizations, however, were unable to contend with the rapid turnover of student populations, with

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increasing administrative intransigence, and internal division created by law enforcement *provocateurs* and ultraleftist organizations.

Prior to the 1970s there were few Chicano professional associations, which is not surprising, given the small number of Chicano professionals. As the system yielded to pressure, however, and greater numbers of Chicanos became teachers, lawyers, physicians, and business managers, organization became viable. Many started with less than a dozen members; in many of the academic disciplines, the formation of Chicano/Latino caucuses in major Anglo professional organizations was a necessary first step. Public and private foundations, responding to demands for increased numbers of Chicano professionals, provided support to foster organizational activity. Among these were the *Southwest Council de la Raza*, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), and the *National Task Force de la Raza*.

Until 1970 Mexicans were traditionally concentrated in the nonunion ranks of the U.S. economy. Starting in the early 1920s they attempted to form their own unions or to affiliate with unions in Mexico and the United States. The leadership of established industrial unions in this country was never Chicano, although some change is now taking place. Latino workers—Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and others—are beginning to coalesce in organizations such as the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement.

With the establishment of "national" offices based in Washington, several Chicano organizations began to grow in the mid-1970s. Interorganizational cooperation between Chicanos and Latinos in general has become more common. There have been several attempts to weld "Hispanic" organizations together in some sort of federation, notably the newly created Forum of National Hispanic Organizations and the Hispanic Higher Education Coalition. In the late 1970s such Washington-based groups as the *National Council de la Raza*, MALDEF, and the Mexican American Women's National Association could coordinate to express the common concerns of Chicano organizations.

Chicanos have gravitated toward public employment, having found opportunities there, particularly in lower-status positions, somewhat more open than in the private sector. Organizations within the public sector, such as IMAGE, a nationwide group of employees that seeks to enhance the working conditions and positions of Chicanos and other Latinos within the government, have emerged. Although there are few high-level government officials of Mexican origin, organizations of Latino officials have come into being. The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials tries to increase communication between Chicano and Latino decision-makers, particularly on the local level. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus, consisting of the six Latino members of Congress, is the group with the highest governmental status at the federal level.

Two broad coalitions of interests make up the major political parties in the United States, and in general, Chicanos have been exploited by both. Many of the successes of the Democratic party can be attributed to the 70 to 90 percent electoral support regularly given by Chicano voters. Minimal rewards, in the form of minor patronage and policy concessions, have been returned to the Chicano community by the Democratic party, which for the most part has taken the Chicano vote for granted. In very close elections, Democrats have

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made extravagant promises to Chicanos, but once the election is over, the Anglo Democratic leadership has generally failed to follow through. The Republican party has only limited appeal for Chicanos; Republican leaders have not made a very serious effort to broaden their base by attracting Chicano participation.

Minor parties, including socialist and Marxist-oriented parties, have not been very successful in recruiting Chicanos to their cause. The most successful third party movement for Chicanos, *El Partido de la Raza Unida* (LRUP), at the height of its influence in the early 1970s played a pivotal role in determining the outcome of several local elections, primarily in South Central Texas. In small localities with large Chicano populations, it succeeded in school, town, and county government elections, often stressing the unresponsiveness of the major parties, and arguing for cultural nationalism. The *Partido* provided an alternative that threatened the customary hegemonic position of the major parties. Both the Democratic and the Republican parties reacted by supporting minor institutional reform: they set up "Hispanic" offices within their party organizations, and the Democratic party went so far as to guarantee Chicano representation in its party structure. Conflicts within its own ranks over strategic issues led *La Raza Unida* to fragment into smaller locally based units. Punitive measures sponsored by the State of Texas and specifically aimed at breaking up the *Partido* contributed to its decline. Modifications in electoral laws proved problematic to third parties that attempted to place their candidates on the ballot. By raising the number of required petition-signers or votes received to qualify for inclusion on the ballot, third parties could be excluded.

By the late 1970s the organizational base of the Chicano community had been largely transformed. Many of the more radical and ideological organizations had either disappeared or were mere shadows of their former selves. Leaders who cut their political teeth in such organizations have become part of older, more broadly based organizations or have joined the new professional organizations that continue to advocate, with renewed spirit, specific political reforms. The organizational structure changes as collective and individual political sophistication continues to grow.

Growth and National Visibility

The structural characteristics of the Chicano population suggest why Chicanos have gained national visibility. All demographic description starts by emphasizing the youthfulness of the Chicano population, the median age for Chicanos being seven years younger than the national population. A youthful population is one that will be active for a longer period, with the bulk of its members in an early phase of labor force participation, or only just beginning to prepare for that phase. A youthful population has its future before it; schooling, family formation, and child-rearing are crucial issues. And given their rapid numerical growth, Chicanos must play an increasingly important role in the United States in the next decades.

With journalistic phrases like "people on the move," "awakening giant," "emerging minority," and "sleeping giant," writers have drawn attention to the "sudden" visibility of Chicanos. Some are surprised by this visibility. Even the most casual traveler through the southwestern United States has observed the

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centuries-old Spanish and Mexican influence on architecture, cuisine, language, art, music, and the very layout of towns and cities. Chicano presence in the Southwest has never been hidden. It is the sudden awareness that Chicanos also reside outside these traditional southwestern enclaves, and that Chicano issues are not simply regional in nature, that has drawn the continuing attention of the mass media. Indeed, the rapid *growth* and continuing *dispersion* of the Chicano population is producing the new national awareness.

The Chicano population has grown substantially over the last decade. Although this growth is attributed in part to improved methods of survey and enumeration by gathering agencies such as the Census Bureau, the greater part of the increase comes from the real growth of the Chicano population. This growth rate has been conservatively estimated at 2.2 percent per year; a more liberal estimate is 3.5 percent per year. The first figure indicates a doubling of the Chicano population every twenty-five to twenty-seven years; the second, a doubling in less than twenty years.

This phenomenal rate of growth is in stark contrast with decreasing growth rates for the U.S. population as a whole. While U.S. birth rates are stabilizing at just above replacement level, the Chicano population is maintaining the highest rate of growth of all major racial and ethnic groups in the country. Early marriage and the emphasis placed on family accounts for these high fertility rates. Chicano families are generally about 25 percent larger than the average American family, and one in every five Chicano families consists of six or more persons.

There is, however, a trend toward lower birth rates. Younger Chicanas are having fewer children and spacing them out longer over the childbearing years. Still, even among younger and better-educated women, the emphasis on childbearing appears to remain strong; voluntary childlessness among married Chicanas, or those who were married, is virtually unknown.

The high fertility rates of Chicanos suggest major structural differences between them and the Anglo population. Although the Anglo birth rate has decreased owing to later marriages, birth spacing, and the use of contraceptives to synchronize childbearing with the demands of increased female employment, this has not always been the case. From the late 1930s to the early 1940s the United States had high rates of immigration and fertility; the two together produced a period of high population growth. The Chicano population explosion today is in many ways reminiscent of that earlier era, with high rates of immigration (both legal and undocumented) and birth rates. All signs point to a significant growth of the Chicano population in the 1980s.

There is now considerable discussion regarding total Hispanic population growth in the United States and whether this collective group will overtake blacks as the largest national minority group. Precise projections are impossible, since they depend on how long current high rates of growth in the Hispanic population are sustained. Still, it is now expected that the Hispanic population will become the largest minority in the United States in the foreseeable future. Further, since Chicanos make up the majority—60 percent—of this population group, they will be among the more visible elements in what is increasingly referred to as the "Hispanization" of the United States.

If high birth rates are important, so also is immigration. The century-old relationship between the United States and Mexico continues to affect both

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nations. Immigrants, natural resources, and profits continue to flow north. Legal immigration from Mexico to the United States at present allows between forty and fifty thousand visas each year for permanent residence. Those looking for "commuter status," which allows them to work in the United States while living in Mexico, have to endure, barring political connections, a three-year waiting period.

Mexican workers caught in Mexico's economic sluggishness are aware that wages in the United States for identical work are sometimes seven times higher than at home, and many are thus led to risk illegal entry. Such illegal entry is only increased by the active recruitment by "coyotes," who transport Mexicans across the border for a fee. Undocumented workers are a significant part of the U.S. labor force, particularly for work that most American citizens regard as demeaning, low paying, dirty, and unstable. Undocumented workers have always come to the United States in circumstances of multiple jeopardy, as minorities unprotected from employer exploitation and abuse. Such conditions continue unabated today.

A majority of the undocumented workers in the United States come as sojourners in search of economic opportunity; few have any desire to remain here as permanent residents. Despite the widespread impression that Mexican undocumented workers come across the border in search of the promised land, *corridos*, or ballads, by and about them celebrate the less hostile, more familiar ambience they plan to return to.

The flow of immigration, both legal and undocumented, is extensive: more than a million persons annually are apprehended by the Border Patrol for seeking entry without inspection. Annual deportations, both voluntary and involuntary, continue to increase steadily. These statistics suggest improved enforcement capabilities; they also measure, however crudely, the growth in the number of Mexicans wanting to cross the permeable U.S.-Mexico border. That flow increases in part because of labor force needs. Jobs are available to Mexican migrants largely in the secondary labor market, where the lack of fringe benefits makes these low-paying, seasonal jobs unattractive to domestic workers. The Mexican worker historically has been desirable. Mexicans—particularly without legal rights and privileges—are especially desirable for agribusiness, marginal industries, seasonal work, or in businesses quickly affected by economic downturns.

Although only a small fraction of the undocumented workers come to the United States with any intention of staying, there is no reason to believe that Mexican immigration will cease, at least in the foreseeable future. The flow of nearly a century and a half, responding to the need for labor by U.S. employers, seems to argue against the possibility of immigration being terminated. The growth of the Chicano population, because of higher fertility and continued immigration, is increasingly visible. The continued dispersion of the Chicano population out of the Southwest into the industrial Midwest, particularly into cities like Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Kansas City, Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw, will go on. It is not difficult to understand the attraction of the Midwest: a Chicano worker with a high-school education will earn approximately $4,000 more per year there than his cousin can expect to earn in the Southwest.

Such differentials in income are significant. The Midwest, highly unionized and with a long-established industrial base, is very different from the South-

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west, which is only now beginning to unionize, and where light manufacturing is still the rule. In the Southwest, also, labor-intensive industries in agriculture and mining are giving way to high-level service industries in aerospace, electronics, and petrochemicals that require a labor force that is technically trained. This new labor force tends to be made up largely of transplanted Easterners.

Chicanos in the Midwest, Pacific Northwest, Florida, and other parts of the United States need to be seen as a vanguard. Although farther removed from their origins, they still maintain and perpetuate their Mexican heritage. Their entry into an area is almost always followed by the rapid opening of small Chicano businesses that specifically cater to their needs. Spanish-language mass at the Catholic Church typically follows, along with Spanish-language radio programs and bilingual programs in the schools. The taking root of Chicano businesses, services, and traditions produces a Midwestern version of the Southwestern or Mexican environment. The ability of Chicanos to transfer their ethnic preferences from one location to another tells something of the strength and durability of their cultural ties.

Midwestern Chicanos, finding themselves among non-Chicano Latinos, necessarily interact, but not always easily or without hostility and suspicion. New patterns, however, are becoming evident as efforts at cooperative ventures are made. Chicanos in Milwaukee, Chicago, and Detroit, for example, discovering that they face problems very similar to those of other Latinos, seek to create coalitions that form the basis for a national Latino thrust. These contacts have understandably progressed further among Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Chicano leaders at the national level than at the local level, particularly as the strategy of nationally organized coalition-building has spread.

The dispersal of Chicanos has had positive and negative effects, making it obvious that Chicano issues cannot be dealt with simply as a regional (Southwestern) matter. Chicanos now reside in every state in the Union; the 1980s will undoubtedly see almost half the Chicano population residing outside the five southwestern states. Had the dispersal of Chicanos not occurred, most of the southwestern states would be overwhelmingly Chicano. Although the size of population does not automatically translate into political power, political negotiation and coalition-building would have taken very different forms if the Southwest had become a single and greater Chicano enclave.

Current Status

Chicanos lag behind the rest of the U.S. population by every measure of socioeconomic well-being—level of education, occupational attainment, employment status, family income, and the like. Some say that Chicanos are no different from other immigrants who arrived in the United States impoverished, and who managed by hard work to gain advantages for their children, taking the first important step toward assimilation. The substantial achievements of the American-born first generation over that of the immigrant generation are thought to be conclusive. Such an optimistic view overlooks major changes in the society and the historical relationship of over a century and a half of racial discrimination and economic exploitation. Although economic expansion and

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dramatic social change characterized the postwar years, economic contraction and dislocation, possibly exaggerated by the new conservative retrenchment, are the hallmarks of more recent times. When the economy was productive and growing, Chicanos participated in that growth, at least through their labor. A close examination, however, suggests that the modest gains made in average income and occupational status during the 1950s and 1960s were lost in the 1970s. As one scholar explains:

> When the 1975 occupational employment distributions for Anglos and Chicanos are compared to the Labor Department's revised estimates for 1985 employment opportunities, it is clear that the [1975] recession hurt the future income potential of Chicanos as well as their current incomes. In general, the recession has forced Chicanos into occupational groups for which future employment is expected to decline relative to the employment, and in which relative wages can be expected to fall as well. Similarly, while Anglos were moving into those occupations that are expected to have the greatest future income potential, Chicanos were moving out, thus losing the ability to share in the expected relative wage increases that growth usually brings. By 1975, only 33 percent of Chicanos were located in expanding occupations. . . . The evidence supports the conclusion that our latest recession had a definite racial bias and that Mexican Americans received more than their share of economic hardship.[42]

Although second-generation and later Chicanos made large gains relative to those of the first generation, such gains did not allow for their thorough absorption into the economic and social structure of U.S. society. The data of the late 1970s suggest how different generations of Chicanos have fared.[43] The median education for second-generation Chicanos was 11.1 years, only two years more than for U.S. born first-generation, but decidedly more than for the immigrant generation (5.8 years).

All generations of Chicano males are underrepresented in white-collar jobs; Mexican-born males are least likely to be found in such positions. Farm labor is the one area where there is a significant difference between the U.S.-born and immigrant Chicano populations.[44] Over 15 percent of Mexican-born men are employed as farm laborers, twice the number for sons of Mexican immigrants, five times the number of second-generation Chicanos. Labor force participation figures, however, also show that second-generation Chicanos had the highest unemployment rate, while the immigrant generation had the lowest. The data on incomes indicate first-generation Chicano families as having the highest median income, with the second-generation following, and the Mexican-born as having the lowest incomes. The range, however, was not great—about $1,500.

That Mexicans who have resided for the longest time in the United States—second generation—have the highest unemployment rates and only very modest representation in white-collar, professional, and managerial categories suggests the limited structure of opportunity for Chicanos. They are entering the industrial sector at a time when its socioeconomic structure is increasingly tertiary, demanding highly trained personnel in high-technology industries such as aerospace, communications, and the like. Although Chicanos may be making "progress" relative to their immigrant parents, they are actually falling farther behind when looked at in the context of the opportunity structure in an increasingly postindustrial social order and compared to the dominant popula-

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tion. Also, there is evidence that Chicano technical and occupational skills will increasingly limit them to the secondary labor market, with its unfavorable wage rates, limited fringe benefits, and general instability. These conditions do not promise either full equity or full participation for Chicanos in the decades immediately ahead. Still, that the Anglo population growth is at or near a steady state, with its income-generating population increasingly aging, suggests that the younger and expanding Chicano work force will be shouldering a growing and disproportionate burden in the future. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the myriad of other social programs funded from taxes on the work force will be more and more borne by youthful employed Chicanos.

Historically, Chicanos' economic rewards have been disproportionate to their contribution to U.S. industrial development. Now that the society is increasingly postindustrial, Chicanos find themselves still carrying the burden. The federal government, which played a prominent role throughout the history of Mexicans in the United States, has often been repressive, supporting industries and employers, and generally frustrating Chicanos' efforts to advance. Many of the organizations developed by Chicanos were direct responses to these negative influences. The prediction seems to be unremitting governmental policies that will continue to deplete the resources of the Chicano community or leave it as disadvantaged as ever. But Mexico's new wealth, particularly its energy resources, may somewhat alter that prognosis, especially if Mexico retains control over those resources. A nation tends to treat descendants of foreign stock, even a militarily conquered population, with greater responsibility when it is obliged to negotiate with that foreign nation on an equal footing.

Still, the outlook for Chicanos is not very encouraging. Efforts by Chicano organizations to obtain justice and equality, and to share in society's bounties, have not been overwhelmingly successful. Whether these efforts stand a better chance of succeeding when external forces are more active in helping such efforts, only the future can tell.

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This essay is a joint effort by the authors. The listing of names on the title page in no way indicates the extent of contribution. Rather, all four authors contributed equally.

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[38]McWilliams, *North From Mexico*, pp. 227-58.

[39]Roger Daniels and Harry H. L. Kitano, *American Racism: Explorations of the Nature of Prejudice* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 76.

[40]Armando Morales, *Ando Sangrado: I Am Bleeding* (LaPuente, Calif.: Perspectiva Publications, 1972).

[41]Meier and Rivera, *The Chicanos*, pp. 242-43.

[42]Tim D. Kane, "Structural Change and Chicano Employment in the Southwest: Some Preliminary Changes," *Aztlan*, 45 (1973): 383-98.

[43]Ibid., p. 29.

[44]Philip Garcia and Lionel Maldonado, "America's Mexicans: A Plea for Specificity," (mimeo); Philip Garcia, "Nativity, Bilingualism and Occupational Attainment among Mexican American Men," (in press). The data summarized here are from a more detailed analysis of the 1970 Decennial Census and the March 1978 Current Population Survey. This section borrows from that more detailed analysis. Chicanos' attainments on selected racial characteristics are presented in terms of Mexican immigrants, first-generation and subsequent-generation Chicanos.

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FRANK BONILLA AND RICARDO CAMPOS

A Wealth of Poor: Puerto Ricans in the New Economic Order

> The humblest barefoot peon in the forests of El Yunque has the same right to expatriate himself if he chooses as does the millionaire. . . . Porto Rico has plenty of laborers and poor people generally. What the Island needs is men with capital, energy, and enterprise to develop its latent industries and to reclaim its sugar estates; to build factories and railroads, and make this country hum with the busy round of commerce.
>
> —Charles H. Allen, Governor of Puerto Rico
> *First Annual Report 1900-1901*

Exchanging People for Capital

EIGHTY YEARS HAVE PASSED since the first American civilian governor promulgated his succinct economic prescription for Puerto Rico. Over these decades a great many enterprising capitalists flocked to the Island while thousands of humble, barefoot peons abandoned their land in successive waves of migration. This headlong exchange of workers for capital profoundly shaped contemporary Puerto Rican society. Two million Puerto Ricans living in the United States (two out of every five persons of Puerto Rican parentage) and nearly $24 billion of direct U.S. private investment on the Island are the cumulated outcome of that prolonged and continuing exchange. The steady expulsion of "surplus" workers and efforts to attract greater amounts of capital together have governed all the plans and projects formulated by and for Puerto Ricans to solve the persisting problem of "overpopulation" and to promote an economic development that remains elusive. Although the finer points of the rationales for, and formulations of, these policies have been modified over time to reflect the acuteness of population pressures and the characteristics of each period, the policies themselves remain unchanged.

The most fulsome expression of Governor Allen's thesis, which transformed his dictum into a model for national economic development, was unquestionably the once-celebrated "Operation Bootstrap," conceived and implemented during and just after the Second World War. Bootstrap strategists argued that the intolerable population pressures on resources constituted the root obstacle to economic advance and the necessary modernization of Puerto Rico.[1] Their

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prescription was to find a low-cost approach to channel the movement of redundant Puerto Rican workers abroad while drawing energetic entrepreneurs to the Island from the United States. The necessary economic and social operations envisioned in Bootstrap were to be carried out through the agency of a newly designed political structure, the commonwealth.

The tutelary partner in Bootstrap, the U.S. federal government, was to provide the ideological and technical inspiration for the project and retain political command of the operation. The goal was to modernize the former Spanish colony, to place the ages-old colonial relationship on a more productive and rational footing. During the first four decades of this century, a handful of corporate sugar producers had dominated the Island economy, helped by accommodating and subordinate local bourgeois elements, also tied to agriculture. The overwhelming power of the sugar corporations rested on the Foraker Act, passed in 1900 by the U.S. Congress.[2] This pioneering colonial statute placed under the control of American capital almost the entire local production and circulation of commodities.

Two important resources, however, had been omitted from this legislation's protectionist mantle: coffee and the labor force. The deliberate exclusion of coffee contributed to the prompt financial ruin of what had been the principal export crop. But a different destiny awaited the growing wage-labor force. American citizenship, conveniently decreed during World War I by the Jones Act,[3] allowed the already itinerant work force of Puerto Rican nationals to circulate freely through increasingly extended circuits within the U.S. labor market. Thereafter, workers and capital traversed closely linked, though inverse, paths between the colony and metropolis.

By the time the designs for Bootstrap and Commonwealth were completed, partly inspired by the anticolonial clamor in the recently formed United Nations, more than a quarter million Puerto Ricans were living as "citizen" expatriates in the United States; thousands more were scattered among neighboring Caribbean countries; others had emigrated as far as the sugar islands of Hawaii, the western outpost of corporate America's agricultural network. The historical antecedents for a major population transfer were well established. The decline of the sugar plantation system in the 1930s signaled that a new sector of the North American class with "capital and enterprise" had to be brought into the picture. Both operations, the dispatch of workers abroad and the shift to industrial capital—accompanied by the political restructuring necessary to accommodate these new economic relationships—were to be feted in the world as an imaginative design for the national economic development of a former colony under the protective benevolence of a major power. The list of celebrants, distinguished public servants and academics in the United States, is long and impressive.[4]

It would be a mistake to consider this widely touted design for development as unique to Puerto Rico. The international exchange of labor for capital has long been invoked in both large and small "overpopulated" nations to articulate strategies of economic growth linked, directly or indirectly, to forms of political subordination to capital-rich imperialist states. The particularities of these relationships vary, of course, with the magnitude of the exchanges and the diversity of political superstructures devised to support them. Puerto Rico's

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present singularity lies in having run through the full course of options in these exchanges of capital for people as we now know them, most recently within the framework of commonwealth, a political arrangement regarded as totally inadequate in its present form even by its most ardent advocates.

INVESTMENT AND THE PERSISTENCE OF SURPLUS LABOR

The most up-to-date stocktaking of the consequences of these developments is in the U.S. Department of Commerce's recently published *Economic Study of Puerto Rico.*[5] According to this report, the free and uninterrupted flow of U.S. capital to the Island has been the moving force behind the accelerated growth of the total goods and services generated in Puerto Rico—GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Behind these promising gains, however, are significant and paradoxical dislocations in local production. The study warns of a growing imbalance between the swelling GDP, more than $14 billion in 1977, and the declining gross national product (GNP), the share of goods and services reserved for local consumption, which was $13.5 billion in the same year. The gap "consists almost entirely of profits and interest income remitted to firms and creditors on the mainland." The difference indicates, of course, only the profits that have "emigrated," not the totals generated; a large proportion of these remain on deposit in U.S. banks operating in Puerto Rico. The unrestricted entry of capital and the substantial outflow of profits have reduced local productive activity to a subordinate "tandem economy, meeting needs within the continental market." More important, industrialization has not only continued to reproduce high official rates of unemployment and underemployment, but has left some 60 percent of the population mired in poverty, as measured by government standards. This extensive and persistent poverty is seen as the inevitable consequence of a chronic disequilibrium between economic development and uncontrollable population growth. Alleged population excess reflects in fact a surplus of workers in relation to the labor force employed by invested capital; this is acknowledged in the report, which concludes by pointing to the "limited generation of jobs" as the principal source of population imbalance.

Yet the question remains: Why does the supply of jobs grows so slowly in Puerto Rico? Why has not the rush of "men with capital" reduced employment but rather aggravated it? Figure 1 shows that foreign capital invested in Puerto Rico surged from $1.4 billion in 1960 to nearly $24 billion in 1979. The latest official figures show unemployment at 19 percent—a significant jump from the 13.2 percent in 1960—despite recent adjustments that exclude young teenagers and other workers in these calculations.

A notable decline in the demand for labor has accompanied an astonishing influx of capital. The dynamic of job generation under capitalism, identified long ago by the classical economist, David Ricardo, seems to be at work here in an extraordinarily severe form. As he observed, "The demand for labor will continue to increase with an increase of capital, but not in proportion to its increase; the ratio will necessarily be a diminishing ratio."[6] In Puerto Rico this law operates so inexorably (perhaps because of so few counteracting forces) that it may have been subtly altered: the larger the increment of capital, the higher the rate of unemployment.

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

Figure 1. Foreign Capital Invested in Puerto Rico. *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970, 1977, 1979. Appendices 11, 15. Owing to the proximate nature of the figures supplied by the Planning Board, these magnitudes should be treated as incomplete, but illustrative, estimates of capital investment tendencies and unemployment index.

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A further distinction may perhaps better explain this contradictory relationship. The demand for labor does not move simply in response to total capital invested but in accord with the magnitude of its variable component; that is, the funds earmarked for labor costs—wages and related benefits. The impact on employment of each addition to capital depends on the increments actually apportioned both to the variable component and to the constant component; that is, capital invested in materials and instruments of production. The necessary tendency toward the proportional reduction of variable in relation to constant capital is the operative principle behind the mechanism of job generation pointed out by Ricardo.

Puerto Rican society today, besieged by unemployment as it is saturated with enterprises that use advanced, high-cost technology, is living out this contradiction of modern capitalism in its most acute expression. Between 1970 and 1979 the number of employed Puerto Ricans grew by only 17.6 percent, a sharp contrast to the numbers of unemployed or those counted as surplus population, which more than doubled (116.4%). During this same period, variable capital in industry more than doubled (149.5%), while industrial jobs advanced by only 15.1 percent (Table 1). But variable capital also reflects wage increments and other compensations to those already employed. Larger amounts of variable capital represent higher labor costs, but they do not necessarily translate into more people at work.

These specific features of investment flows and their impact on employment are a major source of the unresolved problem of excess population in Puerto Rico. The progressive imbalance between capital invested and labor demand is now aggravated by the velocity of investment and the appropriation of returns. Between 1970 and 1979 profits and interest rose by a staggering 555.3 percent. Returns, in short, amounted to three times what was paid to labor. Such rates of accumulation might of course represent renewed sources of variable capital, but as we have seen, this now means capacity to consume more labor, not to employ more workers. However, as the Commerce Department points out, almost all such profits and interest now find their way out of Puerto Rico. At the end of a long cycle of investment, with half of its population expelled and its doors opened wide to men of capital and enterprise, Puerto Rico is among the most modern and industrialized of colonies, a privileged site for capital accumulation, and a factory of profits and redundant people.

What about capital connected to labor-intensive production? Can such investment be attracted to help break the impasse? Unfortunately, Puerto Rico has lost the principal drawing power for this kind of industry. As Teodoro Moscoso, a resourceful promoter of Bootstrap, observed, "We are no longer a low-wage area."[7] Puerto Rico has been sidelined in the restless global search for the cheapest available labor. In an ironic inversion of the rhetoric of economists, a modest advance toward a desired goal (wage parity with U.S. workers) has now become "an erosion of Puerto Rico's competitive advantage."

Industrial wages in Puerto Rico have in fact crept up toward the standard set by the U.S. minimum wage. They are higher today than equivalent labor costs in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Although average earnings are lower than in a country like Japan, wage scales in specific labor-intensive industries such as textiles, apparel, and electrical appliances are higher.

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Table 1. Industrial Capital (in millions) and Industrial Work Force (in thousands) in Puerto Rico

	1970	Percent	1979	Percent	Percent Change
Industrial Capital	$2,534		$7,150		182.1
Variable	608	24	1,517	21.2	149.5
Constant	1,926	76	5,633	78.8	192.4
Installations*	344	17.8	136	2.4	−60.4
Equipment and machinery	382	19.8	621	11.1	62.5
Raw and semiprocessed materials	1,200	62.4	4,876	86.5	306.3
Profits and interest**	1,350		2,287		555.3
Industrial work force	132		152		15.1

Source: Junta de planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970; 1979.

*The decline in the value of private industrial installations between 1970 and 1979 reflects the enlarged participation of the government in construction for lease to new industry (from $150 to $336 million). These gifts of values by the state, or rather by Puerto Rican construction workers, further mask profit rates and the relation of constant to variable capital. Note, however, that these figures also cover some commercial construction unrelated to industrial investment.

**It is impossible to calculate profit rates exactly in the absence of a figure for accumulated constant capital. Also total profits, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, include some values not produced in Puerto Rico.

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Such wage changes determine the kinds of capital drawn to the Island and the types of commodities produced. Since production is principally for the U.S. market, these wage shifts also affect the relative share in U.S. imports of countries competing for low-wage jobs. Figures for 1965 and 1976 from the Commerce Department report reveal how Puerto Rico has lost ground in exporting commodities typical of labor-intensive production (apparel and shoes) while making gains in high-technology products (chemicals and pharmaceuticals).[8]

Whatever form of capital is attracted, continued pressure on maintaining profitability in industry will work toward a relative reduction in the work force. The overflow of supernumeraries must thus be accommodated in derivative or accessory functions in commerce and services, and above all, given the collapse of agriculture, government. The government bureaucracy in Puerto Rico employs 38 percent of the work force, twice the proportion of workers employed by the U.S. government. In the long run, there are costly and untenable contradictions in such attempts to cut into the surplus of workers.

Although the shift in the nature of capital invested in Puerto Rico has fallen far short of creating a workers' paradise, even for those fortunate enough to have jobs in the more advanced sectors of the economy, it has decisively altered the position of the Island with respect to other low-wage and intermediate-wage areas throughout the world. The change implies the need to curb profit-taking and reduce the generous scale of incentives to investors. Such an adjustment, however, will work against ingrained corporate expectations of bonanza concessions and returns. Commerce Department analysts acknowledge these dilemmas and caution that, no matter how much capital is attracted, it will probably prove quite a feat to achieve the low double-digit rates of unemployment (10-12%) that were regarded as disastrous only a few decades ago. The optimistic expectation is that "emigration to the mainland may arise in the future to alleviate the problem." We have come full circle. The palliative recommended for the limping Commonwealth economy—in full awareness of the contradictions that underlie the present crisis—is the Bootstrap formula, not even slightly refurbished: import more capital; employ/disemploy more workers; and transport supernumeraries to the United States, this time, however, accompanied by the lavish profits being reaped locally.

CORPORATIONS AND CIRCUITS OF VALUE

The particular place that Puerto Rico occupies in the international division of labor, together with the uncontrolled and complex techniques of pricing transfers between corporate subsidiaries on the Island and their U.S. headquarters, make calculating the key parameters of this contradictory dynamic of economic development extremely difficult. Estimates of the value added to capital by workers in Puerto Rico (i.e., local rates of exploitation) and how these increments enter into international flows are especially problematic. To further complicate matters, until 1976, Section 931 of the federal Internal Revenue Code exempted firms operating in Puerto Rico from taxes on income from other countries.[9] That is, the profit balances of these companies included quanta of value added by other work forces within the global network of commodity production and circulation.

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With these reservations in mind, a closer look at the corporate actors in command of these circuits of value transfers and the class forces they link and bring into conflict will nevertheless prove fruitful. In this connection, it may plausibly be affirmed that Puerto Rico has been overly saturated with U.S. capital. A capital investment of $24 billion in a tiny territory of just 3.3 million inhabitants has few parallels in the contemporary capitalist world. The Island shelters a variety of "blue chip" firms, the vanguard of U.S. transnationals, that in 1975 had 362 installations in operation. Prominent among these were petrochemical, electronic, chemical, and metallurgical firms. Industrial production accounted for about $13 billion of the total capital invested in 1979.

This concentration of industrial capital is favored by the privileged legal status of firms registered as Possessions Corporations (Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 936), all of which enjoy a common citizenship, currency, and customs system. This statute permits firms to repatriate profits free of federal tax after paying a modest charge to the colonial government. Of the 624 firms listed by the U.S. Department of Commerce under this heading, 612 are in Puerto Rico, making these entities in the federal view "largely a Puerto Rican phenomenon."

The accumulated investments of these firms stand out among similar investments in Latin America. In 1978 just over 34 percent of total U.S. direct investment in Latin America was concentrated in Puerto Rico, one and a half times the amount in Brazil, three times the investment in Mexico, and more than the total in all other Latin American countries. The figures on profits are even more extraordinary. This small island, whose natural resources are still being assayed and are yet to be brought into production, is providing fully 42.4 percent of the total returns skimmed off in Latin America, more than twice the proportion accumulated in the bountifully endowed Brazil. To top off these astonishing numbers, Puerto Rico yielded an impressive rate of 18 percent profit accumulation in that year (Table 2).

Table 2. Direct U.S. Investment and Income on Investment in Latin America, 1978 (in millions)

	A		B		
	Investment	Percent	Income	Percent	B/A × 100
Latin America	$32,389		$4,681		14.4
Mexico	3,712	11.4	597	12.7	16.1
Panama and other Central American countries	3,182	9.8	290	6.2	9.1
Argentina	1,658	5.1	152	3.2	9.2
Brazil	7,170	22.1	932	20.0	13.0
Chile	230	0.7	28	0.6	12.0
Colombia	769	2.3	98	2.1	12.7
Peru	1,429	4.4	125	2.6	8.7
Venezuela	2,015	6.2	287	6.1	14.2
Puerto Rico	**11,053**	**34.1**	**1,987**	**42.4**	**18.0**
Others	1,171	3.6	185	4.0	15.8

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*; Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador, 1977-79*.

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The Island now plays a remarkable role in the international operations of U.S. investors. In addition to activities connected with the kinds of industrial capital already mentioned, these operations include transactions made through an $11 billion investment in finances: mortgage credits and loans extended through federal agencies, home mortgage loans, the debt and foreign deposits of local banks, and the Commonwealth's public debt. Outside of a considerable part of the public debt, the rest of these funds for the most part simply yield interest on loans. In any case, the government debt is the most important of these financial investments and represents a substantial flow of money to the Island. Of total investment in 1979, 56 percent represented purchases of obligations of the local government that produced 60 percent of the interest earned by financial investments. This type of investment is important since nearly half—43.2 percent—are *high-yield* bonds floated by Wall Street firms for Puerto Rican public corporations.

These corporations, reputedly government-operated capitalist enterprises, were organized to provide essential services at low cost. Most of the firms employ productive workers (a work force adding value to capital), whether the commodities produced are tangible (water) or not (telephone service). The volume of bonds outstanding has transformed these corporations into mere fronts or delegated administrators for U.S. investors. In short, such public enterprises function as convenient intermediaries between U.S. financiers and productive workers in Puerto Rico. The role of these fictitious state entities is to process U.S. investments in the guise of public loans, using the funds to employ Puerto Rican workers, and returning the value added to U.S. investors. In 1979 corporations of this kind returned $266.3 million (47% of the total interest paid abroad) to mainland creditors, who were able to pocket the earnings without bearing the burden of ownership of enterprises that steadily showed massive losses and accumulated a multibillion dollar debt (Table 3).

Bankrupt firms such as these continue to operate because of generous state subsidies provided by the United States and the Commonwealth. In 1979 the federal government provided $261 million to these public corporations to complement the $64 million advanced by the local government. In their role as

Table 3. Profits and Debt of Public Corporations (in millions)

	Profits	Debt	Percent of Total Public Debt
1970	$ 5.5	$1.307	62.5
1971	7.5	1.383	66.4
1972	−8.2	1.731	68.0
1973	−38.1	2.060	68.8
1974	−14.2	2.520	67.5
1975	−63.1	2.657	71.7
1976	−77.9	4.052	74.5
1977	−115.9	4.358	73.0
1978	−49.9	4.537	74.6
1979	−112.3	4.873	75.8

Source: Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1979.

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Table 4. Industrial Net Income Generated by Foreign Capital and Total Net Profits and Interests Appropriated by Foreign Capital, Puerto Rico, 1950-79

	Net Income	Net Profits and Interest
1950	3.5%	9.1%
1960	53.8	22.1
1970	81.7	42.3
1971	82.0	44.0
1972	83.9	48.7
1973	86.5	53.7
1974	87.8	55.3
1975	86.8	61.7
1976	89.2	65.1
1977	91.2	67.0
1978	90.5	66.4
1979	91.8	68.0

Source: Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1979.

middlemen, these corporations duly passed along almost the total amount to the unconcerned and well-satisfied U.S. holders of insular bonds. This seeming generosity, of course, bears close scrutiny, for this is only one of several circuits through which the value generated by workers both in Puerto Rico and the United States circulates as either public or private funds, sometimes going through deceptive metamorphoses. This analysis reveals the close connection between the forms of exploitation and profit-taking in the public and private sectors in Puerto Rico, and the total control of U.S. investors over Island production and locally generated surplus value. In 1979 U.S. capital generated 91.8 percent of industrial net income (i.e., variable capital plus profits), and appropriated 68 percent of all interests and profits (Table 4). The breakdown of income generated by industry (Table 5) shows the extent to which Puerto Rican firms have been restricted to production in sectors with modest rates of accumulation (printing, food, lumber).

Table 5. Net Income Generated by U.S. Capital, 1979, by Industrial Sector

	Percent
Food	57.2
Tobacco	96.3
Textiles	99.7
Apparel	96.0
Lumber, furniture	57.2
Paper, printing	38.8
Chemicals	99.6
Stone, clay, glass	70.9
Machinery and metals	97.6
Miscellaneous	95.8

Source: Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1979.

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U.S. capital of course is not limited to industry and public-sector financing; it maintains a commanding position in air transport, insurance, and banking, as well as commerce and services, including hotels and tourism. (Some of these activities—for example, wholesale and retail trade—do not generate surplus value, and each accounts for sharply varying proportions of profits.) In 1979 agriculture was the source of 5.2 percent of total profits and interest accumulated on the Island; construction and mining accounted for 1.1 percent; transportation and some public firms, 6.6 percent; commerce, 11.2 percent; finances, insurance, and real estate, 17.3 percent; and services, 7 percent. Industrial production alone generated more than half (51.6%) of all profits. The whole economy, in fact, at present rests on industry, which comprises the main artery of outward flows of value. These massive flows intensified with the arrival during the sixties of the giant multinational corporations—petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and metals—that now totally dominate economic life in Puerto Rico.

There is no gainsaying the remark made recently by the North American president of the Commonwealth Oil Refining Company (CORCO), an early (1953) starter in the field: "The economic health of Puerto Rico and CORCO are too closely intertwined to permit any serious misunderstandings between the company and the local government."[10] CORCO, a many-sided enterprise, with thirteen of its twenty-four subsidiaries on the Island (seven registered in Delaware, two in Liberia, and one each in Virginia and the Bahamas), occupies a strategic position, since it provides the basic fuel needs for all Island industries. CORCO, moreover, has just made a dramatic comeback after four years of losses and public declarations of impending bankruptcy following price increases for Venezuelan oil. With only 1,450 workers in 1979, the CORCO combine cornered $81 million of the value added to processed petroleum derivatives.

Multinational users of other small contingents of Puerto Rican workers are reaping even higher returns. In 1979, a highly profitable year, capital-intensive enterprises, employing only 34,600 workers (just over a fifth of the active work force), reaped an impressive 82.6 percent of the total value added in industry (just under $2 billion, as shown in Table 6). Pharmaceuticals, as might be expected, led the field, employing one in ten industrial workers, but taking 47.4 percent of the industrial value added ($1,081 million). These modern corporations have far outstripped their earlier agricultural counterparts, as they continue to outdo lesser industries today (food and apparel), in extracting greater productivity and profits from workers. These gains, however, are obtained at the cost of redoubled pressures on the population in terms of unemployment and relative surplus population that flows directly from the "modernization" of production in the Bootstrap mode. At the same time, backward flows to the United States combined with the intensified circulation of monies and commodities stimulate industrial and other activity as well as job creation. While U.S. corporations do not pay federal taxes on Island earnings, derivative operations such as these do generate revenues that partially cover the federal transfers necessary to keep alive the social product of these uses of high technology, the idle and impoverished.

The special place carved out for Puerto Rico in the international division of labor by U.S. "men with capital" is thus sharply brought into focus. The Island

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Table 6. Value Added, Variable Capital, and Employment by Industrial Sector, 1979

	Value Added	Percent	Variable Capital	Percent	Proportion of Value Added	Total Employment	Percent	Production Workers	Percent
Total	$2,287.3[1]	100.0	$1,517.8[1]	100.0	1.50	152,400	100.0	123,400	100.0
Chemicals	**1,081.1**	**47.2**	**235.3**	**15.5**	**4.60**	**16,000**	**10.5**	**10,700**	**8.6**
Petroleum	160.1	7.0	53.7	3.5	3.00	6,000	4.3	4,500	3.6
Machinery and metals	650.8	28.4	421.2	27.7	1.50	12,000	8.0	9,800	8.0
Food	152.9	6.7	260.5	17.1	.59	23,300	15.2	15,500	12.6
Miscellaneous	**152.3**	**6.6**	**305.1**	**20.1**	**.50**	**60,300**	**39.6**	**51,100**	**41.5**
Apparel	90.1	4.0	241.9	16.1	.37	34,000	22.4	31,700	25.7

Source: Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1979, p. 57; *Statistical Report* vol. 1, no. 10, Oct. 1979; Depto. del Trabajo, Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.

[1]Millions of dollars

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is not the bridge between two cultures envisioned in Operation Serenity (Bootstrap's cultural counterpart), but provides essential linkages between raw material producers and the voracious productive apparatus of the United States. Commonwealth planners see in this arrangement a ready-made path to progress and prosperity. As Puerto Rico's Planning Board asserts, "Our economic development is based on the incorporation of manpower ('mano de obra,' i.e., 'working hands'), our primary resource, to raw materials or intermediary goods coming from abroad." What is being incorporated, of course, is not manpower, or "hands," but the value added by these. The larger such values, the fewer the hands.

COMMODITY FLOWS

The circulation of commodities—the movement of exports and imports—is no less revealing of Puerto Rico's total dependency than the circulation of capital and profits. With respect to both individual consumption and the materials and goods to be processed for export back to the United States, the Island is locked into commodity circuits akin to those in which capital moves. With the passage of years, the value of goods exchanged approached the GNP (total income available to Commonwealth residents), and moved beyond it after 1973. The growing gap between these two values (Figure 2) is evidence of the subordination of internal economic activity to outside forces. Exports are overwhelmingly directed to U.S. markets. In 1979, 84.7 percent of more than $6 billion in exports went to the United States. Not surprisingly, chemicals (42%) and metal products (19.7%), along with other high-technology products, now dominate the outward flow.

Imports in 1979 were an extraordinary $7,386 million, about two thirds from the United States and the remainder, in Planning Board parlance, from "abroad." Nearly two thirds of imports were either intermediary goods (59.4%)



Figure 2. Ratio (a/b) of Value of Imports Plus Exports (a) to Gross Product (b). *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1979. Gross product is equivalent to GNP in U.S. national account terms.

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or capital goods (6.5%), evidence, once again, of the export-processing character of local operations. Petroleum purchases of $1.5 billion (about a third of intermediate goods imported)—mainly from Venezuela, but also from Liberia, Angola, and the Dutch Antilles—led. But local commerce must also meet consumer needs. Seventy percent of the $2.5 billion in consumer goods entering Puerto Rico (34% of all imports) were nondurables. The Puerto Rican people, having been persuaded to put aside production for their own needs, are dependent for their most basic needs on an international market subject to all kinds of manipulation and inflationary pressures, a dependency reflected in Puerto Rico's astonishing ranking among importers of U.S. products. In 1978 the Island was seventh among buyers from the United States and had the highest index of per capita imports, $1,300.[11]

The magnitude of these purchases, aside from the direct effect on the number of people active in local trade (as proprietors, middlemen, and employees), points to another major circuit for exchanges of value between the United States and Puerto Rico. As with consumer commodities produced in Puerto Rico for U.S. markets, the value added by workers is realized in the final sale. Thus the commodities arriving in Puerto Rico bear the value added by workers of many nationalities in the United States and elsewhere, a value shared by local tradespeople and their employees. It is in this sense that we treat those employed in wholesale and retail trade on the Island as nonproductive workers. They add no fresh value to commodities in the final steps of merchandising, but do share in value generated elsewhere by workers of many nationalities. It is worth noting again, however, that through local tax payments, some of this value is returned to U.S. investors in the form of subsidies to public corporations, bond servicing, and other interest payments.

Surely, this torrent of consumer goods, many of which are still regarded as luxuries in scores of poor countries, must require an equivalent magnitude of disposable income. But how much income can a population that is one fifth unemployed and, by official figures, three fifths poor bring to market? How can we account for consumption costs that in 1979 fell just short of $10 billion? In 1979 personal income of $9,914 million came from the following principal sources: U.S. and Commonwealth public sector disbursements (46.6%), industry (13.7%), and free transfers from government to the needy (26.2%!). Again, public sector subsidies backstop highly profitable corporate operations. Nevertheless, public support does not fully cover the rising costs of consuming U.S. goods. In 1979 income after taxes was $545 million less than total consumption. As Figure 3 shows at a glance, the imbalance between disposable income and consumption has been chronic for decades. This gap points not only to a long-standing and rising consumer indebtedness, but also to a systematic net "dissaving" induced by the untrammeled movement of capital and commodities. The end effect is the liquidation of all internal mechanisms that might support an internal capital market. Of course, the absence of any local saving does not exclude Puerto Ricans totally from access to capital. It does mean that they must maintain close identification with the powers that rule in U.S. financial markets. With the industrial sector completely monopolized by outsiders, Puerto Rican capitalists have meekly moved into the sphere of local circulation and financing—insurance, real estate, retail trade. Nor has the absence of local financing for productive ends foreclosed a prodigal underwriting of consumer

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

Figure 3. Ratio (a/b) of Personal Consumption (a) to Disposable Income (b). *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1978, 1979.

indebtedness, now approaching a third of personal income (27.7%). Three fifths of total lending went toward the financing of commercial transactions (37.6%) and personal consumption (22.7%). The powerful lever of bank credit is plainly being applied to spur the circulation and consumption of U.S. and some Puerto Rican production.

FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MARKETS

Bank credit is not the sole promoter of a consumption that is geared more to the needs of a producers' market than to consumer needs. More pertinent, and even more contradictory in their effects, are mushrooming federal transfer payments,[12] most of which go to the working poor and the unemployed. A substantial portion goes to the Commonwealth government to keep its bankrupt public corporations afloat, to pay the swollen ranks of public employees, and to provide the educational and social services that help defuse an explosive social situation. Of course, Island workers and employers contribute to these funds through social security and employment insurance payments. Nonetheless, the net flow of federal monies to Puerto Rico is simply enormous (Table 7). These massive outlays now exceed the total gains of U.S. corporations operating in Puerto Rico. Figure 4 shows the movement of profits gained by U.S. capital in relation to federal transfers during the last decade. This gap would be even wider if the value added by Puerto Rican workers were more closely reckoned, and if other factors that inflate profits were better controlled.

The apparent anomaly in the management of the colony is readily understood if we keep in view the totality of circuits between the metropolis and the colony through which values travel. All of this circulation is driven by the appropriation and transformation of surplus or added value, whether in state revenues, debt service, commercial capital, or corporate profits. Thus, in looking more closely at federal disbursements, we discover that social security

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Table 7. Net Federal Transfer Payments to Puerto Rico (in millions)

	1950	1960	1970	1979
Total	$125.3	$233.6	$720.6	$3.829.0
Federal agency expenses	46.8	91.8	160.8	257.5
Defense	36.7	74.5	126.0	147.5
Others	10.1	17.3	34.8	110.0
Gifts to colonial government	9.4	46.2	256.5	1.149.4.
Returns to individuals	50.4	79.6	282.4	2.059.1.
Social Security payments		36.9	174.0	881.2
Food stamps				821.8
Others		42.7	108.4	356.1
Remittances to private institutions		.9	2.9	43.3
Industrial subsidies	18.7	15.1	18.0	33.1

Source: Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970; 1979.

payments constitute a redistribution of a part of the wages of all U.S. and Puerto Rican workers, along with a part of the surplus value generated by them and entered in these accounts as "contributions" by employers. Unemployment insurance and pension funds involve transactions of the same kind as do food stamps, though the latter are more clearly based on a process of appropriation that reaches more substantially into the multinational work force in the United States.

This surrogate currency, designated "food stamps," but which in fact supports a diversified mass consumption in the pinched Island households, is the most controversial form of federal payment to individuals. Food stamps first came to the Island in a recession year (1975); $282 million in coupons was distributed to 978,000 Puerto Ricans (an average grant of $288.54). Four years later, more than half the population—about 1,720,000—were in the program, receiving average grants of $426.49 from a total allocation of $733 million.[13] This much money in circulation has beyond doubt stimulated the purchase of heretofore unobtainable U.S.-produced food items (especially those most assiduously promoted in the mass media). A third of the value of food sales in 1979 was covered by food stamps. More important, three fourths of those helped by these transfers were among the idle reserves that are the hallmark of modernized Puerto Rico. Workers in the United States pay to feed their counterparts languishing in enforced idleness in the colony. Those denied work eat expensively, though not necessarily nutritiously. They learn to accept their exclusion from work, pass officially into the ranks of the "discouraged" or willfully not working, and cease to count in official calculations of the unemployed.

LABOR MARKET EFFECTS

Commerce Department probers complain that the local government is actively covering up massive "hidden unemployment" that eluded their best

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efforts to detect. The observation is hardly newsworthy; a key 1976 report to the governor of Puerto Rico had already noted that "concealed unemployment in Puerto Rico may be established at two to three hundred thousand above official unemployment"[14]—remarkable elasticity, it would seem, for such a crucial estimate. But even if we add only 200,000 to the 172,000 officially unemployed in that year, it means that no less than 34 percent of the Puerto Rican work force were marking time.

These large numbers of unemployed are a result of swift industrialization, not a problem of backwardness; in other respects, in fact, the Island now has a division of labor very much like the metropolis (Table 8). As in other advanced industrial societies, the proportion of productive workers shrinks while the ranks of those not productively engaged tend to swell. Rural workers and small farmers have practically disappeared. The Island is an urban society with a third of its people clustered around the capital city. Nonproductive workers abound in wholesale and retail trade (13.2%), finances, insurance, and real estate (2.9%), and many-sided services (9.7%).

But the 244,000 persons on the Commonwealth payroll (37.3% of all those employed) most evidently betray the economic and political contradictions that underlie the present structure of the work force. Their jobs depend directly on the sizable proportion (27%) of the administrative budget contributed by the federal government (more than $1 billion). This device has some limits even in the best of circumstances. In the troubled present state of the U.S. economy, and the certainty of drastic cutbacks in social programs, the effects in Puerto Rico will be swift and, as always, even more severely felt than in the metropolis.



Figure 4. Net Federal Transfer Payments and Profits on U.S. Capital. *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970–79.

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Table 8. Social Division of Labor: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1978

	United States		Puerto Rico	
	Number (Thousands)	Percent	Number (Thousands)	Percent
All industries	90,730	100	657.0	100
Private sector	75,083	82.8	402.0	61.2
Agriculture	1,596	1.8	19.5	3.0
Mining	894	1.0	0.9	0.1
Contract construction	4,586	5.1	36.0	5.5
Manufacturing	20,651	22.8	134.2	20.4
Transportation and public utilities	4,908	5.4	20.4	3.1
Wholesale trade	4,932	5.4	29.2	4.4
Retail trade	14,702	16.2	67.7	10.3
Finance, insurance, and real estate	4,724	5.2	19.1	2.9
Service industries (except private household)	16,245	17.9	64.0	9.7
Private households	1,845	2.0	11.0	1.7
Public sector	**15,647**	**17.2**	**255.0**	**38.8**
Federal government	2,744	3.0	10.2	1.6
State and local government	12,903	14.2	244.8	37.2

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Economic Study of Puerto Rico*, vol. 2, 1979, p. 617.

A closer look at private and public sector employment reveals some additional anomalies and less publicized changes, such as the quiet "nationalization" of what remains of agriculture (only 0.2% of rural workers are employed by the private sector) and the unremitting use of public funds to keep bankrupt sugar *centrales* in operation. A large factor in the collapse of agriculture was resistance to working for miserable agricultural wages as industrial wages rose. Since 1950 industrial wages have been rising steadily, from 29.2 percent to 55.1 percent of the U.S. scale, and are growing at about twice the U.S. rate. Though the gap between wage scales in the metropolis and in the colony remains large, there has been a long-term leveling tendency. This is particularly so for what Puerto Ricans can earn in either setting. These relative gains by no means indicate that wage equality is in the offing, or even in the cards, under the present relationship. Moreover, they mask the more decisive fact that, while the absolute difference in industrial wages was $1.02 in 1950, it is today more than $3.00.[15] Relative to U.S. wage levels, Puerto Rico remains "a cut-price haven for American companies," but only a tiny fraction of Puerto Rican workers are in a position to cash in on those differences by rational moves in the labor market.[16]

This financiers' sanctuary is maintained by the small part of the Puerto Rican working class who have productive jobs. A large part of their apparent gains in earnings has been eroded by the soaring U.S. inflation and its reverberations on the Island. The index of real wages has dropped abruptly from 0.904 in 1970 (with 1967 as the base year) to 0.506 in 1979. Using the same

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base year, the price index for working-family budgets was 211.4 in May 1980.[17] Metropolitan monetary policy—framed, of course, with other considerations in mind—makes these problems all the more acute. The standard response is to call for belt-tightening by workers and more incentives for the "men with capital." As might be expected, the Commerce Department, although acknowledging the absence of financial mechanisms to deter inflation or the flight of profits, concludes that "the anti-inflation policy of the government is reduced essentially to controlling wage increases." In short, cut the cost of the workers' labor so that the share of value-added rewarded to investors may suffer no adverse effects.

In keeping with this hard line on wages, the Commerce Department report sees the integration of almost all Puerto Rican workers into the federal minimum wage standard as a dire threat to future economic growth. Oddly enough, by managing wage levels, the Commonwealth has produced a situation in which higher wage rates mean more, not less, pressure for migration, an effect paralleling those of capital-intensive investments. The circulation of people is now an integral feature of the movement of capital, commodities, and other values; it constitutes a long-term traffic between colony and metropolis that varies only in volume, composition, origin, and point of destination. As Figures 5 and 6 clearly show, the two-way movement of inactive labor reserves intensifies during periods of recession. Costly and risk-laden choices, among alternatives that provide increasingly narrow margins of advantage, constitute the baffling and disorienting reality of social opportunity for more and more Puerto Ricans.



Figure 5. Unemployment Compensation Paid in Puerto Rico, Based on U.S. Employment. Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970, 1978, 1979.

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Imported Labor in the United States

As capital-intensive industrialization and economic absorption in Puerto Rico intensify, they continue to generate and propel a redundant population toward the United States. These migrants are, in Marx's phrase, part of "the light infantry of capital, thrown by it, according to its needs, now to this point, now to that."[18] In the United States they confront in only slightly altered configurations the very same economic forces that marked them as supernumeraries in the homeland. As the 1980s open, this migration is being promoted in Puerto Rico even more actively than in the initial years of Operation Bootstrap.[19] More clearly than ever, whether in Puerto Rico or in the United States, Puerto Rican workers move within what is essentially a unitary labor market, the defining parameters of which are determined by U.S. corporate and governmental decisions or programs.

Despite an extraordinary volume of private investment, public sector economic activity, and federal spending, employment and per capita income in Puerto Rico are no closer today than in the 1940s to the employment and per capita income of the poorest state in the Union. Pressures on Puerto Ricans in cities on the mainland to move on or return to Puerto Rico continue to build. The result is a permanent and restless traffic, a massive circulation of workers without fixed abodes or occupations, between Puerto Rico and a growing number of regional concentrations scattered throughout the United States. Around the relatively stable core of each Puerto Rican community gravitate troops of fresh arrivals and contingents newly poised for departure.



Figure 6. Unemployment Compensation Paid in the United States, Based on Puerto Rican Employment. Junta de Planificación, *Informe económico al gobernador*, 1970, 1978, 1979.

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Owing to the minuscule number of Puerto Ricans in the aggregate U.S. work force (mainland workers and other labor reserves available to U.S. producers around the world), corporate and federal policy decisions have rarely contemplated in any substantive detail the needs or interests of Puerto Rican workers. Over the decades, Puerto Ricans, wherever they find themselves, have come to constitute a partially used labor pool whose conditions of work, rates of employment, and remuneration appear to be stabilizing at levels well below those of other workers in the United States. But it is only in recent years, and against considerable resistance, that still fragmentary data on the economic situation of Puerto Ricans in the United States are beginning to be collected as part of a social accounting.

The lack of data and state policy directed at the needs of Puerto Ricans in the United States reflects not only their small numbers, but also the anomalous status of Commonwealth citizens. As U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans move freely between the Island and the mainland, leaving no trace in immigration statistics. Though technically entitled to full citizen rights in the United States, they often find themselves perceived and treated as foreigners, in fact thrown together in most official statistics with "Hispanics"—citizens and noncitizens, legal and undocumented entrants. This ambivalence is apparent as well in the designation of target populations for particular government or philanthropic programs. It is rarely clear whether the underlying rationale for assigning minority status to Puerto Ricans is economic disadvantage, linguistic or cultural distinctiveness (national origin), presumptions of racial separateness, or a tacit recognition of the need for affirmative steps to counter the continuation of colonial relations in the metropolis. The complex ways that considerations of class, race, nationality, language, and culture shape social interventions by the state serve as well to define the kinds of information thought necessary to formulate national policy, particularly to support implementation and legal enforcement of measures intended to defuse threatening social cleavages.[20]

These political ambiguities, in combination with other features of the social data-gathering and research enterprise, preclude the treatment of official statistics and other studies of Puerto Ricans as anything more than accessory items in research programs dominated by other concerns.[21] Problems of underenumeration, misidentification, and inadequate representation in samples, as well as infrequent soundings and long delays in reporting results, further limit the usefulness of the spotty data collected. Poor samplings mean that published results often do not meet conventional standards for error estimates, and that subgroup analysis, by sex, class, or region, for example, is severely constrained.[22] Furthermore, changes in the number and intricacy of worker migration circuits make estimates of net passenger movement between Puerto Rico and the mainland a precarious, largely meaningless basis for appraising the dynamic of this massive circulation of people.

In recent years the sum of arrivals and departures from Puerto Rico has been close to 5 million. Establishing who among these millions are to be reasonably counted as "migrants"—persons moving in either direction for more or less prolonged stays that involve changes of job and residence—is a difficult task conceptually, and virtually impossible to do in practice with available data. The Commonwealth government estimates that return migrants constitute 20 percent of the general population, a fifth of these the offspring born abroad of

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Puerto Rican parents.[23] Four hundred thousand in these two categories are believed to have returned during the past decade. In the view of some planners and others in Puerto Rico, these return contingents, especially those born and raised in the United States, are a further drain on the limited supply of new jobs. The returnees' alleged competitive edge in the labor market does not, however, prevent their being seen also as a socially disruptive source of fresh demands on an already strained educational and social service apparatus. In addition, the unrelenting exodus from Puerto Rico does not offset the combined effects of population growth and return migration on job demand on the Island. Rather, this exodus steadily adds newcomers—many of whom find it difficult to adapt—to Puerto Rican communities in the metropolis.

In the pages that follow, the 1960 and 1970 censuses, along with the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, are the main reference points for a longitudinal evaluation of changes.[24] Every major official data collection effort in recent history, including these, fails to cover fully the Puerto Rican population by a still undetermined margin of households and by persons not counted or inadequately represented in the samples. The undercount also prevents accurate measurement of Puerto Rican social and economic conditions. In addition, misinformation about individuals further compromises the validity and reliability of estimates of group characteristics.

The lack of reliable information on Puerto Rican migration renders any attempt to project future population growth and trends in social and economic variables largely a matter of speculation. During the 1970s, for example, it was widely accepted that the "return" migration was in balance with, or exceeded, outward movement. This assumption is now in doubt. In the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, persons born in Puerto Rico were asked what year they had first come to stay in the United States. More respondents specified the years between 1970 and 1975 than the two preceding five-year periods (Table 9). In conjunction with the results of the 1977 and 1978 Current Population surveys, which showed an increase of about two hundred thousand Puerto Rican-born in the U.S. population since 1976, these data indicate continued net migration from Puerto Rico to the United States. Early tallies of the 1980 census also suggest that outward flows were substantial in the 1970s, though the net balance of departures fell well below the 1960s.[25]

Table 9. Persons Born in Puerto Rico and Year of Migration to the United States*

Number	Year Migrated
111,230	1970-75
94,432	1965-69
79,932	1960-64
295,050	1950-59
153,436	1920-49
439	Before 1920

Source: *1976 Survey of Income and Education*, U.S. Bureau of the Census.
*Asked in 1976.

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Far more important today, though, is the serious investigation of the complex circuits being traveled by Puerto Rican workers in their widening search for connections to the labor market. The duration and amplitude of this movement have paradoxical effects on population that are as yet only dimly perceived. Migration, for example, seems to be decisive as a determinant of the Island population configuration, while natural growth is an increasingly important factor shaping demographic contours in migrant communities. Thus the preoccupation in most research with net balances and the gross effects of "pulls" and "pushes" on individual decisions to migrate consistently draws attention away from critical underlying processes.

Yet within this fluid dialectic of separation and return, major trends and stable flows are discernible. Five to be kept in mind in considering the crude sketch of Puerto Ricans' socioeconomic conditions that can be assembled from official statistics are:

1. A sustained movement of newcomers to the United States, whatever the net balance of population transfers in any given year.
2. A long-term growth trend in returns to Puerto Rico of persons at varying levels of acculturation to the life and language of several regions of the United States.
3. A dispersal (migration within a migration) of Puerto Rican concentrations in the United States, fed both by arrivals directly from Puerto Rico and circulation among communities on the mainland. Although comparative studies of these communities are beginning to appear, there is no evidence as yet that this dispersal is producing significant economic gains for Puerto Ricans as a group.
4. A sharp drop after 1974 in the number of farm workers coming to the United States for seasonal work under contract between the Commonwealth government and mostly East Coast growers (from 12,760 in 1974 to 3,872 in 1979). Noncontract workers in this traffic, however, were estimated in 1974 to be around sixty thousand. Despite the entry of other Caribbean workers into this migratory stream, Puerto Ricans remain the main source of cheap labor on the East Coast.[26]
5. A consolidation of numbers in the United States, such that growth through natural reproduction now exceeds the increase through migration. The concentration of youth among newcomers and the moving toward reproductive ages of the cohorts born in the United States should reinforce this trend.

The 1980s should see a continuation of the growth pattern of recent years. Since 1950 the population of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland has nearly doubled in each decade: from 301,345 in 1950 to an estimated 1,800,000 in 1978. The Puerto Rican population is approaching one percent of the total U.S. population, and is about 15 percent of the total Spanish-origin group in this country. Puerto Ricans appear to be the fastest growing component of the "minority" with the highest growth potential.[27]

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LABOR USED AND UNUSED

This migration escapes the designs of capitalist planners; it lays bare the underlying structures and relations through which migrants prolong and reconstitute their positions in the prevailing division of labor, even as they strive to improve their potential to serve capital. In Puerto Rico, the contradictions of high-technology industrialization, led by worldwide U.S. enterprises, are acutely felt. Pressures on the work force to migrate, to accept poverty wages as the price of protecting a collective "competitive advantage," to experience idleness and dependency at subsistence levels as a "privilege" of association with the United States—all reflect systemic changes in the way the available work force is used or not used. The same systemic changes—the relative reduction of active producers within the working class, the enlargement of the reserve labor force, the proliferation of unproductive work, the growth in government employment—have parallel effects on Puerto Rican workers in the metropolis. Ironically, Puerto Ricans in the metropolis suffer the impact of these changes chiefly in the weak and declining economic sectors of the financially threatened cities to which they have migrated. The same forces that produce and sustain an international division of labor, in which whole nations are arrayed in a structure of specialized and unequally rewarded functions, generate and maintain segmentations in the U.S. work force. Ironically as well, the ways in which labor market structures reflect and reinforce historically unequal relations among peoples, regions, sexes, and races become more transparent in the metropolis.[28] There as well the cycle turns relentlessly, as those who remain in devastated ghetto neighborhoods—the Bronx, Harlem, Newark—are asked to gird themselves for fresh rounds of "reindustrialization" in the familiar Bootstrap mode.[29]

In U.S. employment statistics, individual economic activity is ascertained by answers to the question, "Did this person work at any time last week?" "Yes" respondents are asked to identify the kind of work they performed and in what kind of business. Workers are considered employed even if they are temporarily absent or laid off from their jobs, what is called "with a job, but not at work." An unemployed person is someone who did not work the previous week and had been looking for work during the preceding four weeks. Respondents are questioned with regard to the prior year, and how many weeks of the year they usually work. Since anyone working fewer than fifty weeks (and certainly fewer than thirty-five) is considered to be less than fully employed, the number of weeks *not* worked constitutes a measure of underemployment. Individuals neither working nor looking for work are considered as out of the labor force, or economically inactive.

For decades, the rate of unemployment, based on answers to these questions, has been used as a master indicator of the state of the economy and the condition of the labor force. As noted recently, "It is difficult indeed to conceive of another socioeconomic statistic that has been more influential in public policy debate, more critical in the shaping of modern political cleavage, or more central to social scientific theory about the socio-economic order."[30] Two points should be made here before looking at a few statistics on the labor force participation of Puerto Ricans in the United States. First, the inadequacy of these estimates for public policy and social science use, noted originally with their use in developing economies with large rates of visible and disguised forms

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of underemployment, is now seen by many economists to have significant bearing on conditions in the United States.[31] Second, although ceilings on permissible national rates of unemployment have crept upward, there are well-defined limits beyond which widespread demands for state action occur. However, for certain groups, rates of double or more above such ceilings are not only rationalized or tolerated, but ignored or swept from view.[32]

In the period 1960-76, participation rates for Puerto Ricans in the work force were lower than those for U.S. workers as a whole. The percentage of Puerto Rican men fourteen years of age and older in the labor force differs persistently from that of the total population by 5 percent. Although the labor force participation rates of Puerto Rican young adult males generally approach the corresponding figures for the total population, these rates decline notably after age forty, which accounts for most of the gap with the total U.S. population. In 1960 the participation rate of Puerto Rican women in the labor force was slightly less than the rate for the total female population in the United States, 36 compared with 38 percent. Since then, this measure has declined considerably, reaching a level of only one third of Puerto Rican women compared with 47 percent of all females in the United States, a difference that was fairly constant across ages, in contrast with the age-progressive decline among Puerto Rican men. Contrary to past trends, the largest gap in economic activity has been found recently among Puerto Rican teenagers of both sexes, a decidedly troubling disparity, because about one fourth of Puerto Ricans leave school by age sixteen, and 70 percent are no longer enrolled by age nineteen. Thus significant numbers of Puerto Rican teenagers are neither enrolled in school nor working or looking for work.

The percentage of Puerto Rican men and women reported as looking for work has been generally one and a half times the corresponding measure for the total U.S. population. The difference became greater between 1970 and 1976, indicating the increased difficulties Puerto Ricans encountered in finding employment during the recession of the mid-1970s. Unemployment rates were consistently highest among Puerto Rican teenagers and women and men beginning work careers.[33] Unemployment rates for Puerto Rican men were generally lower than those for women in each major age category (except among teenagers), a difference that indicates the double disadvantage of women in the employment market (Table 10).

Table 10. Rates of Unemployment for Puerto Ricans in the United States

	Labor Force[1]		Teenagers[2]	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1960	8.8%	11.1%	14.8%	11.0%
1970	6.3	9.3	17.9	16.8
1976	16.3	22.3	55.2	38.2

Source: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators of Equality for Minorities and Women*, Washington, D.C., 1978.

[1]The percent of the labor force 15 years of age and older who were out of work and actively seeking work.

[2]The percent of the labor force from 16 to 19 years of age who were out of work and actively seeking work.

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Table 11. Puerto Ricans in the United States by Employment and Major Occupational Group

	1950[1]		1960[1]		1970[2]		1976[1]	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Employed								
Thousands	65	39.4	194	91.3	261.8	122.4	309.6	189.4
Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Productive workers—percent	80.0	83.6	83.0	78.1	76.3	57.0	72.8	60.2
Craft and kindred workers	11.0	1.7	11.3	1.9	15.7	2.4	18.9	.6
Operatives, including transport	33.5	73.7	41.4	66.5	33.7	40.8	24.3	37.0
Service workers	25.7	6.9	18.4	8.5	17.5	12.4	18.8	20.8
Laborers, excluding farm	7.2	1.0	8.7	0.9	8.0	1.1		
Farm laborers and supervisors	2.6	.3	3.2	0.3	1.4	.3	10.8	1.8
Unproductive workers—percent	20.0	16.4	17.0	21.9	23.7	43.0	27.2	39.8
Professional, technical and kindred workers	5.2	3.3	2.9	4.0	4.7	7.3	7.0	5.8
Managers and administrators	5.3	1.2	3.4	1.2	4.2	1.6	7.2	3.2
Sales workers[3]			2.9	2.8	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.2
Clerical and kindred workers	9.5	11.9	7.8	13.9	10.6	29.7	8.7	26.6

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950, 1960, 1970. The 1976 figures are from that year's Survey of Income and Education.
[1]For those 14 years old and over.
[2]For those 16 years old and over.
[3]Sales workers were included with clerical workers in 1950.

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The results from questions regarding Puerto Ricans *not* in the labor force in 1976 are even more distressing. Among persons generally who had not worked during the previous year, 20 percent had sought, but had not found, work; most were no longer looking for work at the time of the survey. Persons neither working nor looking for work during the week prior to the survey were asked whether they wanted a regular job. Among Puerto Ricans in this situation, 36 percent of men and 25 percent of women replied Yes or Maybe. Many Puerto Ricans recorded as economically inactive apparently would work if they had the chance. Persons who show a disposition to work, but who have made no recent attempt to look for a job, are called "discouraged" workers, on the assumption that they perceive no work to be available to them after months or sometimes years of unemployment.

The jobs for which Puerto Ricans are hired are well in line with their rates of labor force participation, unemployment, and underemployment. (Table 11). The largest number of Puerto Ricans are factory operatives, although this kind of work is declining steadily among men (from roughly 40 to about 25% between 1960 and 1976), and more sharply among women (from about 65 to 35% over the same period). These jobs typically involve some type of grading and sorting of materials, an assembly function, a finishing task, or wrapping and packing the manufactured item, in a continuous line of activity. Such jobs are an uncertain and discontinuous source of employment; they depend on variations in rates of production and entail periodic layoffs, and as such, represent a long-standing way of life to many Puerto Rican men and women. Employment of this kind is growing at the slowest pace nationally and is in active decline in the Northeast, where most Puerto Ricans live.

By looking at sex and age groupings, we can find little evidence to support optimism for change in the direction and nature of labor use in the 1980s. A decided shift has taken place from factory work to service occupations among Puerto Rican men below thirty-five years of age. In 1976 many of these were busboys, dishwashers, food-counter workers, attendants at amusement and recreational facilities, welfare and health aides, and orderlies, cleaners, and janitor's assistants. From 1970 to 1976 a similar shift to service jobs occurred among young Puerto Rican women, but there was an even greater expansion in clerical work—mainly as secretaries and file clerks, but also as bank tellers, cashiers, postal clerks, and teacher aides. Lower-level attendant and white-collar jobs are now those typically held by Puerto Ricans starting work careers. With some exceptions, all are low-paid occupations having little or no promise of employment security or career advancement. They are the jobs least important to employers, and are often subject to slack periods or part-time or piecework arrangements.

Puerto Rican men forty years of age or older were found to be laborers as often as men younger than twenty-five, a finding contrary to expectations, since aging has negative consequences for such physically demanding tasks. Clearly, many of the workers displaced by changes in factory production now hold nonskilled manual jobs that offer fewer possibilities of employment security and often lower wages than their previous occupations as operatives.

Government, which in Puerto Rico takes up a substantial part of the slack in job supply, is still a low-penetration sector for migrants even in areas of high concentration such as New York City. And though Puerto Rican municipal

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employees were few in number and clustered mainly at the lower levels of a handful of agencies, Puerto Ricans were nonetheless dropped from the city payroll in disproportionate numbers during recent cutbacks. Altogether, in 1976 two thirds of Puerto Rican workers in the professional and government service sectors, according to occupational definition, actually occupied subprofessional jobs. Many had clerical, food-service, and cleaning jobs. Most of the "professional" workers in government and other services were engaged in social action, health technology, personnel/labor relations work, or held positions as recreation leaders. Some were elementary school teachers, librarians, and members of the clergy. The sample included no scientists and engineering technicians, lawyers, physicians, dentists, airplane pilots, radio or television announcers, editors, reporters, architects, urban planners, or veterinarians. Although some Puerto Ricans are in these higher-status occupations, their numbers remain so small as to fall entirely from view within national samplings.

From these patterns of participation and exclusion in economic activity, we can understand why Puerto Rican families earn less than most Americans. In 1959 the median family income for Puerto Ricans was $3,811, or less than 65 percent of the median for whites in the United States, $5,893. By 1976 the estimated income for Puerto Rican families had risen to $7,669, but the median white family income was $15,176, a much larger gain. Thus Puerto Rican families earned about half of white median income and less than other Hispanic and black families; for example, the median income of all families of Spanish origin was $10,259 in 1977. Such income differences are further reflected in the proportions living below officially designated poverty standards. Over 38.8 percent of Puerto Rican families, for instance, are estimated by the Census Bureau to be living below the poverty level, set in 1976 at $5,815 for a family of four. This contrasts with an estimated 23.1 percent of total families of Spanish origin and 8.7 percent of families of non-Spanish origin.

Of all Puerto Rican households in 1976, 34 percent did not receive income from wages, salaries, or self-employment during the previous year. Of the mean total household income ($8,745), 18.7 percent derived from various transfer payments, mainly those associated with the low-income status of Puerto Rican households, such as food stamps, aid-to-dependent-children and other welfare payments, and unemployment compensation. Also included were Social Security and veteran's benefits, pensions not directly related to low-income status, and small amounts received from other persons in alimony and support payments. Were we to disregard such transfer payments in the poverty calculations just summarized, the economic conditions of Puerto Ricans would look even more depressed. Although the proportion of household income made up of transfer payments may seem substantial, it is relatively small when compared with what it could be if eligibility for public assistance alone determined actual participation. Many who are eligible, and needy, never apply for assistance or are unable to establish their right to service.

On every dimension of labor use and nonuse, including earnings and available income, the experience of Puerto Ricans in the United States is closer to that of Puerto Ricans who remained on the Island than that of the average U.S. worker. In all these respects, their situation is worse than that of blacks and other "Hispanics," and shows only feeble and scattered signs of improve-

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ment. A considerable amount of more imaginative and fine-grained analysis is needed to elucidate how class and national factors operate to keep Puerto Ricans tied to their place in the work force—a work force whose highly segmented nature we are beginning to understand better. The evidence attesting to the independent effects of race, sex, and region on income inequality in all economic sectors and labor markets in the United States is mounting steadily. While most work in this area treats blacks alone or lumps all "nonwhites" together, historical analyses on the labor history of Chicanos and other groups, which probe the effects of class, nationality, and migration on the structuring of U.S. labor markets, are beginning to appear. The only data-supported test of dual labor market theory that included Puerto Ricans focused on New York City in the early 1970s. The report concluded that education and training opened paths to mobility within and across secondary and primary labor markets for all workers except women and Puerto Ricans.

There were several depressing findings in the study with respect to Puerto Ricans: (1) unemployment was just as high among youth with or without high-school diplomas; (2) Puerto Ricans with college degrees earned on the average about as much as others with high-school diplomas; (3) at each level of education and occupation, Puerto Ricans, regardless of age, training, time in the United States, or job experience, earned 60 to 70 percent of the average earnings of other workers with the same characteristics; (4) it took two wage-earners per Puerto Rican family to match the average income of other families with one wage-earner; and (5) lifetime gains in earnings, which for other workers averaged about 150 percent, were 35 percent for Puerto Ricans.[34]

The closest scrutiny of the personal characteristics of individuals will tell us little about what the next decades hold for minorities in this country, unless at the same time we seek clearer knowledge of how nationally subordinate populations are brought into the U.S. work force, are situated within it, and are expelled from work and circulated among jobs.

THE CHAIN OF INEQUALITY

In the main, the same tired rationales are offered as explanations, prospective solutions, and as guiding ideas in research that is intended to ferret out the mysteries behind the abortive, long-term results of the combined strategy of massive investment and migration. Broader, better-directed dispersion of the migrants within the United States continues to be proposed as a remedy for the problems the new arrivals allegedly bring to U.S. communities, and as a way of minimizing the dangers they represent as potential return migrants. Flurries of news commentaries and hastily done research dwell on the impact of "former citizens" as competitors in the labor market, as a burden on social services, and as a factor in rising crime rates. Computers continue to grind out regression coefficients intended to establish once and for all whether migrants as a group are really superior individuals with higher potential for adaptation, social advance, and assimilation, or pathological beings, willfully repeating and spreading erratic and disruptive behavior throughout the labor circuits they traverse. Such characteristics as educational attainment, place of birth, recency of migration, language competences and preferences, marriage outside the

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group and, more recently, settlement away from New York have generally been taken as indicators of readiness for social mobility and entry into the mainstream of American life. Given the spottiness of data, the weakness of theory, and the mechanical, static way that research techniques are brought to bear on these issues, the outcomes of such soundings have been, expectedly, ambiguous and contradictory. What is more, these results have seemed sufficient warrant to continue the search for "causes" in individual characteristics, and to keep attention focused on questions of education, language, and culture, rather than on the economic relationships and practices, private and public, that undergird persistent inequality.[35]

Yet inequalities of income and occupation reflect and help to reproduce in new generations the very educational differences that are advanced in some quarters to explain the weak position of Puerto Ricans in the market for employment. The circulation of parents involves as well a circulation of children from one school system to another, and their educational needs are poorly served in all. During the 1970s, this rotation of pupils between schools in Puerto Rico and New York City alone involved close to or over twenty thousand students in most years.[36] There was, of course, considerable movement as well within the city's far-flung school system, and to other cities and states. To what extent these repeated transfers may themselves be a disruptive factor in schooling is not established, though some relationship between dropout rates and recency of migration has been observed. There are enough other substandard and problematic features of the education offered to Puerto Rican children in all settings to more than explain the discouragingly small gains in the schooling of young adults. The slow pace of gains in this connection between 1960 and 1970 implies, in fact, a decline for the group, given the increased importance of education for access to the more desirable jobs and related gains in the general population.[37]

Observed differences in mainland and Island educational systems, however, obscure the fundamentally consistent treatment of Puerto Rican children in both places. Among Puerto Ricans on the Island and in mainland schools, dropout and delayed schooling rates are among the highest, and median years of school attendance among the lowest, for any group in the United States. In 1977, for instance, only 30.6 percent of Puerto Ricans in the United States twenty-five years of age and older had completed four years of high school, as contrasted with the 39.6 percent among the total "Spanish" population and the 66 percent of the non-Spanish population that attained equivalent schooling. Dropout rates for Puerto Ricans between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four in New York City have been put at 50 to 55 percent in recent years. Estimates for other cities range as high as 70 percent (Chicago) and 80 percent (Boston).[38] However, the dropout rate for young adults sixteen to eighteen years old in Puerto Rico is nearly twice the 25 percent rate for New York. Only 46 percent of this age group in Puerto Rico were still attending school in 1976 to 1977. The dropout rate for that year, excluding private schools, was thus around 54 percent. Only one third of those entering Island public schools in 1964 to 1965 graduated.[39]

These studies attest to a systematic pattern of educational tracking and exclusion that has effectively solidified class disadvantage and a sense of political frustration among generations of Puerto Ricans. The record in higher education

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reflects the consequences of this process. As late as 1976, only 6 percent of Puerto Rican males and 4 percent of Puerto Rican females in the United States had completed college, in contrast to 34 percent of white males and 22 percent of white females, and 11 percent of black males and females. Minority college enrollments in the United States peaked in the mid-seventies, and new students were more and more channeled into public two-year colleges. Like Chicanos, Puerto Ricans are found increasingly in these institutions. In 1971, 17.2 percent of those enrolled in such colleges were Puerto Rican; a few years later this proportion had more than doubled.

Educational conditions in Puerto Rico have a direct bearing on these outcomes, and reveal how the contradictory workings of Commonwealth and federal policies serve to maintain the educational inequities they profess to combat. Though Puerto Rico's school system is second in size only to that of New York City, allocations for education in Puerto Rico are significantly lower than in any of the States. Per pupil expenditure in Puerto Rico in 1977 averaged $694 (with less than 50 cents per child available for materials each year[40]). This compares with $1,740 for the United States as a whole, and $900 for Arkansas, the state with the lowest spending per pupil. As a direct result, Puerto Rico has a severe shortage of educational facilities, and the majority of those in existence are in desperate need of repair and minimal maintenance.[41] The resort to double enrollments and interlocking schedules is an unsuccessful attempt to relieve the crowding.

Federal government planning and policy-making is implicated in many of these problems. The program to aid educationally deprived children, for instance, includes a congressionally imposed 25 to 90 percent cut in the formula amounts that Puerto Rico may receive. Puerto Rico's very many children eligible for the educationally deprived category inspired this arbitrary cut. In addition, of the total federal funds for education that find their way to Puerto Rico, only about two fifths are used for elementary and secondary education, and a large percentage of these (over 40%) are for special programs other than basic education. Nevertheless, elementary instruction in art and music, science laboratories, physical education, and even basic health care for pupils are not a part of public education in Puerto Rico.[42]

The condition of the public-school system of Puerto Rico has led many middle-class and upper-class Puerto Ricans and other nationals to enroll their children in private schools. The private-school system has grown threefold since 1940, and in 1976, 12 percent of the total student body in Puerto Rico was enrolled in private schools, creating a two-tiered school system with distinct class features. Almost all private-school students graduate, for instance, and nearly 40 percent are admitted to and attend the University of Puerto Rico at Río Piedras, a public institution that is considered more prestigious than the private colleges. Private institutions at the postsecondary level proliferated during the 1970s, owing to the availability of tuition grants to students through federal programs. These institutions serve the public-school graduates who are unable to gain admission to the University of Puerto Rico and the few academically solvent private institutions.

The problems of education for the Puerto Rican on the Island and in the United States are not simply similar or parallel but deeply interconnected. The operation of a dual and underfinanced educational system in Puerto

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Rico produces a mass of undereducated Puerto Rican youth on the Island. Pushed from their schools, these young people are forced to choose between a life of dependency, idleness or underemployment, and emigration to the States, where a similar occupational role and educational experience awaits them and their children. Increasingly, the circular migration of Puerto Ricans between the Island and a growing number of states has meant that more and more Puerto Rican children will suffer the double penalty of attending two systems of public education whose insufficiencies and inadequacies are only further compounded by their incompatibilities. How in these circumstances Puerto Rican children can be given educational opportunities equal in every respect to those available to other U.S. citizens is an issue that has not even been formulated in more than piecemeal fashion. And unequal education as a social and political concern becomes greatly magnified when viewed in the context of Puerto Ricans as one of the youngest population groups in this country. In 1977, for instance, more than 38 percent of the total Puerto Rican population were under thirteen years of age, while more than half were estimated to be twenty years of age or younger.

Despite some slender and sporadic gains, the root problems of educational inequity for Puerto Ricans remain unresolved and largely unaddressed. And the resistance and hostility to the few grudgingly made concessions of the last two decades are so disproportionate to their results, that the prospects of any generalized willingness to see the problem whole are dim indeed. In this instance, Puerto Rico's ambiguous political status and that issue's international volatility add objective perplexities and emotional dimensions to public perceptions of the situation. Who are these problem-ridden aliens, armed with citizenship, yet brazenly doubting their desire to become Americans? Where, in practice or principle, do state power and responsibility for this politically hybrid people lie? The public mood in the United States seems clearly against any further concessions or accommodations of the special needs of disadvantaged groups, especially any that hint at legitimating or lending permanence to separatist claims or further political fragmentation. Unfortunately, that mood seems obstinately unmindful of the historical and contemporary forces thrusting the peoples, problems, and politics of colonialism to the center of U.S. society.

The Governance of Colonials

Both Puerto Ricans and mainland Americans have been schooled to believe that the Island's political status remains undefined owing to the failure of a people to arrive at a clear consensus regarding their political future. Yet at every major juncture, as the economic relation between Puerto Rico and the United States evolved, political relations and structures were substantially altered to meet emergent requirements and opportunities quite independently of Puerto Rican opinion. This is a lesson of the colonial experience that bears close study. As a consequence of the unrestricted migratory circulation of Puerto Rican workers between colony and metropolis, any adjustment of political relations now carries decisive implications for Puerto Ricans wherever they reside. Now as well, the magnitude of economic and strategic U.S. interests at stake in

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Puerto Rico and the Caribbean thrust the seething status controversy to the center of U.S. politics in unprecedented ways.

In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Professor Alfred Stepan of Yale University stressed the importance of the status issue and urged that it be given priority on the current political agenda.[43] Puerto Rico, he wrote, "deserves our special attention precisely because it is that part of our Latin American foreign policy most neglected by analysts and policy-makers alike." Stepan argues that the United States should face reality: the status of Puerto Rico is no simple "domestic matter." Rather, "the statehood debate may ultimately present the United States with its most difficult Latin American related domestic and international problem in the 1980s."

Stepan's comments are pertinent, for in his analysis, Puerto Rico is properly treated as a Latin American nation from which the United States has managed to extract substantial profits while making enormous outlays of federal monies, as though it were on an *ad hoc* basis really a state of the Union. But the existing structures that sustain this confusing duality have now run their course. The widely acknowledged bankruptcy of Operation Bootstrap and its later incarnations laid bare the weaknesses of its political underpinnings. As Stepan correctly points out, "The current commonwealth arrangement is rejected as colonial not only by the independence movement but by the leaders of the statehood movement as well. . . . Even the leader of the party most associated with commonwealth, the Popular Democratic Party, has come out with a 'new thesis' advocating a major restructuring of existing legislation." Without a doubt "change in Puerto Rico is inevitable." But what kind of change, and in which direction?

Preliminary answers to such questions can only come from close scrutiny of the diverse social forces in Puerto Rico and in the United States that are surfacing politically in both settings and that reach across national lines to reinforce and contest one another. If we do not take into account the social classes, groups, and institutional actors on both sides who have a stake in the status issue, we will fall into the prevailing stereotyped representation of the controversy: on the one side, Puerto Ricans faced with the problem of expressing a consensual option through electoral choices or plebiscite; on the other, the United States generously awaiting a popular verdict, ready to move in consonance with the aspirations of a former dependency.

For the U.S. social forces most directly involved in Puerto Rico, the current political formula, commonwealth, has until recently been regarded as the most adequate. In the foreground of these material interests are some $24 billion of industrial and financial investments and the magnitude of the Island market for U.S. exports. Identifiable fractions of the U.S. bourgeoisie are prominent in this network of relations, though many others in the business class without immediate interests in Puerto Rico will surely close ranks to ensure that any status change leaves unaltered the present stated goals to maintain "a second to none investment climate."[44] But there are numerous other actors besides the main body of U.S. business interests and their Island associates. Strategic concerns, given urgency by fears of the "regionalization" of conflict as armed confrontations between polarized political forces multiply in Central America and the Caribbean, will weigh heavily as Pentagon spokesmen and others in the

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U.S. security establishment debate the status issue. The wide array of federal agencies that exercise direct controls over many aspects of Island life, and through which flow massive amounts of U.S. tax dollars, will also find reason to press their own status options.

When the chips are down, hammering out a final U.S. position on the status issue will depend on which of many divergent and even counterposed interests and definitions of the situation prevail. The resolution of Puerto Rico's social problems and Puerto Rican opinions with respect to status are clearly only two, probably secondary considerations in the debate as it is taking shape. The executive branch and its numerous agencies, the State Department, the Pentagon and security apparatus, and the Congress, along with many of their associated consultants and think-tanks—all are already deep into a somewhat loosely coordinated crafting of scenarios and strategies regarding Puerto Rico's future status. What will be the reaction of each of these to the apparent collapse of the Bootstrap design? How will these separate entities respond to the appearance of a substantial social movement in support of statehood in Puerto Rico and to proponents of statehood in their own ranks?

With two presidents endorsing statehood, and that option enshrined in the 1980 platforms of the two major political parties, the cards already seem to be stacked for annexation, especially since the independence option has been unswervingly discarded at these levels, allegedly because of its feeble showing at the polls. But, paradoxically, now that "pro-statehood" sentiment has surged, the unpopularity of independence is no longer unanimously regarded as an insurmountable obstacle. Some of those who have advanced this view in the State Department and in Congress are liberals who are sympathetic to independence and a more open working-out of political tensions in the region. It is important to recognize, however, that some business and other groups now regard formal independence as compatible with continued economic and political controls that ensure U.S. interests. The loss of key tax privileges to business, the prospective federal burden of statehood, and the political uncertainties of a forced coupling combine to lend a measure of attractiveness to independence under certain conditions. Thus, according to one view from within the State Department, a Puerto Rican republic would face "no major economic obstacles from the U.S. point of view, provided the independent government of Puerto Rico supported a continuation of the current economic and development philosophies and respected existing foreign investment."[45]

Yet, even if Puerto Ricans could be persuaded to accept a version of national autonomy so patently tailor-made to accommodate the interests of a handful of U.S. corporations, there are likely to be other obstacles to such a radical change of direction in U.S. policy. The central place of Puerto Rico in U.S. military-strategic projections in the Atlantic for the navy alone suggest that the Pentagon would firmly resist any such shift. The Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility (AFWTF) on Vieques is described in a recent navy document as "one of the largest and most technologically advanced training areas in the world, an integrated unit providing training in all aspects of naval warfare for the Atlantic Fleet and NATO units."[46] The Roosevelt Roads Naval Station and other ranges operated by AFWTF provide facilities for missile exercises, gunnery practice, underwater tracking, and electronic warfare simulations over a sea area of nearly 200,000 square miles.[47] Given present tensions in the Caribbean, formal

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independence for Puerto Rico, no matter how hedged with economic and political constraints, is likely to be viewed with alarm by the Defense Department and by related defense and security strategists. Underscoring the importance of this naval complex, this report notes: "Because geopolitical considerations dictate a forward strategy which utilizes the oceans as barriers for defense, as military lines of communication, and as world trade arteries, national security cannot be assured without a balance of maritime superiority residing in favor of the U.S. and its allies."[48]

The position of U.S. labor groups on the status issue also merits some attention. Thus far, U.S. labor organizations, despite the obvious economic contradictions involved, have gone along with the commonwealth formula. Yet it is here that there may be expected to occur, in the longer run, the most decisive rupture in the forging of a unified U.S. position on the future status of Puerto Rico. Within the *status quo*, and even more so, within any scheme of annexation, a growing part of the tax burden for maintaining privileged conditions for business in Puerto Rico will fall on workers in the United States. Objectively, it is the most organized sectors of U.S. labor, whose jobs and income are most directly threatened, who have least to gain from annexation.

In the final analysis, of course, the confrontation of social forces active in Puerto Rico itself will ultimately resolve the matter. The Puerto Rican business class, unequally allied in a network of interests with its U.S. counterparts, steadfastly opposes independence. Faced with the sharpening economic and social crises of recent decades, this sector increasingly views annexation as the path to economic salvation. The business class provides the backbone and direction for a growing pro-statehood electoral movement that paradoxically draws its numerical strength from the masses of the jobless and poor. "Statehood for the poor"—the movement's slogan coined by the incumbent governor, Romero Barceló, conveys, more clearly than intended perhaps, the opportunistic and simpleminded rationales that hold this coalition together. The inescapable converse of the slogan is that statehood also carries with it "a heavier burden on those in better economic condition."[49] Thus the collapse of commonwealth will mean the eventual federal taxation of the hitherto untapped wealthy capitalists, North American and Puerto Rican alike, and a simultaneous increase in the amount of food stamps and other federal transfers for the impoverished Puerto Rican masses. An enviable and rosy fate awaits the "profit island" of the Caribbean![50] Pro-statehood forces are advocating, in effect, the institutionalization of a parasitic "welfare state," with the U.S. working class defraying indefinitely, at a miserly level, the subsistence needs of their colonial counterparts.

The pro-statehood movement confronts other obstacles besides the shallowness of its economic rationales and its unstable political base. Yet another slogan, "*Estadidad Jíbara*"—statehood without cultural assimilation—underscores the deep roots of national sentiment and attachment to a distinctive culture and language and historical traditions acknowledged even by leading advocates of statehood. This point does not escape the notice of the movement's tentative allies or opponents in the United States. More than half the vote in the 1980 elections went against the statehood party (PNP—*Partido Nuevo Progresista*), and this lack of a clear majority constitutes a significant recent setback for pro-statehood forces. Professor Stepan's stated apprehensions thus have some

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justification: "Admission by Congress," he warns, "may pose the threat of an American Quebec . . . with extensive international support and perhaps with the high violence levels of an Ulster before, during and after admission to statehood."

The many pressures of the current crisis push increasing numbers of Puerto Ricans toward independence as the only viable solution to the present impasse. To be effective, however, this independence must have a social and economic content qualitatively distinct from that tentatively being considered at high-policy levels in the United States, with its emphasis on "the continuation of the current economic and development philosophies." That is not to say that independence on such terms may not prove more workable in a genuine drive toward economic and political emancipation, but that, in the long run, political independence will be judged viable only if it can radically alter economic relations and meet the social needs of those now stagnating in idleness or working at poverty wages. In any such endeavor, a free Puerto Rico would have to count on close exchange and collaboration with other Latin American peoples engaged in similar programs of social and political reconstruction. The matter thus has not simply to do with Puerto Rico, but with the prospects for a restructuring of relations among independent nations on a hemisphere-wide basis. Moreover, the matter inevitably reverts at yet another level to the United States itself, and to the potential identification with the social transformation of the multinational labor force taking shape there, with its already massive contingents of workers from Latin American countries.

Stepan does not elaborate his concern for the "17 to 22 million Hispanic Americans" in the United States, but he clearly acknowledges their potential role in what he calls a changing "interest to instrument" relationship. By this he means the enlarged stakes of the United States in Latin America and places like Puerto Rico, and the diminished efficacy of heretofore conventional policy instruments, identified further with respect to Cuba as invasion, counterrevolution, and economic embargo. Aside from their growing numbers and highly visible recent efforts to coordinate their activities nationally, Hispanics must now be given attention because "unlike Black Americans, whose priorities have traditionally been domestic, the political agenda of Hispanic Americans gives prominence to a series of national and international policies such as migration, relations with Cuba and the question of the political status of Puerto Rico." Hispanic political mobilization, however, should not be likened to the formation of a "Jewish lobby. . . . Hispanic Americans are not psychologically involved with the defense of a single 'homeland' outside the United States; rather they are concerned with many issues and countries in Latin America."

That black Americans are concerned only with domestic issues is certainly arguable, especially at a time when black leadership nationally has so forthrightly affirmed its intention to speak and act independently on foreign policy matters that closely touch black concerns. The absence among Hispanics of a pro-Israeli-like sentiment seems just as much off target. The potential consolidation as a political force of Hispanics and other peoples from Latin America and the Caribbean now living in the United States takes on social thrust and meaning precisely through a unifying sense of a common historical experience. It is the immediacy and constantly renewed reality of external domination, whatever the combination of traditional or modern "instruments" through

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which it may be expressed for particular homelands and peoples, that repeatedly renews those identities and invests them with political substance.

Stepan's plea may thus be read as a call for a strategic restructuring of U.S.-Latin American relations, in which serious thought is given to the "arriving presence" of Hispanics within the country as a political factor, as an object and instrument of *foreign* as well as domestic policy. In the past, the uncontrolled linkage of domestic issues and movements to international causes and organization has been seen as a danger to be combated at any cost. The new strategy can thus only mean an attempt to fashion some kind of institutional superstructure to coordinate and oversee any action on an international plane by Hispanics. For Puerto Ricans, the specific integrating instrumentality proposed by Stepan is a federal interagency committee to be lodged in the Office of the Vice-Presidency.

Such an agency in fact would be a considerable departure: in contrast with the successive creation and revamping of political superstructures in Puerto Rico, there has so far been firm resistance to the formation of specialized, stable structures to deal with Puerto Ricans in the United States. Efforts to contain the concerns of Puerto Ricans and other small national groupings within larger, overarching umbrella designations still prevail, as the term "Hispanic" itself demonstrates. Specifically Puerto Rican superstructural entities continue to be improvised from above only under intense pressures and as political contingencies dictate. This occurs not only at the federal level, where the presence of Puerto Ricans living in the United States is only beginning to be acknowledged—as earlier noted, for example, in national social accounting—but even in cities like New York. *Ad hoc* committees, task forces, special offices, and other short-term political units are routinely closed out at the top as soon as they have served their immediate purpose or begin to show excessive independence, as has occurred after every mayoral change in New York City (Wagner, Lindsay, Beame, Koch). They have also repeatedly been toppled from below by grass roots political forces rejecting leadership that is merely self-selected or imposed from above. As a consequence, there is now a local counterpart to the old saw that Puerto Rico's political status remains unresolved because Islanders cannot decide what they want. Puerto Ricans lack strong and lasting organizations in the United States because they are too individualistic (each at heart an anarchic Spanish grandee) and lack any tradition of civic organization or political participation in the Anglo or European mode.

In fact, social science accounts of Puerto Rican leadership and organization in the United States have by and large focused almost exclusively on the characteristics of this mediating stratum and the weakness of its position and performance vis-à-vis other "ethnic" leaders.[51] These observers have generally studied samplings of varying size from among a few score New York community figures, referred to variously as "elites," "activists," or "ethnic leaders." Researchers concur broadly in describing this leadership as almost entirely dependent on external, especially public sector, resources and recognition; divided and powerless; circumscribed to local and regional affairs; and inclined to Left oppositionist "protest" tactics, often against their own mainstream organizations and patrons. The last of these patterns is difficult to explain, since these analysts almost unanimously impute strong desires for self-advancement to this leadership, and a corresponding interest in maintaining a politicized

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"ethnicity," subject to structured control through their role as mediators.[52] How, then, do so many fall into dissident roles, into repeated ruptures and realignments, forced back time and again to their primary constituencies? What brings ambitious and seasoned leaders to self-destruct in midcareer? Surely Puerto Ricans are not perennial dissenters and outsiders merely by virtue of temperament, a lack of "cool," or cultural compulsion.

The matter is of some importance, for it bears not only on some shortcomings of the research cited, but also on the presumed role Puerto Ricans in the United States are to take in Professor Stepan's and other projected high-level reorderings of U.S.-Latin American relations and the resolution of Puerto Rico's political future. Several points can be made about the research cited. Mediating, external roles, which show social ascent and the penetration of policy-making, or "power," circles, dominate in observation and evaluative analysis. The importance of leadership functions and organizations, whose main focus is internal to the group and which interface with the larger society at low levels, is generally downplayed. The "community" remains largely unanalyzed as a social entity, and tends to be treated as a mere pool of candidates for social opportunities, an amorphous social aggregate randomly casting up and pulling down organizations and leaders. Only token gestures are made toward the history of Puerto Rican political organization in this country. References to events before 1950 are summary and anecdotal.

Since nearly all of this research is the product of doctoral investigations at reputable universities, sometimes by Puerto Ricans, some larger questions arise concerning social science practice and training in the United States. But that is another matter. The point here is that there *is* a history and tradition of political and worker organization, ignored by U.S. scholarship and only beginning to be chronicled in a systematic way. Tracing the political evolution of Puerto Rican communities in the United States thus involves the reconstruction of a prolonged interplay between efforts to impose mediating structures from above and the persistent struggle to construct minimal organizations for self-direction and defense from within the group. That contention has been driven by a combination of class and national forces and contradictions that remain very much alive today. The story goes back to the 1860s and the activity in New York of revolutionary societies and patriots promoting the cause of Cuban and Puerto Rican independence from Spain. A core of politically conscious, literate, and well-organized craftsmen and skilled workers, many of them cigarmakers, remained in the forefront of the small, but assertive, Hispanic community well into the early decades of the 1900s. Early organizational ties between the labor movement in Puerto Rico and the American Federation of Labor and socialist organizations in the United States also drew early migrants into local politics. Succeeding decades saw the progressive diversification of organizations and a gradual consolidation of forms of participation from neighborhood to borough and city-wide institutions.

A thorough analysis of these changing patterns is still to be accomplished, though sketches of various periods have been attempted.[53] The limited penetration of major political parties and persistent low voter turnouts, contrasting sharply with Island patterns, have so far had only speculative explanations.[54] But by 1979 a Commonwealth directory listed over nine hundred Puerto Rican organizations around the country, heavily concentrated in New York and its

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environs, but scattered along the Eastern seaboard and reaching into the Midwest and on to California and Hawaii.[55] The most stable and professionally staffed of these organizations are, of course, heavily dependent on federal funding and philanthropic support. They therefore represent responses to social problems programmed and deployed from above. By far the largest number, however, are maintained by grass roots support and the dedication of individuals. They constitute a lasting, bedrock expression and recognition of the Puerto Rican tradition: the awareness of being a people set apart and denied, a people whose unfulfilled economic and political aspirations are in the main simply excluded from consideration within present social arrangements.

In this sense, the Puerto Rican's relentless grasping for effective political direction and organization, seemingly a minor skirmish at the sidelines of more momentous national affairs, does in fact reach to the quick of the most urgent challenges confronting contemporary U.S. society. This would be so even aside from the issue of the Island's juridical status, the aspect of the Puerto Rican "problem" that looms so large on the political agenda. Not that the sheer numerical presence of Puerto Ricans in the United States makes much of a dent in the overall economic and social structure; nor, as we have seen, has a Puerto Rican "lobby" surfaced capable of wielding any consequential influence at a national level. Precisely because the presence of Puerto Ricans in the United States through migration and natural reproduction has been officially defined as marginal to the vital, systemic needs and workings of the larger "receiving" society, their problems have so far been consistently sidelined or ignored.

Political struggle has for decades been part of everyday reality for Puerto Ricans in the United States, from the level of street and neighborhood to city, state, and most recently, federal arenas. How Puerto Ricans along with other groups of Latin American origin will surface in Washington in the 1980s is in fact a major question. As Stepan intuits, there has been throughout this history a consistent strand of internationalism going beyond concern for the homeland. But he falls short in failing to realize that the ideological symbols around which he believes Hispanics in the United States should rally ("pluralism" in society and a "new" economic order) hold little novelty or fresh promise for a people uprooted and locked into poverty precisely by the advances abroad of that same economic order. "For democratization to be consolidated in the 1980s," says Stepan, "the United States must help create a new economic order that will facilitate integral, sustainable and equitable development in the newly industrializing countries to the south." Some more convincing demonstrations that the United States can create such an order for the millions of Hispanics within its borders will likely be demanded as part of any hemisphere-wide negotiation of political status and economic orders.

More to the point, the framework for a new internal economic and political order expressly designed for Hispanic and other labor reserves in economically distressed cities and regions of the United States is taking form in concept papers, planning documents, and draft legislation for the new, conservative presidency. What emerges looks strikingly like the formula long implemented in the colony. In fact, the "Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act of 1980" has already been hailed as a domestic Operation Bootstrap by one of its congressional standard bearers, the only Puerto Rican member of the House, Robert García. As in Bootstrap, the ideas behind this proposed legislation did not

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originate with its political sponsors (Representatives Jack Kemp and García, New York Republican and Democrat, respectively) but in the councils of business policy analysts. Key features of the concept include:

1. The suspension of taxes on industrial and commercial property in Enterprise zones
2. A significant reduction of capital gains and other business taxes for firms operating in these areas
3. Exemption from impediments to job creation, such as the closed shop and minimum wage laws in such zones
4. Incorporation of a free trade zone into the Enterprise zone[56]

Not all of these features are fully written into present draft legislation, which is framed as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but the intent to establish highly privileged conditions of accumulation for U.S. and foreign investors in these depressed zones is patent.[57]

Theorists of internal colonialism may be astonished to find the new Administration providing the needed missing links to give their conceptual scheme greater plausibility: a territorial basis and legal superstructure that support different rates of exploitation for an ethnically and racially segmented work force. Puerto Rican workers, compelled to wait since the passage of fair labor standards legislation in 1938 until 1980 to come under full protection of the U.S. minimum wage, may be just as surprised to hear that new legislation is now required to free them from this handicap.

The logic of colonialism and capitalist expansion thus leads not only to the introduction of the peoples and problems of colonialism into the metropolis, but also to the transfer there of colonial "solutions" and practices. For Puerto Ricans in the United States, as for other Hispanics, the outcome of this historical process hinges on their success in forging and solidifying the political alliances made possible by their now pivotal social placement. The most immediate alignment is with other oppressed minorities, particularly blacks. In arguing for close political cooperation between Puerto Ricans and blacks, Congressman Robert García wrote recently:

> Blacks and people of Hispanic descent are natural allies. The needs of both groups are strikingly similar: protection from discriminatory practices, better education and employment opportunities, improved housing and health-care services. Since both groups disproportionately shoulder the hardships imposed by cutbacks in domestic spending, the arguments for Black and Hispanic cooperation are compelling. . . . Only by joining forces will Blacks and Hispanics ever have the power to reorient this country's national priorities so that they adequately reflect the needs of minorities.[58]

That joining of forces, however, must be informed on both sides by a technically and politically sensitive awareness of the common roots of inequality in this country and of the self-defeating effects of remedies that enhance the capacity for action and command over resources of a single class, the entrepreneur. Schemes such as the Enterprise Zone Act of 1980, which simply make more profitable the existing segmentation of the working class based on race,

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nationality, and region, should be among the first logical targets of such an alliance. More than ever, those who would lead minority peoples need to see clearly the connections between internal events and the long history of colonialism and present patterns of economic and political domination on a world scale. The very practices that seek to divide, divert, and deny the capacity to act to classes, races, and peoples at the same time create the conditions necessary for political combination among U.S. "minorities."

References

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[1]Puerto Rico Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning Board, *A Development Plan for Puerto Rico* (San Juan: 1944). This hasty conclusion was variously formulated, depending on how the resources were defined. A typical example appears in a brief preface to a study of the relation of population to agricultural resources by Jaime Benítez, one of the co-architects of these modernization plans. According to Benítez, the agrarian reform plan intended to complement industrialization goals would ease "the great pressure of population on arable land." The author paradoxically revealed that this problematic relation was not a consequence of demographic growth but of the control of 60 percent of farmland by 5.6 percent of the landholders, North American and Puerto Rican. Moreover, "in 1940, illegal corporate holdings accounted for slightly less than one-third of all holdings of 500 acres or more." In short, the problem was legal rather than populational. Unfortunately, the tolerated violation of the legal limit of agricultural holdings stipulated in the 1900 Foraker Act (500 acres) vindicated the prophetic remarks of Congressman S. Jones on endorsing the statute: "If such concentration of holdings shall become the case, then the condition of the population will, I believe, be reduced to one of absolute servitude." See Walter E. Packard, *The Land Authority and Democratic Processes in Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras: Social Science Research Center, University of Puerto Rico, 1948).

[2]For an informed account of the passage of the Foraker Act and its implications, see Lyman J. Gould, *La Ley Foraker* (Río Piedras: Ed. Universitaria, 1975).

[3]See Antonio Fernós Isern, *Estado Libre Asociado, Antecedentes, creación y desarrollo hasta la época presente* (Río Piedras: Ed. Universitaria, 1974).

[4]Earl Parker Hansen gives a bouyant account of early socioeconomic changes in *Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). See as well J. K. Galbraith and C. S. Solo, "Puerto Rican Lessons in Economic Development," *The Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 285, 1953; and Clarence Senior, C. Wright Mills, and Rose Goldsen, *Puerto Rican Journey* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). For nineteenth century and early twentieth century migrations, see History Task Force, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, *Labor Migration Under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), chapter 3.

[5]U.S. Department of Commerce, *Economic Study of Puerto Rico* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vols. 1 and 2.

[6]David Ricardo, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (London: Dent Everyman's Library, 1972).

[7]Teodoro Moscoso, "Fomento, Its Past and Present," in *1976 Puerto Rico Industrial Directory* (San Juan: The Witcom Group, Inc., 1976).

[8]U.S. Department of Commerce, *Economic Study*, vol. 2, pp. 109, 626.

[9]The corporate maneuvers through which tax-free profits are moved to the United States are detailed in an article by Luis P. Costas Elena, "History of Federal Income Taxation in Puerto Rico: Analysis of the Possessions Corporation in Comparison with Other Modes of Business Operation; An Insight into Tax Exemption in Puerto Rico," *Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico*, 36 (2) (1975). Donald W. Keefer provides a more recent appraisal of these transactions in "Treating Puerto Rico as a State under Federal Tax and Expenditure Programs: A Preliminary Economic Analisis *[sic]*," *Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico*, 39 (4) (1978). See also Luis P. Costas Elena, "I.R.C. Section 936 and Fomento Income Tax Exemption in Puerto Rico," *Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico*, 41 (1) (1980). Possessions Corporations were the object of a special investigation during a 1977 federal campaign against the "obscene profits" of oil companies. Outsize gains were traced to the fact that, "parent firms have found it profitable to grant exclusive and perpetual patent rights to their island offspring, so that licensing, royalty, sales and commission

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profits show up on the books of the tax-free Puerto Rico operation" (John S. Butter, II, "Trouble in Tax Paradise: I.R.S. Corporate Operations in Puerto Rico," *Barrons*, Oct. 9, 1978). Government policy is now inclined toward the imposition of local taxes on these corporations, though at the risk of "revising the common corporate view of the island as a nice place for freeloaders" (*The Economist*, March 10, 1979). Julio César Pérez, Island Secretary of the Treasury has recently stated, "We are no longer offering inducement for those firms that would inflict incalculable harm on communities in the United States by abandoning them overnight to set up operations in Puerto Rico, which they would also abandon overnight after a few years of exemption. . . . Responsible industry, the kind we wish to attract, can never feel comfortable about receiving anything for nothing. Someone has to pay the price" (*Puerto Rico Business Review*, 5 [3] [1980]).

[10]Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc. *1979 Annual Report*.

[11]U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 862-65.

[12]A critical assessment of these transfers can be found in "Puerto Rico's Drift Toward Statehood and Dependence" by Herman Nickel, in which the author concludes that "Operation Bootstrap has begun to look more like 'Operation Welfare' " (*Fortune*, Aug. 13, 1979).

[13]Parimal Chandhury, "The Dynamics of the Food Stamp Program in Puerto Rico," *Puerto Rico Business Review*, 5 (4) (1980).

[14]*El desarrollo económico de Puerto Rico: Estrategia para la próxima década*, Informe preparado para el Consejo Financiero del gobernador (Río Piedras: Ed. Universitaria, 1976).

[15]U.S. Department of Labor, *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, 1970; U.S. Department of Labor, *Monthly Labor Review*, 103 (2) (1980); Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Statistical Report*, 1, 10, (1979).

[16]*The Economist*, p. 116.

[17]Depto. del Trabajo, E.L.A. *Informe Anual*, 1972; Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Statistical Report*, 1, 10; *El Mundo*, May 8, 1980.

[18]Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 663.

[19]Recent declarations of Miguel A. Rivera Ríos, president of Puerto Rico's Planning Board, are clear on this point. The time has come, in his view, "for our citizens to stop considering the natural limits of our shores as the limits of our labor market. . . . on the contrary we enjoy the prerogative of considering the great continent to the north as our home, where we may work and carve out a future" (*El Nuevo Día*, San Juan, April 13, 1980).

[20]See, for example, the informative discussion by Barbara R. Bergmann, *Labor Market Data Needs Relating to Antidiscrimination Activity* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, 1979).

[21]We have in mind here the reigning empiricism, ethnocentric presumptions, and shallowness of social analysis in much "policy-oriented" research, along with entrepreneurial approaches to deciding research priorities and the allocation of resources. These are, of course, matter for another essay.

[22]In the 1970 census, for instance, a self-identification question was included to determine and improve the count of the Spanish-origin population. This was asked of 5 percent of the country's population, with a specific listing of Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and other Spanish-origin groups, regardless of birthplace and parental background. Most of the 1970 census data for Puerto Ricans were based on birth or parentage, i.e., persons born in Puerto Rico or of parent(s) born in Puerto Rico, which excluded third-generation and subsequent generation Puerto Ricans. The result was, of course, that the Puerto Rican and general Hispanic population was not accurately counted. The comparability of data from different censuses is also at issue, since identification questions are usually not consistent. More details are provided in José Hernández et al., "Census Data and the Problem of Conceptually Defining the Mexican American Population," *Social Science Quarterly*, 33 (4) (March 1973): 671-87.

The absence of an alternative to public data sources has given a strong impetus to efforts to demonstrate the need for reform in the statistical system of the United States insofar as Puerto Ricans are concerned. In addition to problems of coverage and accuracy, questions have been raised regarding how appropriate the conventional census concepts are for a meaningful diagnosis of social and economic variables. Data are very limited on conditions directly affecting the lives of many Puerto Ricans (for example, seasonal employment patterns, involuntary joblessness, and personal satisfaction with one's occupation and living arrangements). Concepts of well-being important to Puerto Ricans such as the group's scope for self-determination, evidence of discrimination, and sense of group identity are not part of public surveys or research agenda. Until an appropriate data system is fully developed, social and economic indicators will remain a matter of inference from responses to questions based on the majority experience and concerns.

[23]Junta de Planificación, *Informe Económico al Gobernador*, 1979, pp. 236ff.

[24]This account is partially based on the results of a project completed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and subsequent research by Prof. José Hernández that used computer files of records drawn from the data sources just described. Statistics presented on 1976 were drawn from

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computer tabulations of the public use data files of the Survey of Income and Education and will not be repeatedly documented. Data file composition and sample information are described in detail in pages 108-10 of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1978b.

[25]*San Juan Star*, November 20, 1980. The figures are from a report of the Center for Demographic Research.

[26]The Commonwealth government has fought hard to protect its place in this queue against the encroachments of non-U.S. citizens. Contract workers have been almost entirely replaced by "locals" in Connecticut. Mechanization and incursions by other workers explain the decline in New Jersey, according to officials of the Commonwealth migration office in New York. Of course, many of the "local non-contract workers are Puerto Ricans, who have settled in nearby towns and cities and are now 'day workers' " (personal communication, Office of Migration, Puerto Rico Department of Labor, New York). See also *NACLA* (North American Congress on Latin America), 11 (8), (1977).

[27]National Puerto Rican Forum, *Fact Sheets on the Puerto Rican Community* (New York: 1980).

[28]See the summary discussion by Richard Edwards in *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1979), chapters 9 and 10, "Labor Redivided," parts 1 and 2. The technical difficulties of measuring differential rates of labor exploitation across or within nations are formidable. Sociohistorical (e.g., culturally defined living standards) along with political factors (i.e., class contention) weigh in the outcome, along with economic and technical considerations. The argument goes beyond questions of whether structural features of the labor market or human capital characteristics of different groups best explain job and income to the question of *unequal pay for the same work*. As Bowles and Gintis note: "Capitalists will treat technically equal labor as different in the market, but there are no direct *economic* lines to conversion rates or measure of different rates of exploitation" ("Marxian Theory of Value and Heterogeneous Labor: A Critique and Reformulation." *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1 [1] [1977]). See also Donald L. Harris, *Capital Accumulation and Income Distribution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 280ff.

[29]At this writing, "development" plans for the Bronx, after nearly half the population has been displaced by the deterioration of the housing stock and systematic arson, call for the building of industrial parks and other infrastructure for light industry, along with tax and low-wage incentives to draw investors. Note the comment later in this essay on proposed legislation by Congressmen Kemp and García.

[30]Clifford C. Clough, *Measuring Underemployment* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), chapter 1.

[31]Ibid., p. 2.

[32]Clough identifies three main concepts of underemployment; work time lost, income deficiency, and the mismatch of workers' skill attainment with required job skills. He also uses the term "sub-unemployment" for the more familiar "discouraged worker" status.

[33]Teenage participation and unemployment rates for Puerto Ricans are worse than those for blacks, which have been described by a respected labor economist as "a catastrophe" and "a national scandal." Eli Ginzberg, "Youth Unemployment," *Scientific American*, 242 (5) (1980).

[34]Recent and informative data-supported analyses include R. Hodson, "Labor in the Monopoly, Competitive and State Sectors of Production," CDE Working Paper, 78-2, February 1978; and Erik Olin Wright, *Class Structure and Income Determination* (New York: Academic Press, 1979). See also Edna Bonacich, "Advanced Capitalism and Black-White Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation," *American Sociological Review*, 41 (1) (1976). Essays by Tomas Almaguer and Larry Trujillo in a Working Paper Series published by the Institute for Social Change, University of California, Berkeley, are also valuable. For Puerto Ricans, see Ruth Fabricant Lowell, *The Labor Market in New York City: A Study of Jobs and Low Income Area Workers in 1970* (New York: City of New York, Department of Social Services, 1975).

[35]The essay in this issue by Juan Flores, John Attinasi, and Pedro Pedraza treats ways in which language and culture intermesh with the complex of class and colonial relations, giving impetus to this migration and shaping outcomes in the United States.

[36]Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, *Puerto Ricans and Other Hispanics in New York City's Public Schools and Universities* (New York: 1975).

[37]Aspira of America, Inc., *Social Factors in Educational Attainment Among Puerto Ricans in United States Metropolitan Areas* (New York: 1970).

[38]Ibid.

[39]U.S. Department of Commerce, *Economic Study*.

[40]National Education Association, *Puerto Rico: Tragedy in the Schools* (Washington, D.C.: 1979).

[41]U.S. Department of Commerce, *Economic Study*.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Alfred Stepan, "The United States and Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (3) (1980): 659-92. All material quoted in this section, unless otherwise cited, is from this article.

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[44]See "Ideal Home for American Business: Puerto Rico," *Forbes*, 126 (10) (November, 1980): 220.

[45]Eric Svendsen, "Puerto Rico Libre," *Open Forum*, 20 (1979).

[46]Department of the Navy, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement*, vol. 1, 1979, pp. 1-4.

[47]Ibid. vol. 2, pp. A-4, 5.

[48]Ibid. vol. 1, pp. 1-10.

[49]Carlos Romero Barceló, *Statehood Is for the Poor*, 1976.

[50]This is the suggestive title of a promotional pamphlet circulated by the Economic Development Administration (*Puerto Rico: Profit Island, U.S.A.*, 1974). Governor Romero Barceló sets out unconvincingly to refute Professor Stepan's arguments about the implications of statehood in "Puerto Rico, U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood," *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (1) (Fall 1980): 60-81.

[51]See John W. Gotsch, *Puerto Rican Leadership in New York*, Master's thesis, New York University, 1966; Rosa Estades, *Patterns of Political Participation of Puerto Ricans in New York City* (Río Piedras: Ed. Universitaria, 1978); George Martin, *Ethnic Political Leadership: The Case of Puerto Ricans* (San Francisco: R and E Associates, 1978); James Jennings, *Puerto Rican Politics in New York City* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977); Judith F. Herbstein, *Rituals and Politics of the Puerto Rican "Community" in New York*, Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1978; Angelo Falcón, "The Puerto Rican Activist Stratum in New York City," Graduate School of Public Affairs, SUNY at Albany, 1979.

[52]Judith F. Herbstein, *Ritual and Politics*, is especially cogent on this point.

[53]Rosa Estades, *Patterns of Political Participation*, provides a beginning inventory and narrative account of organizations in New York City in the 1920s and 1930s. *Memorias de Bernardo Vega* (edited by Cesar Andreu Iglesias) (Río Piedras: Ed. Huracán, 1977) is the first politically informed reconstruction of the formative years of the migrant society reaching back to the 1860s. See also History Task Force, Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, *Labor Migration Under Capitalism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 144-77.

[54]A recent thoughtful approach is taken by Angelo Falcón in an unpublished paper, "Puerto Rican Participation: A Comparison between New York City and Puerto Rico," SUNY at Albany, 1978.

[55]Migration Division, Department of Labor and Human Resources, Government of Puerto Rico, *Puerto Rican and Community Service Organizations throughout the United States*, 1979-1980 (New York: 1979).

[56]The items cited are from a July 1980 Issue Bulletin written by Dr. Stuart Butler for the Heritage Foundation.

[57]Refer to H.R. 7563, 96th Congress, 2d session, (S. 2823).

[58]Letter to *The New York Times*, May 30, 1980.

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CARLOS H. ARCE

A Reconsideration of Chicano Culture and Identity

PREOCCUPATION WITH ETHNICITY IS A PERVASIVE PHENOMENON in the United States today, evident across many sectors of society and a consideration, often of preponderant importance, in many aspects of social and political life. This preoccupation most frequently centers on the more visible, concrete artifacts of ethnic culture and identity. It is also manifested in popularized modern film and print versions of centuries-old questions regarding the Americanization of groups of significantly different national origin from most European-origin Americans, and in concerns about the failure, or reduced ability, of one or another group to downplay its cultural differences in the shared arenas of life in the United States. Most groups in the United States that have maintained a distinct culture and identity for any significant length of time were generally isolated or excluded from the major currents of American culture or were viewed as too racially different from the typical Euro-American stock. Other reasons derive both from characteristics of the groups and from the amount of receptivity or antipathy shown toward the group by other Americans.

People of Mexican ancestry in the United States possess some ethnic characteristics that in the past tended to promote greater cultural maintenance. First, they were concentrated in regions of the West and Southwest that were out of the mainstream of American culture and political and economic processes until the latter half of the nineteenth century, in some cases, well into the twentieth. Second, from the beginning of this century to the present, the continuous waves of immigration from Mexico have replenished sources of cultural contact and preservation. Third, throughout most of the past one hundred fifty years, Mexicans have been perceived as a racially nonwhite group, and as such, have been systematically and rigidly prohibited from full entry into, and participation in, mainstream American society. This segregation necessitated more intensive intragroup reliance and interaction, reduced socio-cultural contact with non-Mexicans, and, hence, inadvertently reinforced the Mexican ethnic persona. According to most observers and researchers, Mexican Americans—"Mexicans," as the majority refer to themselves, or "Chicanos," as they are increasingly labeled in social research literature and in the mass media—today maintain a tenacious hold on significant elements of their culture and share an ethnically salient identity.

I will review here, in the broader context of social science study of racial/ethnic minorities, the utility of various conceptual models for explaining the present-day status of Chicano culture and identity. The primary focus is on the

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contrasting models of assimilation versus social identity and group consciousness. My objective is to review these models critically and to propose alternatives, mainly in the form of integrative revisions and approaches to empirical measurement and testing. The intersection of the study of culture and identity with the study of Chicanos is a natural and useful one. Few groups have had as consistent a history of collective identity, of pronounced preferences for ethnic group labels, and of resistance to assimilationist tendencies or forces. In addition, most social institutions, including governmental bodies, schools and colleges, and organizations within the private, business, and social sectors, have paid little attention to Chicanos or had little firsthand experience with them. As a result, Chicanos have often been naively or projectively characterized as a forgotten, neglected, or invisible population. My approach here is to examine in-group ethnic awareness of Chicanos and their relative mainstream invisibility in the light of models of assimilation and collective consciousness.

Relevance of the Assimilation Perspective

The extensive sociological, psychological, and popular literature on assimilation provides important insights for the study of ethnic group culture and identity. Assimilation was originally defined as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons or groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life."[1] This broad, seminal conceptualization of the assimilation process has been narrowed, expanded, modified, and otherwise refined, but it nonetheless remains most influential in studies of group contact in the United States. Unfortunately, most major assimilation studies focus exclusively on European immigrant groups that arrived by way of the Eastern seaboard. Relatively little work has been done on non-Caucasian groups or on immigrants whose method and location of entry was other than the European tradition of booking voluntary passage to the colonies, Boston harbor, or Ellis Island and the port of New York. Of greater significance, very little empirical research has sought to test the applicability of the assimilation model for groups such as Chicanos and American Indians, who created stable, complex civilizations here long before the arrival of European settlers.

In *Assimilation in American Life*, the most complete attempt to synthesize previous research on assimilation, Milton Gordon proposed an important and useful typology of seven "assimilation variables."[2] The typology, implicit in the form of a model of assimilation stages, included: (1) marital assimilation (extensive and large-scale exogamy); (2) attitude receptional assimilation (absence of prejudice on the part of the host society or dominant group); (3) behavioral receptional assimilation (absence of discrimination against the incoming or subordinate group); (4) civic assimilation (absence of value and power conflict or of dominant/subordinate relations in public life); (5) cultural or behavioral assimilation; (6) structural assimilation; and (7) identificational assimilation. These last three suggest crucial distinctions for the exploration of current culture and identity among Chicanos.

Cultural assimilation involves the adoption (under varying conditions) of the cultural patterns of the majority, dominant, or "core" group in a society by a

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minority, subordinate, or "peripheral" group. These patterns typically include language, religious beliefs and observances, dress and food preferences, choice of first names for children and modification of surnames, entertainment patterns, and informal cliques. *Structural assimilation*, which is Gordon's crucial variable in determining the likelihood and inevitability of total assimilation, is defined as the commingling of the groups (peripheral/core; subordinate/dominant; new/old; immigrant/host) by large-scale contact in primary relationships—interhome visitation, membership in social clubs, and small-group cooperation. Finally, *identificational assimilation* refers to the development of a social identity (or sense of peoplehood) based exclusively on the host society. An identificationally assimilated person of Mexican ancestry in this country would thus align totally with the dominant elements of American life, and not at all or only secondarily with the Mexican heritage of values, customs, and behavior patterns. It may happen, however, that concentrated groups of such assimilated Mexican Americans can coalesce socially or politically on an ideology of shared self-interests that do not include, and may even reject, Mexican cultural heritage. In the Gordon model, cultural assimilation is presumed to be an antecedent and, generally, a prerequisite to structural assimilation. Once achieved, the latter inevitably brings about the other stages of the assimilation process. The assimilation process takes an obligatory toll (or "price," according to Gordon) of an individual's loss of ethnic identity and, collectively, of the ethnic group's disappearance as a socially visible entity. Various contemporary observers have suggested—and have provided persuasive evidence—that for many "white ethnics" presumed to be totally or almost totally assimilated, the process as delineated by Gordon is not inevitable, irreversible, or unidimensional.[3] As we explore the case of Chicanos with this background, we should bear in mind that Gordon's model and his variables are conceptually useful, but that the suggested relationships among the variables are empirically unproved.

Gordon further divides his concept of cultural assimilation into three components: (1) extrinsic traits or external behavior; (2) intrinsic traits based on value systems related to inner psychological attitudes; and (3) a distinctive institutional life within the subsociety. Extrinsic traits are adaptive or responsive to the context of contact; intrinsic traits are vital ingredients of the group's cultural heritage. The difference between them allows us to distinguish those characteristics that "run to the core" of the culture[4] from those that reflect a "culture's *reaction* to its containment."[5] The role of domination and reaction in cultural assimilation has been more fully developed in works about colonial societies around the world. Frantz Fanon in *Black Skins, White Masks*, for example, perceptively recognized the importance and fundamental power of colonial domination on the identity and the culture of groups of people.[6] Amilcar Cabral in *Return to the Source* further clarified the role of culture in domination and rebellion against domination in African anticolonial movements.[7] Culture, according to Cabral, is both the target of repression by the dominant group and the vehicle of resistance by the subordinate group. Assimilation models that exclude the variable of one group's domination by another are doomed to fail as satisfactory explanations for culture and identity change when tested in empirical research. Several Chicano scholars, influenced by Fanon, Cabral, Albert Memmi, Manuel Gonzalez Casanova, and by other Marxist and neo-Marxist thinkers, have proposed explanatory models for

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Chicano cultural change based on colonial domination and structural discrimination.[8] Further, on the concrete issue of Chicano culture, Juan Gomez-Quiñones has proposed that a central function of culture itself is to express sociopolitical struggle against class domination and cultural repression.[9]

Whether domination or subordination are included as variables, the assimilation literature has generally identified race and color as critical extrinsic criteria in the dynamics of the process. The assumption has been that groups more similar in race and color to the host, dominant, or majority group are more likely to be assimilated.[10] It has been asserted, for example, that if Mexicans lost their cultural identity, those more light-skinned and Caucasian-appearing would "become a part of our class order and be capable of rising in our social hierarchy," while those darker would probably become semicaste and possibly merge with black or American Indian groups. Thus, assimilation on the ethnic continuum has been postulated as easier, more rapid, and more complete than on the racial continuum.

Such speculations notwithstanding, the function and impact of color and race among Chicanos has been seriously neglected. A few writers have discussed the color/race factor; Jack Forbes, for instance, noted that "more than 95 percent of Mexicans are part Indian, 40 percent are fullblood Indians, and most of the mixed bloods have more Indian than non-Indian ancestry . . . and are, therefore, a racial as well as a cultural minority."[11] The overwhelmingly lower class, rural, Central Mexican origin of Chicanos suggests that Mexicans in the United States are more likely to be of Indian than European ancestry, or if they are *mestizos* (part Indian, part European), to be genotypically more Indian than Mexicans south of the border. Historical documentation of contacts between whites and Chicanos in the Southwest reminds us that, whatever the actual genetic heritage of Chicanos, clear racial boundary lines between the two were drawn and sustained from the initial contacts up to the present.[12] Further, the inclusion in the 1930 census of "Mexican" as one of five racial categories, and the intense opposition to such categorization by assimilationist groups who aspired to the middle class—such as the League of United Latin American Citizens—are evidence of a continuing Chicano racial consciousness, their sensitivity about racial labeling and color distinctions, and their perception of the potential damage that racial definition and segmentation could, in that era, have imposed on their ethnic group. Historical and impressionistic references to this sensitive identity-related phenomenon abound; yet there is no empirical research for any period of our history that sheds light on the racial and color components of the Chicano identity that perhaps held sway with the majority of people of Mexican ancestry. What emerges clearly, however, from the journals, newspapers, government records, and literature about Chicanos from the first westward movement by whites up to the present, is that whites, as the dominant group, have always perceived Chicanos as an ethnic *and* a racial group distinctly different from their own. This perception, furthermore, was reflected in segregationist public policies, laws, and the separationist etiquette that delimited acceptable patterns of interaction between whites and Chicanos. As such, race necessarily constituted a determinant variable in the rate of progress of Chicano cultural assimilation.

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Gordon, as we have seen, postulated that behavioral and cultural precedes structural assimilation, and that this inevitably results in other types of assimilation. Upward socioeconomic mobility, combined with cultural assimilation, has been cited as leading to either structural and identificational assimilation or, in some cases, to some form of personal marginality.[13] The principal issue here is whether the attainment of upward socioeconomic mobility ("success") and structural assimilation ("acceptance") must be paid for with cultural/behavioral assimilation (loss of ethnic knowledge and behavior) and identificational assimilation (loss of ethnic identity). With regard to Chicanos, some writers have predicted that assimilation will accompany upward socioeconomic mobility.[14] Others, as far back as Manuel Gamio, who wrote in the thirties, and as contemporary as Forbes, make an opposite postulation based on the substantial racial differences or undiminished discrimination patterns, or both.[15]

Little empirical research exists on the relationships among the variables of assimilation for Chicanos, but there is a body of thoughtful and provocative literature around this issue. For example, it has been found that upwardly mobile Chicanos do not shed their identity significantly but only their lower-class cultural traits.[16] In contrast to other ethnic or immigrant groups, Chicanos do not increase in upward mobility between the second and subsequent generations. The relationship between the structural assimilation and identity processes remains ambiguous, and the hypothesis that marginality or loss of ethnic identity, or both, must necessarily accompany structural assimilation and upward socioeconomic mobility is still current. This relationship and its assumed inevitability have received attention in explorations of how values in advanced education bear on Chicano cultural background. In a poignant and provocative autobiographical essay, Richard Rodriguez asks why it took so long to acknowledge publicly the cultural costs he paid to acquire a doctorate in eighteenth century English literature.[17] He concludes that this form of educational mobility required absolutely that he forget and consciously reject his cultural background. David Hayes-Bautista suggests that even though graduate training "requires almost as a prerequisite that a Chicano be as much like an Anglo as possible," perhaps "the transformation of ethnic identity can be seen as a type of socialization that occurs in later life."[18]

Recent research on Mexican and Cuban immigrants emphasizes that socioeconomic mobility and the various assimilation variables "must be empirically differentiated since no *a priori* reason exists for assuming perfect correlation between them."[19] In addition, several variables have been proposed for measuring the type of "welcome" an immigrant group receives from the host group. Five determinative variables summarize the important components of any model that examines the assimilation of Chicanos: (1) the mode of entry into the majority society; (2) numerical size in relation to the majority society; (3) distribution within the majority society; (4) racial characteristics, with reference to those in the majority society; and (5) culture, with reference to that of the majority society.[20]

A final problem in most assimilation literature on ethnic minorities is the assumed unidirectionality of the process, where individuals move along a

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bipolar continuum from the unassimilated entry point to the assimilated endpoint. The possible reverse process of searching for and recovering one's prior culture is discussed in "Models of Chicanismo," which follows this brief discussion of identity.[21]

Toward the "Deobfuscation" of "Identity"

Much of the literature about Chicanos, as well as much by Chicanos, deals in one form or another with identity. Most writers, however, Chicano or not, apply the term to concepts that have little universal clarity or consistency, a most unfortunate state of affairs, given the importance and salience of identity for any ethnic group. Such diverse components as pride in group symbols, history, and beliefs, associational preferences, self-labeling in group terms, and self-evaluative feelings about the group have been included under the rubric "identity." Considering the conceptual ambiguity of identity, the genuine importance of the phenomena alluded to in these concepts, and the centrality of identity for Chicanos, it is essential that Chicano identity be carefully and rigorously defined, measured, and interpreted.

Identity as used here has its origins in the observation that, to enhance the achievement of a sense of well-being and to reduce self-hatred, minority persons need to feel as one with their group's heritage and culture.[22] All individuals need to share with others some kind of essential character to build a strong sense of personal identity.[23] Minority status magnifies this need of group identification. For minority group members, identification with others who share their origins and traditions is critical in developing both a positive personal identity and feelings of self-esteem and efficacy, rather than self-blame and powerlessness. Furthermore, identification is a central factor in electoral politics, collective commitments, and social change involvements of minorities.[24]

A full examination of Chicano identity requires a formal distinction between private feelings about oneself, sometimes called "identity" in behavioral studies of Chicanos,[25] and categorizations of the self that involve major roles, social types, or group memberships. The former, which denote personal attributes, is personal identity; the latter, which denote cognitive, categorical aspects of the self, is social identity. Social identity can thus be defined as *the categorical product of the cognitive awareness of kind, or perception of common interest and similarity with social groups*. Ethnic identity is that dimension of social identity that involves ethnic categories in the context of other social categories such as occupation, family role, religion, and social class.[26] Virtually all studies of Chicano identity have been too exclusively focused on the ethnic aspects, without adequately examining an individual's private definition and categorization of his or her total social identity. If such a distinction were adopted, it would be possible to assess the importance of ethnic identity in the broader framework of a multidimensional social identity. For Chicanos, ethnic identity is not simple or undimensional. It potentially operates on multiple levels (on a private to public continuum), each of which has several components that may be ethnic in general character. The most distinctive of these components are language and culture, race, color, national origin, and minority or subordinate group status.

A brief review of how Chicano identity has been treated by researchers demonstrates the confused commingling of disparate phenomena and the failure

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to develop consistent conceptual definitions. One group of researchers emphasizes "identification with Mexican American values"—for example, certain isolated values regarding parental attitudes, traditional family ideology, and Mexican family behavior patterns—as the normative standard.[27] One who agrees with these values is viewed as having high identification—the "conservative Mexican American"; one who disagrees is viewed as having low identification—the "rebel or anglicized Mexican American."[28] The problem with this approach is that it assumes a monolithic and static Mexican culture of a folk or traditional type, and an equally monolithic and static Anglo culture of a modern type. Some of the considerable amount of criticism directed at this tradition-modernity theory has focused on this crucial flaw, but this either/or approach is found in many studies of Latin American people (in their own countries and in the United States) conducted by anthropologists and rural sociologists who set out to study modernization or its absence. Very few observers have made explicit the inappropriateness of this frame of reference for studying Chicanos.[29] Other problems associated with this ethnic identification literature are neglect of class influences on values and difficulties in developing stable measurement items that are culture-specific and region-specific.[30] A similar approach to ethnic identity as "degree of ethnicity" uses behaviors rather than values as criteria. Indices of Spanish language usage in several types of settings have been proposed as criteria of "ethnic identification."[31]

The types of behavior that have been singled out and relied on to represent identification (or identity, or ethnicity) have also incorporated social interaction across distinct ethnic groups, thus defining ethnicity simply as "frequent patterns of association and identification with common origins."[32] Empirically based scales that attempt to distinguish behavioral (mostly associational preferences) from emotional and value aspects of ethnic identity have also been developed.[33] These scales contribute important and distinct measurements of several critical phenomena, but they still confuse elements of cultural assimilation and cultural loyalty—such as language preference or social interaction—with the basic notion of social identity.

Surveys of Mexican Americans in communities in Southern California further refine and clarify the conceptual morass of prior work. Cultural awareness, which involves a person's knowledge of various elements (e.g., language, food, values, and so on) of his or her culture of origin, or of the new culture to which the person is exposed, is different and conceptually distinct from ethnic loyalty, which refers to preference for the cultural elements of the culture of origin or of the adopted or host culture.[34] A further valuable distinction is the adoption of self-labeling in ethnic terms as the central, or core, aspect of ethnic identity, and as a phenomenon distinct and separate from cultural awareness or loyalty.[35] In addition to reserving the term *ethnic identity* for the act of self-labeling, "Chicano" identity has been contrasted with "Mexican American," as well as with non-Mexican origin identity, on the basis of respondents' preferences among a set of ethnic group labels.[36]

In summary, social identity is recognized as multidimensional and distinct from personal identity. Ethnic identity is only one dimension of social identity, and for Chicanos, it may have several separate components (e.g., color, race, national origin, and so on). Finally, cultural awareness (which is better treated as a behavioral indicator of cultural assimilation) is separable from cultural

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loyalty (which can best be conceptualized as an aspect of ethnic consciousness), and each in turn is distinct from Chicano ethnic identity.

Models of Chicanismo

Feelings of pride in one's cultural heritage, history, language, and other customs; collective adaptations or survival tactics in the face of externally imposed subordinate status; and preferences for in-group associations—all have generally been treated in the past either as aspects of ethnic identity or assimilation. Such phenomena have more recently been conceptualized as aspects of ethnic consciousness, or in the case of Chicanos, as measures of the salience and extent of "Chicanismo." Awareness of pride in one's cultural heritage has been identified as a preliminary, prerequisite stage in many models of the radical transformation of oppressed groups toward intragroup affirmation.[37] As Patricia Gurin and her colleagues point out, these writers on the theme of consciousness "have been heavily influenced by Marx's social psychological concept of class consciousness."[38] Models for the development of group consciousness—frequently labeled "Chicanismo" for Chicanos—have been proposed by historians, sociologists, social psychologists, and political scientists, and by radical leaders from within groups whose social status and powerlessness in society served as a rallying point for group mobilization. The models depict the changes that occur to individuals and groups when they mobilize to alter both the perceived and the real subordinate relationships of their group to the dominant sectors of the society.

Most models of group consciousness recognize that, as group mobilization proceeds, members of the group reinterpret the group's status, and this reinterpretation may involve the following cognitive and emotional changes; *questioning the legitimacy* of the superordinate group to define the status of one's subordinated group; *shifting the locus of responsibility* for the group's oppressed position and status from blame of one's group to blame of the out-group's prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory policies; and *changing the meaning of the stereotypes* attributed to one's group from negative to positive. The first two are denials of the status and images imposed on the group; the third essentially affirms the imposed image, but turns it on its head by changing the affect attached to, or implicit in, the imagery from bad to good. An example of such a reversal is discernible in the Brown Beret Movement of the sixties. By adopting the slogan "Brown Power," the movement championed and acclaimed the racial distinctness of Chicanos, thus turning the negative image "brown-skinned race," which had been used derogatorily in reference to Chicanos, into a banner of group membership and a source of pride. A similar example is the public act of proudly referring to oneself as "Mexican" in social settings where not long before it was preferable—or more acceptable—to be "Spanish" or "Latin American," and to deny or mute being "Mexican" (or, as the pejorative out-group pronunciation frequently had it, "Meskin"). Such processes of reinterpretation result in new ideologies that include both cultural and political attitudes. Individuals may go beyond reinterpretation and attitudinal changes; they may begin to engage in social action or activities undertaken on behalf of the group to change external, objective, oppressive conditions and power relationships. These new action commitments represent a shift away from an individual's

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earlier preferences for acting only in his or her own behalf. Collectivist commitments and activities in behalf of the group generally occur after cognitive and emotional reinterpretations have set the stage, but collective action can precede, and as a consequence produce, the reinterpretation processes.[39]

Most models of group consciousness do not directly address the issue of the causal dynamics that underlie these different cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects of change. Most, however, suggest implicitly that the cognitive and emotional processes, represented by growth in cultural awareness and loyalty and in political consciousness, will normally precede commitments to collective action. Such collective action may in turn reinforce the new cultural and political ideologies. In discussing the transition in identity that leads to Black Nationalism, J. Turner suggests such a two-phase sequence:

> Becoming a Black Nationalist involves the realization that persons of African descent are treated categorically by the dominant group. Subsequently, the firm conviction that Afro-Americans must become transmuted into a conscious and cohesive group develops. The rationale is that a group giving a unitary response can more effectively and honorably confront the constraining dominant group and its imposed assumptions and definitions about the minority.[40]

Ysidro R. Macias suggested the same sequence for Chicanos in describing "the evolution of the mind," from a stage where people think of themselves as Mexican Americans to a stage of Chicanismo.[41] Reaching Chicanismo involves two types of self-awareness: (1) political awareness, which is the knowledge of the Mexican peoples' history in this country, and the awareness that educational, political, social, and economic discrimination have affected the group as a whole; and (2) cultural awareness, which is pride in language, and awareness of linguistic characteristics of Spanish that symbolize communal philosophy and pride in the cultural values of Mexican peoples in this country. Having rejected the Puritan ethic of individual self-improvement, the Chicano recognizes that though one Mexican-ancestry person "makes it," such success does not validate the system in this country nor render it henceforward responsible or accessible to all persons of Mexican origin. Once Chicanos become more positively aware of themselves politically and culturally, they can develop a sense of responsibility and personal commitment to the Chicano community as a whole, which is then perceived as an extension of the ethnic self or as the larger fount of one's individual ethnic identity. Macias noted that the stage of Chicanismo can give way eventually to a Third World mentality, in which one embraces, and aligns with, all other oppressed ethnic minorities. This can happen only when individuals do not allow cultural nationalism, ethnic identity, and self-pride to interfere with intergroup relationships.

The experiences of students in a health sciences professional school, for whom a forced identification is transformed into an internalized ethnic identity,[42] describe much the same sequence of development. The process begins by forcing of identification—that is, being labeled in ethnic terms either by others of one's group or by the out-group. People may disavow the identification by muting ethnic characteristics or by reconstructing their personal histories. If the disavowal is reciprocated, little else may occur to challenge the individual's *a priori* identity. However, since so many institutions force ethnic identification

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in their need to meet affirmative action or nondiscriminatory compliance regulations, disavowal, at least in public life, may be less and less frequently reciprocated. Some people may acquiesce to such enforced identification and then find that it generates an internal quest for one's cultural roots. Such exploration can lead to the development of group loyalty and pride, and ultimately produce a truly internalized identity. Following this period of cultural and political consciousness and subsequent associational and behavioral processes, individuals develop a deeper sense of belonging to the group, and of wanting to be accepted by the group, and to do something for it. Associational preferences shift inward, particularly toward people who will reciprocate the new identity. A strong, new kinship develops with all Chicanos, and individual personal commitments include action in behalf of the group. When the person finally comes to feel at one with the group, the internalization process has been completed, and ethnic identity established. Although this process tends to be directional, it is not without a back-and-forth dynamic in which later developments may be used to cement earlier processes. Moreover, some defensive mechanisms, such as cultural projection (insisting on being called a certain name, adopting ethnic food, dress, and language preferences) and ideological projection (proclaiming purity of political analysis or testing the collective commitment of others), are used both at the acceptance and internalization stages, because a comfortable "at oneness" with the group takes time to develop.

Most observers of Chicanismo in the late 1960s and early 1970s did not clearly and distinctly differentiate between "core" cultural traits and those more visible superficial cultural emblems that are readily imitated, adopted, and seemingly recovered. More recent observers sharply delineate this flaw, particularly the stagnant view of Chicano culture that presents the "more Chicano than most Chicanos" characterization of college students who wear sarapes on campus.[43] Gomez-Quiñones noted perceptively that Chicano college students "develop a compelling need for overt cultural identification and paraphernalia."[44] These observations are well founded and useful, even though they do not fully explicate the developmental character of identity and consciousness. These radical cultural critiques of the flamboyant Chicano student identity apply equally to many Chicano academics, and to those who speak for the Chicano community and political leaders as well. The use and manipulation of ethnic culture and cultural artifacts has become an increasingly commonplace phenomenon, characterized by an ostentatious behavior that bears little relationship or similarity to the cultural behavior of the grass-roots Chicano population. Further, because much research on social-psychological phenomena such as identity and Chicanismo is done within the often exaggerated and shallow proethnic atmosphere on college campuses, the result can be a serious confounding of concepts and a misinterpretation or misapplication of findings. Such promulgation of "ethnic" characteristics in the typically more avant-garde university settings is a bias that researchers sampling college populations should keep in mind.

Previous empirical work on the relationship between ethnic identity or aspects of group consciousness and group action comes primarily from studies of other minority groups, although a few studies have examined these issues as they pertain specifically to Chicanos. Work in this area was done by Patricia

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Gurin and Edgar G. Epps in a series of studies conducted over the 1960s in black colleges.[45] Their findings show that participation through the mid-sixties in civil rights activities, and in student power activities and nationalist campus organizations later in the decade, was much higher among students who stressed the role of discrimination in the lives of black Americans generally, and who held the system rather than "the victim" responsible for economic and social inequities. Students who had developed this political consciousness were more prone to advocate collective solutions than change through the aggregate mobility of individuals in the group. For such students, collectivist strategies for change were then highly related to actual participation in group action.[46]

We can trace additional strands of insights and clarifications woven through the tapestry of identity and culture through political science studies on other aspects of group consciousness. Political participation studies of different ethnic and racial groups indicate that ethnic identification and political consciousness can be and should be studied beyond the confines of the college setting. Such studies show that when the effect of socioeconomic status is removed, black social and political participation is slightly higher than white.[47] Furthermore, participation is highest among blacks who showed some awareness of race as a basis for political conflict and problems, and among blacks who identified more with their race. Political scientists see participation by blacks, especially when it exceeds that of whites at the same class level, as an expression of cultural solidarity and an affirmation of membership in a group that is the target of discrimination.

Evidence that ethnic identification or political consciousness, or both, promotes social and political participation has not been found for Chicanos. Attempts to determine whether Chicano political participation would be as high as that of whites when socioeconomic status was controlled (and thus support a picture of ethnic community effects similar to the picture increasingly drawn of blacks) have produced largely negative results.[48] When the effect of class is eliminated, Chicanos exceeded or equaled the participation of whites on only some types of participation. The measurement of ethnic identification, however, did not distinguish between the participation levels of those with high identification and those with low identification. It is important to keep these findings in perspective, since they resulted from a single, local study in Houston, Texas. Different results might be expected in larger samples or in other regions and states, particularly in cities such as Los Angeles, where Chicano political mobilization is much more pronounced and advanced.

In contrast to assimilation frameworks, the models of group consciousness are attempts to explain Chicanos' aggressive maintenance of culture and identity in frequently hostile environments. These models, though not yet fully and formally developed, require implementation and testing with Chicano populations. In this essay I have sought to identify and clarify some of the more important phenomena and interconnected concepts around culture, identity, and consciousness.

* * *

Beyond the obvious conclusion that much investigation of the issues discussed here is sorely needed, there is the need to address the question of what

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implications all this conceptual reordering suggests. First, the review of these recent writings reveals a strong, continuing preoccupation among Chicanos with issues of identity. The national economic downturns of the late 1970s and early 1980s threaten to neutralize the modest social, political, legal, and fiscal equity gains initiated by Chicanos during the 1960s civil rights movement. Should this happen, the consequent disappointment and frustration may combine with existing Chicano cultural consciousness and salient ethnic identity to catalyze large-scale mobilizations of the Chicano people. Social institutions in the United States remain condescending and only marginally open and responsive to Chicanos, and Chicanos remain largely distrustful of them. Chicano identity continues to be predominantly Mexican, in spite of national government, media, and academic infatuations with labels such as "Chicano," "Hispanic," and "Spanish-speaker."[49] Chicanos as a group have achieved recognition only to the extent that now they are partially and sporadically visible rather than nationally invisible. Two decades ago their national impact was virtually nonexistent; today it has attained at least the stature and substance of a persistent hobgoblin that, while not yet concrete, is nonetheless apparent and potent enough to haunt the American conscience. In some respects Chicanos regrettably have gone from the neglected to the notorious, for example, through the bad press attendant on the influx of undocumented immigrants or suggestions by the media of a rising competition with blacks for primacy among minority populations in the United States. The Chicanos' new visibility, however, has brought about the promotion of ethnic artifacts in the guise of culture. This proliferation of the symbols of ethnicity, together with the increased acceptance of ethnic identities over the last decade that has come about through legislation and social awareness, have reinforced ethnic pride for Chicanos. In the process the culture has been somewhat trivialized, and nowhere is this a more salient concern than on college campuses, where "being" and acting Chicano is often vigorous and widespread. But Chicanismo also possesses its advantages and stimuli, and to it must be attributed the sharpening and intensifying of Chicanos' examination of their own condition. To it also must be attributed an important literature in the social sciences and a growing number of creative products in fiction, poetry, essays, and other art forms. The relationship of these creative efforts to group consciousness is relatively unexamined, and as with too many elements of the Chicano experience, awaits the attention of critics.

On the individual level, culture, identity, and consciousness are decidedly relevant and closely connected to personal self-esteem and to the individual's sense of efficacy. The precise nature and extent of these connections, however, are not clearly known. In this area, also, too few studies have been conducted with groups other than adolescents and college students. The formal meaning and functions of culture and identity for the majority of the Chicano population and the salience of ethnic identity over other dimensions are questions that are just beginning to be addressed in the behavioral sciences. The psychological and social-psychological study of Chicano culture, identity, and consciousness needs the same rigorous attention that characterized the study of Chicano history in the 1970s, and conceptualizations that address the difficulties outlined in this essay are a most necessary prerequisite for this research.

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[6]Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967).

[7]Amilcar Cabral, *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

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[9]Juan Gomez-Quiñones, "On Culture," *Revista Chicano Riqueña*, 8 (Spring 1979): 29.

[10]W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social System of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945).

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[13]Leo Grebler, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph C. Guzman, *The Mexican American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority* (New York: The Free Press, 1970).

[14]Leonard Broom and Eshref Shevky, "Mexicans in the United States: A Problem in Social Differentiation," *Sociology and Social Research*, 36 (1952): 150-58; also Ernesto Galarza, Herman Gallegos, and Julian Samora, *Mexican Americans in the Southwest* (Santa Barbara: McNally-Loftin, 1969).

[15]Manuel Gamio, *The Mexican Immigrant* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); and Jack D. Forbes, *Aztecas del Norte* (New York: Fawcett, 1974).

[16]Edward C. McDonagh, "Status Levels of Mexicans," *Sociology and Social Research*, 33 (July 1949): 449-59.

[17]Richard Rodriguez, "Going Home Again: The New American Scholarship Boy," *American Scholar*, 44 (1) (1975): 15-28.

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[19]Alejandro Portes, *Assimilation of Latin American Minorities in the U.S.* (Unpublished research proposal, Duke University, 1975).

[20]Edward Murguia, *Assimilation, Colonialism and the Mexican American People* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).

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[22]Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: 1948).

[23]Erik H. Erikson, "Identity and the Life Cycle," *Psychological Issues* (Monograph 1) (New York: 1959).

[24]Several scholars have written on this point with regard to the Chicano population. See, for example, George Antunes and Charles M. Gaitz, "Ethnicity and Participation: A Study of Mexican-Americans, Blacks and Whites," *American Journal of Sociology*, 80 (5) (1976): 1192-211.

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[25]Victor Gekas, "Self-Conceptions of Migrant and Settled Mexican Americans," *Social Science Quarterly*, 54 (1973): 579-95.

[26]These definitions of social and ethnic identity have been clarified and refined by Patricia Gurin and collaborators at the University of Michigan. See Patricia Gurin, Arthur H. Miller, and Gerald Gurin, "Stratum Identification and Consciousness," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 40 (1980): 30-47, for a recent discussion.

[27]William Madsen, "Value Conflicts and Folk Psychiatry in South Texas," in *Magic, Faith and Healing*, A. Kiev, (ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1964); also Manuel Ramirez, III, "Identification with Mexican-American Values and Psychological Adjustment in Mexican-American Adolescents," *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 15 (2) (1969): 151-56; and M. Ramirez, "Identification with Mexican Family Values and Authoritarianism in Mexican-Americans," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 73 (1) (1967): 3-11.

[28]Madsen, "Value Conflicts and Folk Psychiatry in South Texas."

[29]The alternative point is made by Yancey et al.: "The examination of ethnic experience should use the urban American ethnic group membership" as a point of reference. William L. Yancey, Eugene P. Ericksen, and Richard N. Juliani, "Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation," *American Sociological Review*, 41 (3) (1976): 391-403. An even more substantial critique of modernity explanation is Maxine Baca Zinn, "Employment and Education of Mexican American Women: The Interplay of Modernity and Ethnicity in Eight Families," *Harvard Educational Review*, 50 (1) (February 1980).

[30]See, for example, Ramirez, "Identification with Mexican-American Values" and "Identification with Mexican Family Values."

[31]William P. Kuvlesky and Victoria M. Patella, "Degree of Ethnicity and Aspirations for Upward Social Mobility Among Mexican American Youth," *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 1 (3) (1971): 231-44; also Frank C. Nall, II, "Role Expectations: A Cross Cultural Study," *Rural Sociology*, 27 (1962).

[32]Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani, "Emergent Ethnicity."

[33]Raymond H. Teske, Jr., and Bardin H. Nelson, "An Analysis of Differential Assimilation Rates Among Middle Class Mexican-Americans," *The Sociological Quarterly*, 17 (2) (1976): 218-35; and Teske and Nelson, "Two Scales for the Measurement of Mexican-American Identity," *International Review of Modern Sociology*, 3 (1973): 192-203. Their Interaction Scale is the "action tendency component reflected by behavioral patterns." It measures usage of Spanish in various settings; membership and activity in churches and organizations attended predominantly by persons of Mexican origin; and friendship, visitation, and entertainment patterns. The Identity Scale is "the emotional or value set of respondents pursuant to their identification with the Mexican-American population." This scale measures attitudes toward: use of Spanish; being labeled Chicano or Mexicano; various organizations; and children's knowledge of history and culture of Mexicans and Mexican Americans.

[34]Amado M. Padilla, "The Role of Cultural Awareness and Ethnic Loyalty in Acculturation," in *Acculturation: Theory, Models and Some New Findings*.

[35]Manuel L. Carlos and Amado M. Padilla, *Measuring Ethnicity among Mexican Americans: A Preliminary Report on the Self-Identity of a Latino Group in the United States* (paper presented at the Fifteenth Inter-American Congress of Psychology, Bogota, Colombia, December 1974).

[36]Armando Gutierrez and Herbert Hirsch, "The Militant Challenge to the American Ethos: 'Chicanos' and 'Mexican Americans,' " *Social Science Quarterly*, 53 (1973): 830-45.

[37]Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks;* Hall, Cross, and Freedle, "Stages in the Development of Black Awareness"; *Black Nationalism in America*, John H. Bracey, Jr., A. Meier, and E. Rudwick, (eds.) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); and Gomez-Quiñones, "On Culture."

[38]Gurin, Miller, and Gurin, "Stratum Identification and Consciousness." Their excellent treatment of the topic has added many insights and much clarity to the present discussion.

[39]Henry Tajfel, "Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior," *Social Science Information*, 13 (2) (1974): 65-93.

[40]J. Turner, "Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behavior," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5 (1) (1974): 5-34.

[41]Macias, "Evolution of the Mind."

[42]Hayes-Bautista, "Becoming Chicano."

[43]Luis A. Rubalcava, *Family and Class Among Chicanos in Detroit* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1980).

[44]Gomez-Quiñones, "On Culture."

[45]Patricia Gurin and Edgar G. Epps, *Black Consciousness, Identity and Achievement: A Study of Students in Historically Black Colleges* (New York: Wiley, 1975).

[46]An unpublished study in 1975 by Luis A. Rubalcava ("Chicanos and Internal-External Locus of Control") of Chicano students at a single university campus shows much the same pattern. Students who felt committed to return to work in the Chicano community after graduation, and

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who were active in group affairs on campus (largely around recruitment, mutual support of academic and social needs, and communication of student needs to university and departmental administrators) differed significantly from other students. Even those students whose future career commitments involved service to the community, but who were not at that time active on the campus, were found to have less awareness of discrimination, to attribute less blame to the system, and to be less likely to advocate collective solutions than were the community-committed active students. Since Rubalcava's measures of these concepts were adapted from those used earlier by Gurin and Epps with black students, his results provide validation of this general approach to measuring such concepts among Chicanos.

[47]Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Marvin E. Olsen, "Social and Political Participation of Blacks," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (1970): 682-97; and Anthony M. Orum, "A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation of Negroes," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (1966): 32-46.

[48]Antunes and Gaitz, "Ethnicity and Participation."

[49]Note the adoption of "Chicano" in most of the recent scholarly literature, including this and other essays in the present volume.

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JUAN FLORES, JOHN ATTINASI, AND PEDRO PEDRAZA, JR.

La Carreta Made a U-Turn: Puerto Rican Language and Culture in the United States

ARE PUERTO RICANS BECOMING AMERICANIZED? Are familiar national lifeways, traditions, and markers of identity being assimilated to mainstream U.S. culture? Most observers agree that such a process *is* taking place, that indeed it could hardly be otherwise given the degree of economic and political absorption that has long accompanied "culture contact" between the two societies. Particularly when discussion focuses on Puerto Ricans in the United States—and they are frequently the real case in point—no one can deny that the distinctive signs and qualities of Puerto Rican culture, including the Spanish language, are giving way to the seemingly inexorable sweep of Yankee pluralism.

Here, though, the consensus ends, for directly after observing and recording the signs of cultural assimilation come the vexing tasks of analyzing and evaluating them. Is the process desirable or undesirable? Should it be facilitated or denounced? How far along is it, and are there limits to its full realization? Is it inevitable or reversible? Is the main obstacle to total Americanization to be found in national, or "ethnic," resistance, or in the very structural relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico?

More fundamental, perhaps, is the question of what it means for Puerto Ricans to be "Americanized." Which of the most essential features of Puerto Rican cultural life are being integrated? Which are being obliterated by pervasive colonial influences? Which aspects of North American culture are seen as the most potent forces promoting assimilation among Puerto Ricans, especially those living in the United States? Which other U.S. historical experiences of conquest, domination, or absorption through migration are most pertinent for Puerto Ricans? Is the issue of Puerto Rican cultural identity best posed as that of an immigrant group, or of an ethnic or racial minority? Are Hispanics set off by language of origin, or are they Third World victims of

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internal colonialism, or perhaps participants in the culture of poverty? There is some validity in each of these approaches, and interpretations thus far have generally been based on one or a combination of such models. But to what extent can such partial analogies measure the nature and degree of Puerto Rican acculturation? Finally, if the assimilation process is considered neither desirable nor inevitable—not the inherent aspiration nor the conclusive undoing of Puerto Rican culture—what alternatives remain? Might the persistent affirmation of a discrete national culture, and particularly its tradition of anticolonial resistance, be somehow consonant with an ever more deep immersion in the cultural life of the United States?

Such an eventuality is rarely, if ever, addressed by commentators on the Americanization of Puerto Ricans in the United States, despite agreement that assimilation is far from complete and in fact highly problematic. Clearly, something other than fluid cultural integration is at work. Although Puerto Ricans are gaining command of English, they are by no means abandoning their native Spanish. But the debate invariably falters at this point; such a seemingly anomalous cultural and linguistic juncture defies the terms of assimilation theory that underlie most intellectual discourse about the issue.

Within the framework set by Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life*[1] and in subsequent discussions, North American sociologists and anthropologists have generally considered Puerto Ricans in the United States as problematic "newcomers," the most recent in the long line of ethnic immigrants, including blacks from the South, to occupy the lowest rung on the ladder of social mobility. Puerto Rican observers, on the other hand, emphasize the distinctiveness of Puerto Rican migrants; unlike their European predecessors, Puerto Ricans come from a nearby colonial nation, and their national ties remain more active. But assimilation theory provides the theoretical context here also, and commentators inside the Puerto Rican community and those outside have come full circle in the prognosis of an eventual incorporation of "Puerto Rican Americans" into the pluralist mainstream. The most basic problem, then, is the method common to both approaches, since it accommodates two divergent currents of interpretation, both of which are glaringly inadequate—that of American social scientists, because it omits or minimizes the colonial dimension of the relationship between the United States and all Puerto Ricans, and that of Puerto Rican writers, because it lacks a consideration of class relations and the cultural struggle in the United States. Any effort to fuse these miscast tendencies on their own terms, or to build a more satisfactory synthesis by combining the valid insights of both, leads only to further and ever more bewildering dilemmas.

This complex theoretical debate and corollary ethnographic assertions rarely refer to one obvious source of evidence: the firsthand cultural production of Puerto Ricans in the United States and their linguistic practices. The case against cultural imperialism and the data base of urban anthropology have all but ignored the explicit testimony of the community as expressed in its daily verbal interactions, not to mention its painting, drama, music, poetry, and dance. Pathologies are extensively documented, the "requiem" is pronounced, proofs and disclaimers are raised on such telling issues as group intermarriage, the relative successes of bilingual education, and patterns of upward mobility—while the practical communicative and creative experiences of Puerto Ricans in

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the United States go largely unanalyzed. Matters of cultural representation, for the most part, are left to the artistic circles themselves. In the galleries, workshops, and ensembles, and among the painters, poets, and musicians, "Puerto Rican culture" is the substance and product of everyday work, not merely an intellectual issue or category, but a directly and creatively reexpressed reality. Similarly, policymakers and scholars speculate extensively on the Puerto Rican language predicament and its implications for public policy, without ever taking as a point of departure the virtuosity of speech resources in the context of home, workplace, and social interchange.

In this essay we will attempt to tap these active currents by turning to specific instances of Puerto Rican expression in the United States. The conclusions drawn from a long-term study of linguistic practice and attitudes on a single block in El Barrio point up the particular complexity of sociolinguistic change in the Puerto Rican case. These conclusions challenge many guiding assumptions of previous discussions of bilingualism, and have important consequences for the framing of educational policy for Hispanics, especially since these findings rest on an understanding of the historical and political position of Puerto Ricans in U.S. society.

A critical reading of *La Carreta Made a U-Turn*,[2] by the young "Nuyorican" poet Tato Laviera, provides corollary insights. In this volume, poetry itself poses the issue of acculturation in reference to language and verbal symbolization, the hub around which numerous aspects of Puerto Rican culture ultimately turn. Can verse written in English, and at an increasing remove from the national language and traditions, still be considered Puerto Rican literature? Is bilingual poetry, which so insistently presupposes a Hispanic and Caribbean language background, then no more than an ethnic thread within the diverse fabric of contemporary North American writing? The very groping for a category in which to place a characteristic poetic language quickly lands one at the center of the assimilation controversy, and evokes the most critical consequences that arise from scientific description of prevailing cultural patterns.

An in-depth sociolinguistic study and the critical interpretation of emergent literary voices provide but another point of entry into the needed theoretical debate, and cannot presume to yield any ready and felicitous resolution to what will surely remain, in many ways, an inscrutable paradox. Yet such exercises signal, in dramatic form, the grave methodological and ideological impasse of much contemporary thinking about ethnicity, cultural identity, and the assimilation process. The alternative approach that concludes this essay constitutes a preliminary, tentative means of transcending that impasse, and of setting future accounts of Puerto Rican experience in the United States in line with a more dynamic and variegated vision of cultural change.

The Sociolinguistic Evidence

For language minorities in the United States, the acquisition of standard English is presumed to signal both a willingness to assimilate and an effort to take the most crucial first step to gain the knowledge and skills that enable social advance. Learn the language, it is said, and the doors of the "larger" society will swing open. There is, of course, a kernel of accuracy to such reasoning, and it

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impels millions of Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and other Latinos to struggle daily for educational opportunity, employment, and access to social services.

However persuasive it may appear, though, the language-as-lever rationale is riddled with contradictions. As it informs public opinion and policy, it is little more than a rationalization used to conceal the element of coercion that runs through the entire history of language contact under colonial conditions. The very term *bilingualism* has itself been used as a convenient cover for the imposition of English in Puerto Rico throughout most of the twentieth century. What is touted as the most desirable circumstance—trading Puerto Rican Spanish for communicative skills in English—turns out to be not so much a life-enlarging choice as an outright obligation.

Vague definitions and tenuous premises, such as the ingrained assumption that "correct language" somehow implies good behavior and intelligence, are further rationales for the adoption of the standard variety of English.[3] The insidious system of stratification identifies undesirable speech as the speech of undesirables. The consequences of this circular rationale are felt by the poor and working class of all nationalities, but the magnified disadvantage for language minorities is obvious. Rather than assessing intellectual abilities, standards of measurement—whether based on oral or written language—mainly detect deviations from a prestige dialect and the learned routines of social interaction. Clearly, the bias inherent in such hierarchical rankings complement and reinforce the elaborate tracking system at work throughout the educational process and in the society as a whole.

But the most telling case against emphasizing language choice and use is the growing evidence that points to social status as the key to educational success, and not vice versa.[4] Formal schooling and language acquisition, although held up as a ready panacea to economic and political disadvantage, have made only minor inroads into the stubborn system of class and national stratification; to a large extent, in fact, they have served to obfuscate the need for deeper social change. The tiny, often selective trickle of Puerto Ricans into higher education and the professions is the exception that proves the rule. Making it through school and gaining command of English afford little real prospect of alleviating the vast inequities and discrimination that keep the majority of Puerto Ricans on the bottom rung on the social ladder.

These sobering circumstances, however, and the cynical apologetics that support the central thrust of public policy are no reason to relent in the battle for quality education geared to the needs of Spanish-language minorities. The main arena of struggle recently has been in the establishment of bilingual programs in the public schools. The effectiveness of these efforts has been at best uneven, the most visible impediment being reluctant and piecemeal institutional commitment. But many bilingual programs have also been hampered by the unclear, diffuse, and often conflicting goals of the legislators and educators involved. Here, too, numerous issues are fraught with confusion: the choice between English proficiency and Spanish maintenance, or their potential compatibility; the meaning and content of "bicultural" curricula; and the range of language practice among the student population.

The last issue is most pertinent to this essay; the widespread ignorance and disregard for actual linguistic experience results in gravitation toward the accepted norms of Spanish or English language "standards." Only recently—

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and halfheartedly—has attention been paid to dialect usage as a legitimate mode of social communication compatible with broader educational objectives, rather than as a mark of deviance and retardation to be rooted out in favor of sanctioned language norms. The stigma attached to code-switching—the seemingly haphazard and uncontrolled alternation between one language and another that is characteristic of many Puerto Rican and other bilinguals—continues to take on pathological proportions to educators of all cultural leanings and pedagogical philosophies.

It is here, in the description and assessment of how Puerto Ricans actually communicate, that a reformulation and redirection of language and educational policy must begin. The results of an intensive look at language use in a Puerto Rican community follow. To study bilingualism concretely, we sought to understand the norms of speaking in daily interaction by observing residents in a single block in New York City over a long term. We also conducted linguistic studies and an attitudinal survey to complete the description of language use and to take account of community members' own perceptions of the language problem.[5]

We chose El Barrio, or East Harlem, as our site of study because it is a large, old, stable Puerto Rican community, with three generations of U.S.-based Puerto Ricans as well as recent and circulating migrants. Except for the absolute size and ethnic density[6] of the community, the demographics of East Harlem are similar to those for the total Puerto Rican population in New York: the majority were born in the United States or have lived here for more than ten years; slightly over half were born in Puerto Rico; 50 percent are under twenty-five years of age. It is a poor neighborhood where one third of the residents live below the poverty level. No single sample, of course, is fully reliable for purposes of generalization; the richness of the present data base, however, and our diversified sociolinguistic approach ensure that the cultural and political implications to be drawn contain valid suggestions for new lines of thinking and analysis.

A person's placement within the social organization of this working-class community is determined as much by the facts of migration—frequency, recency, and other particulars—as by age and sex.[7] Language use, skills, and outlook connect to these factors in rather complex and surprising ways. Language preference was not decisive among the various motives for community association, and the range of linguistic abilities, although wide, did not obstruct communication.

In contrast to the traditional immigrant pattern of transition from the foreign language to English over three generations, with grandparents and grandchildren being virtually monolingual in one or the other language, nearly all Puerto Ricans are bilingual to some degree, with second language skills acquired, for the most part, outside any formal language instruction. There seems to be a life cycle of language use in the community. The younger children learn Spanish and English simultaneously, hearing both languages from those who use them separately and from those who combine them in various ways. The older children and adolescents speak and are spoken to increasingly in English, which accords with their experience as students and as members of peer groups that include non-Hispanics. In young adulthood, as the school experience ends and employment responsibilities begin, the use of Spanish

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increases, both in mixed usage and in monolingual speech to older persons. At this age, then, the Spanish skills acquired in childhood but largely unused in adolescence become notably reactivated. Mature adults speak both languages. Older persons are, for the present at least, Spanish monolingual or nearly so.

The new roles associated with adulthood involve more serious relationships with family members of all ages. The familial networks, like the general community, are affected by circulating migration, making bilingualism necessary. Migration patterns not only place certain persons of all ages in the Spanish-speaking environment of Puerto Rico, but also require that those who remain in New York communicate with persons who circulate between the two places, with recent arrivals, and with persons who came as adults and who continue to speak Spanish. Although there are societal institutions that tend to reinforce one or the other language, the Spanish-maintaining counterforces become prominent as Puerto Ricans pass from adolescence to adulthood.

How, then, are we to characterize the bilingual practice of Puerto Ricans? Theorists hypothesize that without situational separation of the two languages, the bilingualism of a group is transitory. Others claim that the use of two languages simultaneously is a psychological malady, or at least "uncivilized." And the nonstandard varieties and apparently low levels of literate achievement further buttress condemnation of bilingualism. Yet our research indicates a dynamic bilingualism, with several varieties of the languages remaining systemically intact. A full appreciation of such structural features, however, requires a historical framework.

Just as four centuries of Spanish colonialism have been responsible for the Caribbean variety of Spanish that Puerto Ricans speak, so, too, is U.S. colonialism crucial to the language dynamic current in the last part of this century. The colonial status of Puerto Rico underlies such social conditions as complex and circular migration patterns, economic stratification, American citizenship, and monolingual language policies. Given the dialectical nature of these social factors, the same processes that instigate change also have stabilizing influences within the community, counteractive to the more obvious effects of assimilation. Bilingualism that makes use of nonstandard and class-based vernacular speech is qualitatively different from separated bilingualism comprised of literate standards. Interpretation of the sociolinguistic situation of Puerto Ricans in the United States must therefore be placed within the context of working-class culture and language practice.

Contrary to popular belief, Puerto Ricans living in the United States are bilingual. According to the linguistic arithmetic of colonialism, however, one plus one equals zero, for standard tests would probably label many Puerto Ricans here as "alingual"—that is, lacking in written and oral competence in either language. Prevailing social and educational practices thus convert an enviable asset into a crippling handicap; facility in two languages, which multiplies the communicative and expressive horizons of a people, turns into a trap that blocks them from all access to recognized linguistic command. Rather than enjoying, combining, and developing skills in the two languages, Puerto Ricans are instead caught between them.

Before treating combined usage, it must be recognized that both poles in the Puerto Rican's bilingual range are colonial dialects. Puerto Rican Spanish, with its admixture of indigenous, African, and peasant qualities, is stigmatized to

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this day as a corruption of the pure mother tongue and its supposedly more faithful Latin American variants. The class basis of this judgment is obvious. Unfortunately, this kind of purist condescension toward Puerto Rican Spanish is very much alive among many bilingual educators intent on the maintenance and cultivation of Spanish. Thus the very idiom that Puerto Ricans bring to the bilingual arena as their own is one that has historically been viewed as inferior, and associated with deviance and ignorance. Clearly, some Hispanic teachers and intellectuals have been as responsible for perpetuating this devaluation as their North American "overseers."

The acquired language—the urban varieties of American English most immediately accessible to Puerto Ricans—may also be downgraded dialects, distinct from, but sharing much with, black English. The studies and struggles surrounding the recognition of that variety are most pertinent. Having learned English well enough to communicate actively with their working-class peers, Puerto Ricans—even those who speak little Spanish—enter school with the prospect of having to relearn the language to use it "properly." The transfer, within a generation, from Spanish to English is merely the first step toward social success and acceptance. Class placement then forces still another language adjustment if Puerto Ricans are to "succeed"—the transfer from the colloquial English of the neighborhood and workplace to the more formal language of educational and professional life.

Most Puerto Ricans in the United States, however, are not located at either end of the Spanish-English spectrum, but range throughout it. The resulting phenomenon is the interpenetrating usage of both languages—derogatorily called "Spanglish"—in a wide range of circumstances, especially for in-group communication. Interpenetrating usage is condemned even more vehemently than usage of either variety alone. Code-switching is viewed as the tragic convergence of two nonstandard vernaculars, and thus is assumed to epitomize the collapse of the integrity of both. It is in this context, where practical bilingualism occurs most spontaneously and expressively, that the charge of alinguality has gained its widest currency. For many observers, Puerto Rican and American alike, code-switching amounts to contamination and interference, an easy recourse to compensate for incomplete resources in either idiom. The obvious first impulse is to untangle the two and enforce language separation to restore each unit and usage to its appropriate place within monolingual discourse.

A corollary, though somewhat more sympathetic, view is that bilingual Puerto Rican speech is a phenomenon of transition. Puerto Ricans cannot and should not be expected to carry through the language transfer overnight; with time and pedagogical supervision, hangovers from Spanish will recede, and English will win out. The analogy to other foreign-language immigrant groups is obvious and unquestioned. Even where the need for special educational services is acknowledged, their main function is viewed as simply to facilitate a process that the passage of generations, in any event, will take care of.

The results of our empirical and theoretical study contradict both of these assessments of Puerto Rican bilingualism. Code-switching represents neither the lack of language nor structural convergence. Rather, sentences that used both Spanish and English were found to be grammatical in both languages; switching occurs only where the structures of Spanish and English are

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congruent. We found that balanced bilinguals engaged in more intimate, intricate kinds of switching, while those with fluency in one language avoided syntactic risks by switching between sentences or switching only independent particles and exclamations. Rather than compensating for monolingual deficiency, code-switching often signals an expansion of communicative and expressive potential.

Many aspects of the Spanish spoken by Puerto Ricans are also mistakenly thought to be the result of English influence. The characteristic weakening of plural endings was found to be due to neither linguistic convergence nor the deterioration of the grammatical category of number. Ambiguity is never the result, because variable agreement and contextual indicators of plurality provide redundancy. In another area of structure, the proportional distribution of Spanish verb forms in East Harlem was found to be basically the same as that in the dialogue of a fifteenth century Spanish novel. Aspects of verbs and semantic fields covered by the tenses are also similar to those in standard grammars. Claims of deformation or convergence with English, therefore, seem unfounded. The most visible aspects of language contact, the presence of loan words, also has only a superficial effect on linguistic structure, and is, after all, part of every kind of contact between cultures. It is really social prejudice that leads to the categorical condemnation of forms that occur infrequently as characteristic of Puerto Rican speech.[8]

Although structural convergence is a fallacious notion that derives from a superficial examination of language practice itself, the idea that Puerto Rican bilingualism is a transitional stage in a process of adjustment is based on misleading sociological and historical assumptions. Separation and loyalty in themselves cannot and have not preserved languages in contact. Demographic, institutional, and political factors, among other social conditions, oppose or confirm subjective concerns about language purity. Constantly nourished by both material and ideological influences that are counteractive to smooth language shift, Puerto Rican bilingualism seems to resist both political forces and scientific readings that indicate assimilation.

The most obvious of these factors—and ones that differentiate Puerto Ricans from previous immigrants—are the proximity of the native land (allowing for frequent returns to, and visits from, the Island), the unabating influx of more Puerto Ricans into areas of high Hispanic concentration, and the increasingly circulatory character of the migratory movement. All tend to replenish the presence and influence of Spanish in all aspects of social life. At a more fundamental level, the conditions of colonial oppression have accompanied the entire process of displacement.

The linguistic impact of this pervasive, persistent subjugation is diverse, and includes both implicit and overt intensive pressure to abandon Spanish altogether. But rampant inequality and prejudice also serve to isolate a people within the society, to concentrate them in designated neighborhoods, educational tracks, and positions in the job market, and to leave them with nothing but their own resistance and resources. This effective ghettoization, the sinister, real-life reflex of ethnic pluralism, is a major objective factor in the seemingly enigmatic maintenance of Spanish even among third-generation and fourth-generation Puerto Ricans in the United States. It must significantly inform any sociolinguistic analysis.

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There are also vital subjective factors that reveal pressures felt and exerted in the sociolinguistic situation and that condition the use of language in everyday interaction. In our language attitude survey we found a conscious and widespread connection to bilingualism, so much so that bilinguals are perceived to be most prevalent in the Puerto Rican community.[9] Most of those interviewed found no conflict between speaking English and being Puerto Rican, or speaking Spanish and being actively involved in American culture. They readily admit that many speakers mix both languages in discourse, and view this positively. Both languages are valuable. English is recognized as an asset, and Spanish remains important both as a marker and a component of the culture.[10] On the other hand, none of those interviewed advocate complacency toward the preservation and development of Spanish-language skills, tasks that are viewed as a responsibility of the group itself and as a legitimate right in a democratic society. The dynamic transformation of several traditions into a creative national identity can be seen as opposed to unidirectional acculturation.

By virtual consensus, Puerto Ricans want to maintain Spanish. This is true even for young people who admit to not knowing much Spanish. The feeling is that Spanish should be audible and visible wherever Puerto Rican culture exists, an attitude that connects to both observed language use and the postulated life cycle of language competence. This is concretely manifested in the norms of etiquette in which Spanish speakers are almost always accommodated. Puerto Ricans also want to learn English; for most, a person who is more fluent in English than in Spanish is neither a paradox nor an anomaly, much less a case of deliberate or unwitting cultural betrayal. These findings reveal that both linguistic and cultural identity are changing in response to economic and social transformations, and that interpenetrating bilingualism is the idiom in which these cultural changes are expressed.

There was nearly unanimous support for the principle of bilingual education, although unfortunately this consensus also tended to be uncritical and somewhat confused. Education that both elaborates standard skills and recognizes the communicative value of community speechways, and education that begrudgingly concedes a program to remedy the lack of English, are fundamentally different. This is evident not only from the very conceptualization of the problem, but also at the concrete level of interaction with the bilingual or potentially bilingual child. A community that is composed of people in movement between Latin America and the United States and that communicates bilingually will surely want bilingualism. It misses the point to pose the problem of language choice—Spanish or English—as the simple connection between language and cultural identity.

Although these many linguistic issues seem somewhat abstract, they manifest themselves concretely in coercion and exclusion in language use, and provoke linguistic resistance in response. Concerns about the structural integrity of linguistic varieties, language distribution, and attitudes about language and identity thus reflect a more encompassing cultural and political problematic.

Just as the relative subordination of Spanish is but one piece in a larger structure of hemispheric domination, so the Hispanic determination to maintain Spanish is only secondarily, and by derivation, a purely linguistic issue. Rather, this struggle is motivated by an identification with all Latin Americans and, at a

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deeper level, with the cause of justice in their behalf. Similarly, the drive to gain command of English reflects both economic pressures and the constraints typical of an arrogantly monolingual society. The desire to master English does not come from narrow self-interest; nor does the cultivation of Spanish or proclaimed reverence for the cultural heritage ensure either particular concern for the conditions under which Puerto Ricans live or interest in changing them for the better.

Thus a realistic understanding of the language-culture nexus calls into question both conventional linguistic approaches to Puerto Rican experience and the assimilationist or cultural nationalist orientations in which they are grounded. Rigorous linguistic description is of course indispensable in exposing the profound complexity of the language contact situation in its own right. In addition, a comprehensive conception of language as a system of interaction may help overcome the frozen dichotomy that ties English and Spanish to monolithic cultural blocks, while the analysis of verbal communication serves to illuminate some of the most distinctive qualities of contemporary artistic production and innovation. But explaining these sociolinguistic conditions and even elaborating the rules that govern their practical workings call for placing linguistic considerations in a wide-ranging context of cultural and political theory.

Culture Makes a U-Turn

La Carreta Made a U-Turn, Tato Laviera's first book of poems, clearly belongs to the so-called Nuyorican modality. Freely bilingual in style and conception, it was written by a young Puerto Rican who grew up in the streets of New York City. The poems are filled with that biting defiance and strident pride that erupted on the literary landscape in 1973 with *Puerto Rican Obituary* by Pedro Pietri.[11] Laviera's is another voice responding to the oppression and misery that have been the lot of most Puerto Ricans since their proverbial oxcart pulled up to Ma Liberty's Golden Door. Mass unemployment; inadequate and distorted education; rampant prejudice and injustice; high crime rates and drug abuse that are systematically fostered by the very society that condemns them; social isolation, whether behind bars or in depressed, run-down neighborhoods—these are and promise to remain the most evident thematic sources of Puerto Rican cultural works in the United States.

To expose and denounce such negative conditions, writers like Tato Laviera draw vital inspiration from the struggle to resist the conspiring forces of assimilation and exclusion, forced incorporation, and endemic inequality. Their main recourse is the spirit of national, or "ethnic," affirmation that has been the other face of the colonial history of the Puerto Rican people, both on the Island through the centuries and over the decades as immigrants in the United States. Symbols of indigenous and slave opposition to Spanish rule are held up against the leveling effects of cultural imperialism, as is the militant courage of the Puerto Rican Nationalists, from Pedro Albizu Campos to Lolita Lebrón. These strains of the national legacy, though, most commonly appear in direct interaction with complementary expressive resources available in the immediate North American setting. Among the poets, this admixture is most evident in the bilingual technique itself, with its characteristic switching between colloqui-

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al Puerto Rican Spanish and a variety of urban American English, the latter often the dominant literary idiom. The effect is generally suggestive of contemporary black and Chicano poetry, but always with a distinctively Puerto Rican reference and expressive quality.

What makes Laviera's work particularly interesting is that in it, this Nuyorican potential finds unusually sustained realization, and that, as the title indicates, contemporary Puerto Rican experience in the United States is evoked by a direct response to the classic dramatization of the migration process in the national literature. *La carreta*, which traces the archetypal Puerto Rican journey from rural origins to the San Juan slums to the South Bronx, is a drama written in 1953 by Réne Marqués, the Island's foremost modern author.[12] Marqués's death in 1979—the same year that Laviera's book was published—signaled the close of an era in Puerto Rican letters. In his thirty productive years, Marqués worked in a wide variety of literary forms—often with greater artistic success than in *La carreta*—and expressed a range of notions about Puerto Rican politics and culture. But it was *La carreta* that became widely familiar to Puerto Rican and international audiences, and came to be extolled for over a generation as the classic literary rendition of recent Puerto Rican history.

In *La carreta*, the entire migration experience is presented as a process of abrupt moral and cultural deterioration. By the time we meet them in their dilapidated Bronx tenement, the "typical" jíbaro family, extended around the matriarch Doña Gabriela, has been so traumatized by their collision with a hostile, technocratic Anglo-Saxon society, that their only hope for salvation is in return to the Island and the resumption of peasant life on the land. The "oxcart," guiding symbol of the play and an abiding reminiscence of abandoned national roots, must be restored to its natural place in a world uncontaminated by inhuman modernity and incompatible foreign values. The final vision of a regained life of decency on the sacred soil never fails to capture the minds and hearts of Puerto Ricans of all ages, especially the thousands who have lived through that disillusioning migration process firsthand.

Tato Laviera, who was raised as a child of *La carreta*, picks up where Marqués left off; his book, though not written in dramatic form, may be read as the "fourth act" sequel to Marqués's work. It is anything but a faithful continuation, though, since Laviera's task went beyond that of merely filling in the twenty-five years that elapsed since Marqués wrote his influential play. For Laviera, *La carreta* is not only old-fashioned but fundamentally misleading. In fact, René Marqués is considered to have steered the metaphorical Puerto Rican oxcart in the wrong direction, and *La Carreta Made a U-Turn* is an attempt to set it back on the course of real historical and cultural experience. As the "Nuyorican" corrective to an imposing national self-image, Laviera's poetry thus provides a focus for critical insights into the problems of Puerto Rican identity and assimilation in contemporary U.S. society.

The most obvious of these problems is the perennial question of return to the Island, or more generally, of the direction in which Puerto Rican migrants are headed. Laviera recognizes that, even with the substantial return migration of the past decade, going back "home" has not been the typical fate of Puerto Ricans who have come to the United States or of their offspring born here. Nor should nostalgia for the "old country" be taken uncritically as their inherent disposition or aspiration. For the most part, Puerto Ricans are here to stay, as

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Laviera suggests in the rather irreverent homage to his own boyhood that begins the volume:

papote sat on the stoop
miseducated misinformed
a blown-up belly of malnutrition
papote sat on the stoop
of an abandoned building
he decided to go nowhere.

This is the first, most evident meaning of the "u-turn": the oxcart, rather than pointing to the long-lost byways of Puerto Rico—Marqués's own reversal of direction—is proceeding ever more deeply into the thick of North American life. Laviera titles the first part of his collection "Metropolis Dreams," a deliberate reference to the final act of *La carreta*, "La metrópoli," where the nightmarish urban reality is ultimately transcended in the dream of return to the native land. Laviera's "dreams," on the other hand, are intrinsically bound up with the metropolitan nightmare, and Puerto Rico no longer harbors any such physical or emotional release—at least not in the melodramatic, provincial, retrogressive way that Marqués suggests. The thought of return migration by now, for the likes of Laviera, hardly conjures the illusion of pastoral bliss that brought Doña Gabriela and her daughter, Juanita, to their final affirmation of life. As Laviera puts it in his bilingual poem "my graduation speech" (the complete text of which follows this essay):

i want to go back to puerto rico
but i wonder if my kink could live
in ponce, mayaguez and carolina
tengo las venas aculturadas
escribo en spanglish
abraham in español
abraham in english
tato in spanish
"taro" in english
tonto in both languages

One of the many ironies about *La Carreta Made a U-Turn* is that it is, indeed, a return to Puerto Rico. The very structure of the book suggests that direction, proceeding as it does from the metropolis to "El Arrabal" (the slum), and from English to Spanish as the prevalent poetic idiom. In fact, there is throughout a closer familiarity with the Island and the Spanish language than is common in Nuyorican writing. But this is surely because Laviera spent his early boyhood in Puerto Rico, moving to New York in 1960. In that, he is different from many of his literary peers and even from such relative "old-timers" as Piri Thomas and Pedro Pietri.

But what binds this work with most others written by Puerto Ricans in the United States is that the view of Puerto Rico is conditioned by formative years

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lived in New York. As a result, the Puerto Rico the Nuyorican oxcart returns to is markedly different from the Puerto Rico of the official culture. Laviera's Puerto Rican roots lead neither to the folkloric jíbaro, content under the Commonwealth, nor to the glorified pantheon of the national elite—two sources of patriotic pride that are so prominent in Marqués and his works. Rather, going back to Puerto Rico evokes the popular culture of an Afro-Caribbean island, the birthplace of musical and poetic forms like la bomba, la plena, la décima, and el seis. It is a culture of the slave and peasant masses, the culture of a colonial people who have known not only misery and submission—and pious "decency"—but also joy, creativity, and struggle. All these strains of subordinate indigenous expression are invoked and affirmed in *La Carreta Made a U-Turn*.

Yet these expressions are also transformed, since they are in constant reciprocity with the currents and crosscurrents of cultural life in urban United States. Laviera calls his symbolical return to the Island "Nuevo Rumbón," a new path, since it clashes sharply with the dominant cultures of both societies: the elitist Hispanophile tradition of Puerto Rico and the chauvinist White Anglo-Saxon Protestant core of North American values and identity. Posed against both European legacies is the African culture base shared by Caribbean and American blacks. Thus Laviera in "the salsa of bethesda fountain" finds hostility and estrangement in North American society, as was the case in the works of earlier Island-based authors like René Marqués, José Luis González, and Pedro Juan Soto. But the young Puerto Rican writers also give voice to a strong sense of cultural unity and solidarity with American blacks:

> a blackness in spanish
> a blackness in english
> mixture-met on jam session in central park,
> there were no differences in
> the sounds emerging from inside

Stylistically, this Afro-Caribbean orientation is present in the hovering influence of Luis Palés Matos, who established African rhythmic possibilities as a core element of Puerto Rican poetry. Laviera's indebtedness to Palés Matos, especially in his poems in Spanish, is conscious and explicit, though he generally adapts, rather than merely imitates, his model. The lines from "tumbao (for eddie conde)" are an example:

> pito que pita
> yuca que llama
> salsa que emprende
> llanto que llora
> última llamada sin fuego
> tumba que la tamba
> tumba que la bamba baja
> que pacheco se inspira
> que ismael la canta
> oh! y el baquiné

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"el moreno puertorriqueño" (the complete text of which follows this essay) is also within the Afro-Caribbean tradition. Like most of Laviera's verse, this fascinating "three-way warning poem," as he calls it, is meant to be declaimed, and it relies for its full impact on oral presentation.

Laviera's appeal to the non-European roots of colonial cultures, while sometimes veering toward a clichéd spiritualized Africanism, is by no means uncritical or merely escapist. Africa is a source and reference point, not a sacred hermitage: a sympathetic connection to Africa must also be a questioning one if it is to align with present-day realities. Laviera makes this clear in the pensive "the africa in pedro morejón":

> yes, we preserved what was originally african,
> or have we expanded it? i wonder if we have
> committed the sin of blending? but i also hear
> the AFRICANS love electric guitar clearly mis-
> understanding they are the root,
> or is it me who is primitive?
> damn it, it is complicated.

"The american dollar symbol," the poem continues, "that's african; / the british sense of royalty, that's african; / the colors in catholic celebrations, / that's african." And in the closing lines, the appealing mythologies preached by his Afro-Cuban friend seem to dash against the sobering reality of the New York ghetto:

> this high-priest, pedro, telling me all of this
> in front of an abandoned building.

No remote ideals or easy ways out can alter the immediate stage-setting of Puerto Rican life in New York. However much pride and inspiration may be gained from national origins and the Afro-Caribbean heritage, the "abandoned building" is always hauntingly there, the inevitable backdrop and immediate historical circumstance in which those countertraditions are really at work. Here, in the land of "broken English dreams," as Pietri called it, is where the carreta now sits, where masses of Puerto Rican workers have come to live with little prospect of either advancement or return to Puerto Rico.

Laviera is also keenly aware of the political impetus that set the crowded exodus in motion—for him, René Marqués and the postwar migration are both products of the Muñoz Marín era in Puerto Rican history. Luis Muñoz Marín, at the helm of Island politics from 1940–68, and the father of Operation Bootstrap and Free Association Statehood (Commonwealth), kindled the false sense of freedom, mobility, and progress that impelled the oxcart to the benevolent North. In "something i heard," Laviera comments bitterly on the hypocrisy of this influential political rhetoric:

> on the streets of san juan
> muñoz marín stands on top
> of an empty milk box
> and brings his land, liberty,

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bread message to a people
robbed of their existence.
napoleon's father attentively
listened as muñoz said, "inde-
pendence is just around the corner."

napoleon's father took it
literally, he went around
the corner and found a donkey
tied up to a pole.

He lashes out "against muñoz pamphleteering" in another poem, that "hollow sepulchre of words, / words i admired from my mother's eyes, / words that i also imbedded as my dreams." And in direct reference to the migration, "inside my ghetto i learned to understand / your short range visions of where you led us, / . . . your sense of stars landed me in a / north temperate uprooted zone." The populist promises of Muñoz Marín, his patriotism divested of the demand for independence, formed the ideological program for René Marqués and *La carreta*—"el concepto del vocablo PATRIA," as Laviera puts it, "que Luis Muñoz le dió a los carreteros."

From all of these angles and with recurrent irony, Laviera anatomizes the Puerto Rican cultural experience in New York. He reflects critically on all that would give false solace to his uprooted compatriots, as in the memorable "song of an oppressor," directed against the magnetic television novela "Simplemente María," which keeps his poor working-class mother in a state of sentimental hypnosis:

mami, you sit so calmly
looking at your novelas . . .
mami, tears of sacrifice sanctify
your delicate face, valley of tears
in your heart
mami, i love you
this spirit of love gives me rancor
and hatred, and i react to the song
simplemente maría.

And after all, isn't *La carreta* itself like a novela par excellence, a heartrending melodrama of the Puerto Rican migration?

But perhaps Laviera's most penetrating commentary is the very linguistic range and modulation of the poetry itself. Between the English poems that begin the book, and the Spanish poems that end it, bilingual switching and blending are employed with consistent dexterity. The overall impression, despite the strategic shift from one language to the other, is one of almost undetectably fluid transition, and from the standpoint of either language tradition, of a qualitative expansion of idiomatic resources. As recent studies of Chicano literature show, bilingual writing entails more than merely utilizing the aggregate of expressive possibilities in each of the vernaculars, as if the options were simply between two fixed vocabularies. More than a poetic device, code-

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switching corresponds directly to the generalized linguistic practices of Puerto Ricans and Chicanos whose experiences gave rise to, and are in turn recaptured in, the representative works of each new generation of writers.

In *La Carreta Made a U-Turn*, moreover, as in much Nuyorican writing, bilingual usage is also a matter of thematic concern in its own right, central to what is being said, and not merely a device. Laviera's "my graduation speech" is an excellent example, at once an enactment of the linguistic dilemma of Puerto Ricans in the United States and a telling commentary on it. At first glance the poet-persona seems only to be confirming that the jarring clash between Spanish and English has left Puerto Ricans hopelessly inarticulate and illiterate in either language, and even in their makeshift "Spanglish." The poem ends:

> hablo lo inglés matao
> hablo lo español matao
> no sé leer ninguno bien
>
> so it is, spanglish to matao
> what i digo
>
> ¡ay, virgen, yo no sé hablar!

But a closer look suggests that this cynical castigation of his linguistically crippled countrymen and of the educational system responsible for such an outcome—since it is, after all, his "graduation speech"—is only its most evident intention. The entire poem, in fact, rather than degenerating into sheer nonsense or incoherent rambling, is a carefully structured argument that demonstrates a wealth of expressive potential and a rigorous logical ability. Prefacing his self-mocking "speech" with the succinct paradox, "i think in spanish i write in english," the speaker then offers possible "resolutions" to the conflict—return to Puerto Rico or deliberate gravitation toward one or the other language. Each is rejected, the second not only because his voice does not fit neatly into either exclusive idiom, but also because such a choice would only limit his linguistic virtuosity. Furthermore, the poem illustrates that the apparent contradiction between thought and language ("i think in spanish i write in english") can be and is contraverted in the course of actual conceptualization and verbalization. Thus "¡ay, virgen, yo no sé hablar!" at the close must be understood ironically: the reader is by now aware that the speaker knows what he is saying and can say what he thinks, in both languages and in a wide array of combinations of the two.

Laviera is not claiming to have ushered in a "new language," the tendency at times in the more magniloquent pronouncements of the "Nuyorican renaissance."[13] Rather, his intention is to illustrate and assess the intricate language contact experienced by Puerto Ricans in New York, and to combat the kind of facile and defeatist conclusions that stem so often from a static, purist understanding of linguistic change. Laviera is emphasizing that the cultural decimation endured by Puerto Ricans in the United States, most glaringly evident in the bewildering, unequal clash between English and Spanish, has another side. Perhaps covertly that same process also involves an enrichment, or a shift of focus, that at the linguistic level serves to define the expressive resources available to the Puerto Rican poet in the United States.

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From this critical and realistic perspective, then, Puerto Ricans in the United States are tending toward neither assimilation nor uncritical cultural preservation; they are neither becoming Americans nor continuing to be Puerto Rican in any handed-down or contrived sense. Their historical position as a colonial people at the lowest level of the North American proletariat makes either option unfeasible. But what is left is not simply confusion, or cultural anomaly, or a "subculture of poverty," as a wide spectrum of commentators, including René Marqués, Eduardo Seda-Bonilla,[14] and Oscar Lewis,[15] conclude. It is a delicate balance, "a tight touch," as Laviera calls a remarkable short poem. Although he casts illusions aside, he is still not disillusioned, but instead builds a new affirmation from the life he sees and feels around him:

inside the crevice
deeply hidden in basement land
inside an abandoned building
the scratching rhythm of dice
percussion like two little bongos
in a fast mambo.

quivering inside this tiny ray
of sun struggling to sneak in.

the echo of the scent attracted
a new freedom which said, 'we are
beautiful anywhere, you dig?'

Despite its personal, idiosyncratic qualities, the work of Tato Laviera is representative of a contemporary cultural movement, and embodies the dialectics of everyday language among present-generation Puerto Ricans in the United States. In music, literature, painting, theatre, and dance, Puerto Rican artists are giving expression to the experiences of a people at the intersection of two nationalities, in settings provided quite often by important support institutions, such as Taller Boricua, Teatro 4, and Museo del Barrio. Of all the arts, contemporary Puerto Rican music surely suggests the most prolific and most widely proliferating innovations that come from the interweaving of diverse cultural traditions.

Many of these experimental fusions and crossovers, of course, strongly suggest the pluralist melting pot, and regarded partially, seem to indicate that assimilation is indeed in full swing. But because this fused expression is thoroughly conditioned by the abiding colonial relationship, Puerto Rico remains a key source of reference and collective identity, a wellspring of resistance to the arrogant workings of pervasive cultural subordination. At the same time, this artistic output is also firmly grounded in the sociocultural experience of the larger Puerto Rican population in the United States. It is directly tied to the ongoing struggle for equality in all spheres of social life, such as the demands for bilingual and bicultural education.

But the linkage to the larger, substantially working-class community runs deeper. Most of the cultural spokesmen who make up this movement—and Tato Laviera is but one among many—were raised in working-class families and neighborhoods, and little or nothing in their subsequent social experience has

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induced them to forget their class origins. Frequently, of course, the lumpen and the unemployed inhabit their works, not the proletariat, because the artistic locus is usually ghetto streets and tenements, not factories or union halls. This divergence from a consistent working-class standpoint is at times severe, so much so that the predominant image remains at the level of *West Side Story* and a kind of "Rican Superfly," and the "art" consists of little more than a strained glorification of ethnic uniqueness. But this lumpen orientation demands qualification, because it is in large measure the actual position of immigrant Puerto Rican workers in the reserve and service sectors of the U.S. labor force. Thus, as the following lines from Laviera's poem to "el sonero mayor" (the musician, Ismael Rivera) make clear, the appeal to the lumpen should not be set apart too rigidly from an internationalist class perspective:

> pero creo que había un vacío
> en su alma, a veces oíamos
> sus canciones pero no lo que
> él decía. solamente mi hermano
> pablo y todos los compañeros
> de la soledad y la ironía:
>
> los de las cárceles . . los de fort worth . . los de lex. ky.
> los de la 110 . . los de la castro viña . . los del
> barrio obrero . . los de martín peña . . los de puerta
> de tierra . . los lumpen pobres de la tierra

* * *

These two dimensions of Puerto Rican language and culture in the United States—national resistance and the vantage point of the have-nots—provide valuable coordinates for assessing the theoretical debate over assimilation. In general, the discussion has laid excessive stress on one or the other, depending on whether the commentator is Puerto Rican or North American. Island-based writers such as Eduardo Seda-Bonilla,[16] Manuel Maldonado-Denis,[17] and Luis Nieves-Falcón[18] tend to view assimilation as the fatal assault on the national culture of a colonially oppressed people; many North American social scientists such as Oscar Handlin,[19] Joseph Fitzpatrick,[20] and Oscar Lewis[21] interpret assimilation as the problematic insertion of still another ethnic subculture into the variegated current of the North American immigrant experience.

Such a "sociodemographic" approach, which aligns squarely with Milton Gordon's paradigm, fails to recognize, or take account of, the colonial nature of this interaction, and for the most part, implicitly, if not forthrightly, denies that Puerto Rico has so much as a national culture. Even the "radical" critiques of this mainstream research model, as for example, in *Divided Society: The Ethnic Experience in America*,[22] attach the issue of ethnic assimilation too mechanically to factors of economic and social mobility to assist reliably in assessing the specific cultural direction of Puerto Ricans as a colonial "minority." Increased economic advantage with inevitable cultural integration—often in the supposedly egalitarian, pluralist sense—is still the abiding assumption.

Puerto Rican commentators usually steer clear of these illusions; they see assimilation as the forceful loss of the national culture in its glaringly unequal

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contest with imposed foreign values. There is, of course, a formidable tradition of assimilationism and cultural accommodation among colonial thinkers, couched most typically in cosmopolitan Occidentalist terms. The writings of Eugenio Fernández Méndez[23] clearly exemplify this tradition, though many of the apologists for Commonwealth status, with all their appeals to the cultural patrimony, share the same universalizing orientation. But the Puerto Rican intellectuals who have been most vocal about the assimilation process in the United States all depart from anti-imperialist, cultural nationalist premises. Among them, Seda-Bonilla and Nieves Falcón lean more heavily on North American sociology, while Maldonado-Denis, José Luis González,[24] and Juan Angel Silén[25] attempt to ground their interpretations in a Marxist framework. They are in agreement, though, in their stress on racial and linguistic differences, which stem from the social oppression of a colonized nationality, as the essential defining element in the cultural experience of Puerto Ricans in the United States.

This political emphasis is appropriate, particularly as a means to contravert the immigrant analogy and ethnic pluralism that pervade North American analysis. Social scientists in the United States tend to reduce the national and colonial dimension, but the Puerto Rican writers fall into reductionism, too, although of a different kind. They pose the clash of national cultures as an absolute polarity, with each culture understood in static, undifferentiated, and outdated terms. Thus any disappearance of Puerto Rican traits and the taking on of present U.S. cultural lifeways signifies the surrender of the Hispanic tradition to that of Anglo-Saxon—in a word, assimilation. The complex class dynamic at work in both Puerto Rican and North American history, and at the basis of the migration itself, falls from view in this assessment.

Yet both the overarching Hispanic and Anglo-Saxon traditions have been subject to constant challenge from cultural forces within their own societies, forces that are subordinate and oppositional and that may therefore converge in ways that cannot be written off as mere "assimilation." Upward mobility is not involved here, nor does such convergence necessarily indicate the abandonment of authentic national "roots." One thinks of the indigenous and Afro-Caribbean traditions in Puerto Rican culture and how they interweave with black and other Caribbean cultures in the United States. Even the elements of coercion and inequality, so central in culture contact within an imperialist framework, play no role in this kind of interaction. Rather, shared and parallel social experiences primarily influence the cultures and language practice of working people.

At the level of popular culture, as distinct from the dominant national heritage of each society, the question of assimilation must be viewed from an angle quite different from that of the opposing flanks in the theoretical debate. Popular culture not only places in question the privileged status of the elite tradition, which presumes to define the indispensable features of entire cultures, but is also in constant tension with the very tenets of "nationality" itself, to the extent that these tenets are confining and at odds with other sources of social identity. In this respect, a strong countercurrent to the assimilation process that affects Puerto Ricans in the United States entails an "internationalization" of inherited cultural experience. The works of a representative Puerto Rican writer such as Tato Laviera and the bilingual speech characteristics of the

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community as a whole seem to elude categorization in terms of the current intellectual controversy; both testify to a cultural transformation that would break clear of the bounds set by a narrow national reference, without submitting to the leveling effect of some catch-all multicultural pluralism.

Finally, such a unifying culture and language contact also goes beyond the notion of ethnic unity of nonwhites, or Third World minorities, as expounded, for instance, by Manuel Maldonado-Denis,[26] among Puerto Rican thinkers, and by Robert Blauner[27] in the United States. The strength of this appeal to Third World solidarity lies in its insistence on a qualitative distinction between "immigrant" and "colonial" minorities, and points correctly to unity among racially oppressed groups as their first and most immediate path of political alignment. For this reason, the Third World perspective is properly regarded as a progressive, anti-imperialist position, since it undercuts the relativist understanding of ethnicity at the heart of cultural pluralist theory. Interestingly enough, in their exclusive emphasis on nonwhite as a social category, both Maldonado-Denis and Blauner (among others) allow the national dimension to collapse into another version of racial and ethnic classification, thereby extracting it, once again, from the class context.

The case against this line of interpretation is well stated by Peter Kwong in *Chinatown, N.Y.*, when he argues:

> What I am trying to get away from [in advocating a "national approach" based on political and class analysis] is the all-too-common tendency to use "racial" factors to explain the condition of minorities in this country. To assert that selection and discrimination are a result of pigmentation and physical characteristics is both unscientific and imprecise; it fails to explain the many subtle differences in the way the United States social system operates vis-à-vis each racial group, as well as to encompass within its framework class divisions within such groups. . . . And although physical characteristics obviously play a part in such discrimination, the theory of "race," as opposed to a "national" approach, can only provide a superficial and generalized explanation of a national group's experience.[28]

What Peter Kwong counterposes to "ethnic reductionism"—the term used by Colin Greer in his essay "Remembering Class"[29]—is historical interpretation grounded in an understanding of the class dynamic at work both within each group and in its particular relation to the larger society. The value of the historical method in the study of Puerto Rican culture in the United States is obvious, since most commentary on Puerto Rican acculturation, whether here or in Puerto Rico, goes back no farther than the 1950s; such commentary fails to draw on the wealth of relevant insights in such important documents about the earlier decades as *Las memorias de Bernardo Vega*[30] and Jesús Colón's *A Puerto Rican in New York*.[31]

The filling in of multiple antecedents to the process in its more recent manifestations is indeed necessary, but the full historical picture must also include considerations regarding the likely tendencies for both the short-term and long-term future. Here, in addressing the need for a reliable prognosis, the question of cultural transformation can be seen to mesh inextricably with political analysis. The usual conclusion is to say that Puerto Ricans in the United States are caught up in a process of "transition." We must ask, transition to what, total incorporation or perennial national disadvantage and exclusion?

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Whether resolutions are primarily sought in accumulated adjustments of the existing arrangement or in more basic structural change is decisive. Depending on the magnitude and depth of such change and the role in it played by Puerto Ricans, the entire tortured scenario of accommodation versus self-maintenance could readily fade into historical oblivion.

When the dimensions of class and nationality serve as the basis for analysis, what had seemed the pitiable loss and absorption of the inherited cultural tradition appears as its extension and enrichment through a process of internationalization. From this perspective of interaction among working-class cultures of diverse nationalities—occurring against a backdrop of persistent inequality and commercialist distortion—the very range and desirability of visible historical alternatives become increasingly inclusive in scope. Just as rigorous study of the linguistic situation of Puerto Ricans in the United States evokes an interpretation of the overall cultural experience, so the debate over the direction of Puerto Rican culture can only be assessed, and advanced, within the full span of pertinent options and horizons.

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my graduation speech

i think in spanish
i write in english

i want to go back to puerto rico,
but i wonder if my kink could live
in ponce, mayaguez and carolina

tengo las venas aculturadas
escribo en spanglish
abraham in español
abraham in english
tato in spanish
"taro" in english
tonto in both languages

how are you?
¿cómo estás?
i don't know if i'm coming
or si me fui ya

si me dicen barranquitas, yo reply,
"con qué se come eso?"
si me dicen caviar, i digo,
"a new pair of converse sneakers."

ahí supe que estoy jodío
ahí supe que estamos jodíos

english or spanish
spanish or english
spanenglish
now, dig this:

hablo lo inglés matao
hablo lo español matao
no sé leer ninguno bien

so it is, spanglish to matao
what i digo
¡ay, virgen, yo no sé hablar!

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el moreno puertorriqueño (a three-way warning poem)

qué voy a ser yo como moreno
puertorriqueño, preguntar
¿dónde está mi igualdad?
viendo novelas sobre morenos
esclavos, sin poder ver un
moreno en la pantalla. la
negra dorotea, el nené mingo,
papa cortijo, la morenita to-
masa, todos son blancos dis-
frasados, haciendo papeles sin
vida, haciéndose burla de mi
presencia. tratando de asimilar
mi color negroide para mejorar
la raza. ¿qué pienso yo?
¿qué pensarán mis compañeros?
les pregunto yo, ¿soy yo igual
o soy yo todavía esclavo?

ñam ñam yo no soy
de la masucamba
ñam ñam yo no soy
de la masucamba

ay baramba bamba
suma acaba
quimbombo de salsa
la rumba matamba
ñam ñam yo no soy
de la masucamba
papiri pata pata
loíza musaraña
bembón ay no canta
el cañonero es de acero
las puertas arrebatan
changó cambió color
es de la raza cumbamba
si no me quieres mi compay
te echaré flores
sin abundancia

(puerto rican black—what am i gonna do, a black / puerto rican. ask, / where is my equality? / i've seen t.v. shows about black / slaves but never a single / black man playing the parts. / old sister dorotea, baby mingo, / papa cortijo, that little black girl tomasa, / they are all whites / in black make-up, acting out life- / less roles, making light of / my presence, they'd draw / my black color to better / the race, what do i think? / what will my compañeros be thinking? / let me ask you something, am i equal / or am i still a slave?— Translated by Juan Flores. The remaining two stanzas are primarily rhythmic and for the most part untranslatable. "Three-way warning" refers to not only variety of language, but also to the relationships between verbal meanings and language rhythms.)

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This essay represents the collective efforts of the Culture and Language Policy Task Forces (LPTF) of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, City University of New York. In addition, the manuscript has benefited from close reading by Ricardo Campos and Frank Bonilla.

[1]Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[2]Tato Laviera, *La Carreta Made a U-Turn* (Gary, Ind.: Arte Público Press, 1979). All Laviera's poems in this essay are from this book. The term *Nuyorican* derives from a combination of New York and Puerto Rican.

[3]Standard language is widely assumed to be evidence of clear thought and more elaborated ideas. Basil Bernstein in "A Sociolinguistic Approach to Social Learning" (*Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences*, J. Gould [ed., Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1965], pp. 144-68) asserts this linkage; in *Class Codes and Control* (New York: Wiley, 1972) he argues that social control is exercised through the hegemony of such ideas (a virtual withdrawal from the controversies spawned by his work). Louis Althusser's insights on the ideological aspects of language standardization and social behavior are pertinent here ("Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," *Lenin and Philosophy* [New York: Monthly Review Press, Modern Reader, 1971], pp. 132-33).

[4]J. S. Coleman, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); and R. de Lone (for the Carnegie Council on Children), *Small Futures: Children, Inequality and the Limits of Liberal Reform* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979).

[5]The linguistic evidence reported in this section derives from an interdisciplinary study by the Language Policy Task Force, which includes co-authors Pedro Pedraza and John Attinasi, and Shana Poplack and Alicia Pousada. The work was sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the National Institute of Education, and the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, City University of New York. Mention of specific studies is appropriate here. Pedraza was responsible for most of the fieldwork and the ethnographic description of speech, "Ethnographic Observation of Language Usage in East Harlem" (Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, C.U.N.Y.), that will appear in a forthcoming summary research report.

The main sociolinguistic conclusions in the present article are treated at greater length by LPTF in "Social Dimensions of Language Use in East Harlem" (Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños Working Paper no. 7, 1980) and are contextualized in "Language Policy and the Puerto Rican Community," *The Bilingual Review*, 5 (1-2) (January-August, 1978): 1-40 (Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños Working Paper no. 1, Language Policy Task Force). Specific studies concerning the types of code-switching and their relation to bilingual ability may be found in Shana Poplack, "Syntactic and Social Constraints on Code-switching," *Latino Language and Communicative Behavior*, Ricardo Durán (ed.) (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, forthcoming); (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 2, 1978); and Shana Poplack, " 'Sometime I'll Start a Sentence in English *y termino en Español:* Toward a Typology of Code-Switching" (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 4, 1979; also in *Linguistics* 1980); and David Sankoff and Shana Poplack, "A Formal Grammar for Code-Switching" (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 8, 1980). Regarding linguistic structure, the analysis of the verbal system appears in Alicia Pousada and Shana Poplack, "No Case for Convergence: The Puerto Rican Spanish Verb System in a Language Contact Situation" (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 5, 1979); and plural marking is examined in detail by Shana Poplack, "Deletion and Disambiguation in Puerto Rican Spanish: A Study of Verbal (n) (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 3, 1978; expanded version in *Language*, 56 [2] [Summer 1980]), and Poplack, "Variable Concord in Sentential Plural Marking" (Language Policy Task Force Working Paper no. 6, 1980). The attitudinal report appears in greater detail in John Attinasi. "Language Attitudes in a New York Puerto Rican Community," in *Ethnoperspectives in Bilingual Education Research: Bilingual Education and Public Policy in the United States*, (R. Padilla [ed., Ypsilanti: Eastern Michigan University, 1979], pp. 408-61), and in the forthcoming summary report of research.

[6]The block we studied is 90 percent Puerto Rican, greater in ethnic density than most Puerto Rican communities, great even in comparison with the rest of El Barrio. Actually, only 20 percent of Puerto Ricans in the United States live in neighborhoods where they are in the majority, with the average density at 25 percent. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, New York Tract no. 166. (Washington, D.C.: Census of Population, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); U.S. Department of Labor, *A Socio-Economic Profile of Puerto Rican New Yorkers* (New York: Bureau of Labor Statistics 1975); D. Waggoner, "Geographic Distribution, Nativity, and Age Distribution of Language Minorities in the United States," Spring 1976, and "Place of Birth and Language Characteristics of Persons of Hispanic Origins in the United States: Spring 1976," National Center for Educational Statistics Bulletins 78 B-5, 78 B-6, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Education Division, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

[7]In all, we discovered nine major networks of social interaction at this research site, with subgroupings in each. These were all informal associations of men, or women with or without children, or mixed adults, or adolescents, that shared leisure-time activities. Some were heteroge-

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neous, centered upon a local or institution; others were defined more by similar characteristics of age, sex, or family. If a network consisted mainly of members of similar age and sex, the subgroupings were divided according to migration experience; if a network was defined by similar migration history, subgroupings were delineated by age and sex. All the networks interconnected in the neighborhood through friendship and familial ties. We did not follow the extensions of these networks outside the community, and we focused our observations principally on public and semipublic settings.

[8]Only balanced bilinguals and mainly Spanish-speaking persons were used in these studies, with characterization of competence derived from observed usage, self-report of the language that "feels most comfortable," and of language choice in various settings. Influence from English may of course be expected to be most apparent in the Spanish of those who almost exclusively use English. Such speakers, however, were not included for analysis, because they did not produce enough Spanish to compare quantitatively with the others.

[9]A language attitude survey was conducted through personal tape-recorded interviews using a questionnaire of over one hundred seventy-five items. The sample included ninety-one persons chosen as representative by Pedraza in the course of the ethnographic observation.

[10]A *New York Times* survey conducted May 11-14, 1980, showed similar results.

[11]Pedro Pietri, *Puerto Rican Obituary* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

[12]Réne Marqués, *La carreta* (Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1963).

[13]See especially the Introduction to *Nuyorican Poetry: An Anthology of Puerto Rican Words and Feelings*, Miguel Algarín and Miguel Piñero (eds.) (New York: William Morrow, 1975).

[14]Eduardo Seda-Bonilla, *Requiem por una cultura* (Río Piedras: Ediciones Bayoán, 1972).

[15]Oscar Lewis, *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York* (New York: Random House, 1965). See also, Lewis, *A Study of Slum Culture: Backgrounds for La Vida* (New York: Random House, 1968).

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[17]Manuel Maldonado-Denis, "Cultura y educación: el problema de la asimilación cultural," in *Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos: Emigración y Colonialismo* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1976).

[18]Luis Nieves-Falcón, *El emigrante puertorriqueño* (Río Piedres: Edil, 1975).

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[20]Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, *Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

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[24]See *Conversación con José Luis Gonzáles*, Arcadio Díaz Quiñones (ed.) (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1976).

[25]Juan Angel Silén, "Aspectos sobresalientes del problema nacional puertorriqueño y la nueva lucha de independencia," *The Rican*, 2 (2–3) (1974): 14–20.

[26]Maldonado-Denis, "Cultura y educación," pp. 123-54.

[27]Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

[28]Peter Kwong, *Chinatown, N.Y. Labor and Politics, 1930-1950* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 12-13.

[29]Colin Green, "Remembering Class," in *Divided Society*.

[30]Bernardo Vega, *Memorias de Bernardo Vega*, Cesar Andreu Iglesias (ed.) (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1975).

[31]Jesús Cólon, *A Puerto Rican in New York and Other Sketches* (New York: Mainstream, 1961).

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HAYWOOD BURNS

From *Brown* to *Bakke* and Back: Race, Law, and Social Change in America

Brown as the Watershed—1954–1964

ALONG WITH *Dred Scott v. Sanford*[1] and *Plessy v. Ferguson*,[2] *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*[3] stands as a major landmark on the American constitutional landscape. All three cases had a profound effect on racial justice and social change in the United States. All three reflect quite well the especially American propensity to convert burning social questions into legal controversies and to place them before the nation's courts in the hope of definitive resolution. The courts, of course, do not resolve these issues (not even the Supreme Court). In the case of *Scott*, it took a Civil War to provide even such unsatisfactory answers as we do have regarding the status of black people in white America. The monolith of American apartheid erected on *Plessy* was under assault from its inception, solving nothing for six decades before giving way before the force of *Brown*. Though they definitely resolved none of the controversies they addressed, all three cases deeply affected American racial justice, and are excellent illustrations of how the law shapes and is shaped by social forces in an escalating spiral of interaction and reciprocity. That is, law and legal institutions are greatly affected by the social milieu they are part of, while at the same time, they affect that social milieu through the juridical disposition of social issues. At times they affect society even more importantly through the "messages" sent to the larger society by the way the courts decide these issues and how these decisions are explained: "The negro has no rights whites are bound to respect" *(Scott)*; "Separate but equal" is the law of the land *(Plessy)*.

These observations apply fully to the *Brown* decision. A significant distinguishing feature of *Brown*, however, is that it represented a major legal breakthrough for those who seek to use the law as an instrument of social change in the service of racial justice, both in what it decided and how it was decided. This is in marked contrast to *Scott* and *Plessy*, where the dominant American historical tendency of law as an instrument of American racism further institutionalized and perpetuated a vertical relationship of white over black. *Brown* was a culmination and a genesis, and in this sense it is not only a constitutional landmark, but a monument to the wise and creative use of law as an instrument of social change as well. *Brown* climaxed twenty years of careful building to establish this precedent.[4] It was the product of an elaborate and well-implemented master plan of social change through constitutional litigation that chipped away at segregation through precise, separate, and well-directed

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attacks, until the major blow could be delivered. *Brown* capped a legal strategy that turned *Plessy* on its head.

But *Brown* did more. The "message" it sent to a waiting America was that "equal under law" applied to persons of color as well. It gave the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court's full seal of approval, and with this imprimatur, gave rise to the sense, if not the actuality, that the federal government now stood foursquare on the side of social justice and equality under law for nonwhites. Though in a narrow sense *Brown* only dealt with school desegregation, it became a kind of charter of liberty for minority rights in the United States.

While recognizing the actual precedential legal significance of *Brown*, the symbolic value of this charter of liberty must not be underrated. The symbolic and the actual working in tandem gave impetus to the ferment for social change in the mid-1950s and beyond. There is a direct link between the development of the organized movements for social change of the 1950s and 1960s and *Brown;* in the midst of an unequal and unjust society, these movements were spurred on by *Brown*'s proclamation of equal justice.

In 1955, the year after *Brown*, the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and others, impelled by the imperatives of equality, led the historic Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott, inaugurating the modern civil rights movement in America. This quest, of course, led time and again to the courts and then to the Congress. The protests at Montgomery led eventually to a U.S. Supreme Court decision on November 13, 1956, that ruled as unconstitutional Alabama's laws requiring segregation on buses.[5] Soon after, in 1957, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) came into being under the leadership of Dr. King. Working on its own, and in cooperation with older civil rights organizations such as the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the drive for rights continued apace.

Greensboro, North Carolina, in February 1960 saw the beginnings of the sit-in movement in which black people, through nonviolent direct-action protests, began to make it clear that they would no longer accept segregated lunch counters and other public facilities, go to the back of the bus, enter the side door, or sit in the upper balcony. These protests, led mostly by black students, swept across the South like a prairie fire, integrating lunch counters in city after city, and giving rise in that same year to one of the most important groups to engage in the struggle for minority rights, the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC). Inevitably, in the process of challenge and demand, the law became important in securing recognition of rights and in protecting activists who engaged in the protests. Thousands were arrested and had to be defended. Local laws and ordinances that protected the segregation system had to be taken on in the courts.

What went on in the streets worked in concert with what went on in the courts, jointly advancing the cause of minority rights. Great reliance was placed on the federal courts, most especially the Supreme Court, to protect the right of protest and to give effect to the rights being demanded.

On December 11, 1961, the Supreme Court, in its first decision in the sit-in cases, voided the conviction of 16 black students from Southern University in

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Baton Rouge, Louisiana, who had been convicted of the "commission of an act in such a manner as to disturb or alarm the public." The court held that the peace had not been disturbed by the students' lawful demonstration and that their arrests were unlawful.[6] On February 25, 1963, the Supreme Court ruled that 187 black people were convicted unjustly on breach-of-the-peace charges filed after they had demonstrated on the South Carolina capitol grounds. The Court declared that constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of grievances had been breached.[7] These legal decisions were major victories for the civil rights movement, especially since these rulings had an important bearing on the cases of many other persons involved in the protest movement.[8]

The Supreme Court's decision in *Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia*[9] in early spring of 1961 also had an important impact on the growing demand for minority rights and equal treatment. The Court's declaration, however, rather than being the culmination of a struggle, served largely as the basis for new demands and the launching of a whole new wave of protests. In that case, the court held that discrimination against interstate travelers in bus terminals was illegal. This broad holding called forth the Freedom Rides, a major set of civil rights actions to test the Court's decision. Buses from the North streamed into the South, carrying activists who sought to give the abstract declaration real meaning in the lives of the everyday traveler. The Freedom Rides are significant for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that, unlike the sit-ins, they involved large numbers of persons from outside the South. This fact helped greatly to dramatize racial injustice, violence, and segregation in the South, and to imprint the situation even more deeply on the national consciousness, calling forth national solutions to the problem. The Freedom Rides, finally, were responsible for moving the Kennedy Administration, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, to issue a nondiscrimination directive to bus companies and terminals throughout the United States.[10]

The demand for rights increasingly took on national proportions as the civil rights movement applied pressure not only to the local governmental authorities, but to the federal government as well. The appeal—and demand—went beyond the lower federal judiciary and the Supreme Court to the highest levels of national government—executive, legislative, and administrative.

This particular phase of the struggle for rights came together in a massive outpouring from a broad coalition of civil rights adherents in the historic March on Washington on August 28, 1963. The marchers, hundreds of thousands strong, came to the seat of government (under the banner "Jobs and Freedom") to demand justice. "Freedom" was, in essence, a call to the Kennedy Administration for better civil rights enforcement, but it also called for more—for new national laws to guarantee equal justice for all. Clearly, the president and the Congress already had some understanding of the need for civil rights legislation—there had been almost no major federal civil rights law since 1875.[11] What was less clear to many was the meaning of the demand for jobs coming from the movement at this time. It represented a significant extension of the claims being made by civil rights adherents, going beyond concerns of equality at lunch counters, in restrooms, and on buses, to fundamental issues of allocation of

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national resources and the imperatives of economic justice. Embedded within this demand were the seeds of a major test for America: Could the country, in doing justice to the excluded, not only provide political and social freedom, but right as well the manifold wrongs that were the result of the centuries-old exploitation and pillaging of the "have-nots" by the haves.

The Legislative Response

The Johnson Administration made a strong commitment to passage of major civil rights legislation. This was achieved with the Civil Rights Act of 1964[12] and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,[13] the most important civil rights legislation in almost a century. These laws were the fruition of years of struggle, protest, great human suffering, and sacrifice, and a triumph for those who fought for equality under law in America. The 1964 act contained major provisions that, as pronouncements, placed the national government squarely on the side of racial justice in America. This was especially true of Title II, which banned discrimination in places of public accommodation. Title VI, which provided for the cut-off of federal funds to those who engaged in discrimination, and Title VII, which barred discrimination in employment. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a crucial legal tool in breaking the grip of disfranchisement in which millions of black persons throughout the country were held, most especially in the South. Black exclusion from the ballot in the post-Reconstruction era was both a cause and a result of black powerlessness in the twentieth century. The Voting Rights Act promised to restore the franchise, and with it, meaningful black participation in political power and self-rule.

It was not until 1968[14] that there was national civil rights legislation in the area of housing. The Fair Housing act was passed one week after Dr. King's assassination, after years of unsuccessful attempts to get Congress to legislate in this area. The act was an important step forward for civil rights advocates, but it was handicapped from the beginning by the reluctance of Congress to appropriate funds to enforce it, the number of exceptions and exemptions it included, and the failure to give responsibility for its enforcement to a new agency instead of to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

In this same period, in response to the clamor for economic justice, Congress also passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964[15] and launched its war on poverty. This effort was a government attempt to redress some of the disparities of economic standing that existed in America. It was legislation sired in large part by popular forces for change. As such, it further recognized the importance of law in addressing the problems of the poor by providing major funding for neighborhood poverty law offices to wage the battles of the poor in the courts at all levels. This gave even greater impetus to two already growing phenomena—the expansion of the right to counsel in many areas of law and the increased resort to law as an instrument of change for those locked out of full integration into American life.

The major national legislation was a tremendous breakthrough and a decisive victory for the proponents of social change. But it did not come soon

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enough, nor were its promised rewards large enough, to stem the tide of anger and frustration that was growing in America, particularly in the teeming ghettos of the country's urban centers. These feelings were compounded by the paucity of visible signs of progress as the movement moved into the North to confront a more complex racial situation that was often every bit as entrenched and intransigent as that in the South—often more so. There was no officially sanctioned legal structure of segregation, but racism and discrimination were apparent on all sides. Answers were not readily available, or at least not readily proferred, when the demands increasingly became the right to earn money rather than the right to spend it at a dime-store lunch counter. Anger, hurt, frustration, and fury flared time and again in the urban rebellions of the late sixties. Civil rights legislation or no, the passage of laws does not carry with it their immediate implementation. For many, it was a case of too little, much too late.

The Slide Back—The Nixon Administration/The Nixon Court

Nineteen sixty-eight saw the deaths of Dr. King and Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the election of Richard M. Nixon as president. It saw as well great alterations in the social movements that were pushing for change in the area of civil rights. In many ways this movement was dissipating and becoming fragmented. Some proponents of civil rights had relaxed and become less involved after the great victories in the South and the triumphs of national civil rights legislation. Others had been lost to the despair and disillusionment that came with the urban rebellions of the mid to late 1960s and followed in its wake. Still others became confused and eventually uninvolved when the growth of black nationalism and black separatism within the civil rights movement became the cry for black power. Basic challenges continued, but the impetus for change was slowed down, sidetracked, thwarted.

Greatly aiding in this process, and sometimes responsible for its generation, were major shifts that were taking place in the national political and legal climate—shifts of such magnitude as to alter radically the ability to achieve new legal gains in the area of minority rights and even to obtain adequate enforcements of rights already won. In fact, whereas in earlier years the interaction between the prevailing political and legal climates had served to advance the cause of civil rights, in the late 1960s it served increasingly to stifle political dissent and cut off judicial redress as a means of achieving social justice. Rather than seeking the proper ways and means to be responsive to militant social movements for racial justice, law and state power, acting in the name of "law and order," increasingly advanced ways to damage and even destroy those groups and individuals seeking racial justice through aggressive challenge to the *status quo*.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968[16] is a good example of this harsh political reality. Just as the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 were the legislative centerpieces of their time, so too was this legislation for its. It showed a "get tough" mentality in its provisions for preventive detention, "no-knock" entry into private dwellings, and other gross incursions into what had previously been regarded as fundamental rights. The Interstate Riot Act permitted

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prosecution for crossing state lines with intent to cause a disturbance—a too-elastic law subject to much blatant political abuse. After the 1968 presidential election, these federal statutory provisions operated in conjunction with a national political policy that was consistently hostile to civil rights activism and often to civil rights.

It was not until the late 1970s that the public became aware of a conscious, deliberate, elaborate government program specifically designed to undercut and destroy groups and individuals engaged in the struggle for social justice during those years. In fact, many of the details of the FBI's "Cointel" program began to surface only during congressional hearings in the early years of the Carter Administration.[17] The record is now clear that covert attempts—using nefarious and illegal means—to destroy civil rights elements were systematically carried out during the late 1960s and into the 1970s. These attempts obviously were not without their successes.

In this period, the national administration, rather than being a source of succor in the battle for racial justice, was often the initiator of, or accomplice in, policies and practices that suffocated those who sought change. The Nixon Administration ordered and then defended the mass arrests without probable cause of thousands of demonstrators on the streets of Washington, D.C. It sanctioned wide use of electronic surveillance, manipulation of the grand jury process, and the heavy infusion of paramilitaristic armaments and materiel into local police forces through LEAA (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration). These developments in the administration of law and justice were accompanied by increased visible governmental violence and the summary execution of students at Kent State, Jackson State, and Orangeburg State, and at Southern University, with Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark and thirty-nine persons in D-yard at Attica State Prison all meeting similar fates.

Of course, attorneys for the civil rights movement continued to press their claims in the courts, but the devastation of the movement, the changing political and legal climate, and the major victories already realized changed the nature of the claims. In this climate of repression and constriction, it was difficult for broad new demands to surface and to be clearly articulated and advanced. A great deal of the legal struggle now centered around the elaboration, refinement, and implementation of the major gains already made through legislation and court decisions in such areas as education, employment, and housing. This was a more intricate, sophisticated, and technical process, one of critical importance, but often lacking much of the glamour and high visibility of earlier civil rights struggles.

A crucial change in the period after 1968 is the change in the composition and tenor of the Supreme Court. With the ascendancy of Warren Burger as Chief Justice and the appointment of new justices, the Court began to demonstrate a more restrictive view of human rights across the board. This was true not only in racial areas, but also in related areas that were not racial on their face but that had a decided racial dimension and impact—the rights of the poor, the welfare recipient, the criminal suspect, and the convicted prisoner.[18] Because of this climate, the Supreme Court, which a few years earlier had been

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seen as the last bastion of civil rights under law in this country, more and more came to be viewed with fear and suspicion by those who sought to use law as an instrument of social change.

The Fourteenth Amendment—especially through its "equal protection" clause—has been one of the main constitutional means for guaranteeing equal justice under the law. Constitutional issues involving minorities and equal rights do not always come up to the Court in a purely racial form. There is a confluence of issues of caste and class in this country, because such a disproportionate number of the poor are nonwhite; thus, when issues are presented to the Court as issues of equal protection in matters of economic justice, they often have as well deep and far-reaching racial implications. In deciding these issues, however, the present Supreme Court views the Fourteenth Amendment restrictively, and refuses to apply the same standard of interpretations in cases involving alleged economic injustice as it has in cases involving alleged racial injustice.[19] The result is that government is held to a far lesser standard in discriminating against the poor than it is in discriminating against racial minorities, though the discrimination against the poor has a decidedly racial dimension.

Accompanying this trend has been one of greater restriction of access to the courts for deciding rights issues, and of narrowing the basis for granting civil rights relief. The Supreme Court has made access more difficult by imposing more stringent "standing" requirements; that is, which party has sufficient interest in a wrong to maintain a law suit to right it. It has cut back on the ability to bring law suits on behalf of a group of injured parties—the class action—an indispensable procedural mechanism for the civil rights litigator. Further, it has made proof of discrimination more difficult by imposing a stricter evidentiary standard of proof, and full relief harder to obtain by cutting back on the power of federal courts to grant a remedy.[20]

Both because of problems of access and judicial attitude, civil rights legal advocates have had to rethink their former attachment to the Supreme Court as a court of last resort. Rather than being the tribunal before which to place their most important issues, it has become in many instances the Court to defend against and avoid. There has been considerable attention given to the role of the administrative agency in civil rights enforcement, especially the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the compliance section of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Health and Human Sciences. Such agencies are now seen as more important both because of their pivotal role in the enforcement of civil rights statutes and their responsibility for promulgating the regulations and policies for the interpretation and implementation of civil rights laws. Lesser reliance on the federal judiciary and especially the Supreme Court has led to greater emphasis being placed, not only on the administrative process, but also on the legislative process in the hope of getting an improved statutory scheme from the Congress.

Further, Justice William Brennan, who increasingly in the post-1968 era has found himself in the dissent as the Court retreated on matters of federal civil rights, suggests in a seminal article that litigators press their claims in state courts, relying on provisions in state constitutions that parallel those in the

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federal Constitution but that receive their ultimate interpretation from the state supreme courts.[21] This suggestion has not gone unheeded, but that it was even felt necessary to be made by a justice of the nation's highest court speaks volumes on the present status of law, civil rights, and social change.

Affirmative Action: Bakke *et al.*

Not only has the Supreme Court ceased to play its former role in the area of civil rights, but it is now held in high regard by the forces—both government and private citizens—arrayed against civil rights adherents. These have now turned to the Court as a court of last resort, with the same hope and expectancy once held by civil rights lawyers. Such hope and expectancy have not gone unrewarded. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of opposition to affirmative action and the use of the courts to advance that cause.

Affirmative action is a straightforward private or public administrative remedy designed to correct past discrimination or ameliorate its effects. Though full reparations for racial minorities (and women) in this society may never be possible, it represents some small effort to bring simple justice to the employment and educational sectors of our national life. Affirmative action measures, whether court-ordered, administratively directed, or voluntary, have called forth large-scale white opposition. This opposition often takes the form of litigation, forcing those who advocate racial justice to struggle in the courts again, this time not as plaintiffs seeking rights, but as defendants seeking to protect these measures against charges of "reverse discrimination." *University of California v. Allan Bakke*,[22] like *Brown*, *Plessy*, and *Dred Scott* before it, became the key case into which were poured massive amounts of national energy, thought, resources, and emotion, with the hope that the Supreme Court would give the clarifying, definitive answer to this troubling racial question. The answer was far from fully satisfactory to any of the contending parties. A badly divided court essentially took the position that it was acceptable under the right circumstances to take race into account when making decisions on access to higher education, but that numerical quotas, at least of the kind in place at the University of California at Davis, could *not* pass constitutional muster. *Bakke* thus left undefined and unanswered many questions regarding the limits of affirmative action.

The issue was somewhat further illuminated in the case of *United Steelworkers of America v. Weber*,[23] in which a white worker challenged a special job promotion program on the ground that it discriminated against him in favor of blacks with less seniority. The Court upheld this voluntary private plan, but it did not indicate whether such a plan would be valid if governmentally ordered or initiated.

In *Fullilove v. Klutznik*,[24] a 6 to 3 majority of the Court upheld a federal law requiring 10 percent of the public construction funds disbursed under the affirmative action law to go to minority contractors. Though this so-called minority business enterprise or set-aside provision provided a more important test of the power of the government to use numerical percentage targets in its remedial affirmative action efforts, the victory hardly disposes of all the issues involved in this area, since even the justices comprising the majority could not

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agree on their reasons for upholding the legality of such a governmental effort. In terms of their broader implications, however, cases like *Weber* and *Fullilove* may have even greater importance than *Bakke*, since they involve affirmative action in the workplace—an area more meaningful, at least in numerical terms, to millions of minority persons than access to higher education.

In any event, it is clear that the proponents of racial justice and social change will continue to have substantial, if unwilling, involvement in the courts in the post-*Bakke* era, as they attempt to hold onto the hard-won gains of an earlier time and to someday actually achieve their full realization.

The Unredeemed Promise

More than a quarter of a century has passed since *Brown*. In that time Americans have had a great deal of experience with the use of law as an instrument of change in the area of race relations. What difference has law made in the real life situations of persons of color in the United States? In the area of education, where *Brown* focused, it certainly has not been a panacea; though gains have been made through a systematic legal struggle to implement *Brown*, nearly half of the nation's minority children attend racially isolated schools.[25] Linda Brown, the original plaintiff in *Brown*, now a mature woman in her thirties, in 1979 found it necessary to take further legal action in her original case owing to the lack of true desegregation in Topeka schools. Of course, for all its failings on a national level, how much less desegregation would there be but for the legal struggle waged in the courts and elsewhere for two and a half decades since *Brown*. The accomplishment must also be seen in the context of the massive violent white resistance to desegregation in general, and busing for the purposes of desegregation in particular. This popular resistance, of course, has had its political and legislative counterparts in the constant and ongoing attempts to throw legislative roadblocks in the path of meaningful school desegregation.[26] The beginning of this decade finds minority children and their parents by the millions still seeking to redeem the promise of *Brown*.

The employment status of minorities has long lagged behind that of whites, especially white males. Despite the reach of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court decisions, administrative actions, and regulations pursuant thereto, a great gap remains. In fact, the disparities in unemployment rates of minorities and women and of white males increased between 1970 and 1976,[27] disparities that, according to recent statistics, persist today.[28] After *Bakke*, the ultimate fate of affirmative action in the Supreme Court remains in doubt. There have been helpful court, legislative, and administrative initiatives in the area of employment, but nothing of the magnitude that alone will bridge the unemployment gap. The "jobs" that were sought in the March on Washington in 1963 are yet to be found for millions of minority persons.

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 carried with it the promise of equal opportunity housing, but all indicators point to continued barriers to minority persons in their search for decent and affordable housing, free from racial discrimination. After an in-depth look at the patterns and practices in housing in America, a recent U.S. government study dolefully concluded that the "persistence of discrimination in housing in the United States more than 10

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years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 is one of the most troubling aspects of the past year."[29] This situation twelve years after the enactment of the Fair Housing law is a product of historic exclusion, but reflects as well the failure of HUD and the Department of Justice in administering and enforcing Title VIII.

One of the more visible "successes" of the civil rights movement and the legislation that came out of it is the experience with the franchise. Major breakthroughs have been made by minorities in this area, greatly increasing the number of minority elected officials and enhancing minority political power. This in turn has had an effect on the numbers of minority-appointed officials, including members of the judiciary. For minorities, the ballot has been responsible for greater participation in, and control over, their own lives. It has also brought about a decided diminution in the overt violence and repression directed at minority group members owing to their attempts to exercise the franchise; once the vote had been won, the power that came with it had to be recognized and to some appreciable degree respected.[30]

The movement's efforts, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the enforcement of that law by the Department of Justice notwithstanding, there remains a need for continued vigilance and active enforcement in this area. However, the greatest threat to minority voting rights today comes not in the form of outright exclusion from the ballot box, but rather from artful stratagems designed to dilute or cancel the effect of the minority franchise. At-large systems of voting, designed to make it all but impossible for a minority person to win an election, where a multidistricting arrangement would assure minority representation, are often used for this purpose.[31]

For all its value, the full and free exercise of the franchise by minority persons will not guarantee equal justice under the law. It will help, but since this group is, by definition, in the minority, it does not have the numbers to control the politics of rights. Thus even with the newfound power of the franchise and increased representation and participation in government, minorities must depend on just laws and the Constitution fairly enforced to avoid Tocqueville's "tyranny of the majority."

In absolute terms, blacks and other minorities have made progress in recent decades: they are earning more, learning more (if blacks in higher education is any measure), and living longer. In relative terms, however, little, if any, progress has been made in the real-life situations of most blacks. The gap between white America and nonwhite America, despite all efforts, is still large.[32] Granted, it would without a doubt be even larger were it not for the struggles waged and the legal advances made. The present reality, however, is, as Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his separate opinion in *Bakke*, that the black infant mortality rate is twice that of the white; a black mother is three times as likely to die of childbirth or its complications; a black family is four times as likely to be below the poverty line; a black person is likely to die five years sooner than a white.[33]

The promise of *Brown* and the civil rights acts has not been redeemed. In the face of rampant economic disaster and unrelenting racial discrimination, far too many minority persons in the United States enjoy neither jobs nor freedom. This, however, cannot necessarily support a negative judgment on the efficacy

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of law in bringing about social change and racial justice. The shortcomings are obvious, but just as obvious are the millions of lives that have been touched and made better by civil rights laws and decisions and their enforcement. Further, these were far from hollow victories; they have had a decided and indelible impact on the nation's attitudes about race, and provide a foundation on which to build civil rights enforcement efforts in the future and a program for wider recognition of civil rights under law.

Our national odyssey since *Brown* should have taught us something about the possibilities and the limitations of social change through law. On the one hand, our experience has given the lie to the old William Graham Sumner dictum that "stateways" cannot alter folkways. Rejecting the notion that an attitudinal change must precede a behavioral one, the civil rights movement and civil rights laws got people—some people—to act differently, whether they liked it or not, because it was right. In many instances the hearts and minds of people did indeed change once the law got them to act differently. People sit on racially integrated buses, eat at racially integrated lunch counters, drink from racially integrated drinking fountains, and attend racially integrated theater performances without a second thought, where once it would have been anathema for them to do so. On the other hand, law has not succeeded in breaking down the racial walls that separate us in our homes, our schools, and our workplaces. The personal/private and the economic sphere have been more impervious to legal assault. This is so, not because law is somehow inherently incapable of making fundamental changes in these areas, but because it cannot do so in the face of widespread and deep-seated popular resistance. In this sense, at least so far, Sumner has been proved right. If national resolve could match national legislation in these areas, racial disparities in our national life could be eliminated. But when the man and woman (white) in the street do not want these changes, they will not come about. What we get instead is intrepid opposition at the street level, legislative proposals to undermine forward movement, and weak, sometimes nonexistent enforcement efforts by the executive branch of government. The lack of greater change is, ironically, evidence of the democratic system at work, for it reflects the will of a people who have yet to accept fully their darker fellow citizens.

The efforts at economic justice have fallen far short of the mark as well because of the lack of a collective commitment to redress the economic imbalance. Instead, the prevailing economic self-interest makes virtually impossible the kind of economic readjustments and commitments necessary to redress the abject poverty that exists in this country. Both in terms of dollars and other efforts, the war on poverty, for all that it attempted, was little more than a skirmish, but there is no popular mandate that would allow for more. Unless and until there begins to be something like a national consensus opposing racism and discrimination in all of its forms, in favor of realigning our priorities and reallocating our resources, there is little reason to hope for the just society.

This is the political reality that circumscribes our legal institutions. Law can transcend these boundaries only so far—if at all—for in the large measure, its capacity is defined by them. But this is not a reason for the advocates of social change through law to despair. Within its limitations, law has played and continues to play a crucial role. It can affect, alter, and extend these boundaries,

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and over time make its contribution to the larger political process that will forge a new political consciousness—out of which a more just society may arise.

REFERENCES

The research assistance of Sharon Carter, of the City College of New York-New York Law School, Urban Legal Studies Program, is gratefully acknowledged.

[1]Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

[2]Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

[3]Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[4]See Richard Kluger, *Simple Justice* (New York: Knopf, 1976) for a detailed development of this history. In treating the subject of race, law, and social change in the post-*Brown* era, this article will focus mainly on developments in the federal law and the Constitution, though of course many of these developments were in response to local and state laws and of necessity involved them. In most instances, the racial group directly involved is black, but this is mainly because of the special role blacks have played in the era of race, law, and social change. The legal principles involved apply equally to other racial minorities. The scope of this article did not permit a detailed treatment of the individual special experiences of the different racial groups. There are varieties, levels, and permutations of this question that deserve further scrutiny and more extended treatment in another setting, for example, the question of *Brown* and its application to multiracial desegregation situations, and a host of legal issues pertaining to bilingualism and the Hispanic community. Further, it can be demonstrated that members of racial minority groups have played a disproportionately large role in bringing about positive changes in the law in noncivil rights areas, such as advances in the criminal justice system, where as defendants they have successfully challenged unfair practices. See, for example, Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932), Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In a similar manner, many social and legal changes have come to the welfare rights movement, the prisoner's rights movement, the women's rights movement, the gay rights movement, and others through the inspiration and example of the movement for racial justice. Such important, but derivative, impacts, however, are beyond the scope of this article.

[5]Browder v. Gayle, 352 U.S. 903.

[6]Garner v. Louisiana, Briscoe v. Louisiana, Hoston v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157.

[7]Edwards v. South Carolina, 371 U.S. 229.

[8]See Derrick Bell, *Race, Racism and American Law* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 301-2.

[9]Boynton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 364 U.S. 454.

[10]49 C.F.R. § 180 (a).

[11]Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634; Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86.

[12]Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241.

[13]Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437.

[14]Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73.

[15]Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 508. This legislation was, of course, the product of more than pressure from the civil rights movement, but such pressure played a significant role in its passage.

[16]Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197.

[17]See, for example, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2d Session, Report no. 94–755.

[18]It would be a mistake to view this development in a wholly linear fashion. The Court and its process are much too complicated, and decisional patterns much too varied, for this. There have been countervailing tendencies within the Burger Court as there were within the Warren Court. However, the dominant tendency remains for both, the Warren Court advancing rights, the Burger Court cutting back on them. See Sidney Zion. "A Decade of Constitutional Revision," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 11, 1979, p. 26 et seq.

[19]See, for example, Dandridge v. Williams 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Jack Greenberg, *Judicial Process and Social Change* (St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1977), pp. 237-326.

[20]See Michael A. Berch, "Unchain the Courts—An Essay on the Role of the Federal Courts in the Vindication of Social Rights," *1976 Arizona State University Law Journal*, 437 (1977); and Lawrence B. Liebowitz, "*Rizzo v. Goode:* The Burger Court's Continuing Assault on Federal Jurisdiction," *30 Rutgers Law Review*, 103, (1976).

[21]William J. Brennan, Jr., "State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," *Harvard Law Review*, 90 (January 1977): 489-504.

[22]University of California at Davis v. Allan Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a slightly earlier example involving a white person's challenge to affirmative action in law school admissions, never

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resolved by the Supreme Court owing to mootness, see De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).

[23]United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 61 L.Ed 2d 480 (1979).

[24]*Fullilove v. Klutznik, 48 United States Law Week*, 4979 (July 2, 1980).

[25]"The State of Civil Rights: 1979," *United States Commission on Civil Rights* (1980), p. 14.

[26]For an excellent discussion of the 1979 congressional efforts to limit school desegregation progress, see "The State of Civil Rights: 1979," Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[27]Ibid., p. 21.

[28]Ibid., p. 30. "During the third quarter of 1979, the unemployment rate for black males age 20 and over was 8.3 percent and 5.5 percent for Hispanics, compared with 3.3 percent for white males. For females age 20 and over, the unemployment rate was 11.4 percent for black females and 8.4 percent for Hispanic females, compared with 5.2 percent for white females. For teenagers (16–19 years of age) the unemployment rate for black males was 30.3 percent and for Hispanic male teenagers it was 18.3 percent, compared to 12.8 percent for white males. The unemployment rate for minority teenagers (16–19 years of age) was markedly worse for females than for males. For black females it was 38.6 percent, for Hispanic females it was 21.8 percent, and for white females it was 14.2 percent. These employment statistics are virtually the same as those reported in the third quarter of 1978."

[29]Ibid., p. 2.

[30]For further commentary and analysis, see *National Roster of Elected Officials*, vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1979). The ballot has been far from a panacea, however. Advances in the all-important economic sphere have not kept pace.

[31]In spring 1980 the Supreme Court turned back a civil rights challenge to the at-large voting system of Mobile, Alabama, declaring that dilution of the black vote through this system was not a matter of constitutional consequence unless proof of *intent* to discriminate could be demonstrated. This requirement of proof will make it virtually impossible to establish a constitutional violation in many areas where the black franchise has been diluted. *City of Mobile v. Bolden 48 U.S. Law Week*, 4436 (April 22, 1980). Similar results were reached in *Nevett v. Sides 48 U.S. Law Week*, 3750 (May 20, 1980) and in *Aranda v. Van Sickle 48 U.S. Law Week*, 3750 (May 20, 1980), a case involving a claim by Mexican-American voters. Evidently, it is still possible under some extreme circumstances to obtain a favorable ruling from the court in the dilution of the franchise areas, as in the Rome, Georgia, case where changes from the plurality-win to majority-win system, and other alterations in voting rules, were found to be racially tainted and unlawful. *City of Rome v. U.S. 48 U.S. Law Week*, 4463 (April 22, 1980).

[32]See, for example, "The State of Black America: 1980," National Urban League (1980).

[33]University of California at Davis v. Allan Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395 (1978).

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THOMAS F. PETTIGREW

Race and Class in the 1980s: An Interactive View

A PERSISTENT PROBLEM IN AMERICAN social science has been the conceptualization of the complex relationship between race and social class. The issue arises now with special force because social stratification has intensified among the nation's racial minorities. Present-day race relations require, then, a revised formulation of the race-and-class question.

I will begin by placing the issue in historical perspective through a brief review of the various formulations that have been advanced over this century.[1] I will then sketch out three significant social trends that are altering the framework of race relations. These trends render the old formulations even less appropriate than they were at an earlier period in our national history. Only a more complex, interactive conceptualization of the race-and-class issue can do justice to modern realities. A full development of this interactive proposal is not possible here. Nor is it the complete reformulation that is needed. But any fully satisfactory model will necessarily have to go in this interactive direction. I will close with a discussion of the implications of this interactive perspective—particularly the new patterns of racism that have emerged since the civil rights movement passed from center stage in the late 1960s.

Race and Class Models over the Years

The varying conceptualizations of American race relations through the years have all been elaborations of a few crude analogues. Initially there were three overlapping analogues. One had religious origins, later reinforced by twisted biological arguments. It viewed black-white relations as "naturally" evolving from relations between "higher" and "lower" beings. A slightly more benign version—a cultural one—held sway during the age of colonialism. It viewed race relations as a "natural" result of "advanced" Western culture as it encountered and dominated "primitive" non-Western cultures. A third perspective—this one economic—saw race relations as simply the outgrowth of master-slave relations. Three later models evolved from these initial ones and have dominated twentieth century thinking about race and class. The *race model* grew out of the religious and biological contentions, and emphasizes racial factors as more critical than class factors. The *class-and-caste model* developed from the cultural arguments of the last century. The Hindu caste system serves as the analogue to American race relations, and class variables are considered important within

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each racial group. The *social class model* is an outgrowth of the master-slave analogue. Usually advanced by Marxists, it shifts the focus from race to that of capitalists and labor.

THE RACE MODEL

This perspective maintains that black-white relations in the United States are unique. Our special national history involving skin color, from slavery to current racism, has shaped these relations into persistent patterns that do not allow easy translations into other terms. Thus it is held that American race relations defy direct comparisons with class conflict, ethnic conflict among whites, or even racial situations in other parts of the world. Such comparisons are thought at best to obscure the depth of the problem and at worst to rationalize away its uniquely racist core.

The race model is familiar because it has been the dominant perspective of American intellectuals throughout much of this century. It can assume widely divergent forms, from a white racist version that attempts to rationalize racial domination in the name of black "inferiority," to the opposite extreme of holding that there is something pathological in white American character structure. Yet in its mainstream version, this model has served in this century largely as a general view of "enlightened" liberal thought. Though sometimes patronizingly assimilationist in tone, this model has often been relied upon to argue for the eradication of racial discrimination and segregation.

The scholarly underpinnings of the race model are extensive. Gunnar Myrdal's classic analysis of American race relations, *An American Dilemma*,[2] is squarely within this tradition. Winthrop Jordan's *White Over Black*[3] and other detailed historical works have carefully documented the purely racial nature of the origins of the nation's racial patterns. Economists have isolated the many discriminatory factors that retard black economic progress, some of which operate across all occupational groups.[4] And political research reveals the vast racial discrepancies in power, with even the most prominent black citizens rarely included in the principal circles of decision-making on the federal, state, or local levels.[5] The most persuasive evidence involves housing patterns. Demographers show that urban blacks are residentially segregated from their fellow Americans far more intensely than any other group; that little of this imposed housing segregation can be attributed to economic factors; and that other minority groups, such as Puerto Ricans, dispersed more in one generation in Chicago than blacks have managed throughout the century.[6] Furthermore, the black middle class until recently has been victimized by this massive discriminatory pattern almost as much as the black working class.

Such patterns are not simply a matter of "color," for the post-World War II rise of Japanese-Americans, from grim camps of internment to income and occupational status slightly above that of white-American averages, is nothing short of astounding. Thus race theorists argue that three centuries of slavery and legalized Southern segregation created unique structural, cultural, and psychological barriers to democratic relations between blacks and whites in American society.

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THE CLASS-AND-CASTE MODEL

This second perspective derived from anthropologists who employed a sharply contrasting analogue—India's caste system—to understand the community level data they collected in the deep South. W. Lloyd Warner[7] and his colleagues at the University of Chicago advanced this view during the 1930s. Figure 1, taken from Warner's original article, summarizes this position. Following anthropological work on India, a sharp distinction was drawn between caste (with no intermarriage or cross-group mobility possible) and class (with both intermarriage and cross-group mobility possible and frequent). The patterns in the South were seen as involving both phenomena, with embedded class structures operating within, but not across, the two racial castes.

As indicated in Figure 1, this view held that upper-status black Southerners would generally be recognized by both races as ranking above lower-status white Southerners, though, as Warner was careful to point out, this cross-caste recognition was generally "expressed in circumlocutions and by unconscious actions."[8] He believed that as the process of social stratification continued to develop among blacks in the South, the caste line (A to B) would slowly swing on its axis (c) until it approximated a vertical racial division (line a to e). In other words, Warner was optimistic about the continued development of a far larger black elite and middle class. But he let the caste analogy blind him to erosion in the black-white racial system itself, which only a few years later was apparent to the searching eyes of Myrdal. We shall return to this failing of the caste-and-class model when we consider Oliver Cox's blistering attack on it.[9]



Figure 1. Caste-and-Class Model. From W. Lloyd Warner, "American Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42, 1937, p. 235.

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
SOCIAL DISTANCE PYRAMID
UPPER WHITES
MIDDLE WHITES
LOWER WHITES
Distance to Upper Status Negroes
(expressed by Upper Status Whites)
Ph-Po-R—I
Distance to Middle Status Negroes
(expressed by Middle Status Whites)
Po—Ph—R—I
Distance to Lower Status Negroes
(expressed by Lower Status Whites)
Ph—Po—I—R
Distance to Upper Whites
(expressed by Upper Negroes)
R—I—Ph-Po
UPPER NEGROES
Distance to Middle Status Whites
(expressed by Middle Status Negroes)—R—Ph—Po
MIDDLE NEGROES
Distance to Lower Status Whites
(expressed by Lower Status Negroes)—Ph—R—I—Po
LOWER NEGROES
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
SCALE OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
SCALE OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
R = Residential Distance Ph = Physical Distance
Po = Position Distance I = Interpersonal Distance
= Average of distance on all four scales
*Respondents are classified according to occupational rank.
greater distance
greater distance
POINT OF ZERO DISTANCE
(or "Caste Line")

Figure 2. Social-Distance Pyramid. From Frank R. Westie and Margaret L. Westie, "The Social-Distance Pyramid: Relationships between Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 63, 1958, p. 191.

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Though the model attracted harsh criticism, it held sway until the 1950s, when it was replaced by more dynamic considerations of power and process.[10] One of the more lasting empirical contributions it inspired was provided by Margaret and Frank Westie,[11] who derived from it a "social-distance pyramid" from attitude studies of both black and white respondents (Figure 2). Note how the sense of racial distance of both blacks and whites is simultaneously a function of both the social class of the perceiver and the social class of the perceived. This interesting social-psychological approach represents an early forerunner of an interactive model such as proposed in this essay.

THE SOCIAL CLASS MODEL

In *Caste, Class, and Race*,[12] Cox advocated a more purely class model, largely in terms of raising three serious objections to the caste-and-class perspective. First, he argued that the critical concept of caste had been employed in so many different, loose, even conflicting ways, that it no longer possessed scientific value. Even a casual reading of the literature on race substantiates this point. Second, Cox held that the caste concept was inapplicable to the American situation because it strongly implies a static, one-dimensional, even permanent social structure instead of the complex, ever-changing process it has proved to be throughout American history. The turbulent 1960s and the changes wrought by the civil rights movement certainly demonstrated Cox's contentions. Finally, Cox argued that the Indian caste analogy breaks down completely, because caste restrictions have traditionally been accepted as "right" and religiously ordained in India, but are rejected by black Americans. Here, Cox has been severely questioned by anthropologists who insist that low-caste Hindus often did not accept their lowly status any more than black Americans.[13]

In place of the caste-and-class view, Cox proposed his own version of a Marxist analysis. He held American race relations to be largely a special case of class conflict in a capitalist society. Thus black-white relations in the United States derive from the requirement of capitalism to "commoditize" the working masses, white as well as black. Consequently, the solutions to the nation's racial problems must come in class terms. The hopes for black progress, argued Cox over three decades ago, rested with improving the lot of labor in America generally. "President Franklin D. Roosevelt," he wrote enthusiastically, "did more to elevate the status of Negroes in the United States than all other leaders, white and black together, over a period of decades before him."[14]

Although most black specialists in race relations have favored various versions of the race model, Cox's arguments followed a tradition of black Marxist analysis begun by W. E. B. DuBois. Of course, the long-lived and productive DuBois cannot be easily classified by any scheme. Early in his life he advanced a straightforward version of a race model. But in his autobiography,[15] DuBois remarks that as a young man he had not known "Karl Marx well enough to appreciate the economic foundations of human history." Nonetheless, as Rutledge Dennis notes,[16] even the young DuBois never overlooked the critical role of economics—whether in explaining the slave trade[17] or in analyzing the causal factors behind early race riots in Philadelphia.[18] The full expression of his use of the class model, however, awaited the writing of his monumental volume, *Black*

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Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880.[19] This book, together with Cox's *Caste, Class, and Race,* basically established the class model. It is an interesting comment on white social science in America that two black scholars almost alone advanced this alternative view during the first half of the twentieth century.

Two speculations can be ventured for this situation. The preponderant influence of "Southern liberals," black and white, in the study of race probably contributed to the neglect of the Marxist perspective.[20] Many of these Southerners had soured on Marxist analysis after the Communist party in America failed completely during the 1920s and 1930s to organize textile workers and to effect other changes in which Southern liberals believed deeply.[21] Cox and DuBois, neither of them native Southerners, believed that the general failure of white social scientists to provide a more differentiated view of the black world was itself racist. Joined by such non-Marxists as Franklin Frazier and Charles Johnson, black scholars during the 1930s and 1940s provided a broader perspective by emphasizing the vast social class distinctions within black communities. Put bluntly, it was left to black writers of this period to counter the stereotype that all blacks were poor and wretched.

In view of this history, it is not surprising that a black sociologist now claims that class has become a more significant consideration than race in understanding the contemporary position of black Americans. In *The Declining Significance of Race,* William Wilson provides a historical and economic view of black-white conflict in America that only indirectly relates to the title. It does, however, conclude that "class has become more important than race in determining black life-chances in the modern industrial period."[22] A segmented labor market leads to shrinking opportunities for poorly trained blacks and "unprecedented job opportunities in the growing government and corporate sectors" for well-trained blacks. And, Wilson reasons, this increasing importance of class must signify the decreasing importance of race.

The rapidly expanding stratification within the black world has long been recognized. Social scientists were noting this phenomenon in *Daedalus* by the mid-sixties,[23] and it was the basis of President Lyndon Johnson's famous address to Howard University in 1965. The following year it was formalized by the economist Andrew Brimmer in his chapter in *The American Negro Reference Book.* Brimmer, later a governor of the Federal Reserve Board, demonstrated that income was increasingly becoming more maldistributed among nonwhite than white families.[24]

What is new is Wilson's insistence that this widening stratification within black America necessarily signals "the declining significance of race." Earlier observers viewed the trend as indicating the *changing* significance of race in the United States. But neither the phenomenon itself nor the data in Wilson's book reveal any decline in the importance of race as such.

One problem concerns "significance" for what? A few dependent variables support Wilson's argument; others reveal the dominant importance of race; and a wide range show the importance of both class *and* race. Wilson is mistaken in his belief that an increase in the predictive power of one set of variables (social class) necessitates a decrease in the predictive power of another set (race). For a wide range of socially critical variables, social class *is* increasing in importance.

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But the race and class interaction term is also increasing, and race persists as an important indicator. If Wilson were right, it would be a startling and positive mark of the nation's racial progress. But the black poor are far worse off than the white poor, and the black middle class still has a long way to go before it overtakes the white middle class in wealth and economic security. Even black median family income, a crude indicator at best, is not closing the gap with white median family income, despite the growing disparity within black America.

The importance of this latest version of the class model for our present discussion is twofold. First, the fallacy of viewing race and class factors as if they are necessarily either-or, zero-sum explanations, in which the rise in one requires the decline in the other, is generically important. Modern complexities require an open-ended perspective, one that involves interactions between race and class as well as their direct effects. Second, Wilson's focus on the rapidly expanding social stratification of black America, with its ever-widening discrepancies in life-chances and life-choices, merits further consideration. It is one of three interrelated trends that provide the social context for evaluating the varying conceptions of race and class.

Three Major Trends in Contemporary American Race Relations

The discontinuities of social change, the two contrasting racial processes, and a shifting demographic base are three current trends that invite discussion.[25] Each intersects with the changing meanings and effects of race and class.

THE DISCONTINUITIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Social changes as profound as those of race relations in the United States over the past four decades do not occur smoothly and consistently, either within or across institutions. Fundamental alterations necessarily entail confusion and ambiguity, with traditional customs maintained side-by-side with new practices. Such glaring discontinuities characterize transitional periods, and America has been passing through such a period in race relations since World War II.

Transitional periods are awkward. The society must haltingly develop a new equilibrium and a new, at least partial, consensus. Moreover, the awkwardness and controversy are exacerbated when both national symbols and social structure are intimately implicated, as they are with race relations. The treatment of black Americans has been a national issue since our beginning; it has persistently been our key domestic issue of conflict; and it has shaped and contorted much of our social structure. Not surprisingly, then, the end of this transitional period is not yet in sight.

Assessments of differential black gains during the 1960s suggest that progress was greatest in employment and earnings and next greatest in education.[26] In these, blacks actually gained on whites in absolute as well as relative terms on some indicators. For example, in 1960 only 33 percent of blacks twenty-five to thirty-four years of age had completed four years of high school, compared to 61 percent of whites in the same age group; but by 1970 the figures were 52 percent

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and 74 percent, and by 1975, 69 percent and 82 percent.[27] Real income gains for blacks showed the next largest improvement, although the absolute dollar gap between blacks and whites widened. Health ranks fourth in the order of improvements, despite the fact that the life expectancies of black men actually declined slightly during the 1960s.

Political advances rank next, thanks largely to voting registration gains in the South made possible by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Yet today, after a sixfold increase since 1967, the roughly five thousand blacks elected to public office are less than one percent of elected officials in the nation. Black-owned businesses actually declined in number during the 1960s, and even with a modest increase in the early 1970s, they constituted less than 3 percent of all noncorporate firms in 1972.[28]

Housing witnessed the least improvement. Although housing quality advanced markedly for blacks during the 1960s, the gain remained less than that of whites, and took place within the context of an unremitting pattern of intense residential segregation by race throughout urban America.[29]

Most of the favorable trends for blacks in the sixties—such as education of the young, occupations of the employed labor force, and female earnings—continued into the seventies.[30] But negative trends that disproportionately affect lower-status blacks also continued—a rise in the number of female-headed households and extremely high rates of unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force among black men and youth. Indeed, blacks now comprise an even larger proportion of America's most destitute citizens than in 1969.[31] These conflicting considerations introduce the next trend.

TWO CONTRASTING RACIAL PROCESSES

The civil rights movement *did* make a fundamental difference in the lives of younger, educated blacks, but achieved only modest gains for older, less-educated blacks. The movement's goals were generally oriented toward status and dignity for the black middle class rather than bread-and-butter issues for the black lower class. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated at precisely the point when he was attempting to redirect the movement's thrust by leading the protest of the Memphis garbage workers.

The middle class of black America has markedly expanded in recent decades. Using a rough definition of middle-class status in terms of employment, education, and real income, approximately two fifths of black Americans are now middle class, contrasted with only about one twentieth in 1940 and about two thirds of white Americans at present. Thus 38 percent of employed blacks in 1974 were either in white-collar or skilled blue-collar occupations, compared with 64 percent of employed whites. In 1975, 43 percent of adult blacks and 65 percent of adult whites were high-school graduates. Similarly, 38 percent of black families had incomes over $10,000 during 1974 compared with 67 percent of white families.[32]

This eightfold growth of the black middle class, combined with a doubling of the black population since 1940, suggests that over 80 percent of black middle-class families today are first-generation middle class. Like other such families, they are eager to consolidate their newly attained status and pass it on to their children. Early indications are that this process of consolidation is tak-

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ing place successfully,[33] and this is noteworthy, because prior to 1962, children of the black middle class found it difficult to maintain their class position.[34]

One implication of this social class trend involves a caution for comparative racial research. Social scientists deceive themselves and others into thinking that they have equated for socioeconomic status across race when they define social class in terms of present education, occupational status, and income. The rapid growth of the black middle class requires that the recency of the status attainment and the accumulation of wealth also be considered before truly meaningful racial comparisons can be made.

Other implications are political. Militant black ideology today emphasizes group unity, precisely because unity is made more difficult as the growing middle class acquires interests that conflict with those of poor blacks. King may well have been the last black national leader who could appeal to a wide class spectrum across black America. A further political effect involves whites. Black poverty and despair are largely beyond the purview of most whites, but the enlarged black middle class, with its new opportunities in formerly all-white institutional settings, is highly visible to whites. This differential association process supports the widely held contention that racial injustice was eradicated during the 1960s, a fiction further supported by the arguments of conservatives who select data that reflect the expansion of the black middle class and then ask, "Where's the problem?" Liberals usually counter by selecting data that reflect the insignificant changes in the lives of the black poor.

The actual situation is far more complex. Neither conservatives nor liberals consider the large middle-range group of black Americans whose modest gains place them in a position so marginal as to make them especially vulnerable to today's hard economic times. And neither group considers the fact that the two divergent processes taking place at the top and bottom of the black class distribution have created the most differentiated black class structure in the nation's history.

THE SHIFTING DEMOGRAPHIC BASE

There have been three overlapping demographic racial eras in this century. Each has contributed to the distinctive quality of present-day race relations, and each has set the context for a different relationship between race and class in America.

The National Era: 1915-World War II—There was relatively little black migration out of the rural South for a half century after the Civil War; thus the first of the demographic racial eras began in 1915. World War I abruptly ended European immigration while it simultaneously led to increased industrial activity in the form of orders for war materiel. Industry turned to the South with its labor surplus, and began to recruit furiously among poor whites and blacks alike. A train ticket, combined with a guaranteed job at what appeared to Southern eyes as big wages, offered a powerful temptation to leave the South, and for the next half century millions did. This massive long-distance migration of blacks from farm to city, and South to North, made race relations not merely a provincial concern of the old Confederacy, but for the first time an urban and national concern.

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The Metropolitan Era: 1945-1970—The second era involved the separation of the races between the central city and suburbs, and a continuation of the migration to the urban South and North. With a two-decade back-up in housing demand, an enormous boom in housing construction followed World War II. This construction boom basically established the present pattern of intrametropolitan segregation of blacks and whites. The principal force in this process of residential separation was the federal government.[35] Since 1935, one federal program after another—public housing, Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration mortgages, urban renewal, model cities, even taxation policy and the federal highway system—contributed to this trend. Within this national structure, the many discriminatory practices of the banking and real estate industries sealed in housing segregation of the races at the local level. Just as the first demographic era established race relations as a national issue, this second era established race relations as a metropolitan issue.

The Redistribution Era: 1970 to the Present—The third demographic era arrived before the nation had come to grips with the metropolitan scope of its racial problems. We must await analyses from the 1980 census to appreciate fully the radically different dimensions of this new era and its sweeping implications for race relations. But we already know its broad outlines.

1. Nonmetropolitan areas at present are growing faster than metropolitan areas. For many Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), annual out-migration often exceeds in-migration. And the sharply lower birth rates of both blacks and whites limit compensating natural population increases.

2. This aggregate decline in metropolitan growth varies across SMSAs by both population size and region. Most of the growth decline is concentrated in the largest of metropolitan areas with over 3 million people each. Medium-sized SMSAs, from 1 to 3 million people each, tend to be continuing their growth; but region is significant here. Intermediate metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest are not growing, and some are even losing population. Western and Southern SMSAs in this group, however, tend to be still growing. But their growth rates are typically reduced, and much of their expansion is concentrated in Sunbelt retirement areas. In contrast, the small SMSAs with less than 1 million people are experiencing accelerated growth and in-migration. The racial significance of these differential trends looms large when we recall that the black population is concentrated in the largest SMSAs. In 1975 blacks comprised 27.6 percent of the central city populations of SMSAs over 1 million, compared with 16.8 percent of the central cities of smaller SMSAs.[36] More dramatically stated, there are more black citizens today in the New York SMSA than in any Southern state; more in the Chicago SMSA than in Mississippi.

3. Major shifts are also occurring within metropolitan areas. Between 1970 and 1975, fully 40 percent of all suburbs lost population.[37] This decline was greatest in suburbs that border central cities or that were more than twenty miles from the central city—the latter effect, perhaps, an early population re-

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flection of the energy crisis. Suburban losses during these years were also greatest for those inner suburbs that ringed older central cities (mostly in the Northeast and Midwest) rather than newer central cities (mostly in the West and South). These intrametropolitan shifts are important for race relations, because blacks are overrepresented in central cities and underrepresented in suburbs. And this maldistribution constitutes the basic "structural linchpin" undergirding modern institutional racism in America.[38] Although the black population constituted 22.6 percent of the nation's central-city dwellers in 1975, they constituted only 5 percent of suburban dwellers, an increase from 4.6 percent in 1970 that was caused especially by the suburban movement of middle-class black families to rings around New York City, Los Angeles, and the District of Columbia.[39]

4. These significant shifts represent major movement across regions and states. Kaplan and Russell,[40] projecting earlier data to anticipate the results of the 1980 census, show the magnitude of these alterations since 1970. The Northeast, especially such states as New York (−3.5%) and Rhode Island (−2.1%), is expected to reveal an absolute drop in population of about one hundred thousand (−0.2 %). The Midwest is expected to show a modest increase of about 2 million (+3.5%). This leaves the South and West as the regions that have absorbed roughly 90 percent of the country's population increase during the 1970s. Six of the ten states expected to show the largest absolute population gains are in the South: Texas (2.4 million, for a 21.4% increase); Florida (2.29 million, +33.7%); Virginia (0.6 million, +12.9%); Georgia (0.58 million, +12.6%); North Carolina (0.57 million, +11.2%); and Tennessee (0.5 million, +12.7%). The remaining four major growth states are in the West: California (2.98 million, +14.9%); Arizona (0.75 million, +42.1%); Colorado (0.62 million, +28.1%); and Washington (0.56 million, +16.4%). All together, the South is expected to show an increase of 9.7 million people (+15.4%), and the West, 6.8 million (+19.5%). Much of this movement is toward the Sunbelt, but movement toward less densely populated areas is also a pronounced trend. Hence, many of the fastest growing states are not in warm climates and are sparsely inhabited: Wyoming (+39.4%); Alaska (33.3%); Idaho (29.6%); and even New Hampshire in the East (22%).

5. Black citizens are participating vigorously in these trends. For the first time in American history, both the Northeast and Midwest are losing black as well as white residents through more out-migration than in-migration; the West continues to receive a net inflow of both races; and the South now records a net inflow of black as well as white residents. The South, then, is likely to remain the dominant regional home of black Americans with just over 50 percent. Initial evidence suggest that these in-migrating blacks are relatively well educated, Southern-born, and returning to their vastly altered hometowns either to retire or to continue their professional careers.

6. Jobs and income are also on the move. Projections for the 1980s indicate a pronounced shift of jobs and income from the Northeast and Midwest

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to the West and South. These projections are based on trends already well underway. Even as early as the five years between 1967 and 1972, the growth rate of total employment was five times greater in the South Atlantic than in the Middle Atlantic states.[41] That black as well as white workers move in the same direction is critical. In past years, the black population increasingly concentrated in the older central cities of the Northeast and Midwest where the total number of jobs was already declining; thus structural unemployment, apart from continuing job discrimination, remains a serious threat to the economic prospects of black America.

These three interrelated trends render the older models of race and class obsolete because they affect blacks and whites of varying social class differently. For example, black participation in recent demographic trends involves largely the new middle class; they comprise the vanguard of blacks who are returning to the South or moving to the suburbs. The poorly educated and older families are still largely locked into the dense black areas of large core cities. Thus the diverging housing developments mirror the diverging socioeconomic developments among blacks. This relationship is imperfect, to be sure; some poor blacks reside in such places as "suburban" East St. Louis, and most middle-class blacks still live in central cities. But as these processes go on, a geographical as well as socioeconomic distance will develop between the two status poles of the black world. Such a development is comparable to white patterns; but it will be novel for black America, and it carries profound implications for the future of American race relations.

Many of these implications are negative. The exodus of the rising black middle class from Northern central cities could strip these areas of their major leadership. Worse, the new population trends are too little and too late to prevent massive concentrations of the poorest and least skilled blacks in the largest central cities that are losing both jobs and their tax bases. One in three black Americans lives today in just fifteen central cities, in such troubled municipalities as New York City, Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, and Newark. The spectre of widespread structural unemployment of the least educated blacks in these cities, far worse than even that experienced in recent years, is a clear danger.

Such considerations mandate a more complex model, one that does justice to current black-white realities. One promising approach focuses special attention on the interactions involved between race and class.

Toward an Interactive Model of Race and Class

An interactive model holds that we should increasingly expect racial phenomena to operate differently across the social class lines within both black and white America. Likewise, class-linked phenomena will often vary according to race. Put differently, the direct, or main, effects of race and class added together do not adequately account for an increasingly wide range of important outcomes. This model suggests that in addition to these main effects we must consider how racial and class factors jointly determine ("interact") the shape of present-day American race relations.

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This perspective argues the following:

1. The traditional race model is in part correct; there are significant main effects of being black in America in the 1980s that apply across social class lines. In some situations, given the rise in black consciousness among the young, the effects of race per se have even been enlarged.

2. Likewise, the traditional class model is also in part correct; significant main effects of social class in the 1980s apply across racial lines. Wilson is probably correct in saying that purely social class influences are increasing in importance;[42] though, as we have noted, this possibility need not imply that the purely racial influences are therefore decreasing in importance.

3. But the chief contention of the interaction model is that neither of these simplified, older perspectives can account for the complexities of the 1980s. Race and social class increasingly *interact* to produce critical effects that cannot be explained by simply combining the main effects of the two factors. This is not to assert, of course, that there are *no* important direct effects, but to advance the hypothesis that an increasing number of important outcomes require an interactive perspective. For instance, the model contends that the total condition of being black and poor is greater than the sum of its two racial and class parts.

EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF RACE AND CLASS INTERACTIONS

A recent study of political attitudes in Atlanta provides examples of the various empirical possibilities under discussion.[43] Data were gathered in hour-long, face-to-face interviews with the seniors and their parents of six Atlanta-area high schools. Three domains of political attitudes were measured: political efficacy (the sense of personal influence on the political process); political trust; and political interest. The schools were selected in order to assure adequate numbers of whites and blacks of four varying socioeconomic levels (SEL)—though this research follows social research custom and does not consider wealth or recency of status in its calculations of social class.

Figure 3 illustrates all of the effects we have been describing. Main effects for race and class are the easiest to detect. Thus there are statistically significant effects for race in the student results on both political trust and political interest, with the black seniors consistently lower on both measures at each of the four class levels. Note in passing that, contrary to Wilson's expectations, the differences between the black students and their parents on political trust suggest an increasing influence of race across generations. Similarly, significant class effects emerge for both the parents and students on political efficacy and interest, with upper-status respondents consistently higher on both measures for both races.

Of more immediate interest, however, are the joint effects of race and class. A straightforward additive result is provided by the data on the students' interest in politics. But four of the graphs of Figure 3 demonstrate the predicted interactions between the two sets of variables. Nearly significant interactive

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Student Data



N:					
	White:	79	137	162	181
	Black:	135	94	68	45



	White:	81	137	157	182
	Black:	138	92	68	43



	White:	82	137	164	184
	Black:	148	97	69	46

Parental Data



N:					
	White:	48	81	122	161
	Black:	85	70	57	36



N:					
	White:	48	81	122	160
	Black:	84	70	55	36



	White:	48	81	122	162
	Black:	85	70	56	36

a. The horizontal bars indicate the locations of the natural midpoints of the scales.

b. The natural midpoint for parents' political interest is −1.29.

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$
*** $p \leq .001$

●——● Blacks
□——□ Whites

Figure 3. Political Attitudes by Race and Class. From Bruce A. Campbell, "The Interaction of Race and Socioeconomic Status in the Development of Political Attitudes," *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 60, 1980, p. 655.

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patterns are provided by the student data on political efficacy and trust. Observe for political efficacy that social class does not clearly differentiate black from white students until the highest status level. The political trust graph illustrates another interactive pattern, with social class sharply separating the poorest white students from other whites but having little effect on black students. Two highly significant interactions emerge in the parental data. First, for political efficacy, social class, although sharply related for both races, is nonetheless more important for the white parents. Second, note the classical interaction graph for political trust. Here, social class operates in directly opposite ways across the races: the higher the social status among white parents, the greater the trust of government; the higher the social status among black parents, the lower the trust of government.

Figure 4 demonstrates a race-and-class interaction for aggregated data from a different domain. These results show that marital instability is related to both race and personal income of males between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age. But note, too, that there is an important interaction between the two variables, with the difference between the races over half again as large at the highest income level as at the lowest.[44] In still another domain, a survey by the Prudential Insurance Company found that black families with over $15,000 annual income in 1965 utilized as many types of financial services as white families with comparable income; but poorer black families used far fewer such services than white families of comparable income.[45]

We need to specify the general domains where *racial* main effects might generally be anticipated, and where this is true also for *social class* main effects. And we must learn where additive effects or interactions might be expected



Figure 4. Marital Instability by Race and Class. Percentage of ever-married males 25 to 34 years of age who were separated, divorced, or had been married more than once at the time of the 1960 census, by race and income. From Richard Udry, "Marital Instability by Race and Income Based on 1960 Census Data," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 72, 1967, p. 673.

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when race and social class factors are both considered. For instance, several studies suggest that particular types of alienation and dissatisfaction are concentrated among lower-status whites and higher-status blacks. Should this interactive result be replicated in further research, it would suggest interesting theoretical possibilities about the special strains of black middle-class status during a transitional era. The empirical specification of these various types of effects by domain would enable us to advance beyond the point of claiming simply that "race is declining" or "social class is increasing" in significance.

Implications of this Interactive Perspective

The principal thrust of the interactive perspective is not merely to achieve more accurate statistical predictions of racial phenomena. The view is advanced primarily as a means of better understanding the currently evolving patterns of race and class. These new patterns operate at each level of analysis: the institutional, the situational, and the individual.

THE ALTERED NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

Racial discrimination lives on, but its character has fundamentally changed. Older forms of institutional discrimination generally invoked total exclusion of blacks or a rigid color line above which blacks could not rise. Such blatant mistreatment proved to be relatively simple to attack in the federal courts and in legislation. Consequently, in recent years these older primary forms have been replaced by secondary forms of racial discrimination that are more indirect, more subtle, more procedural, more ostensibly nonracial, and more centered on demographic and housing patterns. These modern forms of institutional discrimination typically affect blacks of all social classes, but often they vary in their operation across class lines—hence the value of an interactive approach.

The counterattack to this proliferation of secondary discriminatory forms has necessarily emphasized affirmative action programs. Earlier case-by-case enforcement of antidiscrimination laws proved ineffective because complaints were typically nonstrategic.[46] Systemic patterns of discrimination require systemic patterns of reform and enforcement. The relative success of these new procedures, at least for middle-class goals, is amply attested to by the ferocity of the attacks on affirmative action procedures and what is misperceived to be "racial quotas" and "reverse discrimination."[47] The Supreme Court's mixed judgment in *University of California at Davis v. Allan Bakke* and supportive judgment in *United Steelworkers v. Weber* appear to leave these needed programs in place for the present. A survey of higher education admissions by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1979 indicates that the feared cutbacks in minority educational opportunities as a result of the *Bakke* decision did not take place, at least during the fall of 1980.[48] Note, however, that these cases attacked a prime source of the growth of the black middle class, not only in professional school attendance, but also in high-level blue-collar employment involved in *Weber*.

The arguments surrounding Bakke's admission to the University of California at Davis Medical School illustrate the secondary forms of racial discrimina-

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tion that are now more subtle, procedural, and ostensibly nonracial. Bakke, who had been rejected thirteen times by twelve different medical schools (one of which had no minority students), chose to sue over Davis Medical School's sixteen slots for minorities rather than the five slots the school annually reserved for the children of the rich and powerful.[49] Many of his contentions centered around the Medical College Admissions Test—as if the test unquestionably predicted who would be "good doctors." Actually, test scores correlate moderately with grades during the first two years of medical school; correlate not at all or even slightly negatively with grades during the last two, clinical, years of medical school; and bear no known relationship with later professional competence.[50]

Other examples include the newer patterns of racism that assume ostensibly nonracial forms, centered around the demographic and housing patterns just described. Let me cite an example from recent experience as a court-appointed expert in *Crawford,* the Los Angeles public school desegregation case. Together with other experts I emphasized the only long-term solution for stable, equitable school desegregation in the Los Angeles basin—the reorganization of the area's many school districts to prevent the artificial boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District from acting like a Berlin Wall, sealing in minority children and sealing out majority.[51] In short, a metropolitan perspective is needed. This approach would not involve one big metropolitan district. Rather, it would present the opportunity for multiple districts that efficiently crosscut present lines, that would be far smaller than the present too-large Los Angeles district, and that would maximize interracial schooling while minimizing student transportation.

Suggestions to the Court along these lines were greeted by suburban howls of defiance that rivaled those of the white South during the 1960s. And the Supreme Court on May 12, 1980, rejected a similar metropolitan approach for Atlanta (though they had previously allowed it for Louisville, Kentucky, and Wilmington, Delaware). The point, however, is to illustrate how a spatial barrier, grounded in residential apartheid, now serves as the functional equivalent of the blatant segregation laws of the old South in maintaining racially segregated public schools.

THE NEW SUBTLETIES OF INTERRACIAL INTERACTION

Turning from the institutional to the face-to-face interaction level, new patterns of racism have emerged in a variety of ingenious experimental studies in social psychology. A revealing field study conducted at a supermarket[52] engaged passersby in a helping situation in which either a black or a white middle-aged woman dropped her packages in the path of oncoming customers as she left the store. The old racist pattern of ignoring the black-in-distress did not emerge: whites stopped and helped the black woman just as often as they did the white woman. But the new pattern of interracial interaction emerges when we note that 63 percent of the time the white helpers picked up *all* of the white woman's groceries, but did so only 30 percent of the time for the black woman.

In a second study, registered members of the Liberal and Conservative parties of New York State were telephoned and asked for help.[53] A black or white

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experimenter, pretending he thought it was a garage he had dialed, asked for someone to come and repair his car, supposedly broken down on a highway. When told he had dialed a wrong number, the experimenter excitedly said that he had just used his last dime, and asked the "subject" if he or she would call the garage for him. Among those who did not hang up prematurely, Liberals helped both the black and white callers in about the same proportion, but Conservatives acted out the older racist pattern of rejection by helping the black (65 percent) less often than the white caller (92 percent). However, Liberals demonstrated the new pattern of discrimination by far more frequently hanging up prematurely on the black than on the white caller (28 to 10 percent) than Conservatives (8 to 5 percent). Apparently, many Liberals defended themselves by not hearing the full story, thereby making it easier to maintain a prejudice-free self-image without offering help.

Other studies demonstrate that among white college students there are a variety of reactions to blacks that appear to be direct reflections of the changes wrought by the 1960s. Often there is a public "bending over backwards" in expressing acceptance of blacks, while indirectly expressing negative feelings. And if there is any threat to the self-concept of nonracist fair-mindedness, there can be attempts either to compensate blacks[54] or to denigrate a black victim on nonracial grounds.[55]

Few of these studies have systematically varied class as well as race. Most of the white "subjects" and black "targets" have been middle class (shoppers at a suburban supermarket, registered members of splinter political parties, college students, and so on). One study, however, suggests that there may be many interracial situations where social class will interact with race to shape what happens. Field research conducted on New York City subways had either a black or white "victim" carrying a cane and falling, apparently unconscious, in a crowded car.[56] These "victims," looking respectable and appearing to have heart attacks, were assisted proportionally as often by white as by black passengers. But when the "victims" appeared to be of lower status, smelled of alcohol, and carried a bottle wrapped in a brown bag, they were disproportionately helped by members of their own race.

Social psychological explanations for these new patterns of interracial interactions employ Joel Kovel's distinction between the old-style *dominative racism* (where racist beliefs are unabashedly acted out in public "to keep blacks in their place") versus the new-style *aversive racism*.[57] This newer pattern is characterized by people who value a self-image as unprejudiced, fair-minded individuals. Yet they possess negative feelings about blacks and other minorities that have to be denied and dissociated from the self. Consequently, encounters with blacks in everyday life challenge their unprejudiced self-image. Their racially "appropriate," often excessive public behavior is therefore offered to preserve their self-concept.

But this behavior may change under two types of situational conditions. When there are socially acceptable nonracial reasons readily available, they may not treat blacks in this manner. One field study found that restaurants' dress codes were less often enforced for black customers unless they had just been previously enforced for white customers—thus demonstrating that the enforcement was apparently not racially motivated.[58] Likewise, in the subway study, the drunken victim had "brought it on himself" and could be expected to sober

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up in time without assistance. Not helping the drunk of the other race could hardly be described as racist; yet same-race victims were in fact more often helped.

The second exception occurs when the costs of maintaining the egalitarian image become prohibitive, as when the interracial interaction is deemed too threateningly intimate. Then compromises are struck—only a few packages are picked up, the victim is denigrated, the situation redefined. These compromises may be more often struck when blacks are presumed to be lower in social status. Once again, race and class probably interact to influence interracial behavior along the lines outlined by Margaret and Frank Westie a generation ago and shown earlier in Figure 2. One means by which social class factors could shape black-white interaction has been suggested by Milton Rokeach.[59] He maintains that negative attitudes and avoidance are often the result of the anticipation of belief incongruence. That is, we tend to like those who share our views and dislike those who do not share them. And class as well as racial cues are typically employed to judge whether another person is likely to share our values and beliefs.

An interactive perspective helps to sort out the possibilities. Laboratory research has shown how white subjects, watching precisely the same interview on a television monitor, believed that a "black" interviewee had more dissimilar beliefs from their own than a "white" interviewee.[60] Assuming the same phenomenon for class, it seems likely that, for example, middle-class whites would anticipate the greatest belief congruence and positive social encounter with persons of their own class and race, the least with lower-status blacks. Beyond this additive effect, though, we would predict that the expectations for the mixed cases—lower-status whites and upper-status blacks—would be determined by both the situational context and the personalities of the interactors.

CONFLICTED ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

This analysis of conflicted behavior and feelings is supported by recent survey evidence on the conflicted racial attitudes and beliefs of white Americans. White attitudes on a wide range of racial issues have modified sharply over recent decades, especially in improved stereotypes of blacks and in less support of blatant forms of racial discrimination.

The bedrock assumption of racist theory—the alleged innate intellectual inferiority of black people—presents an acid test of these changes. In 1942 only 42 percent of whites believed that blacks had the same intelligence as whites; by 1956 this percentage had risen to 78, where it has remained. But two qualifications have to be made. First, the fact that one fifth of white adults in present-day America still ascribe to this fundamental racist belief is a sobering fact in itself. Second, such broad general stereotypes have been replaced by a variety of more specific prototypes: "the tough street-black," "the promiscuous black welfare mother," "the 'Oreo' middle-class black," and so on. This decomposition of stereotypes from the general to subtypes may be characteristic of our era, for it is also occurring in American imagery about women and the feminine role.[61]

Similarly, although in 1942 only 42 percent of whites felt blacks "should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job," 81 percent thought so by 1965, and 95 percent by 1972.[62] Yet there is no change at all in

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white responses to the standard survey statement, "Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted." Only 27 percent disagreed with this item in 1963, and only 23 percent disagreed in 1977.[63] Even more revealing is the widespread white approval of interracial schooling coupled with an almost equally widespread rejection of the "busing" of school children to achieve desegregation. Although only 30 percent of white Americans believed that blacks "should go to the same schools as whites" in 1942, this figure rose to 49 by 1956, 70 by 1965, and 86 by 1972.[64] Yet 69 percent of a national sample of whites told Harris Survey interviewers in March 1972 that they opposed busing school children for desegregation in their communities. Fully half of white Americans, then, support school desegregation in principle while opposing the chief means of achieving it.

These data suggest a general principle that characterizes many of the new patterns of racism: *white Americans increasingly reject racial injustice in principle, but are reluctant to accept the measures necessary to eliminate the injustice.*

* * *

We must take a fresh look at American race relations. It remains the nation's primary domestic schism, but its dimensions have been radically altered since the 1960s. In particular, the roles of race and social class have become increasingly intertwined, conspicuously outdating the simpler models that have dominated racial thought in the past. An interactive perspective has been presented in this essay as an alternative approach for viewing the operation of race and class factors in modern American race relations. Such a perspective aids in understanding the new patterns of racism that have emerged since the sixties—patterns that appear to be ostensibly nonracial and often involve an ambivalent, conflicted quality.

These more complex race-and-class patterns will make further racial progress increasingly difficult. And the early 1980s represent an inauspicious time in our national history for racial progress, with the United States in the grips of severe international and economic problems. At such times, progress toward righting past injustice is rarely accomplished. This volume of *Daedalus* nevertheless faces what remains to be done in preparation for the time when America regains its confidence and tackles its racial problems once more. America has made significant progress over the past generation, but there are still "rivers of blood and years of darkness" to surmount.

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The Elusive Quest for Economic Equality

The Meaning of Progress

MINORITY GROUP PROGRESS IN THE LABOR MARKET has long been a subject of interest and controversy. During the 1960s, blacks and other minorities entered many occupations—especially white-collar and skilled blue-collar jobs—previously closed to them, and in 1969 black unemployment fell to 6.4 percent, its lowest level in a decade. During the 1970s, however, although occupational status continued to improve for minorities, their gains in the labor market slackened considerably. Minorities who lacked a high-school or college education made few, if any, gains. Unemployment drifted upward. Minority youth were especially hard-hit; their unemployment rate was consistently higher than 30 percent throughout the decade.

Unfavorable trends in the nation's economic performance and its social policy preferences now threaten prospects for further minority labor market gains in the 1980s. Most economic forecasts for the decade project slow growth in production, output, and employment, together with continued high levels of inflation and little growth in productivity. These conditions will affect minorities disproportionately, not only because the struggle over the distribution of our national economic "pie" intensifies when it grows slowly, but also because efforts to improve the labor market status of minorities depend, in part, on public expenditures, and these will be under severe budgetary constraints in the coming years. Further, special efforts to help improve the status of minorities, such as federal income transfer and affirmative action programs, have come under increasing attack. Some critics question the programs' effectiveness in achieving their stated objectives; others believe these programs unfairly limit opportunities for others, particularly the white majority, in the labor market.

Yet, even without such questions and objections, confusion concerning the employment position of minorities in America exists. We lack a consensus on a policy for assisting minorities and on whether minority and majority labor market positions have been converging in the recent decades. The latter question is now open to serious debate.

The issue is partly a matter of different time horizons. Those who see convergence take a historical view, and point to the significant structural changes in racial attitudes and employment access in comparison with pre-

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World War II minority relations. They believe that the progress made by the younger minority generations will be the impetus for an eventual, if gradual, convergence between majority and minority employment positions. It will be a limited convergence, excluding, as it will, older minority group members whose work histories and schooling severely constrain their employment options, as well as minority youth from impoverished urban households, still ill-equipped to enter the labor market.

Nevertheless, we are assured that convergence will come, as schooling and other background characteristics of minority and majority youth increasingly merge. For doubters who claim that recent minority gains are concentrated in sectors—such as government—that are potentially unstable or deteriorating, the early occupational footholds of European immigrants are offered as an analogy. The Irish and Italians, we are told, similarly utilized specialized channels of employment to secure an economic and political base. The overrepresentation of minorities in certain occupations and industries is but a transitional step; later generations will achieve parity.

Another form of historical analysis reinforces the notion of convergence. Although its advocates do not dispute the minority-as-immigrant paradigm, they believe that secular economic growth is as much the determinant of minority employment progress as are political pressures, such as those exerted during the 1960s. Economic growth facilitates changes in minority-majority relations, especially by opening the occupational hierarchy to minorities at a faster pace as jobs filter downward.

An alternative perspective finds evidence of both convergence and divergence in minority-majority economic positions. Employment progress has been limited, in this view, to those minorities whose education and training enabled them to take advantage of expanded employment access. As access broadened for minorities, whether because of economic expansion or affirmative action, the most able were skimmed off, leaving behind a poorly educated, unskilled subgroup, whose economic position worsened relative to the majority. Our postindustrial society, where the skill and training components of new jobs advance faster than minorities can acquire them, cannot absorb this subgroup as readily as our industrial society absorbed the waves of European immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Aggregate measures of economic progress, such as family income or unemployment rates, mask the resulting minority economic differentiation, because these measures fail to take account of changes in the proportion of the minority population totally outside the labor force. Shifts in household composition further confuse our understanding of whether convergence is taking place and at what rate. As the number of workers per household falls, and the labor market attributes of the typical household vary from double-head to single female head, the economic prosperity of minorities declines. The conclusions regarding convergence or lack of convergence become tenuous; worse, in the face of conflicting evidence, we cannot achieve consensus regarding which public policies will be most effective.

For this reason, it is not surprising that some critics see no significant progress. They believe that minority employment and earnings gains were a fleeting by-product of both the unique circumstances of the accelerating

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economic growth of the 1960s and a concern for increased minority access. And even minorities with distinguished academic qualifications suffered from sophisticated discriminatory practices, such as assignments to "minority" jobs within corporations.

Proponents of each view have offered policy recommendations that could not be predicted from their reading of the evidence. The most diversity is among those who see no real progress, and who argue for fairly radical changes in the distribution of economic power, such as worker control or planning. Others reaffirm the need for broader and more effective implementation of equal opportunity policies. For still others, the goal is the economic rebuilding of American cities. A few call for the economic independence of minority communities, while most of those who advocate minority policy stress further expansion of policies developed in the 1960s, especially in civil rights and poverty programs.

Perhaps, then, the issue is not whether there *has* been convergence, but how convergence should be achieved. Policy prescriptions typically reflect varying assumptions regarding how the labor market functions or how it would function with more or less intervention. Some of these assumptions, of course, concern the probable response of minority populations to differing intervention strategies. A recent debate focuses on whether income transfer programs do not in fact hinder minority labor entry by offering alternative sources of livelihood. Transfer payments are intended to be a temporary source of income, but they may generate withdrawal from the labor force, depreciate a minority group member's ability, or sap his willingness to compete in the marketplace.

The crux of the matter is that we still must search for a better understanding of why disparities in minority and majority economic positions remain unresolved. Is it because minorities still enter the labor market unequal in their education, training, and preparation for work? Or is discrimination built into the labor market, so that those who differ only racially and ethnically, although similar in all other respects, are treated unequally?

Some recent studies of minorities in the labor market show that disparities in educational attainment between minorities and others are narrowing. Yet minority employment status and earnings appear to be converging with those of other U.S. workers at a slower pace than educational attainment. The life cycle earnings of minorities and white males still differ significantly. White male earnings peak in midlife (between forty and fifty years of age), while earnings of minority males and all females peak only modestly in their early working years. Beyond the obvious conclusion that earnings of white males outstrip those of all others, we can conclude that education influences the kinds of employment and earnings of all adults throughout the life span, but that even educated minorities and women do not match white males in upward mobility.

Population age structures also explain differences in minority and majority employment and earnings, particularly the accompanying shifts in access to job opportunities for the better-educated and more highly trained younger minorities. Inevitably, minority-majority differentials will narrow as new generations of minority youth similar in education and skill to majority youth enter the labor market. Gross comparisons between the minority and white populations that ignore these variations will obscure an important narrowing process.

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Yet, despite improved training and educational opportunities for minorities, economic fluctuations and secular changes will alter the demand for labor and, thereby, the rate of absorption and upgrading of minority group populations in the employment structure. Thus the argument that minority workers are overrepresented in industries sensitive to national economic cycles, especially manufacturing and construction industries that traditionally employ many semiskilled workers, is well taken. Adverse local economic conditions will also affect the demand for minority workers. Minority concentration in slow-growth or economically declining urban and regional areas—formerly industrial areas where immigrants and the less-skilled could usually find jobs—further impedes their employment progress. These shifts in the demand for labor undoubtedly further slow the convergence between minority and majority labor market positions.

The Evidence of "Progress"

A paucity of labor market studies whose findings can be generalized to other minority groups, or that use similar descriptive tools, seriously impedes our understanding of minority economic changes. Extant studies either fail to include minorities in samples large enough to draw conclusions regarding labor market activity, or limit their scope to various demographic subgroups. The more numerous single-minority group studies overcome these objections, but the unexpected variations found within minority populations often raise new issues. The need to place a particular group experience within the American context inevitably forces anew a search for common standards of progress. Although subject to changing definitions, only the national employment statistics in the decennial census and more frequent Current Population Survey permit the broader assessment of trends in minority labor market experience.

Perhaps the simplest measure of progress in labor market position is the proportion of the adult population employed. Yet a large or growing proportion does not imply increasing equalization. The black population, which until recently recorded higher employment/population ratios than the white population, still is in no sense equal in labor market position. The kinds of low-paying jobs to which many blacks have been relegated, both by social custom and racial segregation implicit in the labor market, forced more members of black families to seek employment. Yet by the 1970s the white and black employment/population ratio lines crossed, as black male and female employment rates fell below those of white counterparts. The drop in black male employment participation is cause for special concern, having moved from 87 percent in 1910, to 70 percent in 1950, and nearly 60 percent in 1980 (Table 1).

Shifting age composition accounts for part of the decline in black and white male employment/population ratios. Increased longevity among males overall raises the proportion of the adult population whose health status is at risk and who are unable to work, or who are willing to take advantage of voluntary early retirement. But age is not the only reason for the large employment decline among older black males. Disability insurance payments that often equal this group's low earnings in the labor market also account for a decline in labor force participation.

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Table 1. Employment/Population Ratios*

	1950	1960	1970	1977
Males				
White	73.7%	71.7%	73.7%	71.3%
Black	69.4	63.7	62.8	58.6
Mexican American	66.8	69.7	70.5	73.0
Puerto Rican	62.7	69.2	67.3	60.4
Native American	53.6	47.8	53.0	NA
Females				
White	26.8	31.9	39.1	44.1
Black	34.0	38.1	43.7	42.3
Mexican American	19.3	25.9	33.4	37.3
Puerto Rican	34.7	32.2	28.8	26.1
Native American	15.4	22.2	31.6	NA

Sources: U.S. Census of Population, 1950, 1960, 1970, Subject Reports. 1977 Current Population Survey, published reports.
*Percent of the population, 14 years of age or older, employed.

We lack sufficient data for a comparable view of the employment position of Mexican Americans, mainland Puerto Ricans, and American Indians.[1] Prior to 1970, decennial census statistics were the only national estimates available, and these were confounded by changes in census ethnic identifiers over the years.[2] Nevertheless, the most consistent trend has been the gradual upward movement in the employment/population ratio of Mexican Americans. The age structure of the population is relevant here also. Mexican American males have lower employment participation rates than white males of the same age, but higher rates than age-equivalent black and Puerto Rican males. Native American trends are more mixed: based on the three decennial estimates, American Indians appear to have an extremely low, but apparently stable, employment/population ratio.

Female minority group employment participation is more varied. Indeed, the changes are quite dramatic in comparison with male employment trends, a widely noted social change among both majority and minority populations. Black females have always had the highest rate of employment participation among all female groups. According to one study of pre-twentieth century female employment patterns, the legacy of slavery and the social stigma placed on white women for working outside the home account for much of the racial difference.[3] And Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Native American women have typically been less likely than even white women to hold jobs. Recently, however, younger Mexican American and Native American women are entering the labor force in numbers large enough to surpass the rate of employment increase among white women. Fewer Puerto Rican females, on the other hand, are now employed than in recent decades. Unskilled and semi-skilled occupations in New York City, for example, that were traditionally filled by Puerto Rican females are on the decline, and many of these women lack the educational qualifications to compete for skilled jobs.[4]

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Table 2. Unemployment Rates for Population Groups 16 Years and Older.

	Decennial Census Estimates			Current Population Survey*					
	1950	1960	1970	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Males									
White**	4.7%	4.6%	3.6%	3.7%	4.3%	7.2%	6.4%	5.5%	4.5%
Black	7.8	8.8	6.6	7.9	9.7	14.7	13.5	13.1	11.6
Mexican American	11.3	8.0	6.2	6.7	7.3	11.4	10.8	9.0	7.6
Puerto Rican	15.2	9.5	6.2						
Native American	8.0	16.1	11.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Females									
White**	4.2	4.9	4.8	5.3	6.1	8.6	7.9	7.3	6.2
Black	8.0	8.5	7.9	11.1	11.2	14.8	14.2	14.8	13.7
Mexican American	11.5	9.7	8.7	9.0	9.4	13.6	12.9	11.9	11.3
Puerto Rican	10.5	10.9	8.3						
Native American	8.8	10.7	10.2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Sources: U.S. Census of Population, 1950, 1960, 1970, Subject Reports for Native Americans, Puerto Ricans in Continental United States, Spanish Origin (1970) and Spanish Surname in the Southwest, and General Characteristics of the Population. 1973-1978, Bureau of Labor Statistics as reported in Statistical Appendix, Employment and Training Report of the President, 1979.

*In the Current Population Survey, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans are aggregated with other Spanish Origin groups. Thus the 1973–78 unemployment rates in this table are for all Hispanics.

**White includes Spanish Surname or Spanish Origin. Black unemployment rates in 1950 and 1960 are estimated by data for "Non-white." Mexican American rates in 1950 and 1960 are estimated by data for white Spanish Surname in five southwestern states; in 1970, by Spanish Origin identifiers.

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The variations in the labor force participation of different minority female groups reflect differences in age and education. Family status adds an additional dimension: single females are more often employed than married women. On the other hand, family status does not have the same relationship to female employment among all groups. More black wives, for example, worked (53.5%) in 1978 than either white wives (44.4%) or wives of Hispanic origin (40.0%). Black single women, on the other hand, are much less likely to be employed than single white or Hispanic women. The recent trends in black and Puerto Rican female employment rates may thus be related to the increasing number of minority women who are the single head-of-household and therefore unable to enter the labor market. Females were the heads-of-household in over 40 percent of black and Puerto Rican families in 1979, in contrast to 12 percent for white and Mexican American families.

The decline in real (inflation-adjusted) family income during the 1970s also accelerated the entry of all females into the labor market. Regarding attitudes toward employment, evidence of sex role distinctions among ethnic groups is mainly anecdotal. A recent national survey for the U.S. Department of Labor found that young Hispanic males, for instance, hold more "traditional" views about sex roles than either young black or white males, but that Hispanic females are more "modern" and similar to other female groups.[5]

The economic motivation of immigrants is commonly offered as a reason for employment differences between Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and the majority population. That a relatively high proportion of Mexican American males are employed may, for example, reflect the high work aspirations of the Mexican Americans who enter the United States. A significant proportion of this population, however, is not made up of recent immigrants. But the higher rate of labor force participation among mainland Puerto Ricans compared with the Island population supports the notion that those who come, do so for economic reasons. Others argue that the differential is the result of differing labor market conditions.

Inadequate employment opportunities on or near Indian lands may account for the low employment rates among Native Americans. Yet recent comparison found higher employment rates for Native American male heads-of-household living on reservations than for those in urban areas, but the evidence regarding employment differentials between rural reservations and urban areas is sparse and conflicting.[6]

Overall, we find that differences in minority employment progress, and the gaps that reflect these differences, are smaller than the gap between minority employment and that of white males. As unemployment rates have worsened for the minority groups over the past decade, the gap has become all the more apparent. The ratio of black to white unemployment rates widened from 1.7 in 1950 to 2.6 in 1978 for males, and similarly for females (Table 2). Native American unemployment rates, as estimated in the decennial census, followed the same trend. Although unemployment rates for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in 1950 were even higher than those of blacks, some declines occurred during the last two decades. The Hispanic male unemployment rate now hovers midway between the rates for black and white Americans. But the lower Hispanic unemployment rate occurred primarily among Mexican

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Americans; Puerto Rican unemployment rates rose again in the late 1970s to approximate the black unemployment rate.

The most alarming disparity in overall unemployment rates appears among minority youths. In 1954 young black and white males under twenty years of age were equally likely to be employed or unemployed, despite a considerable racial gap in school enrollment. Within two decades, black teen unemployment rates rose steeply. In 1979, 39 percent of young black males, 23 percent of young Hispanic males, and 16 percent of young white males were unemployed. Employment/population ratios of these groups were: black, 40 percent; Hispanic, 48 percent; and white, 61 percent. These statistics, along with other evidence, show that a substantial proportion of young black males fail to find employment opportunities as do other young males.

Statistical uncertainties argue for caution in estimating the labor market outcomes of minority youth populations. Young minority group members typically combine work and school at the same time and change jobs frequently, spending shorter spells in and out of work. Interpretation of employment indicators for this age group are thus marred by the complex nature of labor force and schooling decisions. The major data base, the Current Population Survey, obtains information on minority youth employment from household heads rather than from the youths themselves (unless the youth is the head-of-household). Lower estimates of youth unemployment may result from parents having inaccurate information regarding the employment-schooling status of their teenagers. In a recent longitudinal survey, this defect was corrected by interviewing directly all youths in the sample; the estimate of minority youth unemployment doubled over the CPS estimate.[7] These new estimates confirm, if not enlarge, our perception that the minority youth employment problem is severe.

Although the labor market failed in the 1970s to absorb the growing wedge of minority youth job-seekers, the employment outcomes of young minority adults who did succeed in finding jobs were positive. Both the occupational status and earnings of minority workers advanced. The ratio of black/white earnings for all male workers fourteen years of age and over rose from 0.58 in 1967 to 0.66 in 1977; for all females, the ratio moved from 0.75 in 1967 to equality in 1977 (1.00). Yet the income of minority family units shows no progress relative to the majority, primarily because of the increasing proportion of female-headed minority households. Not only have minority female earnings and occupational status not advanced relative to white males, but there are serious structural impediments to labor market entry by this group.

Minority individuals have made more progress in occupational upgrading than in earnings improvement. Some of this progress came as the historic migration from rural to urban areas ended in 1970; some came as occupational barriers fell, releasing a labor supply that had been artificially restricted. The decline of domestic service employment among black women brought about additional rapid occupational progress. In 1950 over 40 percent of black employed women were in private domestic service; by 1975 there were only 11 percent, and 76 percent of these were forty-five years of age and over.[8] Overall, the greatest gains in minority occupational position occurred during the 1960s. Caution is urged, however, in drawing conclusions from these occupational

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changes. The broad occupational categories compress heterogeneous jobs within each category that differ in earnings, mobility potential, and security. More important, the trends in two critical measures of labor market position—employment participation and unemployment—offer little to bolster the belief that there has been convergence in the economic status of minority and majority.

Why, then, has this conclusion taken root? Evidence that supports the convergence hypothesis relies on the changing fortunes of minorities who did find jobs rather than on the static or deteriorating conditions of the unemployed or those outside the labor market. All major studies document advancement in the occupational status and earnings of minority workers. But because broad occupational categories have as subcategories jobs that vary by sex and race, their utility as a measure of economic status is diminished. Despite this, the evidence is convincing. Minorities *have* made progress, both absolutely and relatively, in the occupational hierarchy. What is troublesome is that these gains in minority earnings and occupation are taking place while disparities continue in the employment/population ratio. There has not been broad-based minority employment progress among all sectors of the four minority communities; rather, there has been selective progress among those minority group members most able to compete in the labor market. Why has there been a competitive loss for some minority labor market groups, and how can this loss be recaptured?

The slow, uncertain movement toward reduced economic inequality, as reflected in the evidence on employment, unemployment, and labor force participation, has long posed a dilemma both for minorities and for public policymakers concerned with ways to fulfill the nation's commitment to equal opportunity. Attempts to explain the limited progress by reference to objective factors, such as intergroup variations in human capital and fluctuations in general economic conditions, have been less than satisfactory. In the absence of compelling arguments that explain the impact of other factors, labor market discrimination has been recognized as a powerful factor influencing the status of minorities. For some time now, much of the effort to achieve greater economic equality has focused on ways to reduce labor market discrimination.

Toward Labor Market Equity

Prior to the 1940s, there was no national policy concerning the participation of minorities in the labor market. Employee hiring practices, like the determination of wages and working conditions, were matters for unilateral management determination. The intensity of labor demand and social customs that dictated the "appropriate place" of minorities within the occupational structure determined both the number and type of jobs held by minorities.

The absence of policy concerning employment discrimination was one of many examples of laissez-faire in the labor market. Labor markets, it was said, operate more efficiently if decisions that concern hiring and the determination of wages and working conditions are made solely according to economic self-interest, free of government regulation. In addition, private property rights as then interpreted protected the right of employers to be arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory in their employment practices. During the 1920s and 1930s, the

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legitimacy of laissez-faire in labor market decision-making was central to the debate over the right of workers to organize and to participate in collective bargaining.

A major crack in the armor of unregulated laissez-faire occurred with passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1937. The National Labor Relations Board created by the act had authority to establish a set of standards and procedures for protecting the right of workers to organize and to engage in collective bargaining with their employers. It is interesting to note that, although the NLRA was designed to correct labor market discrimination based on union membership, even the most liberal interpretation of the new labor code did not suggest that it could apply to race and sex discrimination. In fact, later attempts to use the act as a weapon against racial discrimination in employment were highly unsuccessful.[9]

FROM NONDISCRIMINATION TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

The unequal treatment of blacks in the labor market during World War II sparked a major protest, led by A. Phillip Randolph, president of the predominantly black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and one of the nation's leading civil rights spokesmen. Randolph threatened a massive March on Washington if President Roosevelt did not issue an executive order establishing a fair employment practices agency to assure blacks equal treatment in the competition for defense-related jobs. After some well-publicized sparring between Randolph and Roosevelt, in which each tested the other's will, the president issued an executive order creating the first federally supported fair employment practices agency.

The wartime Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) was aimed exclusively at employment practices in the defense-related industries, and used only education and persuasion as tools for achieving compliance with the executive order. A review of the commission's work revealed that little real progress toward full participation of minorities in defense jobs could be attributed to the FEPC.[10] Public hearings were held to examine hiring practices in shipbuilding, railroads, and selected manufacturing industries, but little, if any, change in the employment practices of these or other industries followed. Moreover, although the executive order was aimed at discrimination based on "race, creed, and national origin," the FEPC concentrated almost exclusively on racial discrimination. Hispanics and other minorities did not figure significantly on the commission's agenda.

After the war, congressional opposition to the FEPC increased, and in the midst of the widening political problems of the Truman Administration, funds to support the commission were discontinued. After some prodding from civil rights leaders, Truman issued an executive order prohibiting employment discrimination by government-contracting firms, but the effort was mainly educational, and no enforcement machinery was established.

Similarly, an executive order against discrimination by government contractors was issued during the Eisenhower Administration, but no significant enforcement machinery was put in place. A committee on fair employment practices was created, chaired by Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, but records of the committee's work demonstrate its failure to bring any meaningful

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energy, imagination, or commitment to reducing discriminatory behavior among government contractors.[11]

The committee held public hearings on employment practices in the transportation and manufacturing industries, and much evidence of discrimination, including testimony from those who claimed to be direct victims, was reported. No enforcement efforts followed the hearings, however, and despite the available sanctions, no company either lost or was denied a government contract because it had violated the antidiscrimination edict.

During the 1940s and 1950s, the prevailing public policy on employment opportunities shifted gradually from nondiscrimination to equal opportunity, a shift that represented a slow evolution of attitudes concerning discrimination. During the 1940s, largely as a result of tight labor markets, blacks and Hispanics were hired into jobs in manufacturing, transportation, and other industries, especially in large Northern, Midwestern, and Western cities. The less discriminatory hiring practices made necessary by the war effort helped change some of the social customs that had previously barred minorities from employment in some occupations. The job ceiling was raised a few notches, and as a result, minorities for the first time gained a foothold in the semiskilled and white-collar sectors of the occupational hierarchy. This experience helped generate a more tolerant attitude toward minority group employment in nontraditional jobs during the 1950s.

The shift in the occupational status of minorities, together with the growing acceptance of their employment in nontraditional jobs, helped influence the shift of national policy from nondiscrimination, in which the main goal was to raise job ceilings, to equal opportunity, in which the main emphasis was on efforts to assure minority group access to available job openings and to persuade employers to hire qualified minority applicants. During the 1950s, it was assumed that if employers were persuaded to consider qualified black workers, and if minority workers would seek jobs for which they were qualified, the occupational status of minorities would improve automatically as their educational and training qualifications improved. Policymakers believed that greater public education concerning the importance of giving all workers the opportunity to compete in the labor market would be sufficient to overcome job discrimination.

FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

By the time John F. Kennedy took office as president of the United States, the major civil rights organizations, especially the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League, had placed employment discrimination high on their list of problems deserving presidential attention. In response to persistent demands, Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925, prohibiting employment discrimination by government contractors and establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO) to enforce the order. It marked an important step beyond similar efforts taken in the past.

First, PCEEO, chaired by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, was encouraged to go after discriminatory practices through an industry-by-industry approach, while at the same time protecting the rights of individual workers.

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The purpose was to attack broad industry patterns of discrimination rather than limit the enforcement to individual grievances. Second, the committee was given funds to hire a full-time staff to develop strategies against discrimination and to investigate individual complaints. Third, the policy objective of the executive order was not "nondiscrimination" in employment, but "affirmative action" as a means toward equal employment opportunity. This shift was perhaps the major departure from earlier policy, and was to become the primary policy objective of government antidiscrimination efforts during the next two decades.

As understood and interpreted by the PCEEO, affirmative action meant efforts to make employers sensitive to the way some of their hiring, promotion, and other practices might restrict opportunities for minorities. The objective was to persuade firms to adopt new procedures more likely to increase minority hiring. For example, committee staff developed promotional materials to educate employers about alternative recruiting sources to reach qualified minority employees. Employers were strongly encouraged to use these recruitment sources, with the expectation that more minorities would be hired. Employers who adopted the alternative procedures were taking "affirmative action" toward equal employment opportunity. Despite the availability of sanctions in the executive order, however, the committee strongly emphasized persuasion and voluntary compliance. There were no penalties for firms that failed to practice affirmative action.

The main strategy adopted by PCEEO was to promote company participation in "Plans for Progress," statements signed by employers committing them to nondiscriminatory personnel practices, including hiring, training, promotion, and terms of compensation. Nothing beyond exhortation was used, however, to assure employer compliance. During its lifetime, PCEEO did not revoke any contracts with business firms for failure either to implement the plans for progress or to meet the other standards imposed by the executive order.

The committee's requirement that all firms receiving government contracts submit a statistical report that summarized the occupational composition of their work force by race and sex proved to have unexpected value. Initially, the information was sought to support the enforcement of the executive order, especially its focus on industry-wide employment practices. But the reports revealed the extent of employment disparities between minorities and others more clearly than any other evidence available at the time. Moreover, because the PCEEO also had jurisdiction over nondiscrimination in federal employment, data showing minority employment in federal agencies were made available for the first time. These data revealed a pattern of heavy concentration of blacks in the lowest occupational groups in both white-collar and blue-collar jobs, and the uniformity of that pattern across all federal executive departments.[12]

FROM EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO EQUAL RESULTS

The availability of data showing broad disparities of employment between minorities and others by occupation helped move antidiscrimination policy toward greater emphasis on quantitative measures for assessing progress under

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affirmative action. After two decades of efforts to achieve equal employment opportunity through education and persuasion, the empirical evidence suggested few gains in the occupational status of minorities that could be attributed to the antidiscrimination policy. Undoubtedly, government efforts to promote fair employment practices served at the very least to make job discrimination a matter of national concern. Presidential statements on the subject, followed by administrative actions, helped legitimize the view that job discrimination was not in the public interest and should be eliminated. The impact of such exhortations on corporate practices is difficult to measure, but it is reasonable to conclude that, when racial discrimination is widely practiced in the labor market, the effort to create an environment in which fair employment practices are expected is much preferred to official silence.

By the mid-1960s, however, impatience with the pace of progress under benign antidiscrimination policies grew enormously. The civil rights movement had grown to major proportions, and increasing attention was drawn to the continuing failure of prevailing public policies to generate change in the economic status of black workers. Although the movement focused on racial discrimination in public accommodations, job discrimination and economic inequality were also high on the agenda of concerns. The March on Washington in 1963 had as its motto "*Jobs* and Freedom," words not juxtaposed as an afterthought, but reflecting instead the centrality of economic justice in the thinking of many civil rights advocates.

Creeping unemployment among blacks and the widening gap in unemployment between blacks and whites also forced civil rights advocates to focus on the jobs issue. The black unemployment rate increased sharply to 10 percent during the 1954-55 recession. Moreover, the black unemployment rate in 1954 doubled that of whites and remained so throughout the early 1960s. Civil rights leaders recognized that the unfavorable unemployment rate was due in part to sluggish growth in the economy, but they argued that discriminatory practices among employers and trade unions also contributed to the problem. They agreed with efforts to stimulate economic activity aimed at lowering the unemployment rate for the work force as a whole, with the expectation that black unemployment would also decline. But they believed that efforts to reduce labor market discrimination would help to achieve the same purpose.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246 were the policy instruments adopted to generate more progress in occupational mobility among minorities. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created under Title VII, and the executive order established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) within the U.S. Department of Labor. Officials of both organizations placed heavy emphasis on quantitative gains in the employment of minorities as the standard for measuring the success of the antidiscrimination policy.

The OFCC required government contractors to meet predetermined "goals and timetables" in the employment of minorities and women. Affirmative action was now defined as a set of procedures through which employers would assure that minorities and women would be recruited, assessed, hired, trained, retained, and promoted. Compliance with the new policy was measured by the employer's progress in reaching numerical standards, in which the proportion

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of minorities employed in various occupations was similar to the minority group proportion of the population in the geographical area where the employer operated. Failure to meet the numerical goals could be cause for legal sanctions, such as the denial of a government contract or the revocation of an existing one.

When it began operations in 1965, EEOC had no independent enforcement power. The commission could investigate charges of discrimination, and seek to correct them by consultation. If no satisfactory agreement was reached, however, EEOC could only advise the aggrieved person of his or her right to sue for remedial action by the courts.

The commission, however, took a more active posture through its rule-making authority, granted by Congress to facilitate the orderly administration of Title VII. Under this authority, the commission developed definitions and standards of nondiscriminatory practices in recruitment, testing, compensation, and discharge to determine employer compliance. Through its rule-making authority, EEOC developed a code of allowable conduct, later enforced by the courts in their consideration of cases brought under Title VII.

EEOC also interpreted broadly its authority to hold public hearings into employment discrimination. During the early years of the commission's operation, public hearings were organized to review employment practices in many industries and geographic areas. In preparing for the hearings, commission staff assembled and prepared reports on a mass of statistical data on industry employment patterns. These reports, together with information drawn from conciliation files, were the basis for the commission's interrogation of employers who agreed to participate in the hearings. Transcripts of the hearings clearly show that the EEOC commissioners measured compliance by increases in the number of minorities and women in the employer's work force.[13] Thus, although it had no enforcement power until 1972, EEOC became an important vehicle for promoting the adoption of numerically based affirmative action plans as the standard for compliance with antidiscrimination laws.

DEFINING THE LEGALLY PROTECTED GROUPS

Until the late 1960s, most antidiscrimination efforts were aimed at the black community. This was due in large part to the demands of black organizations such as the NAACP and the National Urban League. The national response to the civil rights movement, however, sparked the growth of organizations that advocated equal opportunity for other groups, including Hispanics and women. The newly organized groups called national attention to the employment problems of other minorities, and made additional claims on EEOC, OFCC, and other enforcement agencies. As a result, affirmative action ceased to be identified exclusively with attempts to reduce racial discrimination; discrimination based on gender, national origin, Spanish surname, and other classifications became major issues of concern for the federal enforcement agencies.

Over time, affirmative action has been broadened to require employers to demonstrate that their work force includes blacks, women, Hispanics, and other "legally protected groups" in proportions similar to the presence of such groups in the population of the relevant community. For some purposes, the legally protected groups for whom affirmative action must be demonstrated

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include Vietnam veterans, the handicapped, and displaced homemakers, among others. The proliferation of groups entitled to special protection against employment discrimination has diluted the emphasis on racial discrimination, and has greatly complicated the enforcement task. This problem, together with inflation and the slowdown in economic growth, has generated increased tensions among groups that feel entitled to special relief against discrimination, but also feel frustrated because of the limited progress during the past decade.

Equalizing the Labor Market Status of Minorities

What should be done to equalize employment opportunities for minorities and others? This is a major question facing the nation today. Experience with affirmative action policies in the recent past leads many to oppose such measures, either because of their unfavorable effects on majority males or their alleged distortion of the labor market.[14] There is general support for a national policy of "equal opportunity," but declining support for affirmative action as it has been pursued.

Despite many scholarly studies, there is still much uncertainty about the relationship between equal employment policies and minority group employment progress. The fear, rather than the actual practice, of enforcement may increase the willingness of employers to adopt more open hiring practices or to make special efforts to increase employment opportunities. Many of the published studies refer to the minority employment gains of the late 1960s, and these attempt to isolate the gains attributable to equal employment policies from those that came about through improvements in minority human capital and economic growth.[15] The earliest studies, by attributing labor market gains to improvements in labor productivity or fortuitous shifts in the demand for labor, failed to discern a positive impact on the earnings and employment of minorities. More recent examinations claim that occupational upgrading of younger minority group members with higher educational attainment can be related to equal opportunity policies. Flaws in policy administration are also cited for the failure of affirmative action to produce more measurable results. The difficulty in quantifying the administrative process greatly complicates the task of measuring how much affirmative action affects minority group unemployment.

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE GAINS

Before an effective national policy can be developed for equalizing the labor market status of minorities, several major questions must be answered. What goals should the nation move toward to achieve equal opportunity for minorities in the labor market? Can we measure "equal opportunity" by the percentage of minorities employed in various occupations; by narrowing income inequality between minorities and others; by the quantity and quality of employer efforts to find and employ minorities? What changes in institutional practices are required to assure improvements in the labor market status of minorities, both absolutely and relative to currently favored groups? Is it appropriate for government, as it seeks to assure the achievement of the desired objectives, to

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impose sanctions to control private behavior; to concentrate on its own practices, and thereby set an example for the private sector; to use its purchasing power to influence the behavior of private citizens in the exercise of their property rights?

Further, is there a legitimate difference between equal opportunity and affirmative action? Must affirmative action require the imposition of quotas? What are the responsibilities of the state in protecting innocent parties whose interests are jeopardized by government policies to improve the status of groups whose current position in the labor market reflects the present effects of past discrimination?

In attempting to answer these questions, several considerations might be offered. First, it is unlikely that a withdrawal of government intervention from the labor market will assure the achievement of economic progress for minorities. In a world characterized by free competition, in which all parties begin with comparable assets and enjoy comparable bargaining power, the natural interplay of market forces would perhaps minimize the unfavorable consequences of discrimination.

A cursory examination of U.S. labor markets will show few places where conditions resembling free competition prevail. American labor markets are characterized by concentrated power by employers in some sectors, and by organized labor in others. Recognition of workers' inability to organize and participate in collective bargaining without government protection led to the development of our national labor policy a half century ago. Similarly, state authority will continue to be necessary to protect minorities' rights to participate fully in the broad range of labor market opportunities. There is room for improvement in the administration of equal opportunity policies, but they will continue to be necessary until there is greater progress in narrowing occupational and income status differentials between minorities and others.

Second, a national commitment to reduce employment disparities between minorities and others will help achieve other national goals. Some of the current malaise in economic performance is related to the level of federal expenditures for transfer payments needed to help support only partially employed members of the population. Although some unemployment problems are attributable to structural changes now taking place in certain industries and geographic areas, the unequal distribution of unemployment across different population groups reflects the present effects of past denials of equal employment opportunity.

The current occupational status of minorities and their patterns of participation in the labor market cannot be fully explained by "differences" in human capital endowment between blacks, Hispanics, and others. Nor do different life-styles and cultural preferences explain the disparities. Even the most sophisticated and methodologically sound studies of intergroup variations in labor market status come to no conclusive determination after all objective factors have been considered. There is a need to continue the search for ways to minimize the use of arbitrary and noneconomic criteria in decisions to hire, train, and promote. As such methods are found and their use becomes widespread, the productivity of the work force as a whole will be raised, resulting in higher levels of output, gains in real income, a lower rate of inflation, and less public spending for transfer payments. The latter will ease

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pressures on the federal budget and contribute to more balanced economic growth.

Finally, continued progress toward the reduction of labor market inequality is essential to our continued claim of leadership of the free world. Our system of democracy has long been considered a model for other nations. Thousands of immigrants and refugees who seek to enter this country are mindful that, in the past, many persons with limited means were able to advance and thrive here.

Today, the United States is in a serious struggle to win the minds of the nonwhite nations of the world. The treatment of racial minorities here will help determine the success of that effort. For example, future progress in the relations between the United States and Mexico will surely be affected by our response to the legitimate claims of Hispanics for progress in their economic status. Similarly, the leaders of African nations have often considered the treatment of the American black population an important measure of this nation's sincerity in its attempt to establish good relations, relations that will be increasingly important as world competition for scarce resources, including oil, intensifies.

Thus both domestic and international considerations argue strongly for national policies to promote and protect economic progress among minorities. Improvement in the employment position of minorities can be expected as their educational gains continue and as positive attitudes toward racial tolerance evolve. Trends in the national economy will undoubtedly influence the pace of progress, with balanced and vigorous economic growth the most favorable environment for minority group advancement. At the same time, special efforts to assure improvements in the relative position of minorities will also be required. Such efforts will generate confidence that the nation is committed to the full participation of all groups in the benefits as well as the responsibilities for economic growth.

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JOAN W. MOORE

Minorities in the American Class System

No dream is so dear to Americans as the possibility of a society that is completely open to ambitious people. But when we wake, the realities of class and race are difficult to face. Perhaps this is why we are so willing to leave the study of realities to specialists—and to draw from them the kind of uneasy compromise that we call public policy. But ambiguity has its uses: we must be free to tell children that hard work and education will find their reward. Young blacks and Chicanos must be persuaded to wait another generation, always another generation.

But the problems of class and race are too important to leave to the specialists; we should be at least faintly aware of the main categories of professional polemic and wishful thinking, because the present situation is embarrassing and unpleasant, for at least four reasons. First, obsolete and monolithic paradigms still dominate much of the professional thinking, masking the realities. Second, our share of minority people is growing so rapidly that they will soon be a majority in certain areas. Third, the political climate is such that blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans will be left to themselves to win their own way. And fourth, the surge of hope and practical results won by all four minorities in the 1960s is well remembered.

Biracialism and Other Delusions

The first and most deceptive of the paradigms that mask reality is the assumption that America's minorities and all their problems are simply a question of "black" and "white." For most Americans, "race" means black people and white people, as does "minority." This narrow biracial assumption is enshrined in the U.S. census, where it does great mischief. We are given statistics based on "white" and "nonwhite," and most people read nonwhite as black. Minorities that don't fit this assumption are counted as exceptions and tossed into a residual category—into "other colored," as in the past; "other nonwhite," as used now for Native Americans and Koreans; or into both categories, as is done now for Puerto Ricans. Mexican Americans have so baffled the classifications of the census that they were moved back and forth from a racial ("other nonwhite") category in 1930 to a kind of ethnic group ("persons of Spanish mother tongue") in 1940. An even more ambiguous classification—"white persons of Spanish surname"—was used in 1950 and

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1960. In 1970 it was "persons of both Spanish surname and Spanish mother tongue."[1] In 1980 Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanics became a kind of superethnic group, listed along with other national descent groups and also in a category by itself. Sometimes (but rarely) the census tabulates them as a race, along with white, black, and other nonwhite. This grudging and inconsistent acknowledgment that Chicanos and Puerto Ricans are something other than simple ethnic groups (like Greeks or Italians) is a consequence of the biracialist paradigm. It is not a harmless assumption. It is built into the way the census and the nation constructs reality.

But the census is a model of realism by contrast with the social science professionals. At least the census (and some other federal agencies) troubled to collect systematically the available data on black minorities. Academic social scientists have been extraordinarily blind to Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and other nonblacks. Generations of textbooks on "intergroup relations" have discussed only blacks. Generations of doctoral dissertations, community studies, and policy monographs have equated "minority" with "black." By contrast, there is only a very sparse literature on other minorities in the class system, and as we shall see, it has greatly impoverished the thinking on class and race in the United States.

From the beginning, an Alice-in-Wonderland quality pervaded thought about the American class system and how such a system absorbs or excludes minorities. The dominant sociological paradigm is based on the idea that America is a nation of immigrants. It was assumed that economic opportunity would forever expand and forever provide mobility up the ladder. In the process, all but vestigial and trivial meanings of non-American origins would vanish. It was believed that this upward struggle would create a kind of cohesiveness in the society, because everyone subscribed to the same set of goals.[2]

The process was seen as very nearly inevitable. In the 1940s a detailed timetable was developed for the assimilation of each ethnic/racial group through its mobility in the class system. A later generation of sociologists found a ranking in the current socioeconomic attainment of various ethnic groups that corresponded roughly to the distinction between the "old" (Western European) and the "new" (Eastern and Southern European) immigrants. Latin Americans (Chicanos and Puerto Ricans) and West Indians (blacks) trailed well behind.[3] Some economists have even tried, rather unconvincingly, to project such status attainments into the future, to estimate how long it will take blacks to catch up,[4] like the earlier timetable for assimilation. Class was believed to absorb ethnicity, a conception that was widely accepted for some important reasons only remotely related to science. It was a very nice idea, and romantically comforting: we all grow together in a new land and achieve our dearest aspirations. It offered the comforts of both rationality and morality to the most conservative white people. And, of course, it certified the importance and moral worth of certain American institutions such as the educational system, which, it now appears, do not work very well at present and did not work very well in the past. But back in the forties, these quibbles went unnoticed.

Even then there was the nagging exception of American blacks; it was obvious that the class system was not working in the same fashion for black people. They were seen as separate and apart, locked into a castelike system that

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had been convincingly demonstrated in a series of classic studies, primarily of life in the South. This caste system was unpleasant, but understandable, in the terms of life in the American South. So understandable, in fact, that when coupled with the biracial assumption, social scientists generally overlooked their inability to apply the caste system to any other racial groups or minorities. Every group was somehow an exception. The American Indians were an exception: according to popular belief, they lived mostly on reservations and were a "special" population. When Puerto Ricans began to arrive on the mainland in large numbers, they also were seen as "special." But the exceptionalism used to explain Indians and Puerto Ricans was much less excusable for the millions of Mexican Americans in the Southwest. Mexicans were neither a caste, nor did they fit into the assimilation timetable (even though they were classified as similar to the Mediterranean Catholic immigrants). This minority came to the United States by conquest, not by slavery or immigration. Their status varied immensely from place to place in the conquered territory. Sometimes the conquering Americans displaced the elite Mexicans; in other areas they simply married and joined them. Sometimes they fitted the resident Mexicans into a new industrial system and then found it necessary to import even more. In some cities, old Mexican families retained their status in the very top layers of the upper class; in California, some "old" families are firmly intermarried with the most powerful industrial and financial interests. But Western history is a tiny specialty of American history, and the nation's social scientists knew little of this. When the last great waves of European immigration coincided with the revolution-inspired emigration from Mexico after 1910, Mexicans were treated as just another late ethnic arrival in the panorama of American assimilation. Few noticed that not until after World War II did Mexican patterns of settlement in the United States begin to bear any resemblance to those of the European immigrants who settled in the urban industrial North. The analogy with the older ethnics was just too thin, and there were just too many Chicanos for exceptionalism to work very well.

Interestingly, the academic myths about minorities were destroyed not by more and better research, but by the ethnics themselves. Minority activism of the 1960s not only attacked social and economic barriers directly, but their intellectuals destroyed the melting pot concept. New models were borrowed from the former colonies of European countries. To the ethnic intellectuals, the situation of American blacks, Indians, and Chicanos seemed to be similar to that of colonial and postcolonial situations. To complete the paradigm, Puerto Rico *was* very nearly still a colony. While this "internal colonialism" model had some flaws, the resemblance was striking. The analogy drew attention to long-standing structures and emergent social structures that were very easy to ignore under the discredited ethnic-assimilationist idea—and too narrowly conceptualized under the race and caste analogy.[5] (Generally, these paradigms were congruent with Marxist-Leninist conceptions. Although they tended to emerge first in a cultural-nationalist context, the new approaches probably encouraged extensive exploration of Marxist theories among many minority social scientists.) Certainly the flaws in these old paradigms were very obvious by this time. The search for new models also profited from concurrent attempts to reconceptualize the economic opportunity structure.

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But the old models are slow to die. The caste paradigm clearly no longer fits the facts of the 1970s and 1980s, even for blacks. Yet the idea of caste and the ethnic-assimilationist model continues to suit a large group of social scientists who find the ferment of the 1960s repugnant. The ethnic-assimilationist model fits extremely well with the neoconservative emphasis on "pure" market factors as an explanation of status mobility, and on cultural factors as an explanation of failure. Thus Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for example, argue, in a sophisticated version of the old "cultural deprivation" theory, that there is nothing special in the current circumstances of blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans that cannot be subsumed under the ordinary factors that help or hinder white ethnics from mobility in the labor market. This is a view that condemns minority activism and use of the political system for the direct redistribution of jobs, housing, and other essentials. They charge that all such activity assumes that the ideal of equality of opportunity has failed—and, they claim, it has not. Therefore, such activism is a serious threat to core American values and norms—perhaps even more of a threat than the activities of the crook who uses deviant means to attain success, but does not try to legitimate or excuse his methods. This controversy about the ability of minorities to fade eventually into the mainstream occupational and class structure is far from disinterested or academic. It is often personal, often bitter, and has direct policy consequences.[6]

The Paradox of Place: Old Minorities in New Places

This bitterness about minorities has roots deep in American culture—so deep they cannot be explored here. They reach into the early American idea of faraway people as romantic. This spiritualized gloss lay heavy on the people living in the remnants of Southern plantation feudalism. It created the happy exotics of John Steinbeck's *Cannery Row* and the noble, stoic Red Men living on the reservations in the faraway Southwest. We thought of the Puerto Ricans as fascinating, content in our remote island colony. It was a gloss thick enough to hide the realities of subordination. Only when these minorities left the stage and the novels and their traditional geographic and social places and moved right next door to us in the city did the subordination flower into its true ugliness, highly visible to both the happy exotics and the urban middle-class Anglos. Then conservative social scientists could argue that nothing but ideology hindered these urban newcomers from advancing, just as did the European greenhorns of past generations. The media could prod all the latent fears of the urban middle classes about the depredations (and costliness) of these new barbarians. Immediately after World War II in the large American cities, the fates of the four minorities began to converge, and naive romanticism was dead.

By the 1970s all of these minorities were predominantly city-dwellers. Most blacks (81% by 1970) lived in the cities, and almost half lived outside the South by 1975. Most Mexican Americans (81%) lived in metropolitan areas, and 13 percent had moved out of the five Southwestern states in which they had traditionally lived (the border states and Colorado). More than a third of the nation's Puerto Ricans lived not in Puerto Rico, but on the mainland, and 95 percent of these were crowded into cities. Even the Indians were leaving their

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reservations; half of them lived in urban areas by the mid-1970s. Each group moved geographically and socially in a different manner, but all did so primarily after World War II.[7]

The most openly "managed" migration was that of American Indians. In 1950 only 16 percent of Native Americans lived in cities. The enormous movement in the following decades was the result of the relocation policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Poverty on the reservations led to the policy of "off-reservation" employment in the Employment Assistance Act of 1956. Well intentioned it may have been, but the net result is that the vast majority did badly in urban labor markets and became poor in the cities as well as on the reservations. In some ways they are worse off: the Indian population is such a small fraction of the large cities that it has been generally difficult for them to establish their own institutions and to maintain a strong community life. Some observers think this migration is restless, with some return migration, and much back-and-forth movement. By the late 1970s some experts were predicting a stabilization of urban communities and a revival of tribal patterns in cities like New York. Others continue to see nothing but disintegration.[8]

Back-and-forth migration also characterizes the Puerto Rican movement to cities of the mainland. This also was highly managed, although the mechanism is less overt than in the case of the Indians. Active labor recruiting and contracting brought large numbers of Puerto Rican workers to New York and other cities in the years after World War II. New low-cost air transportation helped make the shift possible. The Puerto Rican government cooperated actively. Operation Bootstrap itself, with its emphasis on high-technology, capital-intensive development, also tended to push out unskilled workers.[9]

Chicanos were not new to the cities of the Southwest; in fact, many of these cities were founded by Mexican immigrants. But they *seemed* to appear in large numbers in the cities, especially in California, after World War II. With this came a gradual awareness of both their very large numbers and their concentration in urban centers. The 1930s and 1940s were times of massive federal and state management. Mexicans were deported in the 1930s, imported in the 1940s as agricultural braceros, and deported, once again, in large numbers in the 1950s. Federal management is still a critical factor in the endless struggle over undocumented Mexican workers. Mexican workers flocked into Southwestern cities because of labor opportunities there during and after World War II. This consolidation of urban settlements coincided with a mass movement out of the oppressive environment in Texas. This movement went largely to California, although increasing numbers of Chicanos are leaving the Southwest and moving into the Midwest, particularly into the great chain of industrial cities from southeastern Wisconsin through Chicago to Detroit. At the same time, enormous numbers of undocumented workers and their families are settling in the more traditional areas of the Southwest. How many is a subject of great controversy, but the correct answer would be in the millions.[10]

The "Great Migration" of black Americans from the South started even earlier, early in the twentieth century. In 1910 almost 90 percent lived in the South, 65 percent of these in rural areas. Labor recruiters spurred the movement to the North as early as the 1920s in a search for large numbers of naive strikebreakers. At the onset of World War II, only 23 percent of the black

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population lived outside the South (most of them in the Northeast and north central regions). As did many other Americans, blacks began to move west in great numbers after 1940, in response to the many industrial jobs created in the Sunbelt by the war and by later economic development. The movement out of the South was overwhelmingly a movement to the cities; 95 percent of the non-Southern blacks lived in cities in the late 1960s. But the pattern slowed considerably by the mid-1970s. Not only did the north central regions and the Northeast begin to lose blacks, but the black population of the South began to grow again.[11]

What, then, did this movement from traditional places mean for these four minorities? Most significantly, it meant that their life circumstances began to converge. All four groups were locked into cities, in some cases, into the same cities. Significant portions of all four groups were locked also into the poverty areas of these cities, areas that had poor institutional services and poor housing—precisely the services and circumstances that to a large degree determine the life chances of minority group members.

Generally, this is described as the process of *ghettoization*, the term most commonly used for blacks in Northern cities. Harold Rose finds that ghetto formation in the Old South depended on legalized segregation, with urban areas set aside for blacks; in the North, the newcomers took over "used" housing in areas of the inner city. More recently, however, these regional differences have begun to vanish.[12] The recent awareness of the growth of the black middle class has led many specialists to question whether ghettoization is not an obsolete concept for a significant number of middle-class urban blacks. But many blacks with substantial incomes still seek out residential areas within the central city, frequently adjacent to black ghettos. Recent real estate inflation may have priced them out of any hope of moving to the suburbs in many cities. What has been interpreted as black suburbanization, according to Rose, is not a middle-class or integrated pattern. Rather, blacks migrating from the South frequently choose to live on the outskirts of large cities in a life-style and setting closer to their rural Southern origins. Even within the metropolitan rings, some enclaves of blacks, communities dating from the turn of the century, are found in industrial "satellites." But neither small towns nor the industrial satellites, although geographically suburban, represent living conditions that are any better than the ghettos of the central city. Whether middle-class blacks can migrate to the suburbs and actually become part of the receiving community (as opposed to segregated "ghettolets," a term coined by Rose) must await the data of the 1980 census.[13]

But is ghettoization a valid concept for the other minorities? There is little doubt that it applies to mainland Puerto Ricans. Incoming Puerto Ricans not only were segregated in the old tenements of New York and other cities, but they even shared many of the living spaces of blacks, as on the edges of Harlem in New York. The concept is less valid for urban Indians, even though they tend to live in subcommunities in poorer areas of the city. It is difficult to think of ghettoization in regard to such a comparatively small number of people.

It is with Mexican Americans that the concept of ghettoization is most questionable. At least in the Southwest, Chicano residential segregation from Anglos and from blacks is markedly different because of two historical factors.

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First, many Southwestern cities were founded by Mexicans. Current prevailing residential patterns reflect many decades during which new Anglos competed with original Mexicans for space. In reverse, waves of newcomer Mexicans are displacing Anglos. Second, many of these cities grew by annexation or absorption of outlying areas. Frequently these areas included traditional Mexican settlements, many of them near work sites. These patterns contribute to a lower level and a more variable pattern of residential segregation, often (as in San Diego or the San Fernando Valley near Los Angeles) to a scattering of older small and medium-sized barrios in a veritable sea of Anglo housing, often very new.[14]

It seems unlikely that big cities will have one big mixed ghetto in the future. Blacks and Chicanos in the Southwest have been segregated from each other and from Anglos at about the same degree for decades, and the pattern appears to be stable. In the Snowbelt cities, black and Hispanic ghettos tend to be adjacent and to blur around the edges, but they appear not to have merged. Although a single huge ghetto is not likely, the living situations of all four minorities have striking similarities. There is, in addition, a growing feeling that their interests may very well be the same. A focus of this interest is, of course, the urban industrial labor market.

Changes in the Structure of Opportunity

Earlier we noted how the massive shift of minority people away from the traditional places made difficulties for the theorists. Urban poverty is meaner and less easily sentimentalized than rural poverty. It is strange that this sentimentalization continues: the Southern caste system and the struggles of César Chávez for his farm workers still attract wide interest. In their time the Chicano Brown Berets and the Black Panthers drew much less interest. The riots of the 1960s were, somehow, the last straw. In policy terms, wide interest in improving the opportunity structure has given way to a neoconservative emphasis on economic development. Yet, there is the special difficulty that economic development tends to erode away at the bottom of business cycles, just when it is most needed. In terms of importance, the rise and fall of economic development schemes are much less critical to American minorities than the structural factors at work in the modern labor marketplace.

OPPORTUNITY AND GEOGRAPHY

A simple and pointed way to begin is to ask whether minorities are in the right places for today's good jobs. In answering, two points should be made. The first is that job opportunities are declining in the North—the target of much minority movement and an area much affected by business cycles[15]—and increasing in the South and West. Most of the job growth in these areas is in the new complex of industries closely tied to federal needs in aerospace and military goods. These are fast-growing high-wage industries, and their rate of expansion over twenty years was 180 percent in the South, compared to a national growth of 92 percent.[16] Minorities leaving the South and Southwest are missing such opportunities, even though others may benefit. But, actually, it is much more

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likely that minorities who remain in these areas will benefit from the darker side of Sunbelt growth. Certain low-paying manufacturing jobs also increased in the nonunionized South, although they declined elsewhere in the nation. Thus cheap labor (leftover minorities and undocumented workers) allowed the Sunbelt "to capture a significant share of the low-wage manufacturing industries, and, in some activities [the South] now accounts for as much as 60 to 70 percent of the national employment in these low-wage portions of manufacturing."[17] Thus the widely hailed shift to the Sunbelt probably has not benefited the four minorities.

The second point, the so-called mismatch hypothesis, argues that blue-collar manufacturing jobs are leaving the central city for the white-collar suburbs just as blue-collar minorities are migrating to those central cities. The hypothesis seems to fit the facts that suburban jobs grew disproportionately between 1960 and 1970 and that there are increasing rates of minority unemployment in the central city. The mismatch idea is especially appealing because the solution appears to be simple: transport central city residents to suburban jobs or relocate segregated minority workers to the suburbs.

Unfortunately, the evidence is not very convincing. There is no simple relationship between the growth of suburban manufacturing jobs and the recent growth of urban unemployment. Worse yet, there is evidence that the mismatch hypothesis is based on wrong information: jobs in the central city were undercounted, and with few exceptions, increased and show signs of continued increase.[18] Furthermore, government and service are the two growth sectors of the economy that disproportionately hire minority workers. Both areas are disproportionately growing in the central cities.[19] Semiskilled and unskilled employment increased enough in the 1960s for all resident central city workers.[20] And in the early 1970s blue-collar work actually continued to increase in the central cities more than in the suburbs.[21] Simple observation of the Chinatown sweatshops in Manhattan suggests that low-wage employers locate near their labor supply. At least one study shows that suburban employers who need low-wage workers are forced to bus their workers—surely an uneconomic activity.[22] Thus, though job opportunities in the central city have not been great, they also have not disappeared—yet unemployment *has* risen. Why this is happening will be a large part of our discussion.

OPPORTUNITY AND THE SHIFTING STRUCTURE OF JOBS

Structural changes in the job market have been critical for minority employment, let alone minority advancement. Both the type of job and the nature of competition for the jobs have changed over the past forty years. More jobs are white collar and tend to demand either a college degree or a high-school diploma, although the upper-level jobs (professions) are expected to increase rather more slowly in the 1980s. Service occupations will expand. Blue-collar jobs will grow more slowly, and farm jobs will continue to decline.[23]

This changing shape of the opportunity structure looks more and more middle class. Yet the long-heralded "revolution of the middle class" may be a long time coming. Much of the white-collar expansion has involved women, many of them second earners, who are entering the labor force in unprecedent-

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ed numbers. And when the revolution does come, it may continue to leave the American minorities behind. The large number of highly educated Americans means that jobs will require higher and higher levels of education, and all four minorities lag far behind Anglos in education, especially college education. "By 1978 one out of four college graduates held a job traditionally filled by someone with less schooling."[24] As this trend continues, minorities will find "credentialism" even more frustrating. It is an endless game of "catch-up." At the other end, jobs that traditionally go to uneducated people probably would expand fast enough to match the supply of poorly educated workers *if* employers were concerned only with skill. Almost certainly, however, employers will continue to discriminate.

These occupational shifts accompanied the expansion of the government, trade, and service sectors of the economy. Trade and service occupations are expected to continue to grow relatively fast during the 1980s because service industries are less likely to need fewer workers because of increased efficiency through either technology or management.[25] It is considered much less likely that the government sector will grow. This is unfortunate because government tends to hire minorities. Most of the expansion in government employment took place at state and local levels, and the slight decline after 1975 was seen as the harbinger of a more general decline that would result from public resistance to taxation. Without acknowledging the vulnerability of public employment, William Wilson in *The Declining Significance of Race*, a recent and important analysis of class and race, sees public employment as a critical factor in the employment of minorities.[26]

OPPORTUNITY AND THE SEGMENTED LABOR MARKET

A job is not necessarily an opportunity: it may be badly paid and meaningless. Some "opportunity structures" consist of a lifetime of bad jobs. The essential question for minorities is just *how* the market for jobs operates. Until recently, most labor economists assumed a kind of mass of job seekers lined up for employers in exact order of qualification: the first best qualified person in the queue, regardless of ethnicity or other irrelevant factors, would be selected for the best job. Irrational employers who insisted on discriminating would, in the long run, pay for their discrimination. This comfortable belief in employer rationality has crumbled in the face of a great deal of evidence that nothing of the sort happens. Instead of one labor market, there are actually several. In technical terms, the labor market is "segmented."

Segmented, or "dual labor market," theorists argue that the labor market operates differently for different types of employers. Employers offering "good" jobs (relatively high wages, good working conditions, fringe benefits, security, a chance for advancement, and due process) recruit in markets that are different from those used by the more marginal employers. The primary core enterprises are heavily capitalized, concentrated, and unionized, at least partly as a consequence of the restructuring of industry and jobs through the unionism of the old CIO and the effective labor legislation it helped shape. On the other side of the market, employers of secondary labor are highly competitive with one another. Not only can they pay the lowest possible acceptable wage, but they

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may structure their work force as they please. A vast number of these enterprises systematically evade wage-and-hour laws, as proved to be the case with 83 percent of the garment manufacturers recently inspected in California.[27]

These marginal employers seek employees who make minimal demands. Teenage workers in the fast-food chains will work for minimum wages and are happy with an occasional free Saturday night as a "reward" in the weekly negotiations for a work schedule. Ex-offenders will work to satisfy a parole requirement. But many adults actively reject such jobs, and this leads to continual complaints by low-wage employers about labor shortages. They turn to pools of workers that make fewer demands. "Employers were actively engaged in recruiting new workers from the American South, Puerto Rico, the Caribbean, Latin America and elsewhere . . . from backward, rural areas, who were unfamiliar with modern industry, illiterate in their own language, and could not speak English."[28] Decades of such recruitment have greatly helped in producing the racial mix of today's cities. Southern blacks, Chicanos settling out of the migrant stream, new Mexican immigrants, and Puerto Ricans from the Island undemandingly accept the wages and working conditions that make them attractive to marginal or exploitative employers. A number of studies show that during the 1960s Southern black migrants fresh to the North were more likely to be working than blacks born in the North. Their attitudes were different: the newcomers were exploitable, docile workers; the Northern-born were demanding and skeptical.[29]

This distinction between labor markets is critical for minorities. Only the core sector offers "opportunity" in the usual sense—a decent job that offers advancement, a career. However, core-sector employers, since they pay more for workers anyway (and are less competitive with one another), do discriminate. This does not usually involve open prejudice but rather credentialism, a problem for minorities. Marginal and low-wage employers in the secondary labor market are looking for cheap, docile workers, and they consistently recruit them both in the inner city and in outside labor markets. Foundries and tanneries in the North, for example, recruited Mexicans in Texas in the 1920s and Puerto Ricans in the 1950s. Thus the operations of marginal employers have implictions not only for minorities already on the scene, but also for their competitors. These are the "newest" of the urban minorities—the Koreans, Thais, Samoans, and Chinese—and this competition has implications for the future of American cities.

OPPORTUNITY AND THE GOVERNMENT

During the past twenty years, government actions have improved the opportunity structure for minorities in several ways. But government action also has its little negative twists. First, it has created jobs, but these jobs are vulnerable to the political winds of change. Second, a large portion of government employment for minorities (at least for blacks, for whom it is documented) is in delivering services to poor minority clientele.[30] This kind of employment provokes jokes about "poverty pimps" and "welfare colonialism," but this function of the welfare state is of major importance to minority

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professionals. (In this sense, the contemporary welfare state differs from its long-standing prototype, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which was notably reluctant to employ Indians in routine administrative positions.)

Government is also important in pressuring both its bureaus and agencies and industry to hire minorities through affirmative action. But, as Wilson notes, the benefits tend to accrue primarily in "higher paying jobs of the expanding service-producing industries in both the corporate and the government sectors."[31] Thus they operate to proletarianize the minority poor even further. In addition, there are those who argue that, for blacks, affirmative action is almost entirely responsible for the gains in middle-class jobs, and there is little noticeable softening in the discriminatory hiring practices of "good" employers.

THE OVERALL IMPACT OF CHANGES

The four minorities have moved out of their traditional social and geographic places into the peculiar world of late twentieth century industrialism, a very different opportunity structure from that found by earlier immigrants. Most observers focus on two particular shifts in this structure: first, government is now important in both opening access to, and in creating, opportunities; second, minorities are moving to the wrong places—that is, to places and industries at a time when those places and industries are losing their viability.

There is little doubt about the importance of government in opening and creating job opportunities, and little question that it is a new effect and generally very beneficial for minorities and for their entry into the middle class. Of course, "qualified" minorities have always done better, but in earlier days that "better" was not very good, and government action appears to have made the major difference.

There is less clarity about the importance of opportunity shifts in creating an urban minority underclass. Theorists of the segmented labor market and some community studies of Chicano and black poor people suggest other factors.[32] The most important is the "generational hypothesis." This model sees a continuous influx of naive and unskilled beginners who take exploitative jobs. Despite the inadequacy of their earnings, they and their children survive and cope, in a tripartite economy that includes welfare and illegal sources of income in addition to wages. Later we will trace some more implications of this generational hypothesis for the urban underclass. But first, generally speaking, how much progress have the minorities made during the last twenty years?

The Question of Progress

Rather than coping with sophisticated definitions, we will deal only with the widely used social indicators of income and occupational attainment. Do these indicators show that life is improving for minorities in the American class system? Almost surely the answer is Yes. Most black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Indian males, at least, have improved their position in the past twenty years. But they still continue to lag behind Anglo males in both occupational and income attainment (according to a measure of change between 1959 and 1975). Beyond such wide generalizations, the question of improvement is very

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doubtful. Even the data base is questionable, largely because of the notorious inability of the U.S. census to find low-achieving minority males.

Some of the best work has been done by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, in an analysis that uses ratios extensively. Thus "progress" is shown by their finding that between 1959 and 1975 minority males came notably closer to Anglo males in earnings (see Table 1A). In 1959 black males earned on the average 52 percent of what Anglo males earned; by 1975 they had moved up to 65 percent. Much less progress is shown for women, even Anglo women. Measured against Anglo males, women in general earned *less* on the average in 1975 than they earned in 1959. Black women are the only exception.

There is another point to remember when comparative earnings are examined. Who is really receiving and using this income? Does the income of a minority worker and that of an Anglo worker mean the same thing at home? The answer is No. It is characteristic of minorities that there are *more* people per household, and each member of the average minority family thus shares less from the wages of the wage-earner (Table 1B). It is in the family that individuals learn values and act out their values and life-styles. This differential experience probably has an impact on the labor market behavior of the minority poor.

But the size of the household is not the only difference. Anglo workers tend to be better educated, to have jobs with more prestige, to work more weeks per year and more hours per week, and to be younger. In addition, the income levels among states of residence may vary considerably.[33] These factors can be controlled statistically by the use of a hypothetical earnings ratio, which estimates what each minority subgroup might have earned *if* these six work-related characteristics were the same as those of the average majority males. When these factors are controlled, the results show that earnings would be closer to parity, but there is still a gap. Compare Table 1A for "reality" with Table 1C for the earnings possible if the minorities were as "qualified" as Anglos. Thus some portion of the earnings gap between minorities and Anglos is explainable by differences in individual qualification and characteristics of the typical job, but discrimination probably accounts for the remaining difference.

Statistical manipulation also is used to explain *away* all of the observed differences between minorities and Anglos, as is basically done, for instance, by neoconservative Edward Banfield when he contrasts the "statistical Negro" with the "Census Negro." Banfield argues that "when all non-racial factors are controlled for . . . the Statistical Negro is indistinguishable from the white." This is done, for example, by calculating a birth rate for blacks that excludes women who have lived on Southern farms. This conceit (the Statistical Negro) comes up with a black birth rate that is the same as white.[34] Of course, it is impossible to justify the exclusion of a socially significant fraction of any group. Analogously, one might exclude all white males who live in suburbs, or all Mexican Americans born in Mexico, or perhaps all Indian women living on reservations. The point remains: a departure from descriptive data drawn from the census or some other broad-based source makes possible the manipulation of results to emphasize progress or problems.

What, then, do these three tables show about minority progress? The answer must be equivocal. Most subgroups of minority males are improving somewhat compared with Anglo males, especially if they have the same work-

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Table 1. Earnings and Household Per Capita Income Ratios, Four Minorities and Majority Males, by Sex, 1959–60 and 1975–76.

	Male		Female	
	1959	1975	1959	1975
A. Observed Mean Earnings Ratios for Those with Earnings				
Black	0.52%	0.65%	0.29%	0.43%*
Mexican American	0.64	0.65	0.33	**0.31**
Puerto Rican	0.60	0.72	0.42	**0.41**
American Indian/Alaskan Native	0.54	0.73	0.36	**0.35**
Majority	1.00	1.00	0.50	**0.45**
B. Median Household Per Caita Income Ratios				
Black	0.46%[a]	0.52%[a]	0.27%[b]	0.20%[b]
Mexican American	0.50	0.49	0.29	**0.28**
Puerto Rican	0.59	0.50	0.49	**0.29**
American Indian/Alaskan Native	0.32	0.57	0.26	0.30
Majority	1.00	1.00	0.75	**0.59**
C. Hypothetical Mean Earnings Ratios for Those with Earnings				
Black	0.71%	0.85%	0.47%	0.61%**
Mexican American	0.84	0.82	0.48	**0.48**
Puerto Rican	0.87	0.98	0.55	0.57
American Indian/Alaskan Native	0.73	0.92	0.53	0.54
Majority	1.00	1.00	0.57	0.57

Source: Derived from U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators for Minorities and Women*, pp. 50, 54. Figures representing a decline in relative status between 1959 and 1975 are in boldface.

[a]All households

[b]Female-headed households

*Interpreted as follows: In 1975 black females earned, on the average, 43 percent of the majority male average earnings.

**Interpreted as follows: In 1975 black females would have earned, on the average, 61 percent of the majority male average earnings if they had possessed work-related characteristics similar to those of majority males.

related characteristics. There is less progress if we look at per capita income on the basis of households: on that measure, all four minorities earn only about half the salaries of Anglo males. Women and female-headed households fare much worse; there is simply no case for progress at all, except a mild improvement for black women. Even when the work-related characteristics are controlled, women do badly—and worse than before. Whatever else the fabled American melting pot can do, it does not yet melt women. And it is accepting minority women even less readily than it did sixteen years ago.

But medians and means tell only part of the story. The two ends, top and bottom, of the income distribution curves for minorities may be very different indeed. Wilson argues that, for black people, both the top of the curve and the bottom are rather strange, and findings from the U.S. Civil Rights Commission bear him out. College-educated black men very nearly match (80%) the earnings of comparable Anglos, but college-educated black women reach only 65 percent of the earnings of college-educated Anglo men. Other minorities do much

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worse. College-educated Indian and Hispanic men and Mexican American women fall somewhere in between the "observed" and "hypothetical" ratios (reported in Table 1A and 1C). College-educated Puerto Rican and Indian women do very badly—and it must be remembered that even black men and Chicano women (the highest achieving) were only a third as likely to complete college as are Anglo men.[35] The top 10 percent of the minority earners thus earn notably less than the top 10 percent of the Anglo wage earners.[36]

At the bottom end, it is enough to say that minority families are from two to five times as likely as Anglo families to be living in poverty.[37] Here the figures rapidly become meaningless, because a number of state and federal supportive measures build an income "floor" high enough so that minority poor are not significantly poorer than Anglos.

Minorities and Classes: Some Special Issues

Unfortunately, these aggregate measures tell us very little about the processes that affect the subgroups of people who reach certain occupations and use the income. And, of course, it has little to do with the experience of these people. What, then, is the impact on American minorities and on American society?

ELITES: THE NEGLECTED THEME

Even coupling the word *elite* with the word *minority* sounds like a bad joke. American experiments in appointing black men and women to high offices are hesitant and trivial: every appointment is still a "first" and something remarkable, and such appointments rarely go to the still largely unknown and untried Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans. Black appointments usually symbolize the growing importance of minorities (at least of blacks) to the fortunes of major political parties. In the corporate world, the alleged new movement toward corporate responsibility has produced almost nothing. In 1976 a study of five thousand positions on boards of directors or positions of authority showed only fifteen blacks, a tiny number indeed, but a substantial increase from an unbelievable *two* persons in 1970. This study did not try to measure the Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, or Indians in positions of national leadership, although there are very few.[38]

But behind this dismal picture there are some interesting changes. Blacks listed in *Who's Who in America* in 1924-25 and in 1974-75 show a very great change (no other minority was studied). The earlier base of achievement was a castelike black subsystem of segregated churches, colleges, and universities. After fifty years, the *Who's Who* listings show greater participation in national organizations.[39] But these listings still are peculiar: entertainers and sports figures account for almost a third of the black achievers in the 1970s. There is little relationship to national leadership, for black leaders are largely symbolic. Unless such celebrity is converted to another kind of achievement (such as Jackie Robinson's), it is transient and even somewhat questionable.[40]

In the lower, but still important, policy-making positions of the federal civil service (grades 14 to 18), minorities (blacks) were less grossly underrepresented.

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Social welfare bureaucracies have 6.6 percent black leaders. But in other bureaucracies, blacks were only 2.7 percent.[41] This rather peculiar distribution of policy-making blacks should be remembered in considering their much larger presence in local government elites. The black mayor is a phenomenon of the 1970s, along with the "black politician class."[42] Yet demographic shifts of blacks to the cities do not quite explain the increase in black elected officials. Few of the cities with black mayors have populations that are more than half black. Nor is the black electorate growing very rapidly, even after the mobilization of the civil rights movement of the 1960s; black voter participation dropped drastically in the North and West between 1964 and 1976.[43]

To follow the mystery of the black mayors a bit farther: many of the cities with black mayors are "distressed"—a bit of urbanist jargon summarizing the more obvious signals of deterioration. These include fiscal problems, many of them caused by the need to provide more public service at higher costs against a fixed or even declining local resource base.[44] Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see the new black politician class as a move toward some kind of vague community control. The old-fashioned organized political party has given way to a set of bureaucracies that are quite dependent on federal politics.[45] Black politicians must not only find substitutes for strong local power bases, but also usually lack strong bases with local white-controlled corporate powers. Many of these cities have "weak mayor" institutions, and thus the political problems of the mayors may be severe.[46] In sum, the new black politician class, especially in troubled cities, is a sad reminder of some of the more cynical black prophets of the 1960s: "The immediate authority is loyalist Black, and the ultimate authority is the white. . . . The Government will allow community control, as long as it determines the framework, philosophy, hiring policies and finances."[47]

Even if the black political elite is thin, no other minority has approached even this level of electoral leadership in local government. A few Puerto Ricans are visible in the New York metropolitan area, but they have gathered virtually no political strength anywhere else, even in Chicago, where their numbers are considerable. Native Americans are invisible in urban politics.

The pattern for Chicanos is rather different because of their historical roots. In certain parts of the nation they were not even outsiders. Rather, as in New Mexico, the peculiarities of the Anglo conquest gave upper-status Hispanics political visibility on the state and local levels. Not only do they elect many local officials in the more obscure counties of New Mexico, but they continue to be represented on the state level as well. In other states, especially California, political representation was never restored after the conquest. Even by 1980 the vast Chicano population of Los Angeles had no elected representation at the city or county level, and very little in the state legislature. Chicano urban politics in California started in the environment of progressive "nonpartisan" reforms, a style that tended to work against the development of the machine-style politics typical of Eastern cities. In the late 1970s the large number of foreign-born Mexicans also clouded the political picture.

It is yet too early, even in 1980, for the black political elite to represent much more than a platform for rhetoric. This is also probably true for the Puerto Ricans. Chicano elites are in a far more equivocal position. Many remnants of

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the old colonial forms, including the colonial exclusion, still bedevil the few political elite.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES: BITTER CONTROVERSY

Minority middle-class citizens always face two sharp dilemmas: first, individual attainments may be at the expense of the poor masses of their own group; second, they may either ally with, or dissociate themselves from, minority causes. Nearly every person in the minority elite shows some kind of conflict or estrangement over the problem of identification. The two Hispanic groups were blessed (or cursed) with a strong middle class already in place. Each traced its growth to the early colonialism of the Spanish conquest, and neither doubted its superiority to the *peones*, an opinion generally shared by the incoming Anglo conquerors. One of the long-standing consequences was a pattern for social acceptability by the dominant Anglos that for a century kept upwardly mobile Texas and California Chicanos resolutely claiming "pure" Spanish ancestry.

Neither the blacks nor the Native Americans could gain acceptance through such social fictions, nor could more than a handful pass as white. For both, the dominating passion was a desire not to be confused with lower-class people having lower-class traits. The pervasive context of race prejudice even in 1899 prompted W. E. B. DuBois to write, "As a class they feel strongly the centrifugal forces of class repulsion among their own people, and, indeed, are compelled to feel it in sheer self defense. . . . They shrink from all such display as will expose them to the veiled insult and deprivation which the masses suffer."[48] A similar Indian pattern often involved a middle class deeply involved with the administration of Indian lands. Often it led to patterns of intermarriage.[49] By the 1950s, E. Franklin Frazier saw the "black bourgeoisie" as people who lived in a world of make-believe, struggling for status in a segregated and artificial "Society" based on nothing more substantial than "the crumbs of philanthropy, the salaries of public servants, and what could be squeezed from the meager earnings of Negro workers."[50] This was a caricature of the white society from which they were barred, but to which this quasi-middle-class black community yearned to belong. Frazier's vivid portrayal of this fantasy world enraged many American blacks.[51]

The life-styles of the black, Puerto Rican, Chicanos, and Indian bourgeoisie no longer much interest social scientists. The "social whirl" may persist, but its symbolic meaning has declined significantly since the middle of the 1960s. At least in part, this is a result of the civil rights movement, which emphasized racial solidarity across class lines. At least in its black version, many middle-class people worked in the front lines. For blacks (and also to a somewhat lesser extent for Chicanos), the movement consciously attempted to legitimate stereotyped lower-class physical and cultural attributes. Thus class distinctions lost some of their nastiest edges. By 1980 it was less necessary for the middle class to dissociate itself from the lower classes.

But the controversy has shifted elsewhere. The new question is whether discrimination and institutionalized racism remain viable diagnoses of the acknowledged problems of minorities. The fury generated by Frazier started all

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over again with Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race*. Wilson puts the question simply enough: Do Americans discriminate against blacks—or is it that they simply discriminate against lower-class people? He argues that in our contemporary industrial society, the overt and explicit efforts by whites to subjugate blacks do not really account for the lack of black progress. In essence, he argues that black work-related characteristics and the segmented labor market together limit black access. Wilson does not deal with the racism built into the schools and the housing segregation that generate and preserve these work-related characteristics. Nor does he acknowledge the remaining income disparities suffered by middle-class as well as lower-class blacks.[52]

Much of the controversy over Wilson's book turns on his unwillingness to accept affirmative action as the major factor in black progress. Wilson implies that, since college-educated blacks earn incomes close to that of whites, "benign neglect" would not affect their progress. For Wilson, affirmative action is only one factor. Other experts argue that affirmative action is the *sine qua non*, and they see Wilson's arguments as jeopardizing not only affirmative action programs, but also policy decisions designed to help the poor of the inner city. It may be true that government policies of the 1960s helped black and Hispanic middle classes more than they helped the poor (a charge hotly disputed by Sar Levitan and others).[53] Yet, some real aid was received by the poor. Its importance is obscured by Wilson's argument just at a time when market solutions to poverty have become political orthodoxy.

Wilson's argument has its own little twist. He fails to note that a major portion of black middle-class attainment rests on middle-class occupations that involve service to the poor—presumably the black poor. By 1976 almost 54 percent of all black professionals, administrators, and technicians were working for the government, mostly on the state and local level. Almost all of these jobs were in education, social welfare, housing, health, and community development.[54] Education accounts for 32.2 percent of all such jobs, more than any other category. This is a very large increase since 1960, both in the numbers involved and also in the concentration in public social welfare work.

There is good reason to believe that the base of other minorities is much the same. The *Trabajadores de la Raza* are the Hispanic counterpart of the National Association of Black Social Workers, and very nearly as old. Almost ten thousand Hispanic professionals are working in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's Title VII bilingual education programs.

The criminal justice system also is becoming a major source of professional jobs for minorities, at the same time that the proportion of minorities in the prisons is increasing: minorities have begun to get jobs as police and probation officers, correctional guards, and parole officers. The minority stake in this billion-dollar "growth industry" is increasing. Taxpayer revolts that threaten the welfare bureaucracies do not threaten the criminal justice system. Criminal justice jobs increased by 59 percent between 1965 and 1976 as new prisons were built in the third great wave of prison-building in the United States.[55]

In earlier days, new ethnic groups used the urban political machines for movement into the class system—a famous example is the Irish policeman. But Steven Erie sees the new minority "welfare economy" as a distinctly different way of using the local political system. There may be more payoff in terms of

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jobs, but there is far less overall control. Clients get their favors from an impersonal bureaucracy that happens to be staffed by fellow minority group members rather than local wardheelers. It is funded in the state capital or in Washington, and local minority bureaucrats have no influence at that level. Erie thinks this remote-control effect explains the lowered voting rates of minority citizens in recent years.[56]

Minority businesses usually have a small and shaky minority foundation. Black and Hispanic business enterprise traditionally has built on the special tastes and needs of a community and on the existence of segregation itself. Some small Chicano food enterprises have grown into large and successful corporations, but most such opportunities have been preempted by earlier arrivals. Mom-and-Pop *tiendas* and restaurants survive in many ethnic enclaves from the South Bronx to East Los Angeles, but small enterprises are hard-pressed to compete with fast-food chains and supermarkets. The decline of the black-owned insurance companies is a cautionary tale. Thirteen of the thirty-eight black insurance companies founded before 1940 and doing business in 1944 disappeared by 1975 and must be presumed defunct. Their dependence on small policies made them fatally less efficient than large companies.[57]

Overall, then, middle-class status attainments are tenuous. The fragility of this base (affirmative action and fellow ethnics) is easily overestimated in the glow of new accomplishment. And unfortunately, this base is deeply intertwined with government and politics, and is thus vulnerable both to the winds of changing policy and the willingness of the general population to pay substantial taxes. In some ways it is narrower than before: in their time, Irish policemen and Italian sanitation workers served the entire city. It is more common now for minority workers to serve minority areas. The last change is very slow and paradoxical: as minorities increasingly are identified with the big city itself, the cities are beginning to be seen as minority places.

The American Underclass: Is It a Proletariat?

The word *proletariat* derived from the Latin *proles*, "offspring." In Roman society it was the class "regarded as contributing nothing to the state except offspring."[58] "Underclass" is a trendy term for an ancient concept and now describes people who are marginal to the labor force, who move in and out of dead-end jobs, and may live on income generated through transfer payments. They make up a surplus labor force that (unlike the reserves of teenagers and the second-earner women) is a kind of community, bounded either by its position at the bottom or margins of the economy, and in America, by virtue of the bonds of ethnicity or race. Because of race, they are also unacceptable, and thus disqualified to work for some employers.[59]

The important connotation in both "underclass" and "proletariat" is the idea of permanency. The dual labor market implies such a permanence. Unskilled, but hardworking, "peasants" are recruited by urban employers (and by institutional brokers like the Bureau of Indian Affairs) who need docile labor for dead-end jobs, where every tiny margin of profit can be squeezed out of the worker by evading normal benefit payments and paying substandard wages. Some of these workers are sojourners and will return home—to Mexico, rural

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Texas, Puerto Rico, small Southern towns, and the reservations—but many or even most will remain in the city.[60] Their children often do miserably in the inadequate central city schools. They drop out, and may be functionally illiterate even after ten years of school. They find themselves unqualified for jobs in an increasingly demanding, credential-inflated, core-sector labor market. They are resentful and unwilling to take the "slave jobs" held by their parents until they are well into their thirties or even forties.

Some of these second-generation children will make their way into core-sector jobs, often through family connections with unionized trades like upholstery and meat-cutting, which at one time were open to Chicanos in such cities as Los Angeles. Or there may be public help in the form of carefully designed employment and training programs. Others will accept the slave jobs of their parents. There are, however, some successes in the secondary labor market. Yet, careful examination shows how very limited are the "good" jobs. And perhaps more important, there is always an endless supply of docile first-generation immigrants.

Of the groups considered here, only the Mexicans have "undocumented" immigrants among their newcomers. There has been a substantial attempt to get American policymakers to think of such immigrants as an "external proletariat" that goes home to villages in Mexico. The worker is pictured as a normal young male venturing forth into American markets in search of wages.[61] It is true that most of those deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service fit this profile. Such men are highly visible in their jobs in the car washes and restaurants of the Southwest and in the huge chain hotels. But there is also good evidence that the undocumented include many women, some of them the huge army of unnoticed and uncounted maids in private homes. There are also many families, and people of a wide range of ages and skills.[62] The process of proletarianization is not the least bit speculative for many of these people. A 1975 Texas law debars education at public expense for the children of undocumented aliens unless they pay tuition—in Houston, a prohibitive $172 per month. Although the law is under heavy assault from some civil rights groups, in 1980 approximately one hundred thousand children were kept out of the public school system.[63] The children of a notably familistic population are being pushed into an inevitable proletarian future. The idea that low-wage Mexicans "go home to Mexico for Christmas" was popular in California in the 1920s, and is an interesting way of allowing society (and the practical men of the county governments) to deny the reality of the millions of Mexican Americans living permanently in their midst.

Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, and Indian newcomers tend to live close to their compatriots in relatively clear-cut urban enclaves. Second-generation young men gather in groups and give themselves emotional and psychological support in a defeating world. The street life-style that develops has been semi-institutionalized in metropolitan barrios and ghettos throughout the nation. The gangs have existed in some areas since the 1920s and in other areas are just beginning. It is a life-style that provides opportunities for income through the illegal sale of drugs and narcotics, petty gambling, or other victimless crimes. At home, it is possible to survive in the tripartite economy—occasional jobs in the secondary labor market, unemployment benefits or welfare, or both, and

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illegal marketing—from which they and other people in the household draw income.

But this street life-style does not necessarily mean one is an outcast or rebel. Black gang boys in Chicago help their mothers at home far more than white gang boys.[64] Chicano gang boys also tend to be integrated into family and community networks. This interaction with the "square" community was fundamental to much of the self-help activity among minority prisoners in the early 1960s and 1970s, and its pervasiveness buttressed much of the community and family support for the community-based gang and ex-prisoner programs during the same period. In the minority ghettos and barrios, the ambivalence toward problem youngsters is not that of the romantic for "rebels," nor is it a tolerance for deviants. It is simply that, statistically, so many respectable, traditional, religious, first-generation black, Mexican, and Puerto Rican families have such sons. Further, even though their personal and network resources are considerably depleted by repeated trips to prison, many of these boys do settle down ultimately to more or less conventional life-styles.[65]

The problems of the second generation repeat in subsequent generations. It becomes more and more difficult to sustain the sense of morale in a minority community, the sense that degradation has not overtaken the community. The feeling of being an underclass grows, both internally and externally. Ironically, it is more difficult to sustain morale if the new workers entering a community differ from the existing minority population, as, for example, when black neighborhoods in New York must also accommodate Puerto Rican and Dominican immigrants. To the old residents—the immigrants from the rural South—the community appears to be deteriorating. The newcomers do not at all resemble themselves when they were new and young. But in the barrios of East Los Angeles, the flow of new Mexican workers from Mexico confirms the sense of worth of the old workers and the validity of their demands upon their children. Mainland Puerto Ricans probably keep up their morale both by virtue of the influx of "new" Puerto Ricans and by substantial visiting and return migration.

It is also in the lower levels of the American class system that female-headed households begin to be significant. Writers on class are quite reasonably accused of providing a "theory of white males." There always have been more black women in the labor force than other minority women, but, ironically, other groups are catching up. (More than half of the black women in this nation worked in 1977, compared with 47.4% of the white women.) More important, when one talks about "the American poverty class," to a large extent one is talking about households headed by women.[66] In 1976 women headed one quarter of the poor Native American households and a third of the poor black households.[67] Some critics argue that these statistics are spurious and that the males are concealed.[68] But it is still true that female-headed households are far more likely to be poor, and this is especially true of minority households. More precisely, minority female households are five times more likely to be poor than Anglo households.[69] Furthermore, as noted in Table 1, minority women did not make many gains during the last twenty years. It is some small comfort that, as some studies suggest, there is more barter economy in female Puerto Rican

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and black households than the average minority household with a male head. Possibly female adaptation to the underclass is quite different from that of men. This, in turn, has some unexplored implications about the long-standing controversy over the effects of life in a female-headed household.[70]

The Meaning of Class and Race

It is ironic that the great diversity of American minorities is just now beginning to be noticed—just as their cultures and diversity are beginning to be lost in the urban industrial world that has characterized America since World War II. Their fate is now inextricably linked both to that industrial world and to the cities themselves. An immigrant history becomes an industrial, urban history, modified more or less by federal and local actions and by the economic climate for the urban industrial base. The real architect of the minority underclass, the marginal employer, will surely continue to import docile, cheap labor. The children of these workers will perpetuate themselves, being changed only in small numbers by the same crippled and inept institutions. This may be an unpleasant prospect, but then, nothing useful is gained by pretending, either in academia or in Washington, that the traditional ladders of a mythic past continue to work.

The euphoria generated during the 1960s and the early 1970s emerged from a sense of progress. Progress meant both movement out of traditionally oppressive places in society and frontal attacks on the agents of traditional oppression. Chicano farm workers thought of the farm worker movement as an economic struggle. Its other Chicano and Anglo supporters usually thought of it as a status struggle against traditional oppression, like the black civil rights struggle in the South and the militant Native American reawakening. But once these movements ran up against the tough bastions of the central city, they began to run out of steam—and, just as important, out of support from nonminority sympathizers. For themselves, minorities see the struggle in the cities as critical. The victories to date are so valuable, however, that the present minority agenda is simply to continue that battle and consolidate that apparent progress.

Interestingly, nostalgia for the old lost places is still important. Indians and Puerto Ricans particularly are nostalgic for what has been lost by the migration away from "home." If the social and economic oppression is alleviated and the "New South" becomes something more than a public relations expression, if the reservations could become self-sustaining, if Puerto Rico could hire its own natives, if Mexico could channel its natural resources efficiently enough to sustain a reasonable standard of living, if the rural Southwest could overcome generations of discrimination and limited local opportunities—then there might be less deadly certainty about the issue of these four minorities in the American class system. Those who wished to live in their homes could do so—and with decency.

The truth is that the notion of regenerating the traditional places is nothing much more than daydreaming. It is the urban, industrial world that is the future locale for most American minorities. In turn, they will become a

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numerical majority in many cities. To the extent that the industrial and institutional bases of those settings can be restructured, there is reason to hope. If they continue unchanged, the prospect is not encouraging.

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[1]The "biracialist assumption," often noted in discussions among Hispanics, is so labeled by Clara Rodriguez from a Puerto Rican point of view. *The Ethnic Queue in the U.S.: The Case of the Puerto Ricans* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1974). Margo Conk (personal communication) notes: "The history of racial classification in the census goes back to the Three Fifths Compromise, which mandated that slaves be counted separately from free people for legislative apportionment in Congress. Questions on place of birth were added in 1850; in 1890, a question on the respondents' ability to speak English was added, and was modified by 1920 to include a question on 'mother tongue.' The purpose of all of these questions was to separate the population into white and nonwhite, and native white and foreign white populations. Any smaller group which did not fit into these gross distinctions was forced into one or another category. The bureau invented 'other colored' in 1890, which came to include Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans (1930 only), Korean, Filipinos, and Hindus (1930). See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population and Housing Inquiries in the U.S. Decennial Census*, 1790–1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); Leon Truesdell, *The Development of Punch Card Tabulation in the Bureau of the Census*, 1890–1940 (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965)." The erratic history of Hispanic identifiers is discussed in *Cuantos Somos: A Demographic Study of the Mexican-American Population*, Charles H. Teller, et al. (eds.) (Austin: University of Texas, Center for Mexican American Studies, 1977).

[2]As discussed by Jessie Bernard in *Sociology of Community* (Glenview, Ill.: Foresman, 1973). This is, of course, in ironic contrast to the Marxian view that class distinctions are inherently conflictful.

[3]W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social System of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945). See Beverly and Otis Dudley Duncan, "*Minorities and the Process of Stratification*," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (June 1968): 356-64; David Featherman, "The Socio-Economic Achievement of White Religio-Ethnic Subgroups," *American Sociological Review*, 36 (April 1971): 207-22; and David Featherman and Robert Hauser, *Opportunity and Change* (New York: Academic Press, 1978) for the documentation of ethnic differences in status attainment. There are anomalies: the "new" Russian (Jewish) origin persons were relatively well off, and "old" Irish-origin persons lag behind, for example.

[4]For an example of this logic: in 1971, 19 percent of nonwhites were poor, with incomes below $3000. The last time that high a proportion of whites was poor was in 1951—twenty years earlier. Thus, the implication goes, it may take nonwhites another twenty years to reach the current poverty level of whites. These time-gap analyses can become very elaborate, and while always interesting analytic devices, they can produce very spurious results for the unwary reader. They do *not* tell us how long it will take for minorities to catch up, just how many years they are behind. For a recent illustration, see Anne Horowitz, "The Pattern and Causes of Changes in White-Nonwhite Income Differences: 1947-1972," in *Patterns of Racial Discrimination: VII Employment and Income*, George M. Von Furstenberg, et al. (eds.) (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974).

[5]This tradition includes works such as Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965); Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Joan W. Moore, "Internal Colonialism; The Case of the Mexican Americans," *Social Problems*, 17 (Spring 1970): 463-72; Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Edward Murguia, *Assimilation, Colonialism, and the Mexican American People* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975); Mario Berrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); William Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). See Joan W. Moore, "American Minorities and 'New Nation' Perspectives," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 19 (October, 1976): 447–67, for a critique.

[6]See Thomas Sowell, "Ethnicity in a Changing America," *Daedalus*, Winter, 1978, pp. 213-38; Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975); and Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination* (New York: Basic Books, 1975) for variations on this theme.

[7]This section was developed from materials prepared by Pauli Taylor-Boyd.

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[8]Estelle Fuchs and Robert J. Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth: American Indian Education* (New York: Anchor Books, 1972); Alan L. Sorkin, *The Urban American Indian* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1978); Joseph H. Stauss and Lawrence Clinton, "The Bureau of Indian Affairs, Adult Vocational Training Program: Success, by Whose Criteria?" in *Chicanos and Native Americans: The Territorial Minorities*, Rudolph O. de la Garza (ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972). Samuel Stanley and Robert K. Thomas, "Current Social and Demographic Trends among North American Indians," in *Annals*, 436 (March, 1978); 111-20. For New York, B. Hawk, personal communication.

[9]Antonia Pantoja, "Puerto Rican Migration," cited in Rodriguez, *The Ethnic Queue*, pp. 74-75.

[10]See Joan W. Moore, *Mexican Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1975).

[11]See Richard L. Morrill and O. Fred Donaldson, "Geographical Perspectives on the History of Black America," in *Black America: Geographic Perspectives*, Robert T. Ernst and Lawrence Hugg (eds.) (New York: Anchor Books, 1976); and Thomas A. Clark, *Blacks in Suburbs* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1979).

[12]Harold M. Rose, "The Origin and Pattern of Development of Urban Black Social Areas," in Ernst and Hugg, *Black America*.

[13]Suburbanization of blacks is dealt with in Clark, *Blacks in Suburbs*; Harold M. Rose, *Black Suburbanization: Access to Improved Quality of Life or Maintenance of the Status Quo?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976); and Robert W. Lake, "Racial Transition and Black Homeownership in American Suburbs," in *Annals*, 441 (January 1979): 142-56.

[14]See Moore, *Mexican Americans*.

[15]Bennett Harrison and Edward Hill, "The Changing Structure of Jobs in Older and Younger Cities," in *Central City Economic Development*, Benjamin Chinitz (ed.) (Cambridge, Mass: Abt Books, 1979); B. L. Weinstein testimony in "Regional Impact of Current Recession," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fiscal and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, October 16, 1979.

[16]Alfred J. Watkins and David C. Perry, "Regional Change and the Impact of Uneven Urban Development," in *The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities*, David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (eds.) (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1977). See also Kirkpatrick Sale, *Power Shift* (New York: Vintage, 1975), esp. pp. 46–48; and George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes (eds.), *Post-Industrial America: Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1976).

[17]Watkins and Perry, "Regional Change."

[18]William Grigsby et al. (eds.), *Re-Thinking Housing and Community Development Policy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), p. 67ff.

[19]Bennett Harrison, *Urban Economic Development: Suburbanization, Minority Opportunity and the Condition of the Central City* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1974), p. 27ff.

[20]Charlotte Fremon argues that the new central city jobs were being taken by commuters from the suburbs: *Central City and Suburban Unemployment Growth* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute), cited in Harrison, Ibid.

[21]Franklin James, "Recession and Recovery in Urban Economics," unpublished paper cited in Grigsby et al. (eds.), *Re-Thinking Housing*.

[22]Ibid., p. 128.

[23]Denis F. Johnston, "The U.S. Labor Force in a Changing Economy: Implications for Manpower Policy and Research," in *Manpower Research and Labor Economics*, Gordon I. Swanson and Jon Michaelson (eds.) (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1979).

[24]Marcia Freedman, "The Competition for Good Jobs," unpublished ms., 1979, p. 3.

[25]Johnston, "The U.S. Labor Force."

[26]William Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Between 1960 and 1970 government workers increased from 15.4 percent to 17.7 percent of the labor force, with a peak in 1975 of 19.1 percent and a slight decline by 1978 to 18.4 percent. These figures are drawn from Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly *Employment and Earnings* reports, summarized in *Statistical Abstracts*, pp. 412-16, and differ slightly from those utilized by Wilson, though they show the same trends. Reference 41 gives an analysis of the minority patterns in government employment.

[27]As discussed in Chicano Pinto Research Project, *Final Report*, 1979.

[28]Michael Piore, "Conceptualization of Labor Market Reality" in *Manpower Research and Labor Economics*, Swanson and Michaelson (eds.), p. 111. This discussion of the segmented labor market also draws on David Gordon, *Theories of Poverty and Underemployment* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972); and Marcia Freedman, *Labor Markets: Segments and Shelters* (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1976).

[29]Larry H. Long in "Reply to Norton," *American Sociological Review*, 44 (February, 1979): 179-81, cites half a dozen statistical studies of this "generational" pattern and a handful of attitudinal ones.

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[30]Steven P. Erie and Michael K. Brown, "Social Policy and the Emergence of the Black Social Welfare Economy," paper presented at National Conference for Public Administration, 1979.

[31]Wilson, *Declining Significance of Race*, p. 110.

[32]For the barrios, see Joan W. Moore et al., *Homeboys: Gangs, Drugs and Prison in the Barrios of Los Angeles* (Philadelphia: Temple Univerity Press, 1978). For the ghetto, see Bettylou Valentine, *Hustling and Other Hard Work* (New York: The Free Press, 1978).

[33]The researchers used a multiple regression technique by which mean values for majority males on each of the six salient variables (educational attainment, prestige score for the occupation, mean income for the worker's state, number of weeks worked during the preceding year, number of hours worked in the week preceding the census date of April 1, and age) were substituted for the observed value of each variable, retaining the "minority coefficient" (or b value) for each variable in the equation. Appendix B. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators*.

[34]Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968) p. 70.

[35]Thus the college completion ratios were as follow: black males 0.32; Mexican American males 0.32; Puerto Rican males 0.18; American Indian/Alaskan Native males 0.24; black females 0.32; Mexican American females 0.15; Puerto Rican females 0.12; American Indian/Alaskan Native females 0.12; majority females 0.65. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators*, p. 14.

[36]A. Wohlstetter and S. Coleman, "Race Differences in Income," in *Racial Discrimination in Economic Life*. A. Pascal (ed.) (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1972), cited in Anne Horowitz. "The Pattern and Causes of Changes in White-Nonwhite Income Differences: 1947-1972," in *Patterns of Racial Discrimination*, George M. Von Furstenberg et al. (eds.).

[37]Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators*, p. 62.

[38]Thomas R. Dye in *Who's Running America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979) studied the one hundred largest corporations in each epoch, the twenty-five largest banks, the twenty largest transportation, utilities, and communications corporations, and the ten largest insurance companies. Blacks appointed to corporate boards in the 1970s were primarily men who were executives of black organizations, e.g., Vernon Jordan of the National Urban League and Vivian W. Henderson, president of Clark College in Atlanta.

[39]Stanley Lieberson and Donna K. Carter, "Making It in America: Differences between Eminent Blacks and White Ethnic Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 44 (June, 1979): 347–66.

[40]One of the more vitriolic attacks on such leaders labels them "eunuch leaders," appointed by whites, members of a leadership that excludes those who can "muster people," i.e., blacks with large followings but lower-class styles of leadership. Nathan Hare, *Black Anglo Saxons* (New York: Collier, 1965).

[41]Michael K. Brown and Steven P. Erie, "Administrative Power and the Black Social Welfare Economy: The Political Legacy of the War on Poverty" (presented at ASPA meetings, 1980). Blacks formed 25.2 percent of the total work force in federal social welfare agencies in 1977, and only 14.6 percent of other agencies. Social welfare agencies include DHEW, DOL, VA, HUD, and CSA.

[42]The phrase is from Martin Kilson, "Blacks and Neo-Ethnicity in America," in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity*, p. 257. The census publication on the social and economic status of blacks notes that the surge in elected black officials (from 103 in 1964 to 3503 in 1975) is the first such surge since Reconstruction (1869-1901). U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical View, 1790-1978*, p. 148. No such surge has appeared for Hispanics.

[43]Erie and Brown, "Social Policy." Black voter participation in the North and West dropped by 16.7 percent, that of whites by 10.4 percent. In the South, black voter participation increased by 4.5 percent, while that of whites declined by 0.6 percent.

[44]Eric L. Stowe, "Urban Issues in the Late 1970s: A Metropolitan Perspective," in *The Need for a National Urban Policy: Occasional Papers in Housing and Community Affairs*, Robert Paul Boynton (ed.), vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development: Office of Policy Development and Research, July 1979), p. 182. Urban fiscal stress varies widely: some states support public social services at a higher level than others; larger and older cities have higher costs by virtue of scale and quality of infrastructure items, e.g., sewers. Western and some Southern cities have been able to alleviate some stress by annexing new revenue-generating territories, but most Northern and Midwestern cities have been hemmed in by suburbs.

[45]Steven P. Erie, "Two Faces of Ethnic Power: Comparing the Irish and Black Experiences," *Polity*, 13 (2) (Winter 1980): 261:84.

[46]Mack Jones, "Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta: Myth and Reality," and Herrington Bryce, et al., "Housing Problems of Black Mayor Cities," *Annals*, 439 (September, 1976); 90-117 and 80-89.

[47]S. E. Anderson, "Revolutionary Black Nationalism and the Pan-African Idea," in *The Black 70s*, Floyd B. Barbour (ed.) (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1970), p. 101.

[48]*The Philadelphia Negro*, p. 177, cited in Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944) p. 1388.

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[49]Stanley and Thomas, "Current Social and Demographic Trends": Murray Wax in *Indian Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971) discusses the "Mixedbloods" who served as middlemen in reservation BIA agencies and whose descendants are some of the urban middle class.

[50]E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p.234.

[51]See, for example, Floyd McKissick's and Oliver Cox's introductions to Nathan Hare's *Black Anglo Saxons*. Cox argues that these caricatures should be seen as "vital solutions to social situations" (p. 19), and McKissick sees them as a "response to the demands of a schizophrenic white society which requires that they think and act white in order to survive but continue to reject them because they are Black" (p. 12).

[52]See *The Caste and Class Controversy*, Charles V. Willie (ed.) (Bayside, N.Y.: General Hall. 1979), especially Charles Paine, "On the Declining—and Increasing—Significance of Race," and Thomas F. Pettigrew, "The Changing—Not Declining—Significance of Race."

[53]Sar Levitan, *The Promise of Greatness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[54]Brown and Erie, "Administrative Power," p. 20.

[55]*Jericho*, 19 (Winter 1979-80): 12. Eight hundred and eighty-four new correctional facilities were under construction or proposed, at an average cost of $7.69 million. *Jericho*, 18 (Fall, 1979): 12.

[56]Erie, "Two Faces of Ethnic Power."

[57]Data on Negro life insurance firms are from Joseph A. Pierce, *Negro Business and Business Education* (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1947), p. 325, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population*, p. 80; data on ownership structure are from p. 78.

[58]*Oxford English Dictionary*.

[59]See Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), esp. p. 215 ff, for a history of this concept. The concept became fuzzier (as Marcia Freedman notes—unpublished ms.) as the term was adopted by mass media writers. It began to connote the "disreputable poor" rather than those struggling for survival, as in the *Time* cover story (August 29, 1977), which embodied Banfield's "lower class" stigma.

[60]There is considerable variation in the rate of return. For the more easily traced Indians, 37 percent of the Navajos who migrated to Los Angeles between 1952 and 1961 were back on the reservation a few years later (Fuchs and Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth*, p. 277). Back-and-forth "sojourns" also characterize the patterns of many urban Indians, Southern-born blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Texas Mexicans. School dropouts also vary widely. One estimate places the Indian dropout rate in some cities as high as 80 percent (Sorkin, *The Urban American Indian*, p. 89).

[61]Thus Daniel Bell (in Glazer and Moynihan, *Ethnicity*, p. 152) use the term "external proletariat" to refer to "large foreign minorities who are at the bottom rungs of the society and are effectively excluded from participation in the political life of the host countries." He is talking about European guest workers, but the concept (and the guest worker analogy) have been utilized heavily in discussions of Mexican undocumented workers, especially by Wayne Cornelius.

[62]M. D. Van Arsdol, Jr., Joan W. Moore, and Susan H. Paulvir, "Social and Labor Force Characteristics of Undocumented Aliens Resident in Los Angeles County," (U.S.C. Population Laboratory, *Final Report*, 1979).

[63]*The New York Times*, March 13, 1980.

[64]James Short and Fred Strodtbeck, *Group Process and Gang Deliquency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[65]This description is drawn from a 1979 study, funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01 DAO 1849–01), the Department of Labor (#21-06-78-18), and the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems, of Chicano "hard core" former gang members, all ex-offenders, and their families. See also Moore, et al., *Homeboys*, chapter 1. Marcia Freedman's "Work and the Underclass" (unpublished manuscript) and Bettylou Valentine's *Hustling and Other Hard Work* have also informed it.

[66]Joan R. Acker, "Women and Stratification: A Case of Intellectual Sexism," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (January, 1973): 936-44.

[67]Special tabulations of the Survey of Income and Education provided through the courtesy of José Hernández.

[68]Thus Bettylou Valentine argues that, because a minimal level of living requires more income than can be provided by welfare (work and hustling supply the missing cash), "women and children help to hide the men" whenever surveys or censuses are taken, to protect the source of income that men represent. *Hustling and Other Hard Work*, p. 124.

[69]U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators*, p. 62.

[70]Carol Stack, *All Our Kin* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), and for Puerto Ricans, Pablo Navarro Hernandez, "The Structure of Puerto Rican Families in a Context of Migration and Poverty: An Ethnographic Description of a Number of Residents in El Barrio, New York City," Ph.D. dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1978.

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